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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the established view of Chelmsford’s 
administration in the light of documentary evidence only recently 
available. It questions such assumptions as that policy originated 
in London, that the Government of India were hostile to change, and 
that Chelmsford was without influence. It is arranged as an analysis 
of policy, describing Chelmsford’s method and its application to 
politics and reform.
The conclusion is that underlying policy there was a 
coherent idea, formulated in India from the Government^ enunciation 
of the goal of Indian self-government within the Empire. The 
Government, it is found, had decided they must begin to resolve the 
contradictions between bureaucracy and Indian advancement, and give 
positive expression to their acceptance of the goal*
Thus, it is shown, the Government worked with collective 
responsibility in consultation with local governments, legislators 
and public - as befitted their changing role. They attacked racial 
discrimination, internal and international, as inappropriate to the 
Indians’ future status. In spite of the dangers of popular activism, 
they evolved a tactic of non-interference with national politicians, 
partly because of an admission that Indian aspirations, if not methods, 
were basically legitimate. They repressed political 'crime' and 
disorders, but saw them as exceptional and as counterproductive to 
Indian progress^ and, though the repressive habit persisted in the 
’Rowlatt’ Act, the 1$>19 atrocities were a local aberration repudiated 
by Chelmsford. Finally, the Government presided over constitutional 
reforms in which they tried for the first time to prepare for a future 
transfer of power.
The thesis recognises different influences on policy, 
limitations to Chelmsford’s vision, the obscurity of his personal 
contribution, and the exceptional unpopularity of his rule. Failures 
are not disputed, but positive achievements are also presented for 
scrutiny. It is suggested that they encompassed a fundamental 
commitment to the future.
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A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
1916 5 April, Lord Chelmsford Viceroy 
April, Tilalc’s Home Rule League formed 
September, Besant’s Home Rule League inaugurated 
24 November, Government of India reforms despatch 
December, Congress-League reforms scheme agreed at Lucknow
1917 March* differential cotton duties
- , unilateral ban on indentured emigration 
April, Gandhi in Champaran
- , Indian members in Imperial War Conference and Cabinet 
May, Chelmsford endorses demand for policy declaration
15 June, Besant and associates interned 
20 July, Edwin Montagu Secretary of State
2 August, Cabinet accepts King’s Commissions for Indians 
8 August, Chelmsford declares policy declaration ’imperative’ 
20 August, Montagu Declaration promises responsible government 
September, HIndu-Muslim riots in Shahabad, Bihar
17 September, Besant released
19 September, O ’Dwyer forced to apologise to Imperial 
legislature 
19 October, India, Office reforms despatch 
10 November, Montagu arrives in India 
10 December, Rowlatt's Sedition Committee appointed
1918 January, heads of government’s conference
27 March, Home Rule deputation refused passports 
April, Rowlatt Committee reports
- , Montagu leaves with Montagu-Chelmsford report
- , Delhi War Conference
16 April, Home Department restricts use of Defence of India Ac 
June, Central Publicity Board formed
8 July, Montagu-Chelmsford Report published
1919 Llewellyn Smith’s Secretariat Committee formed and reports 
January, five governors agree on their own reforms scheme 
6 February, Rowlatt bills introduced
30 March, riot in Delhi
6 April, Gandhi calls hartal in Rowlatt protest
8 April, Chelmsford orders firm but sympathetic policy
9 April, Kitchlew and Satyapal deported from Amritsar
10 April, firing in Lahore
13 April, Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar massacre by Dyer 
15 April, martial law orders in the Panjab
18 April, Gandhi suspends civil disobedience 
5 May, war with Afghanistan
14 May, Cabinet approves introduction of reforms bill 
September, Indian Arms Amendment, and Indemnity, Acts 
October, Hunter's Disorders Inquiry Committee appointed
15 October, all restrictions on Gandhi lifted
23 December, Government of India Act receives royal assent
1920 March, Gandhi'calls hartal in Khilafat protest 
May, harsh peace terms offered to Turkey
26 May, Hunter Committee Report published
28 May, Central Khilafat Committee adopts non-cooperation 
July, Hijrat movement
19 October, Gandhi’s arrest considered after Lucknow speech 
November, government proclamation on non-interference
61921 January, Nagpur Congress
- , reforms scheme operative
- , disturbances in Rai Bareli
March, Home Department urges local prosecutions of 
agitators 
2 April, Lord Reading Viceroy
PART ONE CONSULTATION
Chapter 1. The System
Lord Chelmsford arrived in India when the world was at
war| he left as the subcontinent faced internal disruption. In India
the war and its aftermath had brought a few people wealth, confidence 
and ambition5 to many more it had brought hardship and disease.
India had lost much and been promised much. Chelmsford had to remedy 
the deprivation and redeem the promises. He sought change, and was 
overtaken by it. He had to govern in the years when the war seemed 
long, and in those, after the war, when the rewards seemed small.
His viceroyalty saw the worst disturbances since the Mutiny,
and perhaps the most important new direction in the history of the 
British Indian constitution. His name was associated with repression 
of a brutality unprecedented in British times, and with a report which 
rivals that of Durham in its contribution to Commonwealth evolution. 
Under Chelmsford the British recognised that India's future belonged 
to the Indians, and ensured that its present remained firmly in 
British hands. Probably no earlier period had seen such rapid shifts 
in the British position, but perhaps never before was that position 
so rigorously challenged, Chelmsford's five years coincided almost 
exactly with the period in which national leadership was assumed by 
Mahatma Gandhi. In Chelmsford’s time the Indian National Congress 
and the nationalist movement as a whole changed almost beyond 
recognition. They emerged with new weapons - not only Gandhi's 
satyagraha, but the Home Rule Leagues1 powers of popular appeal and 
permanent concerted oppositionj not only a new discipline within 
the Congress, but an unparalleled cooperation with the Muslim League; 
not only powerful slogans and ideals, but a fusion of religion and 
politics and a common cause in demanding swaraj. Change, readjust­
ment, instability, progress were the hall-marks of this viceroyalty. 
Under Chelmsford the coitrse of British history in India was altered.
On all sides we are told that the alteration had nothing to 
do with Lord Chelmsford. Leading Indian and British scholars have 
been unanimous on this point. R.C. Majumdar has told us that 
'Chelmsford cannot be regarded as an able administrator or a 
successful Viceroy in any sense. He lacked personality and 
independence of judgment and was more or less a tool in the hands 
of the bureaucracy1. Percival Spear has claimed that Chelmsford 'was 
more nearly an agent, and less of a policy-maker than any other 
Viceroy in the last period of British Rule’. Chelmsford's colleagues
9have "been almost alone in having any doubts. Edwin Montagu, often
grudging in his assessment, told Chelmsford he would be 'one of
India's foremost Viceroys'. In 1921 the official Moral and Material
Progress Report enumerated the achievements of the viceroyalty, and
stated that, by the end of Chelmsford's term,
India's future within the Empire no longer remained 
undefined; she could look forward to Responsible 
Government as an entity of Dominion status. She was 
actually operating a progressive scheme leading directly 
to Self-Government, a scheme holding out before her 
infinite possibilities of advancement. In token of her 
changed position, many of those anomalies which aroused 
such bitter feeling had been removed. The racial stigma 
was gone from the Arms Act. Indian soldiers were holding 
King's Commissions. Indian youths were being trained for 
Sandhurst .... In industrial and educational spheres, 
steady and substantial progress had been achieved, while 
local self-government had made notable advances, In brief, 
as a result of the labours of Lord Chelmsford and his 
Government ,„., the face of India was changed in half 
a decade.,
The Report had summed up Chelmsford's contribution thus; 'To few
Governors-General has it been given to accomplish so much towards
the enduring wTelfare of their great charge; to fewer yet has the
1
need of praise and appreciation been so scantily rendered'
The latter remains true* the contemporary vilification has 
run deep. And it continues on the original basis - a discounting of 
Chelmsford's role as a reformer, accompanied by a sense of abhorrence 
at the repression in the Panjab during the disturbances of 1915• Thus 
Sachcbidananda Bhattaoharya, In his Dictionary of Indian History, 
may not be accurate in all debails, but certainly the entry on 
Chelmsford sums up the orthodox view and demonstrates its basis.
Pirst there is the usual disclaimer; ’Lord Chelmsford had little 
initiative of his own and he had little influence on the framing of 
the Indo-British policy which led to the famous announcement made 
on August 20, 1917 • • Lord Chelmsford also had little to do with
the framing of the Government of India Act, 1919 * =■ » * * After this 
the entry concentrates on the repression in the Panjabs 'Lord 
Chelmsford who was aware of all these enormities did little to stop 
the barbarities ...= failed to repress effectively and immediately
^ R.C., with A.K., Majumdar, edd., The History and Culture of the 
Indian People Vol.XV, Struggle Por Freedom, Bombay 1969? 8? percival 
Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1947; Oxford 1965? 325, 
Montagu to Chelmsford, 1 Jan. 1918? CP4? Moral and Material Progress 
Report, 1921, 54-56. See also The Dictionary of National Biography 
under Thesiger (Chelmsford). Por another favourable view, see the 
Maharaja of Mysore (speech of 2 Dec. 1919) in Speeches II, 346; also 
below, note 44 & pp.256-253, 282 & 310.
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the official criminals, and thus alienated Indo-British feelings
more deeply than any other viceroy since the Sepoy Mutiny*. Such 
concentration on negative elements has meant that the verdicts have 
heen partly emotional. In the Dictionary this is emphasised by some­
thing rather puzzlings Chelmsford is criticised first for having 
done nothing, playing a 'passive part in the dynamic politics of
India*, and then for having created a desperate crisis, handling the
2
political situation 'very clumsily*. The indignation at Chelmsford 
is still partly a product of Indian grief and British shame.
Chelmsford governed in a period of great and fundamental 
change5 the consensus is that he played no part. Chelmsford had to 
meet a major challenge and severe problems 5 the consensus is that he 
handled them badly. It is now time to examine the record* We will 
concentrate on the twin spheres of politics and reform - on precisely 
those spheres, of nationalist agitation and the constitution, on which 
the traditional interpretation has been based. But first we shall 
look at the system within which Chelmsford had to work, and at some 
of the methods he employed.
The system of government in India bore all the traces of a 
mixed evolution. At the top the viceroy ruled, at least in name. On 
one hand he was the sole representative in India of the King-Htaperor,
On the other hand he was a British government nominee, responsible 
to the Secretary of State for India, who was in turn responsible to 
the Cabinet and to Parliament. The Secretary of State was also advised 
by the Council of India, a body of retired dignatories with a few 
suitably anglicised Indians, and assisted by the India Office, a 
branch of the British civil service having no formal link with its 
Indian counterparts. The Viceroy was advised in some, though not all 
matters, by his Executive Council, comprising the Commander-in-Chief, 
who also enjoyed certain independent rights, and a group of officials 
who were each thought of as representing one of the great departments 
of the central government, departments which nevertheless through 
their Secretaries maintained their own independent relationship with 
the Viceroy, departments which, moreover, were each more or less a
Sachchidananda Bhattaoharya, Dictionary of Indian History, 
Calcutta I967, 221-222.
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compendium of diverse interests and responsibilities. Below this 
central structure came a confusion of subordinate authorities. The 
most important were the Presidency Governors of Bengal, Bombay and 
Madras, who with their own Councils exercised sway over semi­
independent empires, theoretically subject to the Viceroy, but usually 
appointed from outside the Indian services and guarding a right of 
independent communication with the Secretary of State. These 
Governors communicated with the Viceroy, as it were, as government 
to government; nevertheless the Government of India was able to 
exercise control, mainly by a right of financial scrutiny and veto.
Beside the Governors stood the Lieutenant-Governors, promoted 
from the Indian Civil Service, and sharing in some cases the 
independence of the Presidency Governors, in others subject to the 
closer control exercised over the next and lesser breed, the Chief 
Commissioners. These were in charge of areas of greatly differing 
importance but were all responsible directly to the Government of 
India. In a not dissimilar situation (except where they dealt with 
local governments) came the multitude of Indian princes and chiefs, 
varying enormously in power, independence and influence, subject to 
a great profusion of treaty rights and obligations. Thereafter, in 
the British system, followed hierarchies of minor officials - 
divisional commissioners, revenue collectors, district officers, 
judges, magistrates, police, medical officers, inspectors of education - 
each organised slightly differently (often with further variations 
between provinces) and subject to the appropriate department of the 
local government. The Government of India or the Viceroy also 
exercised some quite separate powers of supervision at this level - 
over Calcutta University (a legacy from Calcutta's days as the 
capital), over the Anglican church, over the railways, in some 
respects over the judiciary and the revenue collection. In most 
departments, therefore, the Indian services were divided into two 
sections, imperial and provincial, and of all of these the Indian 
Civil Service was the greatest, or at least the most exclusive. The 
system was a distended bureaucracy; its methods autocratic.
But the British had also tried to make this machine the 
vehicle for liberal gestures towards Indians. At one level this had 
meant attempts to include Indians in the bureaucracy through the 
progressive indianisation of the services. To some extent, in so 
far as limited practical power and opportunities for initiative rested 
on district officers and depended upon their diverse enthusiasms, this 
did mean real opportunities for Indians to take over some of the
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affairs of their country. But it was never suggested, that it was 
necessary to change the system and not merely to include Indians in it. 
Yet the system was not only paternalistic in its role and traditions? 
it was paternalistic in its structure - devised for alien administrators 
who were intended to rule (not to advise), combining executive and 
judicial powers, separate, authoritarian. Thus too there was talk of 
giving Indians commissions in the Indian army; but there was no 
suggestion that the army might also have to modify its role as the 
ultimate weapon of an occupying power or its structure as a great 
imperial force, unified with other imperial forces, designed (or was 
it inflated?) as an expensive instrument for imperial policies decided 
in London.
On other levels, it is true, there were attempts which looked 
like the beginnings of modifications in the system. There had been 
high sentiments and rather less noble efforts expended on experiments 
in local self-government, involving Indians to various degrees, though 
seldom in very much responsibility. The local governments were all 
great advocates of the devolution of responsibility, but they usually 
had in mind their own standing vis a vis the Government of India (who 
in turn looked for concessions from the Secretary of State); there was 
less practical enthusiasm for devolution of responsibility to local 
and district boards. More important, legislative councils had been 
tacked on to some governments and were planned for more. But they 
did not really fit into the system, and were often regarded as a 
wilful irrelevancy which twice a year interrupted official business.
They had been improved in size by a series of reforms; the latest of 
these had even made possible non-official majorities. But the numbers 
were tiny; the minority of members who were elected were chosen by 
cumbersome machinery of indirect election, involving a few hundreds 
out of the millions; and the councils had not advanced from their 
original purely advisory role. Of course a few Indians had also been 
included in what were In name the highest posts of government, member­
ships of the Executive Councils. Both these intrusions and the 
handfuls of Indians in the legislatures were in fact to be of enormous 
importance in changing British attitudes, advancing them further than 
the stage which these concessions themselves represented. Wot always - 
perhaps seldom - will real influence strictly follow the lines of formal 
responsibility. But nonetheless the liberal aspects of the Indian 
constitution in 1916 looked like, and in some senses were, a show­
case and a sham.
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Progress had been piece-meal. But the heyday of incoherent 
and often inconsistent expedients was almost over. What was needed 
was a wholesale re-evaluation of the entire system. It had to be re­
designed to fit the liberal purpose which some of the British had long 
professed to be the object of their rule* The new direction had to 
come from the top; and it was too great a task for one man or one 
viceroyalty. But prewar promises and wartime pressures were bringing 
matters to a crucial stage. The process of rationalisation, as yet 
uncomprehended, was already underway. It was inherent (though 
vehemently denied) in Morley and Minto's reforms; they had created 
legislatures which, though strictly advisory in conception, had become 
such self-conscious vehicles for Indian opinion and guardians of 
Indian hopes - all this perhaps in the person of G.K* Gokhale alone - 
that already it was natural that one day they would be replaced by 
responsible parliaments. The same process could be discerned in ideas 
put forward by Chelmsford's predecessor, Lord Hardinge, for future 
remedial measures - even though they were conceived as appeasements 
for Indian opinion and not as a coherent plan to reform Indian 
government. Chelmsford was presented with the increasingly urgent 
need to reconcile the two halves of the system, the apparently 
immovable bureaucracy and the yet unformed democratic alternative.
We shall be considering this dichotomy further, in the specif:e 
context of attitudes to political agitation. Before leaving the topic 
for the moment, however, it is worth remarking that the same division 
may be discerned at the personal level as at the institutional. Thus 
the local governors in Chelmsford's time reflect the contradictions 
we have observed in the system itself. Sir James Meston in the United 
Provinces and Sir George Lloyd in Bombay embodied one impulse, the 
'liberal1; Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Lord Pentland, in the Panjab and 
Madras, embodied the other, the 'conservative'. The remainder fell 
somewhere in between. But we should not assess the division too 
simply. 0 'Dwyer and Pentland were vilified by politicians, but in 
some ways their positions were unexceptionable - Pentland for example 
had opposed further press restrictions in 1914 (on the grounds that 
it would be 'a first-class political blunder' to ascribe to sedition 
something ’due to ignorance') - and their administrative abilities, 
especially in the case of O'Dwyer, and their dedication to India, In 
their own terms, cannot be doubted. It was their perspective that 
was narrow. They were suspicious of change and appreciative of the 
workings of the autocratic system. They had little sympathy with those 
elements in which Indians had begun to count. These men were
14
paternalists, not only in their manner and their instincts, hut in 
the exclusion from their ideas of government of any commitment to 
Indian involvement. When asked why Indians did not participate, they 
replied it was because Indians had no experience. When asked why they 
had 110 experience, they replied it was because they did not participate. 
When asked why this state of affairs was allowed to continue, they 
referred to the virtues of British rule.
Thus this attitude was expressed chiefly during the discussions 
on constitutional reforms. O'Dwyer argued that an elected majority In 
the legislature was out of the question, and begged that at least the 
Panjab should be saved from this fate; Pentland opposed any 
discussions of reforms during the war, objected strongly to the terms 
of the Declaration of 20 August 1917? dissented from his own Council 
in refusing any transfer of responsibility, and obstructed the work of 
the committees set up under Lord Southborough to fill in the details in 
theproposals of Montagu and Chelmsford. But this attitude was not 
confined to the reforms; it affected all aspects of policy - 
determined priorities and the assessment of what was reasonable.
And thus both O ’Dwyer and Pentland were suspicious, even outraged, 
when the politicians made (as they thought) impossible demands, and 
both believed such irresponsible nonsense should be put down with a 
firm hand; both concentrated their attention and bestowed their good 
will on those Indians who supported the status quo or those who were 
inarticulate but acquiescent, and both were dedicated to measures which 
would benefit such people. And it should not be forgotten that In 1916 
these categories undoubtedly comprised the majority of the population, 
and that there was some credibility in the paternalist demand that the 
British must continue to rule as the sole impartial element amongst 
the divisions of Indian society. Indeed, 'liberalism' was no guarantee 
of popularity among Indians. 0 'Dwyer was made the subject of effusive 
and affectionate eulogies during the course of his governorship - until 
the 1919 disturbances he was thought of as a popular administrator, 
and there were public meetings in his support even after the tragedy,
3 Most of this introductory material is discussed in detail later, and 
full references are not given at this stage. Por Pentland's attitude 
to the press, however, see Lady Pentland, The Bight Honourable John 
Sinclair, Lord Pentland, G.C.S.I., A Memoir, London 1928, 242-245; & 
for 0'Dwyer's attitudes, see Sir Michael O'Dwyer, India as I Knew It 
1885-1925? passim.
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There can be no clear division, then, according to the degree 
of commitment to particular policies. Sir James Meston favoured a 
conciliatory approach to agitators and was one of the most important 
positive influences on the Government of India, but he too could adopt 
a conservative stance, as in his early exposition of the impossibility 
of divided responsibility at the provincial level , or his reluctance 
to see the transfer of higher education to Indian control. Again, Lord 
Ronaldshay in Bengal espoused a sympathetic understanding of Bengali 
terrorists, but was perhaps the prime mover in the decision to take 
executive powers to repress them George Lloyd, though sceptical of 
'dyarchy', supported the reforms as a pressing need, yet was luke-warm 
in his advocacy of the complementary policy of non-interference with 
national leaders. Lord Willingdon, in Bombay and then in Madras, by 
and large supported rapid constitutional change, but ho did not 
envisage any diminution of his own Influence; his 'liberalism' was the 
product of a confidence in his ability to lead Indians, not of a 
readiness to step aside. He professed to intend participation, but 
his means were paternalistic: the latter was a contradiction of the 
former, Hot surprisingly, he too favoured a strong line with those 
politicians who demanded more than he offered. Thus attitudes varied: 
what remained the same was the philosophy behind them. It is at this 
point that the line between governors can safely be drawn. Administrate: 
in India came to different conclusions on specific issues, but each had 
a concept of British rule and a view of its purpose. The division was 
between those whose aims (however expressed) were primarily paterna­
listic, and those whose aims were primarily educative. Thus the men 
mirrored the contradictions of the system.
But at the personal level also the contradictions were being 
resolved. It is instructive to look briefly at the appointments made 
under Chelmsford. Ronaldshay replaced the more rigid Lord Carmichael 
in Bengal. Sir Edward Maclagan, a man of more flexible mind, followed 
O'Dwyer in the Panjab. Willingdon replaced Pentland in Madras, and in 
Bombay was himself replaced by Lloyd. Meston, singled out by Chelmsford 
for confidence and advancement, joined the Government of India with a 
special responsibility for reforms. Sir Reginald Craddock, a 
'conservative', was replaced as Home Member by Sir William Vincent, 
who was considered 'persona grata' with Indians; O'Dwyer had been 
considered, but on his own admission was disqualified by his lack of 
rapport with Indian politicians. Finally, Lord Sinha, the first 
Indian governor, replaced Sir Edward Gait in Bihar and Orissa. The 
trend is plain. Increasingly the first criterion for judging
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administrators was not their administrative ability (the qualities of 
the old paternalism) but their attitude to Indians and to constitutional 
reforms. Thus the school of Pentland and O'Dwyer was gradually 
discredited? and central in this process had been their failure to 
adapt to the reforms and to accept the policy of non-interference with 
politicians - the explosion of 1919 delivered the coup de grace. The 
newer men - Lloyd and Ronaldshay, in the tradition of Meston - gained 
in influence, accepted by Government of India and Secretary of State 
as the most articulate, subtle, able and reliable of their subordinates, 
Willingdon on the other hand, though respected, was thought rather 
heavy-handed and old-style in method. His credibility and influence 
declined accordingly - thus he was ruled out of consideration as 
Chelmsford’s successor, an advancement he had rather expected.^
It would be going too far to suggest that this trend in
appointments was smooth or even deliberate. After all Willingdon did
eventually become Viceroy. Moreover it remains ambiguous what even
the most ’liberal' of these appointments, even Sinha's, represented
in the eyes of the government and, equally, of the Indian politicians,
Nonetheless it is true that the trend existed. Indeed it was an
inevitable concomitant of Indian participation that the British would
appoint officials with whom participation would be possible, and it v:aj
unavoidable that a reforming administration would advance those who
agreed on first principles and would support its changes. And of course
Indian participation increased in this periods officials had to be 
♦
appointed who would not only work with Indians, but also accept theem 
as colleagues and equals, be prepared to be outvoted by them, even 
take orders from them. Thus the future had begun to assert itself.
Chelmsford's appointment was also significant. He was 
selected by Asquith as a liberal conservative with a respectable 
proconsular record. He was chosen from among men of his own type, 
and in replacement of Hardinge who had been ruled out for a second 
term because Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State, believed ho 
was becoming impatient of control and feared that an extension of his 
term would lead to 'very unfortunate friction’. Thus to some exten’- 
Chelmsford was thought of as a man who would be easy to work with, 
and who would not create difficulties during the war. But he was 
also to be the Viceroy after the war, and thus, in so far as it was
^ Soe Willingdon to Montague, 7 Feb. 1921, MP21, & Lloyd to Montagu,
24 July 1919, & also 1 & 26 Dec. I9I8 & 25 Jan. & 17 Aug. & 2 Oct. 1919. 
MP24. The appointment of Vincent as Home Member is discussed below, 
at p.78? but see also O'Dwyer to Chelmsford, 27 Aug. 1916, CP17*
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recognised that changes would then he needed, his appointment was 
deliberately as a safe man who could he trusted to he flexible and 
open to ideas hut not to countenance anything drastic or revolutionary," 
And if Chelmsford was to put his name to proposals far beyond what a 
liberal conservative would have allowed himself in 1916, it was not 
that Asquith and Chamberlain had been wrong in their assessment.
Perhaps they had not altogether understood their man, whom neibher of 
them knew personally; it is true, for example, that in his method 
and also his acceptance of the goal of Indian self-government Chelmsford 
was strongly influenced by his experience as a constitutional governor 
in Australia, especially in New South Wales where he had helped 
shepherd the first Labour government through its early years - and 
this experience 110 doubt had something to do with his acceptance of 
office as Pirst Lord of the Admiralty in the first Labour government 
in Britain - but nonetheless Chelmsford's policies as Viceroy in no
5
Curzon had pointed out that the appointment was very important and 
that the new viceroy would have to introduce the postwar policies; see 
Curzon to Chamberlain, 9 June 1915? ACP14A/4* Asquith and Chamberlain 
considered candidates with either proconsular or parliamentary qualifi­
cations; almost all were peers and had had impeccably conservative 
backgrounds, schooling and careers. The criteria for choosing among 
these seem to have been (l) sufficient authority and range of mind - 
Asquith rejected Lord Islington by this standard; (2) intelligence - 
Asquith ruled out the Luke of Devonshire for being 'slow-gaited' in 
this; (5) sufficient youth - Chamberlain thought Sir Thomas Buxton 
too old (rightly, for he died the next month); (4) cooperativeness -
thus Chamberlain and Crewe vetoed a renewal f©r Eardinge; (5)
experience - Asquith opposed Chamberlain's first choice, Lord Crawford, 
on these grounds, and, presumably for this reason, seems to have 
favoured proconsuls over parliamentarians (he approved of Chelmsford's 
'excellent' record in Australia). The appointee had to be politically 
acceptable too - Asquith ruled out Montagu (who wanted the post) 
because he was a Jew. Only in Chelmsford did Chamberlain's and Asquit life 
choices coincide; for the Prime Minister he was first choice with 
Viscount L'Abernon, and for the Secretary he was a 'better man' in 
the same type as Sir Arthur Lawley, that is among the proconsuls. We 
may be able to guess at other factors. Asquith did not appoint (l) 
L'Abernon, whose talents were chiefly financial - perhaps he decided 
to seek in Chelmsford a man whose experience was more of governing 
(to lead, rather than conduct, administration); (2) Lord Salisbury, 
Chamberlain's second choice, who was to lead conservative opposition 
to Indian self-government in 1954 and 1935 " perhaps Chelmsford at 47? 
with his Australian record, seemed more open-minded; and (3) Lord 
Donoughmore, third on Chamberlain's list, who was more genial than 
vigorous - perhaps in Chelmsford Asquith looked for something more 
enterprising. Thus safety plus ability was the formula, but it may 
be that more constructive impulses also were expressed. See Chamberlain 
to Prime Minister, 24 Sept. & 30 Nov., & Asquith to Chamberlain, 25 
Lee. 1915, ACP15/1/5 & 7-8; & also S/S to V, 17 Lee. 1915 & 13 Jan.
1916, ACP457278-9? & Hardinge of Penshurst, My Indian Years 1910-1916? 
London 1946, 122. Por short notes on those mentioned above, see 
Appendix,
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way represented, concealed radicalism coming out of hiding; the strongest 
force moving him was always the force of events, and logic, of chang­
ing situations, increasing needs, burgeoning demands* Thus Chelmsford 
leant towards that side of Indian Government which we may call the side 
of the future, but was not necessarily committed to it in all its 
forms: his was the liberalism of the pragmatic not the doctrinaire.
Edwin Montagu's appointment as .Secretary of State, made by 
Lloyd George, was a quite different matter. He was known for his 
energy and enthusiasm - some would have called him unreliable and 
unstable. Lord Islington, the Under-secretary of State, a man in 
Chelmsford’s mould, refused to work with the new Secretary (until 
persuaded by the Prime Minister and the urgent need to continue 
Chamberlain's policies). On 12 July 1917? in the House of Commons, 
Montagu had denounced the Government of India, calling it 'too xrooden, 
too iron, too inelastic, too ante-diluvian, to be of any use for the 
modern purposes we have in mind’. The speech had caused a sensation.
On 20 July Montagu was Secretary of State for India: the dragon-
killer made keeper of the dragon. Whether this was calculated or not 
is uncertain - it was true for example that only the prize of India 
would have brought Montagu into the coalition in betrayal of Asquith. 
Eut, if Lloyd George was not conscious of the significance of his 
choice, and of the excitement (or alarm) it would create in India, 
then we can only conclude that he showed remarkable insensitivity to 
the consequences of his actions. Chelmsford's appointment had taken 
into account the fact that change was necessary; Montagu's could only 
be a declaration of intent to begin at once.
It is tempting to relate this to the trend we have noticed 
in appointments. It would be neat to assume that Montagu was the 
driving force introducing change, and Chelmsford the conservative
Montagu had told Lloyd George of the significance of the appointment 
while accepting it; see S.D. Waley, Edwin Montagu, London 1964, 127- 
131. Islington criticised his 'theories' and lack of 'practical 
experience', and Chamberlain had suggested Islington as his own 
successor; see Islington to Chamberlain, 19 & 24 July, &. Chamberlain 
to Prime Minister, 13 July 1917? ACPI5/4/70? 72 & 82. Holderness 
later reported a conservative Panjab official concluding after an 
interview that Montagu was a 'thoroughly sound man' - from which 
Holderness concluded that Montagu was not 'without a certain capacity 
for adapting himself to the environment'; see Holderness to Chamberlain 
11 Feb. 1918, ACP21/5/9.
19
restraint ensuring that change was acceptable to Parliament and the
Government of India. But the facts deny this simple pattern. Most
of the changes introduced in this period were under consideration
before Montagu took office; and in some respects, notably in the
response to Gandhi's satyagraha after 1920, Montagu tended to lend
his weight towards an active, repressive approach rather than a passive
one - this in spite of his suspicion of the police and their attitude
to Indian politics. It is better, in these circumstances, to note the
difference in temperament, but to judge the respective contributions
to policy separately as each case arises. The point which immediately
strikes us, is that in 1916, quite apart from native inclination,
Chelmsford was faced with a situation in which it was apparent at once
that the whole administrative system would have to be reviewed - both
for the war effort and for postwar changes. The point was reinforced
in 1917? when the Mesopotamia Commission reported on the bureaucratic
incompetence and over-centralisation of the Indian army administration,
Austen Chamberlain resigned, and admitted that he would have had to
recall Lord Hardinge if he had still been viceroy. In 1916, therefore,
Chelmsford had had to begin by reorganising the Army Department to
relieve the burden on the Commander-in-Chief and to assert the
collective responsibility of the Viceroy's Council. The army remained
his personal daily concern until Sir Beauchamp Duff was replaced by a
7
new Commander-In-Chief, C.C. Monro. In the reaction to these 
circumstances, we shall find, finally, that in terms of philosophy 
Montagu and Chelmsford were fundamentally on the same side.
Chelmsford was faced with a complex system subject to two 
contradictory impulses. As an outsider, with a methodical, lawyer's 
mind, his obvious response was to try to impose some order on the 
muddle. The attack, was to be on several fronts. In the course of the 
viceroyalty, the attention of the government was to be forced to 
centre increasingly on the problem of and responses to political 
agitation. Chelmsford's own preference would have been to carry out
7 On the Mesopotamia Commission, see Chamberlain to Chelmsford,
18 July 1917? CP5. (lie had earlier expressed anxiety; see Chamberlain 
to Hardinge, & to Willingdon, 24 Feb. 1916, ACP12/31-32.) On the army, 
see Speeches II, 480; Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 27 May, 29 July,
11 Aug., 18 Oct. &, 10 Nov. 1916, CP2, & 7 & 30 June, & to Montagu,
18 Oct, 19175 CP3* For other criticisms of the Government, especially 
arguments for devolution, see Montagu to Lloyd, 2 Oct., MP22, & Lloyd 
to Montagu, 18 March I919, MP24; Willingdon to Montagu, 30 July 1918, 
MP18; & Curtis to Kerr, 25 March 1917? Lothian Papers GD40/I7/33. For
Montagu's suspicion of the police, see Montagu to Lloyd, 8 Sept. 1919? 
MP22.
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positive reforms in industry, education, the public services and local 
self-government - reforms consciously directed towards a slow modifica­
tion of the British role in India, and seeing the European administra­
tors as trustees preparing India for self-government. The increasing 
militancy and strength of Indian political movements made this slow 
progress impractical and time and energy (among a seriously depleted 
cadre) were diverted to the pressing need for constitutional concessions 
and to the immediate problem of Indian unrest. But, if events over­
whelmed Chelmsford's cautious and systematic approach, the main 
directions of his policy remained more or less clear. If bureaucracy 
and Indian involvement were to be reconciled, both of them would have 
to be changed. The administrators would have to adapt to a new role, 
in which they were not autocrats but aides; and the legislators would 
have to be prepared for the time when they would choose and control 
their rulers and not merely rail impotently against them. The Viceroy 
himself would also have to change, in his relations to the legislators 
and the people, but also, just as important, in his functioning as 
the head of the bureaucracy. Of course Chelmsford did not see all this 
at once, though circumstances were forcing the recognition upon him.
His first moves were exploratory. The first task seemed to be to open 
lines of communication on the main issues that were crowding in on the 
government. In some cases this led to substantive changes - we shall 
consider these in due course. First, we shall look at Chelmsford 
operating within the system.
Two points about his administration immediately made them­
selves evident. The first was native caution, qualified by an 
energetic concern for concerted advance planning. The second was an 
insistence upon consultation as a means of decision-making. Both may 
be related to the changes needed in the Indian government.
In general, Chelmsford's view was that the war should not 
be used as an excuse for procrastination. Under Hardinge a moratorium 
had been placed on controversial questions, and Chelmsford found that 
this had been interpreted as meaning a postponement of any advance 
planning. 'To my mind,1 he reported to Chamberlain, 'this is the 
moment when the Government should consider the future legislative 
proposals; I have pressed this course on Members and Secretaries, and
21
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I am glad to say they agree'. Thus the Foreign and Political Depart­
ment soon found itself considering a scheme for a Council of Princes; 
the Industries and Commerce Department began to be reorganised, with 
the Munitions Board and later in 1916 the Indian Industrial Commission, 
with a view to the better prosecution of the war and the eventual
Q
advancement of Indian industry;' the Education Department was soon to
embark on a major review, in particular with the Sadler Commission on
10Calcutta University? the Home Department was faced with the very large 
questions of constitutional reform, future measures against 'anarchism', 
and changes recommended by the Public Services Commission. In 1916, 
Chamberlain wrote to Chelmsford claiming to have seen, in his administra­
tion, 'such evidence of energy and activity as only great industry and 
keenness could produce1
The Viceroy's Council had been disposed to show caution, and, 
being inexperienced, Chelmsford could not at first ignore their advice. 
Thus, changes in the public services were not taken up with the direct­
ness later shown over the Indian Industrial Commission - and this prompted 
from Montagu what Chelmsford called 'an excellent homily' on delays.
But ex^ en in this case Chelmsford was able to replys ' . .. if I had 
adopted Hardinge's policy, acquiesced in by the India Office, the Report
See Chelmsford's reply to a speech of welcome, 4 April 1916, Speeches 
I; & Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 5 May 1916, SP2,
9
For Chelmsford's interest in the development of Indian industries, see 
Chelmsford to Hair, 15 June 1916, CP17? for measures to expand wartime 
production, see Dote by T.H. Holland, 20 Oct., with Chelmsford to 
Chamberlain, 26 Oct. 1916, CP2, & Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 26 Jan. &
14 June 1917> CP3; lor postwar policy and the beginnings of state inter­
vention to promote industry, see Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 July &
8 Sept. 1917? QT3? l°r a summary of the conclusions of the Indian 
Industrial Commission, see V(C&ID) to S/S, 26 Oct. 1918? CP9«
^  Subsequent delays in these reforms, caused by the Secretary of State's 
refusal to sanction a bill based on the Sadler Report, were later very 
nearly to lead to an open breach between Chelmsford and Montagu. See 
V(ED) to S/S, 18 May & 1 & 22 June 1920, CP12; V to S/S, 22 June, CPI2,
21 & 26 July &, 12 Aug. 1920, CPI3; Chelmsford to Ronaldshay, 22 July 
1920, CP25, Maffey to Chelmsford, 18 Aug. 1920, CP20; &. Ronaldshay to 
Montagu, 12 May 1920, MP5I° The question was later transferred to the 
Bengal legislature; see V(ED) to S/S,18 Feb. 1921, CP14* Mor Chelms­
ford's earlier interest in expediting matters, see V to G/Bengal (for 
Sadler), 2 April 1918, CP20. His other educational hope, to double the 
numbers in primary education in ten years (see Chelmsford to Montagu,
19 July 1917? 6P3)? was no"t to receive his full attention.
11
Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 13 Sept. 1916, CP2, & also 2 Feb. 1917?
CP 3*
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12would still be in my safe locked up from prying eyes'. In June 1916?
only one local government had recommended publication of the Public
Services Report, but the Government of India had advocated early
consideration* This typified the new approach; they had wanted to have
proposals for advance ready when they would rightly be expected, at the 
13end of the war.
In 1918 Montagu, returning from the discussions on con­
stitutional reforms, wrote to Chelmsford calling for reforms in the 
public services, the Arms Act, the Criminal Investigation Departments, 
the Native States' treaties, the Press net, separation of judiciary 
and executive, and legal procedure. He hoped also for the establish­
ment of a Propaganda Department, and for the encouragement of better 
relations between Hindus and Muslims. This, he wrote, was an 
illustrative not an exhaustive list. Later he called for an enquiry 
cn the railways Chelmsford was able to report that many of the 
matters were being considered5 but on legal procedure he vrrote, 'Lord 
preserve me! ' - this was a matter for a new viceroy. But the record 
of the viceroyalty does not support the view that Chelmsford's caution 
expressed itself in an inability to begin projects of reform. In 
addition to normal work, Chelmsford had four major reports to deal 
with at the time of Montagu's letter - on the public services,
'anarchism', constitutional reforms and Calcutta University. There
15was not really any prospect of quicker progress.
But Chelmsford hno not been remembered as a strong Viceroy.
The reason is mainly that he practised a form of leadership unfamiliar
in India, This brings us to the second characteristic of Chelmsford's
style; he preferred consultation and worked through collective decisions.
He expected his colleagues to cooperate and express their opinions
forcefully.^ T-Iis policies were therefore consensus policies - he
wished to administer according to wisdom or unwisdom not according to
'weak' or 'strong' principles? he tried to walk down the middle and
17was attacked from both sides. V/ith the growth in the volume and 
12
Montagu to Chelmsford, 22 Oct. 1918, & Chelmsford to Montagu,
4 Dec. 1918, CP4* See also Chelmsford to Montagu, 5 Oct, 1917? CP3»
15 V(HD) to S/3, 21 June 1916, H.Public (C) 88, June 1916.
^  Montagu to Chelmsford, 1 Jan., 17 April, 10 Oct. & 23 Dec. 1918,
CP4* See also Chelmsford to Montagu., 30 May 1918, CP4.
15
Chelmsford to Montagu, 23 April A 30 May 1918, CP4»
-1-6 See Chelmsford to Montagu, 15 April 1918, CP4, & to Chamberlain 
11 Aug. 1916, CP2, & 23 Feb. & 20 April 1917, CP3*
^  Speeches II, 483-488.
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complexity of business, accelerated by the war, the viceroy had little
choice but to delegate responsibilities? but Chelmsford was also
influenced by his experince as a constitutional governor in Australia -
this convinced him, he claimed, that ’the Council should be consulted
on all possible occasions', 'My methods1, he wrote to Montagu, 'are
not of the sic volo sic jubeo order. I deliberately lay before myself
the policy of constitutional practice .... I am more or less indifferent
to personal credit and onlj*- want to get things done. We have a creaky
and lumbering machine to work, and I believe with present conditions it
18can best be worked only by minimising the friction ... '. This method
was sneered at by more traditional administrators and disapproved of by 
19Montagu? but it was the method of the future rather than the past, of
devolution rather than autocracy.
On all matters of importance, Chelmsford tried to obtain the
'best considered views'of the whole Executive Council. He had regular
Council meetings except when he or most members were on tour. When he
was away, members who were considering important matters were instructed
to consult their colleagues personally, and send the file and their
comments to the Viceroy. Chelmsford also introduced a new practice
of meeting each member informally once a week - a privilege formerly
confined to departmental secretaries. At these weekly meetings
Chelmsford discussed with ea,ch member the problems of his department
20and any matters of general interest. In Chelmsford's own Department,
the Foreign and Political, all telegrams were circulated to other members
21as soon as they were printed. Chelmsford also kept himself and his
colleagues informed, on a longer view, by instituting an annual review
of important decisions - formerly undertaken only at the end of a
viceroyalty - and after 1917 "by maintaining a personal collection of
22important despatches. During M s  viceroyalty, Chelmsford claimed,
the Government of India was 'that of the Governor General-in-Council,
23not only in spirit but also in letter.’
1 P
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 18 Aug. 1916, CP2, & to Montagu, 28 
April 1918, CP4.
19 See E.S. Montagu, An Indian Diary (ed.s Venetia Montagu),
London 1930, 41? 72 & 110-111.
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Chelmsford to Montagu, 18 Oct. 1917> CP5? & to Chamberlain, 5 
May, 18 A 25 Aug. 1916, CP2.
^  Chelmsford to Montagu, 18 Oct. 1917? CP5*
22
PSV to Departmental Secretaries, 29 April 1916? CP17? & 8 June 1917* 
CPI 8.
^  Chelmsford to Montagu, 18 Oct. 1917? CP3*
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Consultation meant delays, Chelmsford sought to minimise
these "by working as far as possible through personal meetings and not
24
by written memoranda. He believed members of Council should be the
thinking part of the government, leaving routine matters to the 
25secretaries. He was willing to see, in these routine matters, some
centralisation and consolidation where necessary - as when he suggested
a Chief of the Administrative Staff for the army, and when a Food
Controller for India was appointed during the shortage of 1918;2  ^ A
certain flexibility also helped. The head of the Publicity Board,
Sir Stanley Reed, who had been ready to criticise the bureaucracy as
editor of the Times of India, wrote to Chelmsford in 1919 after
experience at Simlas
My conviction is that there is nothing wrong with the 
system on which the Government of India is organised, 
and that it is manned by devoted and able officials. I 
have been agreeably surprised to find that when little 
difficulties arose, which might have been accentuated 
by a rigid adherence to rules, there was no tendency 
whatsoever to adhere to rules? but always a desire to 
get the thing done.
In fact the traditions and shortcomings of the Simla bureaucracy were 
not so easily overcome - and Reed himself, though satisfied with the 
system and its flexibility in routine, remained worried at the non­
constructive spirit in the administration and the failure of decisions
27to 'come from the top'.
Chelmsford proposed that the machinery for routine consultation 
should be improved; and he sought to do this, in characteristic fashion, 
by appointing a committee of enquiry. Ho had suggested this early in 
1917? but the Home Department, severely understaffed, had preferred to
24
Collective decisions tended to increase paper work. One revised 
Rule of Business required that each important despatch should be signed 
by all members who had discussed it including those who dissented.
Other despatches were to be signed by at least three members. A 
second revised Rule required that any member who wished to write a 
minute of dissent should confine himself to matters raised in discussion, 
and circulate his minute before the despatch was finally settled. It 
would then refer to the dissent, and if necessary include a statement 
on the majority view. See Rules 37A & 38A, H. Public 55~54? Nov, 1917-
25
Chelmsford to Reed, 26 March 1919, CP22.
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 18 Oct. & 11 Nov. 1916, C^2, & to 
Montagu, 19 Oct. 1918, CP4.
27
Reed to Chelmsford, 23 March 1919, CP22.
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28wait until after the war. a Secretariat Committee, under Sir Hubert
Llewellyn Smith, Permanent Secretary at the Board of Trade, was
eventually appointed in 1919* Its terms of reference were to examine
the allocation of business among the departments, and to report on how
the system could be made more efficient. Each department was to
provide the committee with full Information on its methods| and members
and secretaries were to testify on existing staff deployment and
29
delegation of responsibility, and on possible improvements.
As a result of these deliberations, certain changes were
introduced in secretariat instructions during the last quarter of 1920.
Come hope was offered of relieving the shortage of staff by a scheme
to re-employ suitable officers on a temporary basis during the first
ten years of their retirement, provided they were still under sixty- 
30
five. Consultation was made more expeditious. It was generally to
be personal, with results recorded on the file; and it was to be
conducted simultaneously, if possible, when more than two departments
were involved. Consultation with local governments was to be confined
in general matters to the major administrations, and on special matters
to the governments involved. A definite time limit was to be stated,
and after this time the departmental secretary was to decide whether to
31proceed without waiting for any outstanding replies. In another 
attempt to secure coordination, it was provided that an officer would 
normally be placed on special duty to secure government action on any 
recommendations of committees or commissions of enquiry.
2^ Chelmsford to Reed, 26 March 1919? CP22.
29 V to S/S, 29 Nov. & 29 Dec. 1918, CP9? V(HD) to S/S, 30 May 1919,
H.Public 326 & see 527-340, Jan. 1920; Memorandum (approved by 
Llewellyn Smith), H.Public 342-343? Bee. 1919.
50 H.Public 493-496, March 1921.
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Por attempts by Chelmsford to hurry local governments, see 
Chelmsford to Ronaldshay, 18 Feb. & 25 June, to Lloyd, J to Craddock,
18 Feb. 1919s 0P22, but also Montagu to Ronaldshay, 26 June 1919? Mb'27, 
for Chelmsford's willingness to circumvent usual procedure (to hasten 
Lloyd's housing schemes in Bombay), see Lloyd to Montagu, 28 Feb.,
18 July & 17 Aug'. 1919? MP24? for the HD circular, 9 June 1919? 
urging local governments to consult only a limited number of interested 
parties when replying to enquiries, see H.public 6-7, Feb, 1920. Under 
another rule, differences of opinion were to be resolved personally 
(between departments) without further noting, with only the agreement 
embodied in a joint note.
The Executive Council was also given attention. Telegrams
were being used increasingly in the interests of speed, and this
tendency was encouraged by rules which tended to raise the status of
the telegraphic communication - it was provided that all Council
members should simultaneously be sent copies of important telegrams,
those which, if sent by post, would have been in the form of a 
32
despatch. There had also been an earlier rationalisation in 1917? 
when telegrams were divided into three classes: departmental, depart­
mental marked for attention of the Viceroy or the Secretary of State,
33and private (for personal information only). Such prior classifica­
tion could save time generally, and other ways of doing this were 
introduc ed or revitalised in 1920* Letters rather than despatches 
were sent to the Secretary of State when, in the opinion of the 
departmental secretary, the matter did not express a Government 
opinion or was not of importance. Such matters were not referred 
to the Executive Council. Also in 1920 a division of financial 
references into those of greater and lesser importance (with the 
latter able to issue directly to the Secretary of State from the
spending department) abolished the Finance Department's old and time-
3 £consuming monopoly in this area. The Executive Council was also
able to deal less with routine, by having the Governor General make
necessary orders on unimportant matters, and was to waste as little
time as possible on controversy, by considering only final recommenda-
39tions, after departmental discussions.'' Some steps were thus being 
made to free the Viceroy's Council, already changed by Chelmsford's 
use of it, and to make it an effective governing device. In all the 
measures collective responsibility was protected, but attempts were 
made to limit the delays it involved.
Towards the end of the viceroyalty, Chelmsford was also 
concerned with the question of the proper division of subjects among 
Council members and departments. In December 1920 there were eight 
members of Council corresponding to the departments - Foreign and 
Political (the Viceroy), Army, Home, Finance, Legislative, Commerce,
52 H.Public 73-74? Jan., & 85-86, May 1921.
33
PSV to Departmental Secretaries, with V to S/S, 3 Oct. 1917? CP22,
54 G/l despatch (FD), 3 June 1920, H.Public 102, Nov. 1920.
33
Rules 11(1) A (2) & 19, May 1920, H.Public 991-992, Dec. 1920.
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Industry, Education, and Revenue and Agriculture (including Public 
Works). The Secretariat Committee recommended certain reallocations. 
Chelmsford wan in favour of rationalisation but believed that the 
committee's suggestions were not entirely satisfactory. He wanted 
to see banking concentrated under Finance instead of being shared with 
Commerce, and he believed that railways and ports wore inseparable 
from Commerce and Industry, as were the research projects on raw 
materials dealt with at that time under Agriculture. In March 1921 
he suggested to Lord Reading, who was about to become viceroy, that 
he set up, in addition to Foreign and Political, Army, Home, Finance 
and Legislative, three new departments - Commerce and Industry, in­
cluding agriculture, railways and ports 5 Education, Public Health
and Revenue, including local self-government, excise and salt5 and
36Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, including emigration. To
Chelmsford this rationalisation seemed at once more efficient and
better directed to progress - it concentrated in two departments the
main areas in which he hoped to see advance. The Commerce and Industry
department would supervise all economic improvements, including the
public intervention in industrial projects encouraged by the war and
favoured by Chelmsford^ the department of Education, Health and
Revenue would deal with the Government of India aspect of all local
and provincial affairs, including a.11 questions of public welfare and
broadly covering the whole area of the experiment in self-government.
The Public Works and Posts department would control those matters
which required mainly technical or routine administration - it included
emigration in order to avoid associating such a controversial subject
with the Foreign and Political Department under the "Viceroy. The
Council would be able to work as a cabinet, each member having a more
or less coherent sphere of activity which he could represent in joint
discussions and to which he could Independently direct his energies.
The Viceroy's relations with his Governors were clearly as
important as his relation with his Council. In these too Chelmsford
attempted to provide for consultation. In 1916* iie had written to all
heads of provinces asking them to write to him personally on any matter
37which concerned them. More unusually, he attempted, on the advice of
3 6
Chelmsford to Reading, 3“4 March 1921, CP16, & see V to S/S, 2 
telegrams, 6 May 1920, CP12.
37
See CP17, passim, & Chelmsford to Meston, 7 April 1916, Meston 
Papers 1.
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Edwin Mon tag:.’ , to begin a tradition of Governors' conferences."
Some Governors favoured the idea. Sir M. O'Dwyer in the Panjab and 
Sir B. Robertson in the Central Provinces founa many topics to suggest 
for discussion in January 1919? in Bombay, Sir George Lloyd expressed 
keen disappointment when a serious mill strike prevented his attend­
ing the same Conference. Lord Willingdon in Madras was less
enthusiastic. Before the Conference of 1920 he confessed to Montagu
39that he could not see what they had to discuss. In general,
attendance was not enthusiastic - and Chelmsford did not succeed with
his governors as he had with his Council.
It was largely a matter of temperament. Willingdon, in 192C,
characterised the Viceroy as 'cold and calm', and wished he could see
in him 'a spark of enthusiasm1. He had long been convinced that
Chelmsford had a 'personal feeling' about him, which prevented them 
40from cooperating. In the same year, Montagu had to write to Lloyd
admitting that Chelmsford's coldness could be disconcerting, but
stressing his good qualities - his strength, patience and loyalty.^"
In February 1919? Lloyd had. written of the Viceroys
Personally I like hirn a good deal but he is a curious 
intangible personality. Just as you think he is going 
to become quite human he eludes your touch and leaves 
you wondering. He had. been represented to me as being 
tired and anxious. I did not find him so, I thought 
him clear-minded and determined to pursue his course....
In September, he addeds
I'm afraid the Viceroy is getting very unpopular in India.
I have always got on well with him, but I fancy some 
other governors find it hard to do so. I don't quite 
know what it is. Mainly I think his cold manner and 
lack of any evident human sympathy. Some of the letters 
he writes one make one very angry, but I value his 
loyalty ancLthe straightforward way he deals with 
things....
M.S. Montagu, An Indian Diary (ed.; Venetia Montagu), London 1930? 
17 & 224-225.
39
See O'Dwyer, 2 Dec., Robertson, 6 Dec., P- Ronaldshay, 6 Dec. 1913, 
to Cnelmsford, CP21; Lloyd to Montagu, 10 Jan., P to Chelmsford, 25 
Jan, 1919? MP24? Willingdon to Montagu, 7 & 21 Jan., but also 30 Jan. 
1920, MP20.
40
See Willingdon to Montagu, 30 Jan, 1920, MP20, & also 21 July & 30 
Oct. 1919, MP19.
41 Montagu to Lloyd, 14 April 1920, MF22.
42
Lloyd to Montagu., 12 Feb. & 5 Aug. 1919? MP24. See also Lloyd to 
Chamberlain, 11 July 1919? ACP18/l/6g 'I ... cannot understand why he 
has been so much criticised - He is certainly first rate to work with, 
prompt, sympathetic ...'.
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People who had more frequent contact with Chelmsford do not seem to
have had such reservations. Chelmsford claimed his Council had heen
A ^
’a very happy family' in 1917* G„ S; Barnes had written to
Chamberlain in 19l6=> ’It would be difficult to find a more delightful
man to work for and with, and this 1 think is the view of all the
members of his Council'. Later tributes written to Chelmsford confirmed
this first impression - Sir James Tieston complimented him on his
'patience and consideration' and his ’Spartan courage'. Chelmsford's
personality seems to have been effective in the committee room and in
prolonged contact? but not in occasional conferences or at a distance.
He took his Council with him on constitutional reforms? he was unable
to convince the Governors.^
Montagu diagnosed a further reason, which no doubt magnified
Chelmsford's disability. He suggested that the problem was due to the
course of events - firstly to the war in which the central Government
used wider authority while their staff was short-handed, over-worked,
and 'tending to be snappy' in correspondence? and secondly to the
1919 disturbances during which local governments drew closer to their
officials, while the Government of India, 'from the continued effort
45to get a grip of the situation as a whole', tended to draw away. To
this must be added, as the evidence of antagonism is strongest after
1920, a factor which Chelmsford himself hinted at early in his term.
'In fairness to my subordinates,' he wrote, at the height of the
criticism of the army administration, I feel bound to point out
that they are becoming gravely discouraged under the shower of criticism
which is pouring down on them, and their work will inevitably suffer
from the feeling that whatever they do, however hard they work, blame
A 6
will be their portion'.' It was the system not the personnel that .had 
47broken down. In the deluge of criticism which followed the 1919 
^  Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 March 1917?
^  Barnes to Chamberlain, 30 April 1916, ACP12/II; Meston to Chelmsford. 
31 May 1919? & see Holland to Chelmsford, 14 June 1919? CP22.
45 Montagu to Lloyd, 30 Aug. 1919, M£22.
^  Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 15 Sept. 1919? CP2.
^  See Lloyd to Chamberlain, 13 June 1920, aCPI8/1/9s ' the 
machinery of Government is really vile ... but the understaffing of 
the Civil Service ha s resulted in each individual from the Secretary 
of State downward being so over-worked that no-one has had time ... to 
cope with the system,'
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disturbances and accompanied Gandhi’s non-cooperation campaign, it 
would not have been remarkable if the whole administration had felt 
similarly sensitive, and consequently had become difficult to deal with.
Chelmsford also attempted consultation on a wider scale.
The whole tendency of his administration, while it became more and 
more unpopular, was nonetheless increasingly to pay attention to 
Indian opinion. And of course the largest task undertaken during 
the viceroyalty was to seek ways of improving’ the degree and character 
of this contact through the legislatures. Chelmsford welcomed the 
Imperial Legislative Council in spite of the burdon its sessions imposed. 
He remarked5 'We, as the Government of India, live a very detached 
life, aloof from the troubles which beset the administrator in his 
district and even Local Governments in their provinces, and anything 
which brings us up against concrete facts is to be encouraged'. He 
encouraged this further after 1917 t>y removing the restriction prevent­
ing the discussion of contentious matters at the Simla session of the 
48
legislature. But it was doubtful how useful or relevant the
legislators' opinions could be before the reforms. There were at the
centre only a handful of members from each province, and too often it
was tempting to ignore or underestimate the advice of such a tiny group.
In the provinces there was perhaps more influence. In an enquiry
undertaken in 1918 into the working of the Morley-Minto councils in
Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the Panjab and Bihar and Orissa, it was found
that non-official members, nominated as well as elected, tended to vote
solidly against the government whenever there were divisions, but it
was pointed out that divisions were infrequent and occurred only on
contentious issues\ most local governments considered that legislative
business, which had increased enormously in the preceding years, had
not absorbed official energies to the detriment of efficiency, and all
of the governments welcomed the extra contact with Indian opinion. The
local governments considered that legislators had been useful and
influential in changing bills before or after introduction, in putting
forward resolutions especially on local questions, and in a minority of
49cases by use of the right to ask questions. But perhaps the govern­
ments had written what they thought they were expected to write. The
^  See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 1 & 25 March 1917? CP3«
49
ED circular, 22 Feb. 1918? & replies, II.Public, 600 -606, May 1918.
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true picture, as in the Governnent of India, was less comfortable. The 
changes introduced in bills or government policy were admittedly in 
details and never 'material*. Several governments singled out with 
some asperity the one or two occasions in a decade when they had been 
inconvenienced by having to accommodate their will to the legislature; 
they made no allowance for the frustrations among the legislators at 
being faced time and time again with the impossibility of enforcing their 
wishes on the government! Chelmsford set himself 'from the very
50beginning to ,;i win the co-operation of the educated classes in India'e
But the machinery of the legislative councils was so much in need of
re-thinking, until it was reformed at the end of the viceroyalty, that
it could not be used to create this feeling of partnership. While he
was involved in remedying tho situation, Chelmsford still had to suffer
the disabilities of the past.
Thus isolation was a factor in the Government's unpopularity.
Chelmsford could state the liability and try to chip it away, but ho
remained distant from political as from commercial and rural India.
Calcutta and Bombay, each considered by its inhabitants to be the
centre of Indian affairs, were both far away. 'Simla and Delhi,'
Chelmsford told Montagu, 'are merely artificial conglomerations of
officialdom'. He used this argument to justify the refitting of a
viceregal residence in Calcutta - 'I do not want to see myself and my
successors', he wrote, 'condemned to be dwellers in the limbo of 
51things'. He became increasingly aware during 1917 that conditions
were changing rapidly in India - and this too made it even more
52
difficult to keep in touch. He encouraged his Council members to
&o on tour, and found they returned with 'minds enlarged and broadened*t*'
He argued that Governors too should be allowed leave from their
provinces - he was 'in favour of men getting away from their surround-
54ings and rubbing shoulders with other people'. The Home Department
subscribed to all the important newspapers as well as receiving regular
55provincial reports and press abstracts. In May 1918 the Panjab
50
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Government wanted to prosecute one Sarala Devi for remarks she had made
in a private letter to the Viceroy? Chelmsford demurred - 'It would
be most unfortunate,1 he explained, ’if people were to be deterred
56from writing freely to the Viceroy1-. But good intentions did not
solve the problem.
Moreover isolation was not only the product of circumstances
beyond Chelmsford's control. In one- sense it was peculiarly his own
responsibility. In January 1920, Lord Willingdon reported to Montagus
'i. . the atmosphere of Delhi is most depressing. Chelmsford and his lady
lead a very lonely life and I am really sorry for them. They don't
57seem to be able to unbend and be friendly.*.1. Willingdon, who
thought the Viceroy had treated him badly over his sumptuary allowance,
was perhaps not the most impartial judge? but probably the isolated
atmosphere of the seat of government was partly of Chelmsford's own
making. He severely underspent his entertainment allowance because of
the war, and recommended reductions in the increase - more than double -
58which Montagu proposed for Reading. Chelmsford was not easy in large
social events. Ho was not more successful in popularising himself with
legislators and politicians than with governors. His speeches were
correct but seldom aroused enthusiasm. Occasionally, as in the
uncompromising reply to a deputation against the Press Acts, they 
59aroused anger. Montagu remarked to Sir George Lloyd, the Governor 
of Bombay, that, throughout the debates on the 'Rowlatt' bill, Chelmsford 
made no speech himself - surely, he wondered, 'a public meeting, an 
appeal, might have had a great effect1. Lloyd in reply was sceptical
60of the value of such speeches, But Montagu had urged on Chelmsford 
'the vital necessity of teaching and instructing Government officials
56
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57 Willingdon to Montagu, 30 Jan, 1920, MP20.
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Speeches II, 249-281? H.Poll. 253-254? May 1917? Memorandum 011 
Press Legislation, 1 July 1920, I0R J&P1589 (4468/19); Chelmsford
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6lto explain themselves and the policy of the Government'; and it was
plain that Chelmsford himself did not have this ability. His Government
was
sought consultation and responded to public opinion, hut.never fully
political, never comfortable in this new role. Montagu wrote in 1917
to report that he had heard that the government had never been mere
62unpopular thafa at that moment. It was to become still more unpopular 
by 1921.
One of tho responses to this situation was to hope the
government could project a more favourable imago by propaganda. The
Government of India, declared Chamberlain in 1917? must 'not only do
right, but persuade people that it is right'. They could not rely on
press support, and had to prepare public opinion themselves. But they
did not do so; 'Wherever public opinion is stirred...tho Departments
exclaim "Say nothing! Do nothing! Pray heaven if we are quiet, the
storm will pass over our heads...". I am sure this will not do...it
will lead to a growing estrangement between Government and the governed 
63...'. Montagu, in August of the same year, also called for a 'new
angle of vision's tho Government, he tho eight, 'should learn to a 
greater degree than ever the methods of political life'. In his view 
'publicity and frankness' were the 'remedy for most Indian evils 
He encouraged Chelmsford to call a conference to improve the war
65
effort, and at first propaganda was conceived in this narrower sens'., 
as a need arising out of tho war.
In April 1918? - War Conference, of provincial delegates and 
mostly non-officials, was convened in Delhi. It was followed by 
provincial meetings of a similar type. The purpose was twofold; to 
help create an enthusiastic and loyal attitude towards the war effort, 
and to encourage practical steps to help. Thus tho Delhi Conference,
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over three days, consisted in public sessions for fine speeches and
loyalty resolutions, and private committees for practical suggestions.
Gandhi had arrived in Delhi intending to boycott proceedings on
’various high moral grounds' relating to the exclusion of E.G. Tilak,
Annie Besant and other nationalist loaders who, in Chelmsford's view,
disagreed with the Government on first principles. Chelmsford
persuaded Gandhi to attend, and he made a short speech in support of
the loyalist resolution, Chelmsford thought the conference had been
66a success as an exercise in public relations. In the provinces,
except in Bombay, where Willingdon provoked a walk-out of Tilak and
f/fcher Home Rulers, the conferences passed off without incident, or,
arguably, re sults.^
The Delhi conference recommended the formation of publicity
bureaux, and had led to tho appointment of a War Resources Committee
to coordinate activities. In June 1918? u Central Publicity Board was
appointed, with instructions to establish similar boards in every
province. They were to 'vivify Indian interest in war and intensify co- 
68operation'. A Library was formed for use in preparing pamphlets, and
in July a liaison officer for publicity was appointed at the India 
69Office. At the head of these developments was the former editor of
^  for the Delhi War Conference, including the exclusions and Gandhi's 
attitude, see Chelmsford to Montagu, 28 April & 13 May 1918? CP4? A 
to Willingdon, 15 May, & PS'V to G/Madras & to G/Bombay, 18 April, & to 
Resident, Aden (for PS to Montagu), 29 April, & G/Madras to V, 22 April, 
& V to G/Madras, 11 May, & PS, G/Bombay to PSV, 21 April, & Gandhi to 
Chelmsford, 29 April 1918, CP2O 5 & Speeches II, 82. Gandhi later 
offered his services as a recruiter5 see Gandhi to Chelmsford, 29 April. 
& to Maffey, 30 April, A Maffey to Gandhi, 21 May, & to Crerar, 17 May 
1918, CP20, A also M.K. Gandhi, An Autobiography or The Story of my 
Experiments with Truth (tr.s Mahadev Desai), Ahmedabad 1940, 325-331* 
Willingdon criticised the Delhi conference as giving 'extremists' undue 
prominence| Chelmsford thought his reaction 'hysterical1. See 
Chelmsford to Montagu, 15 May 1918 (with enclosures, Willingdon to
Chelmsford, 9 May, Chelmsford to Willingdon, 15 May, & Reed to Maffey,
11 May 1918), CP4? M Willingdon to Chelmsford, 11 June, Chelmsford t o  
Willingdon, 17 June, &. Maffey to Reed, 16 May 1918, CP2Q. Montagu was 
disappointed3 see Montagu to Willingdon, 4 July 1918, MP18.
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The Times of India, Sir Stanley Reed, now appointed President of the
Central Publicity Board - and happily seeing himself, according to
70Chelmsford, as 'Korthcliffe Asiaticus'.
The Government believed that Indians, except those in 
recruiting districts and perhaps the educated classes, were ill- 
informed about the war. It was necessary to impress on them its 
gravity, and also to disseminate accurate news and contradict rumours. 
The work was to be done locally, by largely non-official committees 
with financial assistance from the central government, and through 
posters, lectures, advertisements, newspaper articles and cinema show­
ings, The Central Board was to coordinate and assist these efforts.
The suggestion, in this form, was sent to local governments in a
71circular letter of May 1918. The response was enthusiastic in some 
provinces, notably the Panjab where publicity work centred on the 
government newspaper, Haq, and the United Provinces where this example 
was followed by a successful War Journal. But not all the provinces 
were active. Assam and Bihar and Orissa underspent their budgets, and 
Bengal, although exceeding its estimates on furniture and establish­
ment, severely underspent its budget for printing and devoted almost no 
funds to schemes originally proposed for using religious societies and 
taking newspaper editors on factory tours. The publicity movement was 
strongest in those provinces where the central government had suggested 
it was needed least, namely in the recruiting tracts. Its political 
success was thus limited.72
Nonetheless this wartime expedient of the publicity boards 
represented one of the first institutionalised attempts by the govern­
ment in India to influence public opinion by propaganda. Some of the
70
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72 See V to S/S, 28 Jan. 1920, CP12? H.Public 65-68, July 1918,
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75boards had already taken on more political functions during the war; 
all of them were intended to explain general and not only wartime policy; 
and when the war ended there was widespread agreement that the hoards 
should he made permanent. A meeting of the Central Publicity Board in 
March 1919 unanimously recommended that organised publicity work should 
continue. Sir Stanley Rood suggested the formation of a small Depart­
ment of Publications under the Home Member, to advise the government 
on the use of existing newspapers for meeting unfair criticism, to
popularise government reports and publications, and to act as an
74-information bureau.
The Home Department took up this idea, admitting that the 
Government of India was 'perhaps of all civilised Governments the worst 
equipped' for propaganda. They suggested, however, a Director of 
Publications rather than a department which they thought might be open 
to public objection. Reed expressed himself rather surprised at 
the strength of the feeling in the Government that the work of the 
Publicity Board should c o n t i n u e T h e  Home Department had already 
decided cn Chamberlain's advice that the Moral and Material Progress 
Report presented annually to Parliament should be improved so as to 
'secure the wider purpose of interpreting the activities of the 
Government to the outside world'. They wanted it printed in octavo 
not foolscap, widely distributed at a low price (about Rs. 1.00), divided 
by subject not provinces, 'narrated in a popular style1, and brought up 
to date. The issue for 1917-3-916 dealt with events until December 1918, 
the time of preparation, whereas hitherto it would have stopped with the 
official year at the end of March. It was prepared by an officer on 
special duty in the Home Department - Professor Rushbrook Williams, 
seconded from the Allahabad University. Formerly the report had been 
compiled in the Home Department, in addition to ordinary duties, and 
mainly from materials sent in by local governments. Thus, when the 
Central Publicity Board was disbanded, the Government already had the
75
United Provinces War Board to Central Publicity Board,28 Nov, 191Q,
H.Public 214, March I919.
74 Seton to Hignell, 15 Nov., & to Reed, 7 Dec. 1918, & Reed to 
Seton, 8 Feb. 1918 (sic;* 1919), IOR J&P1550, 4287; Central Publicity
Board to HD, 27 March 1919, H.Poll. 545, Jan. 1920; & see also Bombay 
Publicity Department to G/Bombay, 19 Dec. 1918, H.Poll. 92, Feb. 1919.
75
HD circular, 18 Feb. 1919, ibid.
T-7
Reed to Maffey, 20 March 1919, CP22.
37
beginnings of a small publicity organisation within the home Department. 
They decided to expand it, and give effect to Reed's suggestion by 
appointing Rushbrook Williams as Director of Publicity. He was to bo 
under the Home Department, with special rights of access to the viceroy 
and heads of departments. In February 1920, Williams was sent on
77deputation to study propaganda methods in Great Britain and iimerica.
The main publicity burden, however, was to be provincial.
The wartime boards were to be replaced, preferably by voluntary agency. 
The publicity newspapers were continued in the United Provinces and 
the Panjab (where Haq was thought to be 'a power in the land'). By the 
governors' conference of January 1920, when the question was discussed, 
only Bengal, the Central Provinces and the Northwest Frontier Province
no
were without some permanent organisation. After the disturbances
of 1919 the Home Department had called for 'systematic and widespread
action on a wide scale for the imrpose Qf contradicting false rumours
and reports', and had promised that the central government would provide
leaflets for local distribution. Rushbrook Williams suggested that he
should s+a.rt sending such information directly to district officers.
This idea was approved:; the first leaflet distributed in this way was on
Bolshevism, and came in two forms, one of which was for general use.
This scheme was most popular in those provinces where local publicity
organisation was weakest, and therefore to some extent provided a
79substitute for local efforts. '
But printed propaganda was limited in effect. Thus, in their 
circular of May 1919? the Home Department suggested that local and 
district officers should be instructed to become concerned in propaganda, 
mainly through private interviews. Local governments agreed, and the 
idea had been endorsed generally in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The 
problem was that the Government Servants' Rules of Conduct expressly 
forbad participation in political movements. On 9 December 1920, in 
order to facilitate proposals from the Panjab and Madras seeking to
77 See H.Public 301-333? Feb., & 151-181, Oct. 1919; & H.Poll. 454- 
471 & -473? Jan., & 374-375? Feb. 1920? & Chamberlain to Chelmsford
14 Oct. 1917? ACP18/3/la.
78
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permit officers to 'organise opposition* to Gandhi’s non-cooperation, 
the Government of India asked tho Secretary of State to permit officers 
to defend and explain government policy in public, provided that thej' 
avoided personal references and confined their criticisms to refuting
misstatements or disloyal propaganda. The Secretary of State gave his
, 80 consent.
81This change was not very great, or probably very useful.
But an old principle had been breached nonetheless, and it was perhaps 
remarkable enough that the Government of India should have taken formal 
concern over publicising themselves. The autocracy had to begin to 
talk to the people*
80 See H.Poll. 689, May 1919$ H.Public 58-67, May 19215 V(RD) 
to S/S, 9 Dec. 1920, CPI 3*
See Montagu to Ronaldshay, 28 June 1921, MP28, on publicity & 
propaganda * *1 believe we have still got to invent our system in
India *,
Chapter 2. Public Opinion
The Government paid attention to public opinion in order to
woo the educated classes. In some quarters the Interests of the massec
were canvassed, mostly as an argument for conservatism.. But Chelmsford
placed the emphasis on the need to placate that small minority whos'_;
discontent, he believed, was bound to infect the bulk of the population.
What India needed, he thought, was twenty years of patient rule - and
1
his task was to enlist the cooperation of the educated elite,
A section of this class, as Chelmsford recognised, was 
influenced by growing nationalism and alienation from the Government*
The unique characteristic which distinguished the 'extremist' party 
was not its desire for swaraj, but its unwillingness to come to terms 
with the British government. Some of the leaders were 'irreconcilable:$ 
and, while the Government did not abandon their attempts to influence 
all public opinion, these inevitably were directed mainly to the un­
committed. It was not difficult for their conciliation to become 
attempts to encourage moderate opposition to tho extremists. In Bengal 
Lord Carmichael diagnosed the main need of his Government in 1916 as
2
to win the 'confidence of the ordinary law-abiding educated Indians'^ 
this aim was not identical with that expressed by Lord Chelmsford. In 
a few isolated cases the Government sought the formation of a moderate 
or pro-government party. But, as a rule, they placed little faith In 
this version of divide et impera, preferring to pursue policies whic.u 
in other circumstances, might have commended themselves equally to 
extremists as to moderates.^
In several celebrated cases the government undermined their 
own propaganda. They planed an officer on special duty to help the 
defendant and otherwise meddled in a private litigation between Tilak 
and Sir Valentine Chirol over alleged libels in the latter's book, 
Indian Unrest. Official intervention had been approved by Hardingo 
and was perhaps inevitable owing to an original failure of discretion 
when Lord Sydenham, then Governor of Bombay, had allowed. Chirol access 
to confidential files for use in the writing of his book. But
1
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 17 May 1918, CPI5.
2
Carmichael to Chelmsford, 5 Aug, 1916, CP17.
 ^ See below, pp. 286-296.
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Chelmsford too showed, lack of tact ~ at the height of the controversy 
and to the intense indignation of Tilak's paper, Kesari, he had Chirol 
to stay at Government House in Delhi In another incident the 
government tried to be more diplomatic. Tilak and other members of 
a Home Rule deputation had wanted to visit England, and were allowed 
passports. The Home Department wired to the India Office that it 
would be 'inexpedient1 to withhold permission, oven though 'military 
or other authorities may regard their presence in England as objection­
able or dangerous1. But tho War Cabinet ordered that the passports be 
withdrawn. The Bombay Government, the Government of India and 
Chelmsford himself protested at this 'highly embarrassing' decision, 
and Tilak's party were allowed to proceed in the hope that the orders 
would be modified. But the Cabinet remained adamant, and the 
travellers were recalled. Five had reached as far as Gibraltar? the 
Home Department requested that they bo treated 'with every consideration 
and not held in custody'. Montagu, who had been in India, persuaded the 
Cabinet on his return to allow Tilak to travel to ^digland for his libel
case on condition that he abstained from politics, Tilak gave an
9undertaking and left for England, A similar restriction was placed 
on Dr. T. II. Hair, an opponent of constitutional reforms; later both 
restrictions were removed.^ In September 1918, when the question of
See H.Poll. 175-177s 1?8 (Report by A*Montgomerie, 30 May 1916),
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reforms deputations was raised again, the Government of India, asked 
for instructions, and were directed to state that the question could 
not he considered at that stage. They promised that assistance would 
he given in the following yo ,r when a reforms hill would come before 
Parliament.^
The impression thus far is of clumsiness and insensitivity - 
although with the deputations this was almost wholly the responsibility 
of the London authorities. In other matters the Chelmsford administra­
tion had more success. Chelmsford had indicated his interest in public 
opinion even before assuming the viceroyalty. He wrote to Hardings
that he had decided to visit Calcutta as seen as possible 'to remove any
soreness resulting from the change of the Capital to Delhi',0 There 
wore two consistent and intermixed motives in his response? he sought 
both to conciliate or forestall agitation, and to right recognised 
failures or abuses. In some cases there was also a desire to reward
Indians for wartime loyalty or services.
In 1917? lor example, Gandhi had started elaborate enquiries
into the grievances of the peasantry in Champaran, Bihar. Some of the
grievances were justified - particularly an arrangement enfoming the
growing of indigo at a time when prices were falling, and a certain
amount of extortion and intimidation by the landlords. Thus, when the
local Commissioner had Gandhi arrested, the local Government pronounced
this a 'very serious mistake of judgment' and ordered the Commissioner
to give Gandhi 'every reasonable facility for obtaining the information 
9
desired by him’. Similarly, when the local Government themselves 
decided to require Gandhi to stop his enquiries, arguing that there was 
a danger of violence and that Gandhi had broken a promise to restrict 
his activities (he had in fact refused to give such a promise), the 
Government of India intervened and ordered that Gandhi should on the 
contrary be invited to join a formal committee of enquiry into the
 ^ See ILC Proceedings, 25 Sept. 1913, H.Poll. 225, Oct. 1918? S./S 
to Y, 3 & 18 Sept., & Y to S/S, 9 Sept. & 3 Oct. I9I8, CP9* Chelmsford 
had objected to the ban, calling Montagu's suggested excuse 'too thin 
for anybody1 and arguing that the only real answer would be 'bluntly to 
say that the embargo is "not ours but yours"'. He thought a deputation 
would be wise on all grounds, and hoped Montagu would be able to 
disabuse his colleagues 'of the awfulness of this imaginary bogey'.
He was disappointed.
^ Chelmsford to Hardings, 1 March 1916, CPI5*
9 H.Poll. 323? July 1917c
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situation. Chelmsford stressed that he had to take a wider view and
insisted that a purely official enquiry as proposed by the local
Government would not meet the needs of the situation. There would be
a danger that Gandhi would not agree with the decision and would force
the government to take action against him - it would be impolitic to
risk a storn on such a matter, especially when genuine grievances
existed. A public enquiry would satisfy outside opinion, and a prompt
10announcement might settle the unrest within Champaran. A similar 
policy was followed over river works at Hardwar, after Chelmsford had 
received anxious memorials, including one from the All-India Hindu 
Sabha, about the interruption of the sacred Ganges. He directed that 
the question should be re-negotiated? a compromise was eventually 
agreed whereby a new channel would be constructed to provide un­
interrupted flow. The Home Department recognised that the changes 
would be expensive and might impure the efficiency of the canal works,
but Chelmsford insisted that it was worth the extra trouble and money to
11avoid 'a big religious row'.
Concern for public opinion also expressed itself in positive 
measures, Chelmsford believed that one of the basic problems in India 
was the racialist attitude of the European community. He had once 
stigmatised that 'typically Australian' tendency to look on Indians (in 
Fiji) as 'an inferior race', and he was determined to rid India of this 
attitude - particularly what he called that 1 carping and sneering at 
the capacity of the educated Indian which cuts like a lash of a whip',"'""'
10
See II.Foil. 314-339? July 1917? V to LG/Bihar & Orissa, 22 May, -v 
Chelmsford to Gait, 8 June, A Gait to Chelmsford, 21 May 1917? CPIS.
See also The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol.XIII (Jan. 1915 - 
Oct. 1917JT Ahmedabad 1964, 362-446, K.K. Datta, History of the Freedom 
Movement in Bihar Vol. I, 1857-1928, Patna 1957? 167-280? 33.u. Panda,
Mahatma Gandhi, London 1958? 156-162? U.K. Gandhi, An Autobiography 
or Ihe Story of My Experiments with Truth (tr. Maliadev Dosai), Ahmedabad
1940' (2nd ediy,"" 300-313? D.G, Tendulkar, Gandhi in Champaran, /"patne-h J
1957? Rajendra Prasad, 'The Champaran Agrarian Policy', Hindustan 
Review, Vol. XXXVIII, I o.227 (July 1918), 49-56? & particularly
documents nos. 32, 35? 71? 77? 79? 81, 85, 95, 100, 104 J HI? in 
B ,B . Misra, ed., Select Documents on Mahatma Gandhi's Movement in 
Champaran 1917-1918? Bihar (Secretariat Press") 19633 and, for~19 th 
century background, 'Indigo Plantation - A Source of Oppression', Bengal 
Past and Present Vol. LXXXII, No.154 (July-Dee. 1963), 154-160, & VolV" " 
LXXXIII, Part 1, So. 155 (Jan.-June 1964), 56-68.
11
See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 20 Dec. 1916, CP2? H.Poll. 178-179?
April 1917? J also 335? Jan. 1918,
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 17 May, A to Archbishop of Brisbane, 5 
March 1917? CPI5.
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Other people agreed. Montagu, worried at the ill effects on Indians of
their present subordination5 Willingdon thought the 'real bed rock1
of their problems was the 'arrogant superiority' adopted by the English
13if this did not change it might lose them India. Most of the positive 
measures under Chelmsford may be interpreted as attempts to grapple 
with this central problem.
His Government sought to improve Indian standing on two main 
fronts - by improving India's international status and by removing 
internal discrimination. The war had provided an opportunity for 
interested people, notably the Round Table group and Lord Hardinge's 
Government, to press for a modification of India's inferior or 'subject' 
role in the Empire. In 1917 Indian members, Sir James Meston, Sir S. 
Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner, were admitted to the Imperial 
Conference and to meetings of tho Imperial War Cabinet. Sir Robert 
Borden and W. F. Massey, the Prime Ministers of Canada and hew Zealand, 
moved at the Conference that India should be represented In future. Of 
their admission to the War Cabinet, Philip Kerr wrote to Lionel Curtiss 
'It would have been impossible to have recognised the status of Indiana 
more completely than to have admitted them to the most secret conclaves 
of the British Empire'. In 1918, however, the question of Cabinet 
membership was still considered opens and Islington, the Under­
secretary of State for India, urged that one full member should be 
admitted and that a representative of the Indian states should attend 
when appropriate, when the Prime Ministers were to be accompanied by 
other ministers. The Colonial Office wanted Indians represented only 
as 'assessors' and by invitation. The Viceroy protested at this 
retrogression, and argued that the precedent of Bikaner and Sinha 
could not be abandoned without disappointment. The War Cabinet accepted 
Islington's compromise of allowing only one full representative, but 
in the event the Native States' representative was invited to most of
13 Montagu to Willingdon, 9 Aug. 1920, MP18, & Willingdon to Montagu,
27 July 1920, MP20. See also Lloyd to Montagu, 5 Nov. 1920, MP25, ,1 
Grant to Chelmsford, 30 Oct. 1920, CP25; the racial point had also 
been raised by Congress, as in Bishan Dhar's presidential address at 
the 1911-1912 session, criticising the British administration 'with 
its vested interests, its domineering habits, its unquestioned 
authority, its racial exclusiveness and quoted by Tilak in 1917
(see D.V. Tahmankar, Lokamanya Tilak, London 1956, 252).
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the meetings.^
There can be no doubt that the personal qualities of Bikaner
and Sinha played a large part in securing this foothold5 but credit for
the policy must go to Austen Chamberlain, and for its defence to Montagu
and Chelmsford. The practical results were not great - at the 1917
Imperial Conference the Indian representatives secured agreement for the
Government of India's scheme to end discrimination against Indian
travellers by establishing a principle of reciprocity in the treatment
15of the nationals of all countries of the Empire 1 but on the other
hand Sinha's presence did nothing to deter a committee of the Imperial
War Cabinet from resolving in 1917? contrary to the wishes of Indian
Muslims regarding the suzerainty of the Caliph over Mecca, that 'No
restoration of Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty should be permitted'
in Arabia after the war. But the principle of Indian representation
17was more important. It established the right of India to behave toward 
the Dominions as if she shared their independent status. The admission 
of India to Imperial councils was illogical in that she was still a 
subject nations this, like her later admission to the Paris Peace 
Conference and her founder membership of the League of Nations, arose 
out of her contribution to the war; but the anomaly should nevertheless 
be interpreted as a recognition that India must eventually come to play 
a fuller part in her own affairs.
See Islington to Chelmsford, lp March 1918, CP4; S/S to V, 17 
Jan. 1917, CP8; V to 3/S, 12 Feb., & s/S to V (HD), 21 & 28 March 
1918? CP9 ? L  KerrJ  to Curtis, 24 April 1917, Lothian Papers GD40/17/33; 
Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Imperial 
War Conference (8th day), 22-~23? _ACP47/5/l; ILC proceedings, 19 March 
1918? H.Poll. 9C, June 1918; ibid. 91-101. See also Chelmsford's 
report and reference to Borden's praise of Sinha, Speeches I, 384-387,
& see also ibid., 244-245? & K.M. Panikkar, His Highness The Maharaja 
of Bikaner, A Biography, London 1937? 177*
15 See Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings... (Imperial War Conf c-renc 
15th day) , 117-120, AGP 47/3/l ? Chamberlain to Kerr, 24 April, & Kerr to 
Chamberlain, 27 April 1917? Lothian Papers GD40/17/34. For an early 
suggestion of reciprocity, see ibidV GD407l7/3» p.232.
See Imperial War Cabinet, 'Report of Committee on Terms of Peace 
(Territorial Desiderata) under Lord Curzon1, ACP20/9/33.
17 For Chelmsford's appreciation of this see Speeches I, 384-387. For 
the antecedents of the change, see, for example, Lord Islington, 'Speech 
to Conference of Representatives of Home and Dominion Parliaments',
31 July 1916, H.Poll. 259? Oct. 1916, and, for a survey of the schemes 
into which India (like Ireland) had to be fitted, J.E.Kendle, 'The 
Round Table Movement and "Home Rule All Round’", Historical Journal,
XI, 2 (1968), 332-353.
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It was only a matter of time before India renewed her demand
to be allowed to behave with similar independence and self-respect
towards Britain. Predictably, that conflict came to a head first over
the cotton duties; Indians and British officials in India had always
resented the obvious subservience to Lancashire interests represented
By a system which kept taxes upon internal cotton manufacture on a level
with import duties - and as other countries began to raise import duties
to protect their own industries, the contrast became more- obvious and
galling to Indian sentiment. Lord Hardings, with tho unanimous and
emphatic support of his Council and the local governors, had attempted
to raise tho cotton duties to while leaving the excise (on local
manufactures) at 3gfi. Sanction was refused on the grounds that raising
18
the question in wartime would be 'little short of disastrous'.
Chelmsford, keenly interested in developing Indian industries, expressed
a forceful view of the cotton excise; It was, ho wrote to Chamberlain,
'an open political sore15 it was clearly imposed to protect British
industry? it fell most heavily on tho poor who bought the coarser
Indian cloth? and it might be used in future as a precedent for
measures against any Indian industry which showed signs of competing
with British products. Its abolition, he declared, would be a sine qua
non of Indian participation in any scheme of imperial preference.
Inclusion of these sentiments in an official despatch brought a strongly
worded objection from Chamberlain? th« despatch was toned down in
deference to his remarks, but Chelmsford defended himself to Montagu
on the grounds that his Government were bound to put forward their 
19position. ' The position they put forward, significantly, was an Indian 
one in opposition to that held in the United Kingdom.
In view of the rejection of Hardinge's overtures, there was
little that Chelmsford could do. During 1916, however, discussions had 
taken place in the India Office, following a suggestion by Lord
18
S/S to V, 26 Jan, 1916, ACP2l/l/l4; Memorandum by Lord Hardinge, 
with appended opinions, ACP21/2/1? & see Chamberlain to Guy .Fleetwood
Wilson, 9 April 1913? ACPIO/3/62 - Chamberlain approved of tariff reform, 
but only as part of a 'general Empire policy1 to be undertaken after
the war. George Lloyd agreed, and later urged imperial preference
(partly because it would please Indians and encourage local industry) - 
see Lloyd to Chelmsford, 22 May 1919? CP22. Sec also Sinha's Congress 
presidential address, 27 Dec. 1915? H.Poll. 358? Dec. 1916.
19
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 14 June, & to Montagu, 5 Oct. 1917 > CP3.
Hardinge, on the size of the contribution which India might bo expected
to make to the cost of the war. A consensus was eventually reached at
a top figure of £50 million, which Chelmsford and his Council agreed
could be undertaken after the war, subject to deductions if there were
expensive frontier operations in the interim. The Army Department also
pointed out that India had already made large contributions and that
there wore limits on the extra taxation that would be possible or just
while India remained 'a dependency, won - and in the last resort held -
by military power'. Privately Chelmsford warned that 'every additional
obligation ... will increase India's expectation of the benefits she is
to derive from the war'. Nevertheless the Chancellor of the Exchequer
20named £100 million as the sum which would be well received,
Chelmsford and his Council replied that they could agree to
such a contribution if they were permitted to raise a loan in India,
place a super-tax on high incomes, perhaps increase the export duty on
jute, and dispense with a surplus which they had accumulated by
economies on civil expenditure. But they could not take these steps
■unless they were allowed to raise cotton duties to 7b/'s to provide a
margin and pay for beneficent expenditure. They would also want an
undertaking that they would be allowed to raise the general tariff
above 7'g/o, and to abolish cotton excise (now as soon as they could
afford the loss in revenue. Privately Chelmsford urged that India was
poor, her government was not democratic, additional taxes might be fuel
for agitators, and other avenues of taxation were closed - it would be
undesirable to have special exactions from landowners, or to increase
21the salt tax and thus the burden on the very poor. It was implicit
in these remarks that the enhanced cotton duties were not only
financially necessary, but essential to reconcile Indians to the large 
22
contribution. Chelmsford later reported that, although in his belief 
a considerable body of opinion shared Malaviya's view (embodied in a 
resolution later withdrawn) that the contribution was too high, the
20
See India Office notes on contribution, ACP2l/l/ll & 15-19; various 
correspondence, ACP21/1/21-25; G/l(AD) to S7§7 6 Oct. 1916, ACP2l/l/25;
V to S/S, 21 Oct., Chamberlain to the Chancellor, 23 Nov,, & tjs to V,
23 Dec. 1916, A draft, ACP21/1/27, 36, 40 & 41; & S/S to V, 29 Nov,
1916, ACP21/1/32 (& CP77T-
21 S/S to V, 5 Jan., & Y to S/S, 6 & 7 Jan. 1917, CP8 (& ACP21/1/43 & 44)-
22
fiscal independence was a long-standing Indian demand, arising out 
of Naoroji's theory of the 'economic drain'. See P.P. Masani, Dadabhai 
Naoroji, Delhi i960, 77-88 & 138, & Stanley A. Wolpert, Tilak and 
Gokhale, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1962, 103-113 & 144* See also Colin 
Forbes Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd, London 1948, 142, for an official 
endorsement of the idea.
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politicians had 'exercised a remarkable restraint1 - without the cotton
duties, he explained, there would have been no 'r^ady acquiescence1 in
the £100 millions.2^
Chamberlain had taken the point, and decided that he could
carry the Cabinet* He telegraphed to Chelmsford asking him to place
special stress on the link between the cotton duties and the war
24
contribution, in order to strengthen his hand in England. To the
Cabinet he echoed Chelmsford's phrase, and explained that increased
cotton duties were the sine qua non of the offer. On these terms, the
2dIndian proposal was accepted, Chamberlain defended the increase as
a necessary war measure to a deputation from Lancashire cotton interest
2 6and to the House of Commons, At one time he thought a government
defeat possible if Liberal, Irish and Lancashire interests combined?
but Lloyd George remained firm, and, as Asquith did not try to use flu
controversy, the Commons vote gave the Government a substantial
majority. Chelmsford ha„d telegraphed warning that if the opposition
were to succeed 'the demand for Home Rule would receive a great, and
27who could say unjustifiable, stimulus'.
To the British in India the solution was Ideal, The loan 
20created goodwill for India. - it wa.s a showy gesture, which Hardinge
29
wished had been made in his time. But it was obvious also that 
Chelmsford was finding In the war an excuse to do what he wanted. 
Perhaps more Important, the increase in cotton duties introduced into 
India's relations with the United Kingdom that same principle of 
national interest, that some contradiction of India's inferior status,
2  ^ V to S/S, 11 March 1917, CP8 (& ACP21/2/14).
24 S/S to V, 2 Feb. 1917, ACP2l/l/28.
25
Chamberlain to Hardinge, 10 Jan., Chamberlain, Cabinet memorandum, 
25 Jan., Note by the Chancellor, 27 Jan., Statement by Meston before 
War Cabinet, 3 April 1917, ACP2l/l/45, 59-60 & 69? House of Commons 
questions and replies, ACP21/2/5 & 10.
2 6
Hardinge to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1917, nCPl2/102? S/S to V, 2 Feb. 
& 10 & 15 March, & (F&PD) 13 March 1917, CP8.
27
Y to S/S, 11 March 1917, CP8 & ACP21/2/14? & see Speeches I, 319
& 388, & II, 25-28. On Lloyd George's attitude, see Chamberlain to 
Chelmsford, 10 & 15 March & 2 May 1917, CP3.
28
See Meston to Chelmsford, 15 March 1917, Meston Papers I.
29 Hardinge to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1917, ACPI2/102.
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which appeared in this period alsc in the relations with tho Empire,
Chelmsford had promised the Imperial Legislative Council that his
Government would offer tho 'most strenuous opposition’ if any attempt
were made to reintroduce the protection of Lancashire interests. In any
postwar fiscal arrangements, he declared, India’s interests would have
to be considered.^
A reversal of old public attitudes to India and Indians also
meant an end to indentured emigration. Nothing perhaps was more
indicative of India’s subservient role within tho Empire than the way
her people were shipped around the various colonics to provide labour,
often under poor conditions and with unfair contracts. Lord Hardinge
had publicly defended Indian rights in South Africa, He had also .agreed
31that indentured emigration must end, Chelmsford preferred bureaucratic
methods, but was not loss devoted to tho cause -- it was anyway not
practical for any Indian government to refuse sympathy on these issues.
At first, however, delay was unavoidable because of the agreement of
Hardinge and Chamberlain to negotiations with other governments before
32indentures were banned. Chelmsford had to refuse the introduction of
bills in the Imperial legislative Council on the subject of emigration,
in 1916 and again in February 1917* Ho had disliked having to do this,
stressing that the Gnvtrmaent sympathised with the Indian view and wore
on very weak ground, end asking tho Secretary of State to urge the
33colonies to accept tho position. Indian indignation became greater 
with the revelation of an agreement, made but not announced by Hardinge, 
whereby a maximum delay of five; years was to be allowed before a final 
abolition. About the same time the Government hoard do trails of the 
degradation, including stories of sexual horrors, suffered by Indian 
women in Fiji. Chelmsford received a womens' deputation, and privately 
expressed his alarm at the possibility of the Fiji stories becoming
34known.'" Unaware of Hardinge’s agreement to the five yoar limit, he 
criticised the delays that had been allowed to 'creep in'? he insisted
^  Speeches I, 388*
31
Sec B.R. Honda, Mahatma Gandhi, London 1958, 116-117.
32
Chamberlain to Hardinge, 24 Feb. 1916? ACF12/31? Chelmsford to 
Chamberlain, 28 Sept, & 24 Nov. 1916, CP2.
Z Z
^eG Speeches I, 46-49? Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 28 Sept, 1916,
CP 2? Y to S/S, 6 Oct. 1916, S/S to Y(C&ID), 12 Jan. & 1 Feb., & Y (C&II>) 
to S/S, 20 March 1917? CP8. In refusing the second bill Chelmsford 
used the excuse that investigation was needed and that legislation, when 
it came, should be a. government measure? see Speeches I, 226-228.
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 9 Feb. & 10 March 1917? CF3«
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that agitation was ’vary serious’ and that ’the tine for palliatives'
35was past* The Commerce and Industry Department alleged that the
Secretary of State did not realise the gravity of the situation, which
had ’all the potency of a morn,! crusade1. Gandhi announced that ho woult
try "by force to prevent tho recruiting of indentured labour, placing
the Government in the odd predicament of perhaps having’1 to prosecute
56for interference with a system which they had publicly condemned.''
In tho midst of this debate the Army Department requested
that assisted emigration be prohibited under tho Defence of India Rules
in order to encourage array recruiting. Chelmsford decided that in this
he had found 'an opportunity of finishing a vicious system’ - if it
were once banned, he believed, 'hard facts' would 'prevent its rc-
institution'. He pointed out that tho Secretary of State could not
37claim he had not been warned of the growing agitation. Chamberlain
considered some of the alarm hysterical; he was not an admirer of
Hardinge’s policy on South Africa, end thought Chelmsford had no
justification for adopting a similar approach when the colonies wore
not intransigent - Meston and Sinha, in a separate negotiation during
the 1917 Imperial Conference, were able to secure agreement that the
38system must bo ended. But Chamberlain's hand was forced; habitually 
he was unwilling' to interfere with the Government's discretion when it 
meant asking them to accept responsibility for an important policy of 
which they disapproved and on which they might be thought to be bettor 
informed - the scandals of the Mesopotamia campaign, then under 
investigation and attributable mainly to oven-centralisation, could 
only have increased his reluctance. The Government of India, by 
invoking the twin arguments of agitation and the. war, succeeded in­
directly in prohibiting indentured emigration.
7C
See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 15 Feb., & Chamberlain to Chelmsford
2 March 1917, CP3; V to S/S, 16 & 28 Feb., & 9 March, 2c (C&ID) 9 March
1917, CP8.
36
See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 6 Oct. 1916, CP2, & 9 6: 15 Feb,,
3 & 10 March, & Reed to Claude Hill, 28 Feb. 1917, CP3> V(C&ID) to S/S
18 Sept. 1916, CP7. Bonar Law, in tho Colonial Office, requested 12 
months' delay for the most minor changes; Chelmsford objected strongly 
See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 6 Oct. 1916, CP2.
37
Speeches I, 286-287 & 295-296; V(C&ID) to S/S, 20 March 1917, 
CP 8; Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 3 March, & Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 
16 & 29 March 1917, CP3.
Speeches I, 387~388; Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 2, 16 & 29 March,
& Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 3 March 1917, CP3.
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In reply to Chamberlain’s criticism, Chelmsford explained
that he did not fear agitation except when it was strengthened by a moral
issue; this came near to an admission that he had decided on the ban,
not in tho interests of order or the army, but because, as with tin.
Lancashire cotton protection, he personally agreed that the system 
30
should be changed. Chamberlain had also complained that Chelmsford
had sacrificed negotiations and provided no alternative - but in a
telegram of 19 March the Government of India had set out a scheme for
safe-guarded free emigration,4^ and moreover the conference organised
by the Colonial Office continued its work in July and recommended a
scheme which was rather loss liberal than the Government of India had
wanted but which still provided, as Montagu urged, unprecedented
advantages for Indian colonists.42- The conclusions were, however,
largely academic, as the Government of India refused to consider the
introduction of any new scheme until Indian opinion had begun to ask 
42for one. They continued to look after Indian rights overseas, send­
ing deputations to Ceylon, Fiji and the Malay States, and attacking 
discriminatory legislation in South and East Africa - Chelmsford
considered that ho had pledged himself 'in the most unmistakable way
43to stand up for Indian rights in Crown colonies'.
At the end of 1920 the emigration controversy was reopened 
when C.F. Andrews reported on further terrorisation of Indians in Fiji. 
Towards the end of January, tho Government, having sent yet another 
deputation to investigate in Fiji, decided to introduce a bill on 
emigration both because tho Defence of India Act was due to expire- and
39
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 28 April 1917? CP3* He had ’complete 
sympathy’ with the Indian point of views see Chelmsford to Archbishop 
of Brisbane, 5 March 1918? CPI5« For some Indian attitudes to indentured 
emigration and the campaign for its abolition, see Fadmini Sengupta, 
Sarojini Naidu, London 1966; Bonarsidas Chaturvedi & Majorie Sykes, 
Charles Freer Andrews, London 1949? 120-123 & also 134-156; M.K. Gandhi. 
An Autobiography ... (tr. Mahadev Desai), Ahmedabad 1940 (2nd ed.), 
295-297; & The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. XIII (Jan. 1915'
Oct. 1917)? Ahmedabad 1964? especially 339 &, 354-355* See also earlier 
campaigns and a description of conditions in South Africa, in B.R. Panda, 
Mahatma Gandhi, London 1958, especially 46-50.
40 V(C&ID) to S/S, 19 March 1917, CP8.
41 S/S to V(CfID), 1 Feb. & 29 May, & V(CAID) to S/S, 3 June 1917,
42 See, for example, S/S to V(CD), 7 & 25 Jan., & V(CD) to S/S, 15 
Jan. 1921, CP14*
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Speeches II, 242-245 & 453-456; Chelmsford to Montagu, 29 Jan.. 
4 Feb. & 7 July 1920, Cp6.
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because renewed public interest made it necessary for them to formulate 
their policy. Chelmsford had already insured that there would bo no 
return to the indenture system - at the time of the ban he had announced 
to the Imperial Legislative Council and to the women’s deputation that, 
in his view, reintroduction was impossible. The Government, therefore, 
proposed to prohibit all assisted emigration to countries where Indians 
did not enjoy the same political rights as other British subjects, to 
permit and even encourage other free emigration, and to appoint agents 
in appropriate countries to protect the interests of Indian settlers. 
Their bill permitted the emigration of skilled workers under certain 
conditions, except to any country specifically excluded? and prohibited 
the emigration of unskilled workers except to any country specifically 
approved.44 Thus India had asserted her right to pass laws, against 
the interests of other parts of the Empire, without any prior agreement 
having been reached. The eventual legislation may not have violated 
the -understanding reached with the Colonial Office, for it was open for 
certain countries to be approved for emigration? but, like tho Indian 
policy which proceeded it, tho new law made such London-based agreements 
irrelevant. The Government of India wore taking the sort of action 
normally taken only by independent nations.
Under Chelmsford there was a willingness also to consider 
the removal of racial discrimination in internal policies. As Indians 
participated more, and more equally, in government, certain adjustments 
were inevitable. Obvious steps, however, were not always easy. Through­
out the viceroyalty, for example, the Government of India tried to 
persuade the Secretary of State and the Council of India to modify the 
rule forbidding British officials to receive presents from Indians - in 
many cases this rule was now absurd, embarrassing to the British and 
offensive to Indians. But the London authorities refused to change -
the best Montagu could do was advise Chelmsford to do a little 1 judicious 
45rule-breaking'. But in other more important matters the response was 
less wooden and bureaucratic.
44 See V(CD) to S/S, 20 Dec. 1920, CPI3, & 15 & 20 Jan., & S/S to 
V(CD), 7 Jan. 1921, CP14.
45 See Chelmsford to Montagu, 17 March (with enclosures; Shafi to 
Chelmsford, 11 March, & Chitnavis, A Currimbhoy to Chelmsford, 17 March)
& 50 Oct., & Montagu to Chelmsford, 1 & 15 April & 10 Uov, 1920, CP65 
G/I(HD) to S/S, 7 Sept. 1917 & 16 July I9I8, S/S to G/l, 14 Dec. 1917 V 
30 Jan. 1919) & HD Circular, 13 Oct. 1919, &■ replies, Ii.Public 88, Sent. 
1917, 76-77, July 1918, 367-388, Oct. 1919, A 43-54, May 1920.'
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The Arms Act, prohibiting the bearing or ownership of arms 
by any except specially exempted Indians, was one great source of
46discontent. In Hardingc.1 s time, the Government of India, admitting 
that the racial distinction - no European wa.s subject to the Act - 
was invidious1, proposed an all-inclusive licensing system, with 
moderately high fees except for persons required to carry arms in the 
course of their employment* Local governments generally approved the 
proposal, but the Government of the Panjab and later, in London, the 
Council of India pointed cut that there would be ill-feeling if all 
Indian exemptions were abolished. Under Chelmsford the Government of
India agreed to retain some personal as opposed to racial exemptions.
17
This decision made delays inevitable, and the Home Department had
recorded that local government replies had generally strengthened their
belief that a complete licensing system would be preferable. The decision
to allow some exemptions was in fact made under pressure from London ~
Chamberlain had endorsed the Council of India's interpretation and
48urged it upon Chelmsford.1
The Home Department began by consulting local governments on 
the exemptions to be retained. They suggested two categories for 
considerations full exemption for a limited number, including heads 
of governments and great zamindars5 and exemption from enquiry before
receipt of a license for persons gazetted by name at the discretion ^f
49
the local government. Pour provinces, Bombay, the United and the
Central Provinces, Burma and the Northwest Prontier Province, continued
to support total licensing,but the remainder were unwilling to see
hereditary privileges taken away - there was a feeling that they should
50not risk disaffooting a loyal class in order to appease politicians.
The Government of India, after considering these replies, produced a 
third plan, a compromise which moved as far as possible in the direction 
of full licensing while still retaining an element of the former 
privileges. They suggested, in July 1918, an even smaller number of
^  Speeches I, 389*
47
Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 11ov. 1918, CPA.
^  Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 5 April, & 16 May 1916 (with minute by 
Daljit Singh, 13 May), CP2j H.Poll. 146-147, March 1916, & 136-148,
March 1917*
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50 H.Police 81-83, Aug. 1918.
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full exemptions, but a very wide class of persons to whom licenses would
bo issued without investigation. Tho proposed list was generous to
Indians, although not to officials - it included all princes, title-
holders, Coorgs, various local notables, but only senior executive 
31officers. The aim was clearly to introduce a licensed system with
the least possible inconvenience to those who might be offended at
the loss of their privileges. There was little concern about European
sensibilities - the Government ignored the more fundamental complaints
from the European Association of Calcutta, and later were unmoved by
52criticisms in the Anglo-Indian press.
After two years the Government had produced what seemed like
a workable and sensible plan. There remained the need to render it
acceptable and to reassure any doubts about their intentions. At the
second session of 1918? "the- question of the Arms Act was referred to
a committee of the Imperial Legislative Council, with which official
53representatives of the provinces wore associated. A year later new
54regulations were issued. Chelmsford explained that they were governed
by three principles - racial discrimination was ended; arms were
readily available to suitable persons; and they were kept from the 
55unsuitable.
Another outstanding grievance, of deep political significance, 
concerned tho Indian army. Many of the- attentions lavished on the army 
under Chelmsford - improvements in pay and conditions, land grants and
HD circular, 26 July 1918? ibid.
H.Police t151-138, Feb., & 157-209? Dec. 1920. (They wore ready to 
discuss details, but not the underlying objection that changes in policy 
had virtually disarmed the Europeans; see also below, note 55)*
55 See H.Police 131-156, Fob. 1920; V to S/S, 9 July? & (BD)? 21 Oct. 
1918, CP9. The immediate reason for the Act was to avoid a situation 
in which people no longer exempted would be breaking the law - see the 
following, note 54*
54 The main provisions of the new regulations followed the earlier 
suggestions - a removal of any racial exemptions and a general curtail­
ment of persons formerly exempted by the discretionary powers allowed 
under section 27 of the Indian Arms .act 1878. The Arms .Amendment Act 
of 1919 provided an opportunity for tho Government to explain and gain 
approval for its new policy, but the Act’s provisions merely substituted 
a new section 16 in the 1878 Act, to allow deposit and sale of arms by 
persons no longer exempted.
Chelmsford to Montagu, 13 Oct. 1920? CP6. (Chelmsford was reject­
ing the 'strain of antagonism' which underlay detailed criticisms of 
the new regulations.)
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pensions for discharged soldiers, even the establishment of a school
for the sons of officers - were essentially in the nature of rewards 
56for services. Tho most important innovation, however, was a political
gesture in answer to public opinion. Under Chelmsford, the racial
barrier within the army was breached for the first time, and Indians
were permitted to hold ling's commissions. The decision was political
also in its repercussions: if India was to be held by force, then the
ultimate control of the Indian army had to be retained in British
hands? alternatively, if Indians wero to govern their own affairs, they
would have to be admitted into partnership in the leadership of their
own army - whether Europe1 an officers liked it or not.
Commissions for Indians wore not a new cause. Mirto had
strongly supported tho proposal? and Hardinge had given it prominence
in his famous memorandum on postwar questions. Under Uardinge, however,
there had been disagreement on details - the Commander-in-Chiof ana a
minority of the Council and the local governors being more cautious than 
57the viceroy. Chelmsford recognised that while divisions continued
in India there was little hope of convincing the military authorities
in London, He considered asking the army to place one or two men on
58duty to formulate a plan. In the meantime progress had been blocked 
in London. The Secretary of State had suggested a few immediate 
commissions as a provisional measure? even this had been turned down
59by the War Office. The Cabinet were too busy to consider the question.
In February 1917? however, Chamberlain was ready to try again. He 
thought he could convince the War Office if he confined his proposal
go
to commissions for a few Indians of 1unquestionable suitability',
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See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 12 Oct, lyl6, CF2; Speeches I, 361-
385.
57 See Mary Kynynmond, Countess of Min to (ed.)9 India, Minto and Morluy, 
1905"197Q ? London 1934? 265? Hardinge, Note on Grants of Commissions to 
Indians (with enclosures), ACP21/5/2? S/S to V, 17 Nov., V to S/S, 24 
Dec., Hardinge to Duff, 18 Dec., & Duff to Hardinge, 21 Dec. 1915, 
ACP21/3/3. The demand had also been put forward by Sinha in his 
Congress Presidential address, 27 Dec. 1915? soe H.Poll. 558, Dec. 1916,
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Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 21 April 1916, CP2,
59 Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 5 April, & see also 22 Aug. 1916, CP2.
S/S to V(AD), 5. & 19 Fob, 1917? CP8. Seo also Chamberlain to 
Chelmsford, 14 Pub. 3-917? CP3*
But by this time the Indian army plan was completej tho Army Depart­
ment suggested four lines of advance. In future, for suitable, 
educated and well-born Indians, there should be ten places a year 
reserved at Sandhurst? for premising Indian soldiers, there should be 
a non-commissioned officers' school established in India - exception­
ally brilliant graduates might also be awarded British commissions.
For the present, Indian officers of distinguished service would be 
granted British commissions, and honorary commissions, with increases
in pay and pensions, wvild bo awarded to one or two Indian officers 
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from each unit.  ^ The India. Office was at first unhappy about the 
suitability of Sandhurst training for the posts which, in their view, 
Indians would be likely to hold? but the Government of India insisted 
that only Sandhurst education would mean equality for Indian officers 
and prevent any exacerbation of racial feeling - British and Indian 
officers were to consider themselves part of the same cadre. Chamber1a in 
accepted this view and placed it before the War Office. It was rejected. 
Chamberlain prepared a minute to take the matter to the Cabinet,^
At this point Chamberlain resigned as a result of the find­
ings of the Mesopotamia Commission, Aclwin Montagu, on taking up office,
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found Chamberlain's minute ana circulated it with his support. On
2 August 1917, opposition having been overcome by Montagu and Curzon,
the Cabinet accepted the principle of commissions for Indians. Bine
named officers were to receive immediate commissions under one part of
the Indian army scheme. The remainder of the recommendations were 
6^still in doubt. r The Array Department sent a despatch embodying a
full version of their proposals. Most of the cadets were to be educated
at Dehru Dun, on public school lines, before being sent to Sandhurst?
on gaining commissions, they were to be able to elect to join the
Indian army (after one year's service with a British regiment), thus
bypassing tho Unattached List, from which permanent commissions wore
6Sawarded in strict seniority or by place at graduation. The War 
61 V(AL) to S/S, 8 March I917, CP3.
^  S/S to V(AD), 28 March & 5 May, S/S to V, 29 March, & V(AD) to 
S/S, 17 April, CP8, &■ see S/3 to V, 19 Get. 1917, ACP21/5/7.
6S
Chamberlain, Memorandum, 10 July, & Montagu, Bote, 20 July 1917? 
ACP21/3/4-
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Montagu to Chelmsford, 3 Aug. 1917? CP3? S/S to V, 2 Aug. 1917? CP85 
Curzon to Chamberlain, 25 Aug. 1917, AGP14/l/5a. The agreement was 
announced? sec S/S to V(AD), 16 & 18 Aug', 1917, CP8.
65 G/i(AD) to S/S, 3 Aug. 1917? ACP21/3/6.
Office prepared to fight a rearguard action against anyone schooled 
in India and against the admission of Indian officers to any hut the 
Indian army. But the Government of India accepted their objections to 
Dehra Dun, and, although they reacted sharply against any formal ’colour 
bar1, pointed out that the War Office could refuse any posting to the 
British army on their own discretion.^ In April 1918? after a 
conference between the India and War Offices, agreement was finally 
reached along these lines. The total number of commissions, from 
Sandhurst and in promotions from the ranks, was not to exceed twenty 
in any one year. The Government of India had asked that no limit be 
stated. ^
Chelmsford had never expected that the proposals would satisfy
'vocal politicians’, but he knew that greater concessions were unlikely
from the War Office.^ The decision in 1918, however, following on the
expectation raised by the first nine appointments of the year before,
seemed particularly inadequate. Chelmsford at first decided he would
make no special announcement, unlike in 1917• He wrote to Montagus
’It Is useless to display a crumb and say "gentlemen, believe me, this
is really a loaf"'. The Army Department, on the other hand, suggested
that they should be allowed to announce, in addition to the permanent
changes, that up to two hundred temporary wartime commissions would be
awarded. The Cabinet, while accepting the permanent measures, rejected
this proposal, and then asked for more information. Their position was
uncertain - and Sir T.W. Holdemess at the India Office believed that
a difference of opinion was revealed in the different tones of the
private and official telegrams reporting the decision to India. The
Prime Minister, in the words of his own addition to the private telegrem,
was chiefly 'anxious to have a fuller statement' of the military
reasons, whereas Curzon and Chamberlain had expressed 'more decided 
70disapproval'. The ambiguity was to prove useful. Montagu, who was 
cc
S/S to V, 19 Oct., & V(AD) to S/S, 13 Nov. 1917? AGP21/3/7.
^  See Montagu to Chelmsford, 16 May & 15 June 1918, CP4? S/S 'to
V(AD), 5 April 1918, CP9 (d AGP21/5/7).
68
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May, & see Chamberlain to Chelmsford,
11 April 1917? CP5«
69
Chelmsford to Montagu, 28 April 1918, CP4« A communique was issued 
on 21 June| see V(AD) to S/S, 13 July 19I8, CP9-
70 S/S to V,23? 24, 26 & 27 April, A (AD), 22 A 28 April 1918, CP9
(& ACP21/3/8) § ACP21/3/9-H .
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in India, launched a vigorous memorandum asking for reconsideration.
He claimed that the two hundred commissions were essential to India's
recruiting efforts, in which the home Government had recently asked to 
71see improvements. The Government of India, also protested, and 
promised up to half a million new recruits if they were allowed to offer 
the stimulus of the temporary commissions - they had in mind about fifty 
of these every six months. They insisted that there would be no lower­
ing of standards 5 and they rejected a suggestion that the Indian Land
Force cadre might be revived as an alternative - this, they held, would
72merely perpetuate an irritating racial distinction. Lord Curzon
rounded on these pleas with a strident Cabinet minute. This meant, he
claimed, that commissions wore to be used as 'political rewards’? this
was not the type of officer they wanted? this would discredit the whole
73commissions scheme. The question came before the Cabinet after
Montagu's return. Chamberlain, irritated by Curzon's interjections,
became a vigorous supporter, while the War Office, in Montagu's
description, tried to get a hearing but were routed. The Cabinet's
main fear on the commissions - that British cadets would be discouraged
from applying - did not apply to the temporary arrangement. The two
hundred commissions were approved. There was one rather important
proviso, imposed for fear of unduly raising Indian hopos. The concession
was not to be published - presnmab^ the effect for the benefit of
7 /
recruiting was to be gradual.
One of Cursson's objections had had more than immediate 
significance, and its rejection by the Cabinet was of far greater 
importance than the immediate decision. Curzon claimed: 'Tho more yon.
hand over the civil administration of India to the Indian, the more you 
will have to depend in the last resort for the stability of the British 
connection upon the prestige and authority of the army.' It was 
precisely this belief that the policy of Indian commissions had sought 
to contest? it was precisely this view of the British raj which the 
whole tenoKp of Chelmsford's positive measures sought to deny. The
71 See Montagu to Chelmsford, 16 May 1918, CP4? Montagu, Cabinet 
Memorandum, 27 May 1918, ACP21/3/I2.
72 V(AD) to S/S, 18 May 1918, CP9 (& ACP21/3/12).
73
Curzon, Cabinet Mote, 5 June 1913, ACP21/3/13.
74
S/S to V, 13 June, & (AD), 12 June 19I8, CP9s Montagu to Chelmsford, 
15 June 1918, C?4«
58
question was how India was to Do held. The logic of Chelmsford’s
policy - and the issue of army commissions now formed part of a
consistent whole - was that India should ho hold not hy force but by
partnership and transfer of power.
All these positive measures Montagu related directly to
public opinion and constitutional reform, calling them ’lubricants’.
He wanted rather more of them than one overworked and understaffed
administration could have tackled. Chelmsford and the Government of
India placed more emphasis on the virtues of each measure in itself.
Chelmsford identified three major concerns of his policy in 1917 -
to reward the Indian army5 to remove all Indian grievances, whether
material or sentimental5 and to define the goal of British rule,
75mapping out the roads which would lead to it. The first two of these
could have been espoused by any benevolent government5 the last, as
interpreted by Chelmsford, imposed a view of the British raj as a
preparation for Indian self-government. Thus the removal of grievances
and the definition of the goal were always interrelated; those causes
of discontent which were admitted to be material, could only be put
right in ways which did not contradict the general conception of the
British role in India - they were part of the mapping out$ they provided
some of the roads. Chelmsford told his Legislative Council in 1916s
war_7 do not and will not prevent the
Government of India from giving their earnest attention to the problems
of this great Empire. The growing self-respect and self-consciousness
of her people are plants that we ourselves have watered, and if the
blossom is not always what we expect, it is not for us to blame tho 
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plant.' The concern with tho response to public opinion, the 
assertion of India’s role, and the denial of racial superiority, were 
not only appeasements, for all the paternalism of Chelmsford's tone.
They were part of an Imperial purpose, and led to Imperial partnership. 
Yet relations with the influential and articulate classes 
worsened steadily under Chelmsford. He had emphasized the value of 
educated support and the dangers that a minority could infect the masses> 
as opposition gained a wider basis, his predictions were proved correct, 
He had tried to counter Simla’s slowness and isolation by introducing 
consultation at every level of his administration, and his Government
'those preoccupations / with the
75 Speeches I, 380-381.
76 Ibid. , 202-203.
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had attempted to use modern methods of publicity and propaganda; his 
and their unpopularity grew regardless. The problem was partly that 
Chelmsford's personality was different from Hardinge's5 it was perhaps 
more that all Hardinge's promises had matured in Chelmsford's time, 
through Chelmsford's own energies and with the rapid developments in 
the situation and in Indian hopes as the result of the war - the time- 
had come when fine speeches had to be given a definite form, and 
inevitably that form turned out to be a disappointment, under Chelmsford 
as it would have been under Hardinge. But nevertheless the most cogent 
reason for the unpopularity was probably the current belief that there 
was a contradiction in government policy. Much of that part of tho 
population which was truly political, by tradition and by resources in 
publicity and education, presented itself to the Government as 
unalterably opposed to their 'alien rule'. The disaffected people 
recognised that some of the government measures were beneficial; but 
they consistently doubted the Government's good faith. They were not 
impressed by what Montagu rather ominously called 'lubricants'. They 
suggested that each concession merely sweetened the next indignity.
The cry of Tilak, that home rule was more important than good rule, had 
been sharpened by the belief that 'good rule' was invariably tempered 
with repression.
But more than this, perhaps Indians were right to suspect
Chelmsford's policy. When he helped improve India's status or
espoused Indian causes against British or imperial interests, it was
because he believed that the Indian government should try to reflect
the will of the peoplej when he agreed to remove racial disabilities,
it was because he believed the government should treat Indians as equal
citizens not as subject peoples; when he urged army commissions for
Indians, even if the change had to be forced on British officers, it was
because he thought full participation by Indians in all aspects of their
country's life was both desirable and inevitable. But these were still
limited aims. It does not seem that Chelmsford did these things because
he intended to help create a wholly independent India, or an independent
77wholly Indian army. 'The question was how India was to be held';
77 A shift to these aims was of course only a matter of time (and not 
much time) in view of the innovations under Chelmsford. With the army 
there is some ambiguity, but it seems the change came in response to 
the new situation after the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In October 1920 
the Esher Committee, appointed to consider army organisation, recommended 
closer links with the Imperial urmy, and, contrary to Chelmsford's 
policy, a weakening in Government of India supervision. The TT.A reacted 
with a hostile resolution on 17 February 1921, and a committee on 5 March,
6o
Chelmsford’s aim was conservative, his dispute with reactionaries over 
tho moans of preserving British supremacy. He postulated partnership 
for Indians and ultimately a drastic reduction in British involvement, 
hut alongside the continuance of British Empire, He looked forward to 
the transfer of power, not of sovereignty. In practical terms the 
distinction was meaningless, hut this was just what was alarming - for 
might not the reservation of sovereignty he used in practice, as it was 
in the 1919 reforms, to limit the transfers of power which had heen 
conceded in prinoiple? Thus, although the suspicion may not have heen 
formulated precisely at the time, the limit to Chelmsford's imagination 
was perhaps crucial for the reaction to his policies. It affected his 
presentation of his approach; it qualified his promises; it made his 
intentions seem suspect. Perhaps altogether it helped jaundice his 
reception; we shall he considering this question again. Certainly, 
as far as public opinion was concerned, it is clear at least that any 
success claimed hy the Government of India was hedged ins it had to 
stand against a growing and seemingly inevitable tide of nationalism, 
uncompromising and ethnocentric.
on 28 March in a series of resolutions it sought to establish the 
principles that the army should be controlled in India, increasingly 
led hy Indian and India-trained officers, and used for Indian purposes 
or, if in Imperial defence, then on terms of parity with Dominion 
armies. In 1921 the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Rawlinson, appointed the 
Shea Committee which (at his prompting) advised complete indianisation 
in 90 years. In 1944 'the proportion of British to Indian officers was 
about 1.5-1. See R.C. (with A.K.) Majumdar, The History and Culture of 
the Indian People Vol.XI, Struggle for Freedom, Bombay 1969? 800- 
802.
PART TWOs AGITATION.
Chapter 3. Tactical Non-interference
Tho British government in India had two replies to Indian
political activity. One was repression; the other was conciliation.
There were also two faces to British rule: one of a permanent
autocracy, and the other of an agency preparing Indians for future
self-government under British suzerainty. It would he possible to
argue that repression was the weapon of autocracy, and conciliation
a necessary corollary to the approval of future self-government. Tho
later history of the British period would then be seen as a struggle
between two opposed, goals, two different paternalisms. Lord Curzon,
who, as Viceroy, was the extreme exponent of 'good' as opposed to self-
government, suppressed Indian opinion with efficiency, more by ignor-
1
ing It than by incarcerating Its leaders. He would be represented as 
the flourish near the end of one tradition; other viceroys would be 
ranged as supporters of his or the rival school.
These polarities are useful as a framework, but otherwise are 
too facile. They would encourage a tendency to divide viceroys and 
their councillors into heroes and rogues, or statesmen and bigots. Yet 
governments with very different policies or reputations often had 
personnel and principles in common. There was never a simple division 
and conflict between repression preserving autocracy and conciliation 
leading to the transfer of power. Always both elements coexisted in 
the same administration. If repression sometimes found a place along­
side the promise of self-government, the reason was not necessarily thrt 
Nie promise was false, held out by cynical bureaucrats who had no intention 
of relinquishing powers even the most ardent official advocate of self- 
government insisted that progress must be gradual, and that in the 
interim the British must retain control, discourage certain political 
ambitions, and put down violence. Many Indians agreed. It is some­
times surprising to remember how long somo nationalists accepted at 
least the principle of this British supremacy. In June 1920, M.K. Gandhi
See S. Gopal, British Policy in India 1858-1909? Cambridge 1965? 
224-245? 26l, 266-2§8~& 271-272; V.C, Bhutani, 'Some Aspects of the 
Administration of Lord Curzon' , Bengal Past and Present LXXXV, Part II 
No.160 (July-Dee. 1966), 157-181? &. for correspondence, S. Bhattacharya,
'Lord Curzon and the Indian National Congress', Calcutta Review 131? No.l 
(April 1954)* 'Good' government, the orthodox and self-centred con­
centration on efficiency, rampant in the secretariats, is discussed, for 
1857-1907? in Valentine Chirol, India Old and New, London 1921, 102-103•
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still called himself ’a devoted well-wisher of the British Empire'.
It follows that somo assessments of viceroys and administra­
tions have been too simple. Lord Chelmsford provides a notable case in 
which confusion has led to an incomplete verdict. His name is 
associated with important constitutional reforms, and he named the 
future transfer of power as tho goal of his government 5 but chiefly 
ho has been blamed for brutal repression and a la.ck of sympathy with 
politicians. He himself, writing to Austen Chamberlain, tho Secretary 
of State for India, explicitly denied newspaper suggestions that his 
arrival had. changed tho spirit of Indian government - ho cited his
advocacy of reforms, and stressed the responsibility of his popular
3
predecessor, Lord Hardinge, for drastic measures against unrest.
Chelmsford., inevitably the heir of a policy which has been attributed
also to Lord Ripon,  ^could d.isputo with the educated classes only the
timing not the principle of the advance, nevertheless, during
Chelmsford's viceroyalty, constructive measures were popularly attribute
to the Secretary of State, after 1917 the persuasive Edwin Montagu5 and -
a s repression was often adopted on local initiative, tho tendency has
been to conclude that Chelmsford and his Council had very little policy 
3
of their own.' The assumption hen been that liberal measures and the 
acceptance of repression were mutually exclusive, and that, when they 
occurred in the same administration, each must have been advocated by 
a different person. There have never been any grounds for this 
assumption.
It was the situation in India that was changing. British 
policy had been undergoing a long process of adjustment to politicp.l 
India, n recent commentary has shown how, in the ninetoonth century 
under Lytton and Dufferin, different policies emerged from a debate on 
the proper attitude to the English-educated, and revealed, in the 
effective exclusion of Indians from higher administration, the
2
Gandhi to Chelmsford, 22 June 1920, CP24* More particularly, sec 
B.C. Pal, The Hew Policy, Madras / 1918_/, 50-53? for the acceptance 
of British control of the Imperial Government of India.
3
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 Aug. 1916, CP2.
^ S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon 1880-1884? London 1953? 
222-223.
5
See, for example, R, Danzig, 'Common Ground.: the Early Stages of
the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms', unpublished Oxford B.Phil. thesis,
June 1967? 19-31 & 93-102? & above, pp.Sff. & below, pp. 313-314*
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ascendency of the goal of permanent autocracy. This tendency was also 
strong enough to prevail against the personal opposition of Ripon.^
Lord Curzon went ahead to partition Bengal in defiance of local senti­
ment, arguing that it was useless to try to persuade people, who would
he convinced only hy a fait accompli. He has heen accused of owing
7more to efficiency than to vision5 hut he too had a kind of vision, 
dangerous to Indian advance, in his belief in tho Englishman’s sacred 
duty to maintain the Indian Umpire. After Curzon, this position became 
more vulnerable, and willingness to conciliate politicians increased in 
rough proportion with their vehemence and popular support. Lord Minto, 
Curzon*s successor, recognised that the Indian National Congress could 
not be ignored, at the same time as ho prepared to doal with 'revolu­
tionary* crime. It was no longer possible for the scorn, with which 
Lytton and Curzon had regarded educated Indians, to find a place in
public policy - oven in the Indian Civil Service, the voice of change 
8had to be heard. '’But Minto still believed that the Congress re-
9presented a section which would never play a, large part In government; 
and the constitutional reforms of 1909 did little more than half- 
consciously continue, as on previous occasions, a faltering progress 
which was to lead to self-determination. With the 1919 reforms, however, 
the progress ceased to bo unwitting. During tho 1914-1918 war, the 
need for adjustment had suddenly become more acute.
There were many reasons for the acceleration in the rate of 
change. Democratic ideals were abroad; Japan, an Asian nation, and 
Ireland, a British colony, had asserted themselves against imperial 
powers; in India, among other factors, wartime loyalty and hardships 
seemed to justify hopes of political concessions - rumour reported, 
accurately, that those were already being discussed by the government.
As hardship grew more severe, Indian expectations multiplied.^ More-
^ Anil Seal, Tho Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Cambridge 1968, 
131-193.
7
Gopal, British Policy ... 1838-1903? 227 & 249.
0
See for example E. Maconochie, Life in the Indian Civil Service, 
London 1926, 251-252.
9
S.R, Wasti, Lord Minto and tho Indian Nationalist Movement 1905 to 
19109 Oxford 1964, 22-25 &. 93*
Explanations are suggested in A. Besant, India1 Bond or free, Adyar, 
Madras 19393 176-208, 6c Congress Speeches, Adyar, Madras 1917? 50-77 
(or see excerpts in C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Annie Besant, Delhi 1963,
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over, in 1916, nationalist politics hod entered a critical phase. In
the country and the Congress? influence and standing were being won by
'extremists1, politicians who advocated more militant nationalism?
short of violent revolution? under such leaders as the Hindu revivalist?
E.G. Tilak? and the Irish Theosophist, Annie Besant. Tilak? in
particular? had spent a lifetime gathering support, and few literate
11families in Maharastra can have escaped his influence. With tho war?
economic distress and burgeoning' political interest? the time had come
to reap the benefits of this long campaign,, Congress memb-.rs, on the
whole, under moderate leadership? had merely informed the government once
a year of their opinions as educated Indians 5 tho now agitators tried
to create a climate of opinion among people at largo? and to use this
support to bargain with tin government. As the Congress at first was
slow to change? Tilak and Mrs. Besant formed Home Rule Leagues, and,
for the first time? Indian opinion confronted the government as a
permanently organised and active opposition. The leagues introduced a
simple demand, borrowed from Ireland? and, using this slogan In their
name and in newspapers and lecture tours? sought? in Mrs. Besant1s phrase?
to ’awaken tho masses1. Impatience with Congress politoness and
12petitions had already led to terrorism, for which the government could 
have only one answer§ now impatience was being channelled, more or loss 
within constitutional limits? into a new and ultimately more dangerous 
activism.^
The older nationalism could not remain unaffected. At Lucknow
111-145)7' 7  in more pedestrian fashion? in H.C. Mookerjco, 'The War of 
1914-1918 and the Appearance- of Biscontent1, Calcutta Review 85? 3 (June- 
1942) & 84? 1-3 (July, Aug. 8c Sept. 1942). Tiiak called for Britain to 
'moke a start in its own Empire1 with the Allies1 wartime principles of 
s^lf-determination and democracy| see D.V. Tahinankar, Lokamanya Tilak, 
London 1956? 284,
^  See for example D.D. Karve (tr.)? The Hew Brahmans, Berkeley? Los 
Angeles & Cambridge 1963? H 4  & 125-284*
12 Sec r'.R, Palande, ed. (for G/Bomhay), Source Material for a History 
of the Freedom Movement in India Vol.II (1885-1920)? Bombay 1958? 333- 
540| & R.C. Majumdar, 'The Genesis of Extremism1? & Gopal Haider?
'Revolutionary Terrorism1? in A. Gupta, ed.? Studies in the Bengal 
Renaissance, Jadarpur, Calcutta 1958? & R.C., with A.K.? Majumdar
odd., Tho History and Culture of the Indian People Vol. 'XI? Struggle 
For Freedom? Bombay 19&9? 19*8-235,
13 See Palande, op. cit., 687-694; N.C, Ke-lkar, Homo Rule and the 
Home Rule League? j(7~Poona__/ 19171 H.F. Owen? 'Toward Nation-Wide 
Agitation and Organisations tho Home Rule Leagues, 1915-1918'? in D„A. 
Low? ed,? Soundings in Modern South Asian History, London 1968.
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in 1917j as part of a new emphasis on "broad representation and unity, 
later to be summed up in the cry of 'Hindu-Musulman-ki-jai', the Congress 
entered a brief but fateful alliance with the Muslim League. In 
successive stages Congress organisation was strengthened and made 
permanent at both local and national levels, using the Home Rule approach 
and sometimes the local branches of the Leagues. Those who favoured 
less forceful methods gradually left, and the Congress found, at the 
moment when it seemed to wish to develop as a national alternative to 
the British system, that it could not avoid turning into a disciplined 
political party. Indian nationalism acquired, if not always new people, 
then new perspectives and methods; the Congress came to provide, at 
the same time, a militant accompaniment to debates and a positive 
alternative to violence. G-andhi, already appealing to the masses by 
his championing of the grievances of the ryots in Champaran and Kaira 
and the mill-workers of Ahmedabad, was both the chief beneficiary and 
an agent of this change.
It has been recognised that this development in Indian politics
was answered by a corresponding change in government policies. Professor
Dietmar Rothermund has claimed that, in the struggle with national
agitation, the government 'veered away from unmitigated autocratic rule
and tended toward a manipulative maintenance of power1 - what I have
called autocracy and conciliation. He does not, however, specifically
15point out that the process occurred unevenly. Professor D.A. Low has 
discerned, in policies between 1920 and 1922, a policy which he 
characterises as a determination to ’stalk Gandhi, not martyr him’.
He too, however, has not distinguished government attitudes to different 
types of political activity; he dismisses the policy under Chelmsford
This subject may be pursued, in addition to standard commentaries 
and biographies, in Gopal Krishna, 'The Development of the Indian 
National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923', Journal of Asian 
Studies XXIV (1965-6), 413~430; Gopi Hath, 'The Home Rule Movement in 
India' (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Agra 1962), summarised in 
Quarterly Review of Historical Studies (Calcutta) Vol. 3, No.3; N.H. 
Phatak, ed. (Tor G/Maharastraj", Source Material for a History of the 
Preedom Movement in India Vol. Ill'Tfahatma Gandhi, Part T 6 1915-1922)
Bombay 1965, 46-47? 71, 76-88. On 'Ilindu-Musulman-ki-jai1 see D.G. 
Tendulkar, Mahatma Vol. II (1920-1929), Bombay 1951, 5-8 & 9. On the 
Lucknow (or Lakhnau) Pact and wartime politics, see R.C., with A.K., 
Majumdar, op. cit., 242-260. Por a discussion of the Congress role 
conflict, seeing it as the 'mouthpiece' of the Indian nation, 'Swaraj 
Government in exile' - 'the' not 'a' political party - see P.D. Kaushik, 
The Congress Ideology and Programme 1920-1947, Bombay etc. 1964, 57 ff/
15
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"before 1920 as the persistence, in the repressive 'Rowlntt' legislation 
and the massacre at Amritsar and other repression during the disturbances 
of 1919? of an early view that all agitation was seditious, he is 
therefore able to claim that the 'stalking1 policy evolved after 1920, 
in response to Gandhi's non-cooperation. What has become clear, 
however, is that the challenge of ’nation-wide agitation and organisa­
tion' , to which this policy was a response, had appeared earlier. The 
government, accustomed to the occasional debates of the Congress, had bad 
to meet a new situation with the Home Rule Leagues, at a time when Gandhi 
and the Congress had not been fully converted to Home Rule and its 
methods
The results had been sufficiently alarming in 1917* Sir James
Meston, the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, told the
Government of India at that time that there was spreading in the country -
side 'a vague notion that in some unknown way the British raj is going
wrong or is going under, and swaraj is coming to put all things right'„
This, Meston held, together with the 'power of challenge and obstruction'
introduced in 1909 by the liorley-Kinto reforms, had discredited the
Cursonian policy of doing 'what wan right for India whether India
altogether liked it or not15 and, as a result, according to Meston,
Chelmsford was trying to govern, as had his immediate predecessors, by
'bargaining and negotiation1, 'a steady yielding to assaults1 which
18always left 'some bitterness behind on both sides'.
Chelmsford's Government had not committed themselves to this ' 
one approach. They governed still by a choice between repression and 
conciliation, according to circumstances. In theory they distinguish'd 
carefully between constitutional politics and 'anarchism1, and, in 
practice, very moderate or very extreme agitation posed no problems,’: 
on the one hand, positive concessions to Indian demands were being 
discussed at the highest levels, and, on the other hand, to the problem 
of what was called 'sedition', the Government were considering a most 
Curzonian reply. In dealing with the control of agitation, Chelmsford's 
practice was to allow local governments the same independence and give
16
D.A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Lon-cooperation 
Movement - 1920-1922', Journal of Asian Studies XXIV (1969-1966').
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19them the same support as he had been guaranteed by Chamberlain. but
in May 1916 he pointed out to Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay
that they had nothing to fear from constitutional agitation reasonably
carried on. He meant, as he explained in July, that they should be 011
their guard ’against excess of zeal in the repression of public 
20opinion', m  April I9I8, Edwin Montagu merely laid down the same
principle when he wrote to Chelmsford that dangerous or unconstitutional
agitation should be firmly put down, but 'propei?ly conducted political
21warfare however objectionable' should be left alone. There was at 
no time any questioning of this as a principle. Government policy was 
clear, at least to the Government. The problem was one of definition.
The Home Rule Leagues created a new category of argument,
protest and agitation which were neither pure politics, in the old 
Congress sense, nor revolution. The Leagues' compaign, before the 
advent of Gandhi, required a rethinking of policy. The principle was
not to be changed? but in the new situation it was necessary to decide
how it should be applied in practice. How was the demand for Home Rule 
to be categorised? Should the Leagues be stippressed, as sedition- 
mongers, or conciliated, as organs of constitutional politics? Out of 
this debate, which we shall now examine in detail, there came an 
important shift in the balance between repressive and conciliatory 
methods.
■ Early in 1917? while Mrs. Besant was prohibited from entering 
Bombay and the Central Provinces, she sat with Meston - 'cheek by jew] 1 
with him according to Willingdon - at the Lucknow session of the 
Indian National Congress, just as earlier she had been received by 
Lord Carmichael, the Governor of Bengal, while she was out of favour 
in Madras. Willingdon, with Sir Benjamin Robertson of the Central 
Provinces and Lord Pentland, the Governor of Madras, requested in 
January 191? what Willingdon called a ’concerted policy’ on Home Rule. 
Chelmsford replied that the apparently contradictory actions all had
19
y Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 12 July 1916, CP2? & see H.Poll. 299, 
July 1917.
20
Chelmsford to Willingdon, 25 May & 15 July 1916, CP17*
21 Montagu to Chelmsford, 17 April 1919, CP4*
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his approval; provinces were allowed to deal with agitators as they
saw fit. In the United Provinces Meston and he had agreed that with
the Congress in session there was every reason to avoid a han on 
22Mrs. Besant, Some of Meston!s officers had been nervous at the
presence of 1 extremists'j and Chelmsford had warned tho Lieutenant-
Governor that he should bc careful about seeing Mrs. Besant, particularly
in view of the Secretary of State’s unfavourable comments on hor visit
to Lord Carmichael, But Chelmsford had supported Meston in the view
that repression would give a 'magnificent grievance' to the extremists|
the Lieutenant-Governor for his part had promised to make no overtures 
23
to Mrs. Besant.
The other local governments were not satisfied. They requested 
24
a clarification of policy. Tho Government of India, realising this
25
was the only answer, issued in March 1917 a circular letter to explain 
their position. They wanted, they wrote, 'firm discouragement' of the 
Home Rule campaign. The methods of this discouragement, within certarn 
limits, were to be chosen locally. The governments were to try to 
persuade individuals to eschew the movement, and were to provide special 
protection for the young. If necessary they were to use the executive 
powers provided by Lord Hardinge’s wartime Defence of India Act, even 
to the extent of the precensorship of political writings. But they weav 
to check extravagant assertions, not the 'constitutional advocacy of 
reform'. The Bombay Government responded by suggesting a conference of 
local governments, presumably in the hope that the combined arguments 
of tho majority would force a change of policy. They wanted the 
Government of India, they explained, to 'define with some exactitude 
the limits within which public orators ma.y discuss schemes of con­
stitutional and administrative reforms', and they wondered if it would
be possible under the Defence of India Act to forbid the inclusion of
26Home Rule among the agenda, of public meetings. A court order in 
22
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November 1916, in a ce.se involving1 Tilak, had held that the call for
27Home Rule was not of itself seditious, Willingdon was trying to 
annul this decision. He had boon calling, in company with most other 
local governors, for a general announcement of policy - he expected it 
to deny that Homo Rule could be a near prospect, and thus outlaw the 
Home Rule agitation. The central government refused to hold a conference, 
and in a letter of 22 Hay set out their position again. It would not 
be legitimate, they wrote, to have a general ban on Home Rule. It was 
possible to ban only those meetings which were arranged ’with the 
intention of promoting disorder and disaffection'. Similarly 
precensorship we,s not for 'general or habitual adoption1. Willingdon 
countered by asking to be allowed to make his own local policy announce­
ment! this too was forbidden. In Juno the letter of 22 May was re­
peated to all local governments, forcing the Panjab Government to modify
28
their policy, which had had the effect of banning all Home Rule meetings.
The difference of opinion was important. On the one side wore
most of the local governments. They had come to consider that the main
danger lay in mass agitation, regardless of whether or not it was
conducted illegally. They wished to redefine legitimate political
activity so as to exclude what tho Congress and Muslim League called
29'educative propaganda'. They wished to cope with a now type of
agitation by reverting to an old type of control - by widening the area
in which outright repression held sway. The Government of India, on
the other hand, supported by Meston, wero determined to avoid any action
which 'might even suggest* that they wore trying to 'stifle fair
criticism or legitimate movements', and were recognising that there
could bo honest differences of opinion about the proper rate of political 
30advance. They held firmly to the traditional method of controlling
agitation mainly by the suppression of objectionable speeches and
writings - agitation a.s such was not punished, only those specific
utterances which contravened the law. Hy the same token, Chelmsford
31was opposed to a mere 'non possumus' announcement of policy,
27
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The Government of India held to their policy in defiance of
pressure, partly as a result of confusion and uncertainty. Until they
had emerged with an answer to this new agitation, it was inevitable
that thoir policy should contain contradictions and a general preference
for tried methods. It was also inevitable- that they should bo reluctant
to interfere in practice with local decisions. They did not object to
'concerted' policies where they thought them appropriate. They
investigated suggestions in 1916 that there should be a more uniform
approach to habitual criminals and criminal tribes 5 and in 1919
advocated such a policy in a conference presided over by the Home
32Member, Sir William Vincent. But in 1916, and in many ways through­
out the viceroyalty, they did not believe that the approach to political 
questions need be uniform - they stressed the need for sensitivity to 
local conditions. Their attitude was to change, as gradually they 
evolved their own answer to the new situation. But for some time it 
was uncertain how the contradictions would bo resolved, and what 
direction local discretion would take.
In June 1916, the Bombay Government had proposed to prohibit 
Mrs. Besant from entering the Presidency, where it was thought her 
influence and speeches would inflame the situation. Chelmsford, shar­
ing this apprehension, had readily agreed. His Council, including the 
Indian member, Sir Sankaran Hair, supported his decision - Nair told 
Mrs. Besant, according to Chelmsford, that he had no intention of 
advising the Viceroy to overrule a local government which included an 
Indian member, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola. Chelmsford explained to 
Chamberlains 'I hate all this suppression but India is in too in­
flammable a state to admit of lighted sparks about. If she misbehaves
further, the Madras Government will be asked to place her ... out of
33communication with her paper and politics
Tho Madras Government needed no prompting. They had wanted to 
deport Mrs. Besant in October 1915 ~ her Home Rule League having been 
formed in September - but Lord Hardinge's Government had preferred to 
wait. In February 1916, after Mrs. Besant had failed in her attempt 
to capture the Congress, Hardinge's Government had told Madras that 
they need wait no longer; and. they had taken action under the Press 
Act of 1910.^ In June 1917? they decided to Intern Mrs. Besant and
52 H.Police 103-128, May 1920.
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 16 June & 24 July 1917, CP3.
34
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two of her associates, G.S. Arundale and B.P, Wadia, on their own 
authority following the general instructions of the central govern­
ment's Home Rule circular of March. Chelmsford's Government subsequently 
gave their approval. They had not inspired the internments, they told 
the Secretary of State, but they had been on the point of suggesting
35that some action be taken. The Madras Government justified their 
action by citing Mrs. Besant's newspaper, New India, and the 'persistent 
campaign' of Mrs. Besant and Arundale to 'foment discontent' among 
students. They brought their policy within the limits imposed by the 
Government of India, by claiming that they wore reacting to 'hints of 
violence1 and not trying to repress constitutional agitation. The 
Home Rule campaign, they alleged, had 'endeavoured in every way to 
excite racial feeling and to promote animosity against the "alien 
government"'.
There were some grounds for thinking that the campaign had had.
this result; and Mrs. Besant had certainly made a number of virulent
attacks, including one which described Chelmsford as reactionary,
tyrannical and 'dangerous to the stability of the British Empire in 
36
India'. The paper held, in the midst of war, that the Indian 
government was worse than those of the Central PowTers - ruining the 
country, causing famine, deliberately impeding education. VJhat the 
government called 'criminal unrest and sedition1, New India referred to 
as 'youthful haste' and 'enthusiasm'. Following violent revolution in 
Russia, the paper called for 'push and go' in the face of repression, 
for Indian sacrifice on Russian and Japanese models. To Chelmsford 
such views proved that Mrs. Besant was following 'a policy of 
vilification of the Government' - she hoped to raise an agitation, 
and this, in Chelmsford's view, might result in a disturbance 
'culminating in bloodshed1. The Madras Government did not make'this 
careful distinctions they went further and claimed that Mrs. Besant 
was actually advocating bloodshed. But they had acted against her 
mainly because they feared her campaign and her growing influence.
Their justification, written for the central government, included 
confused references to Mrs. Besant's attempts to control the Congress,
^  V(HD) to S/S, 12 Aug, 1917> CP8. Compare Hardinge to Chamberlain,
12 Nov. 1915t Hardinge Papers 121s 'I shall ... quietly deal with 
her by internment under the Defence of India Act' (quoted by Danzig,
op. oit., 33).
36
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her use of the Theosophical Society for political purposes, and her 
effect in silencing the 'moderates'. None of these 'offences' justified 
her internment under the instructions of the Government of India. The 
local motive was transparent in the action against Wadia. The govern­
ment had virtually no case - in the very letter that was supposed to 
prove his perfidy, Wadia stressed the value of the British connection
and hoped for Home Rule without violence. Ho was interned merely to
37prevent his continuing New India in Mrs. Besant's absence.
In accepting the internments and in viewing Mrs. Besant with
such disfavour, the Government of India showed how near they were to
condoning a complete ban on Mrs. Besant. There were admittedly some
limits to what they would approve in practice. They refused to entertain
suggestions that Arundale and Mrs. Besant should be deported to England
or another province in India. Chelmsford explained privately to
Pentland that care must be taken of Mrs. Besant's health, and that
women were not permitted sea passages because of the submarine peril;
moreover the Secretary of State was unlikely to concur in further
measures,"^ But the internments had been effected without consultation
or specific sanction; there had been a public outcry in‘India, and
39
questions on the subject had 'overwhelmed' Chamberlain in Britain:
yet the Government of India had continued to support the Madras decision-
When Chelmsford justified the policy, as he did as late as July, it was
in his own terras: he thought people were beginning to realise that the
internment had been due to Mrs. Besant's methods, and that the govern-
ment could not tolerate a 'campaign of calumny and misrepresentation';
but as Meston pointed out, while evincing 'very great satisfaction' at
the internments, the danger was that they would be interpreted as an
attack on Home Rule agitation as such, and used by the 'advanced party'
to show that the government was 'hostile to any real constitutional 
A\
advance'. And while Meston saw no justification for repressing this
^  H.Poll. 90-106, Aug., & 6 & 51, Nov. 1917j Chelmsford to Chamberlain,
22 June 1917? CP3? & to Pentland, 1 Aug., & Pentland to Chelmsford,
23 July 1917? CPI9s & Annie Besant, ed,, Under Sentence of Death,
Madras 1916.
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party - its questions were reasonable oven if sometimes its manner was
not - other local governors did not agree* Sir Michael O'Dwyer in
the Panjab promptly made a speech against Home Rulers, echoing Pentland1s
42controversial declaration on the same subject*
In theory the Government of India still declined to act against 
lawful movements, and required local governments to profess to be 
showing similar restraint* Put they were totally dependent on the 
local governments for the information which indicated whether or not 
local practice conformed to the limits laid down. In August 1917 the 
Home Department assured the Secretary of State that the Madras and 
Panjab Governments were acting properly in respect of constitutional 
agitation. The Department had had to take the Local Governments'
^3word for this - tho judgment was based on the evidence they provided.
Moreover, both Pentland and O'Dwyer in their speeches had maintained
the appearance of keeping their attacks on the Home Rulers within the
framework of the circular on policy. Chelmsford had privately admitted 
44he approved, Thus, while the principle of a complete ban on Home 
Rule would never have been accepted, the practice was more seductive, 
in that the extension of repressive powers would still have seemed 
limited, while its exponents appeared to agree with the fundamentals 
of Chelmsford's idea of British rule - even Pentland sympathised with 
indianisation of the public services, and in 1914 had opposed further
press restrictions on the grounds that they would be a 'first-class
45political blunder'. An effective ban on Home Rulers could have come 
into being progressively at the provincial level, merely by the 
continuance at the centre of the policy of allowing local discretion.
There wore also signs that the Government of India were 
losing confidence in conciliatory methods, Meston, recognising the 
great suspicion and mistrust of government among Indians, stressed 
that nothing short of 'a general campaign of repression' would have 
m y  effect; but he also suggested that such a policy would not bo
42
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45 See Lady Pentland, The Right Honourable John Sinclair, Lord 
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practical or fair. As an alternative, he preferred to try to isolate 
and restrain the Home Rulers, and to reason with their leaders* He 
proposed to counter the pro-Besant feeling by a personal appeal to the 
provincial leaders - he suggested asking the nationalists to have 
patience, and assuring them that the Government were not hostile to 
reforms but were at thatmoment working out the form they should take, 
Chelmsford was doubtful. He thought the nationalists would not co­
operate and wondered if the effort would be worthwhile. He had advocated 
just this policy in 1916 to steady the Muslim community after the revolt 
of the Sherif of Mecca, and he was to suggest it again to prepare for 
the announcement of harsh peace terms with Turkey after the war.^ But 
he was not convinced that personal appeals would still the Home Rule 
uproar^ and, faced with the Viceroy's doubts, even Meston became 
uncertain. The Lieutenant-Governor decided not to risk a rebuff and 
handed over his proposed statement to be delivered by the Commissioners 
of Lucknow and Allahabad. The result was encouraging. The Commissioners 
discerned among politicians a 1 genuine suspicion' that the Government 
were contemplating a reactionary policy, but also a disposition to be 
reasonable and accept the view that they were about to pronounce on 
Home Rule.^ Yet Chelmsford had been sceptical and Meston uneasy? the 
alternative policy, the repression of the Home Rule movement for its 
aspirations and not its methods, was being openly convassed by some 
local governments and was expected by the nationalists; the Govern­
ment of India appeared to be wavering.
On 20 August 1917, Edwin Montagu read the House of Commons 
the declaration of policy for which the Government of India had long 
been asking. He had hoped to be able to announce at the same time an 
amnesty for political prisoners5 but the Government of India insisted 
that they must first consult the local governments. In their own view
an amnesty was 'obviously desirable at the present juncture if it was
compatible with the public safety1! but they thought the local govern­
ments should have discretion on this point. The provinces agreed to 
consider the cases of purely political offenders.^ But in Madras they
See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 July 1916, CP2? H.Poll. 363,
May 1919? Willingdon to Montagu, 13 May 1919. KF19.
47
Meston to Chelmsford, 20 June, & 7 A 25 July 1917, A V to LG/
United Provinces, 22 June 1917, Meston Papers 1.
^  See below, p.119-120.
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decided that it would not be safe to release Mrs* Besant. Montagu sent a
telegram strongly urging a reversal of this decision, as he wished to
49avoid an impending debate on the subject in Parliament.  ^ The Govern­
ment of India executed a. volte face. Chelmsford, despite his promise of 
local discretion, insisted that the Madras Government reconsider. They 
remained adamant. In the meantime, Sir "William Vincent met M.A. Jinnah, 
who believing Mrs. Besant would not lend herself' to agitation under­
took to encourage moderation in her if she were released and to disavow 
her if she again preached violence. In consultation with Jinnah, who 
was then a member of the Imperial Legislative Council, a question and 
answer were drafted for the next Council session. The answer, given on 
5 September, stated that Mrs. Besant would be released if she gave 
satisfactory assurances of good conduct. On the 4^h the Madras Govern­
ment had claimed the release would be 'indefensible' on local grounds? 
on the 15th Pentland, his hand forced, agreed to release the internees 
but not to accept responsibility. Chelmsford accepted the condition, 
and on 17 September Mrs. Besant was released. The Government of Madras 
made their reluctance plain in the wording of their order, and despatched
a strong letter drawing the Home Department's attention to the in-
50consistency of their policy.
The central government gave several explanations of their
conduct. Some may be traced directly to the Secretary of State.
Montagu argued that sooner or later they would have to release Mrs.
Besant? Chelmsford repeated this, talking of a 'colourable excuse',
to both Willingdon and pentland early In September before the
51Legislative Council announcement. Vincent claimed that the most
important consideration for him was not the strength of Montagu's case
52but his weakness as a defender of Pentland's. Either way the inference
49
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53has been drawn that Montagu alone 'had Mrs. Besant released’. But
Montagu, although he had always been uneasy about the internments,
expressly told the Government of India that he 'would not press' the
release of Mrs. Besant if they did not approve of it. His House of
Commons statement, that the Indian Government had acted on their own
54responsibility, was more than a polite fiction. It is true that, 
as late as 12 August, the Home Department had telegraphed the 
Secretary of State to urge that the release of Mrs. Besant would be 
a triumph for the party of violence and would cripple the administra­
tion. Chelmsford, too, continued to believe that the original 
internments had been justified. But in September the Viceroy had 
insisted to Pentland that he was convinced by Montagu's arguments* 
he was ready, he wrote, to resist the Secretary of State when he 
thought he was wrong- but not when he thought he was right. Chelmsford 
claimed he had independently decided on the release, and he wanted his 
concurrence known - he telegraphed to Londons 'I acted on my own 
responsibility and my decision was loyally accepted by the Government 
of Madrass you can make this clear'. Vincent called this a 
'chivalrous' gesture and pointed out that all members of the Executive 
Council were responsible. They had reached their decision, Chelmsford 
admitted, 'after long- and anxious thought'. A majority of the members
had changed their minds since August. There had been a shift in
55policy in India.
Chelmsford would not have insisted on an end to Mrs.
Besant's exclusion from Bombay - although, when it was found that 
the Bombay Government had lifted their restriction, the Heme Depart­
ment asked the Central Provinces to follow suit.^ Chelmsford's
53 See Ii.F, Owen, op. oit. , 177 (my emphasis).
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objection vrcis particularly to internments. In March 1917 he wrote to
Lord Carmichael of his hope that 'a very general measure of amnesty
57might "be possible after the war’. It was an enthusiasm not shared 
by the Government of Bengal, Nevertheless the shift in policy was not 
a moratorium on all internments. The Government of India continued 
to use and advocate this method against ’revolutionaries’. The shift 
in policy had been the decision to exclude Mrs, Besant from this 
category.
The change had been helped by the appointment of a new Home
Member. The repressive policy had had an ally in Sir Reginald Craddock,
Ho, inherited from Ilsrdinge, was greatly respected by Chelmsford for his
'unrivalled knowledge’, 'transparent' sincerity and openness to
conviction5 but his influence, as Chelmsford admitted, was strongly
conservative. In April 1917 the influence was lost, when Craddock was
replaced by Sir William Vincent - whom Chelmsford had chosen as a
'strong ran' who would speak his mind and who was 'persona grata' with 
58Indians, But personality was not a cause of the policy shift. Vincent 
took office some months before Mrs. Besant1s release, while the intern­
ments were still endorsed by the Home Department; and was absent on 
special duty over the constitutional reforms between October 1917 and 
February 1918, when the new policy persisted.
The intervention of Jinnah had some influence. When 
Chelmsford explained his policy to Montagu, he pointed out that the 
Government had taken precautions - they had had Jinnah's assurances, 
and Mrs, Besant had sent a message that ’she was ready to cooperate 
in securing a calm atmosphere' for the Secretary of State's visit. 
Chelmsford also justified his action to O'Dwyer and Pentland -with the 
argument that it was hardly appropriate to continue to intern Mrs.
Besant after she had given, and the Government had accepted, assurances 
59of good conduct. The Government had chosen to ask for this under­
taking, and had ordered the release before Mrs. Besant made her offer 
of cooperation; but the bargain with Jinnah did illustrate a new 
shrewdness in policy. Mrs. Besant interned was a focus of discontent; 
released and cooperative she might prove an irrelevancy. Jinnah's
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offer convinced Chelmsford that many of the politicians disliked
60Mrs. Besant and 'would he glad to see her disappear'. The release
was an attempt to help her do so.
Policy shifted, however, mainly in response to the impend­
ing' visit of Montagu, to discuss constitutional reforms. These reforms
61were, apart from the war effort, Chelmsford’s first priority. He
hoped that Mrs. Besantrs release would he an 'olive branch' to content
the moderates and take the sting from extremists. He told Pentland
that it was an 'almost inevitable concomitant' of the Secretary of 
6)2
State's visit. In June the Government had ignored Meston’s warn­
ing: that widespread agitation would follow the internment of Mrs.
Besant. Meston had been proved right. There had been extraordinary 
demonstrations of public sympathy throughout India, adding to Mrs.
Besant's prestige. In July the Bengal Government, sharing a local 
editor's view that 'a Besant agitation would fall flat in Bengal', 
predicted that there would be only a 'surface ripple' in the province 5 
in August, until Sir S.P. Sinha persuaded them to take a less alarmist 
view, they were so anxious about the situation that they banned a 
protest meeting for fear of widespread violence.^ Meston pointed out 
officially in September, underlining the moral of such experiences, 
that Indians made e. distinction between violent revolutionaries and 
agitators such as Mrs. Besant who abhorred violence. It was open
to the government to make the same distinction. An amnesty, Meston
6S
urged, would show that they could make concessions. By such reckon­
ing, Chelmsford and Vincent were encouraged to weigh the disadvantages 
if Mrs. Besant were released, against the public outcry if she were 
not. Chelmsford wrote to Montagus
I must confess that I personally wavered for some time, 
and so did the Home Member, Sir W. Vincent. It was obvious 
that we should be accused of weakness, of overruling the 
Madras Government, of giving encouragement to extremists.
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Per contra, if we refused to release her, we ran grave 
risk of jeopardising the success of your visit and the 
possibility of setting the lines of political advance. ^
We should, in fact, have stultified our whole policy.
The release of Mrs. Besant represented more than a decision
to treat the Home Rule movement as a political and constitutional j
rather than a revolutionary agitation. It marked the beginning of
a. new tactical approach. Montagu had urged that it was safe to release
Mrs. Besant. Chelmsford, repeating this to Willingdon, claimed that it
would be less harmful to release her than to continue her detention.
* ” (H
He used almost identical words to O'Dwyer nearly three weeks later.
The Government were calculating priorities. After September 1917 they
wore to place more emphasis on questions of the expediency and possible
repercussions of their policy. Chelmsford did not repudiate the
original internment, but learnt a lesson from its failure.
There was an accompanying change marked by a circular letter
of 14 September. In this letter the Home Department called for lists
of restricted persons with the evident intention of ensuring that their
cases wore reconsidered. They directed that the effect on other
provinces of any retention or relaxation should be taken into account -
hitherto this had been at local discretion. They warned that they
would press 'very strongly' for the submission of cases to an indepen-
68dent tribunal wherever restrictions were not removed. The provinces 
remained closest to the problem, but there was a new determination 
at the centre to intervene and supervise. A more active role 
necessarily followed the concern with public reactions and the more 
tactical method fostered by it. Conciliation meant central needs had 
to prevail over local.
The appeasement of politicians became a central tenet of 
Chelmsford's policy. At the opening of the Simla session of his 
Legislative Council in 1917 the Viceroy made a special plea for calm.
66
Chelmsford to Montagu, 22 SeiJt. 1917? CP3*
C 7
V to G/Madras, 2 Sept., & Chelmsford to O'Dwyer, 23 Sept. 1917?
CPI 9. Note also the care taken in reporting press reactions to the 
release; see V(HD) to S/S, 15 Sopt. 1917, CP8,
68 H.Poll. 14, Sept. 1917.
81
When this was threatened hy a 'most unfortunate speech' by Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer, Chelmsford acted sternly to maintain his policy. O'Dwyer 
had made, while Chelmsford was absent from the Council, certain 
'invidious comparisons' between provinces, and serious charges against 
some politicians. Ho had contrasted the attitude of the Panjabi soldier 
'shedding his blood in three continents' with that of the politicians 
who were 'callously discussing and even preaching the doctrine of 
passive resistance'f he suggested that the Panjab would be glad if 
the politicians would show their loyalty 'in some practical form1 
instead of 'actually dissuading their fellow citizens from joining the 
Indian Defence Force'. In the Panjab, he stressed, there was 'no 
sitting on the fence, no mp.wlcish sympathy with red-handed crime', and 
no understanding of Home Rulo propounded as 'a legitimate and 
constitutional ideal' rather than as a revolutionary goal. Indian 
members of the Council had interjected - Madan Mohan Malaviya had 
suggested that 0 'Dwyer's remarks were not consonant with 'the dignity' 
of the legislature - but the Lieutenant-Governor had been allowed to 
finish his speech.
'Dear Sir Michael,' wrote Chelmsford when the news reached
him, 'I think you perhaps scarcely realise ...-the position of
embarrassment in which you have ... placed the Government of India'.
The August Declaration, he claimed,
was made deliberately at my request for the purpose of 
allaying the political agitation existing in the country, 
and the .answer given by Sir W. Vincent on September 5th 
with regard to Mrs. Besant and my speech on the same date 
had tho sane end in view. I think I may say our object 
was substantially achieved. Throughout India a political 
truce was in effect proclaimed ....
O'Dwyer's speech had come as a 'bomb-shell'. Three Executive Councillors
had immediately expressed their dismay, and Chelmsford himself a,greed
that 'anger and resentment' were bound to be aroused. He went ons
any attempt to recreate the peaceful atmosphere which you 
have destroyed, can only be made under peculiarly difficult 
conditions, and I must remind you that it is not your 
"apple-cart" which has been upset but mine. If you had 
made such a speech in you Council, at least it "would Have 
been made in your domain. In this case your1 speech has 
been made in my Council, and its whole tone and temper 
runs counter to the spirit of what I said on September 5th.
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He concluded; 'Will you come round and see me and discuss how we
are to compose matters'. In the face of this reproof, 0'Dwyer proved
'genuinely distressed1, and, a.t Chelmsford's insistence, made a full
70apology to the Council. Chelmsford explained tc Montagu that he 
could not ignore what appeared to be a 'deliberate flouting' of his 
declared policy, particularly when there was abroad the inevitable
71rumour that O'Dwyer had merely voiced the Viceroy's private views.
To Chamberlain, Chelmsford wrote; 'I must make it clear that a
Viceroy's policy could not bo disregarded by the head of a Ideal 
72Government’. O'Dwyer had claimed that his speech was in accordance 
with government policy. Ho abstained from Council meetings on 20 
and 21 September In the hope that Chelmsford would make a statement 
on Councillors' right to freedom of speech and on O'Dwyer's own 
contention that Indian critics should be prepared to take criticism.
The Viceroy merely reiterated his view that O'Dwyer's remarks had put 
him and his Government in a very false position. Nevertheless, in his 
closing speech to the legislature, Chelmsford congratulated the 
Lieutenant-Governor on his 'generous action' and unsuccessfully tried 
to extract the apology which O'Dwyer had wanted from Malaviyo. for
nv
remarks made outside the Legislative Council.
The incident convinced the European community that Chelmsford 
was a dangerous radical. Chamberlain be came something of a repository 
for their complaints. From the India Office, Sir T.W. Holdernoss 
reported to him the view that there was now ajnong the Europeans a 
situation 'quite a.s bad as the Ilbcrt Bill created'; and Ronaldshay, 
making the same point from Bengal, declarer! that the European community 
wp.s 'near3„y frantic'. Another of Chamberlain's correspondents, Sir 
Roger Sethbridgo, M.P., argued that Chelmsford had shown 'amazing 
personal cowardice'. Chamberlain himself had doubted the wisdom of
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Mrs. Besant's release, as he did not think she would rc-strain herself, 
and was 'a good deal alarmed' at Chelmsford's rehuke of O'Dwyer, To­
gether, in his view, these policies had 'dangerously stirred ... racial 
feelings', Chelmsford replied that he was glad the Europeans in India
74were talcing an interest in politics,
O'Dwyer had not been conciliatory in private. The Government's
policy had changed, ho complained to Chelmsford, 'There is a growing
desire to conciliate the extremists by direct negotiations with their
leaders, rather than to back Local Governments in their efforts to
75rally the moderates.' Chelmsford, in reply, denied that there had 
been any change in the policy of giving discretion and support to 
local governments. But obviously, he wrote, they must now try to 
bring the people into a reasonable frame of mind. The Government, he 
went on, with a touch of malice, had already given a clear line on
7 f
that. The Viceroy still recognised, as he admitted to Willingdon
in November, that they could not create an atmosphere of tranquillity
77merely by abstaining from any attempt to control agitation. But, 
whereas reprisals had formerly been limited only by the confused 
application of a principle that constitutional agitation should not 
be muzzled, they were now limited by considerations of expediency.
To this extent the policy was, as 0'Dwyer claimed, one of conciliating 
extremists. If moderate opinion were worth anything, Chelmsford had 
told Willingdon, it would have been rallied already by the August 
Declaration. The implication was that to achieve tranquillity the 
Government must seek more general support, and that among the educated 
classes and politicians. Conservative influences - Craddock? 0 1Dwyer; 
Sir Edward Gait, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bihar and Orissa - sought 
to minimise the importance of this ’.infinitesimal section', this 
unrepresentative and isolated 'upper crust' united in an 'orgy of 
nationalism'; but the central Government had dooiled to come to terms
Holdemcss to Chamberlain, 5 Nov., ACP12/109? Ronaldshny to 
Chamberlain, (?) Sept., ACPI2/206, Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 14 Oct., 
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7ft
with as many politicians as possible. In May 1918? Chelmsford, 
writing privately to Chamberlain, explaineds ’the educated classes
are almost to a man against the Government  It may he that at
present they stand apart from the hulk of the population, hut every 
day is bringing them into closer touch . .. ' . His conclusion was that
79his 'only policy' was 'to endeavour to enlist their cooperation'*
Accordingly, the Government of India had approached Mrs, 13csen 
in a new spirit. After her release she tried to persuade the govern­
ment to release Muhammad Ali, one of two brothers interned as pan- 
Islamic conspirators. The Government had no intention of making such 
a bargain, but were ready to discuss the matter with Mrs. Besant.
Vincent and the Secretary of the Home Department, Sir J.H. Du Boulay, 
met her at Simla while the Viceroy was away on tour. She was not 
satisfied with their answers, and asked to see Chelmsford. The Viceroy' 
Private Secretary made several attempts to arrange a meeting, but 
Mrs. Besant was unable to coordinate her movements with the Viceroy's 
tour. Chelmsford, while not yielding on the Ali brothers, hoped he 
could use the interview to encourage Mrs. Besant to 'take a more- 
temperate view' of what was possible 'as an immediate step in the 
direction of political advance'. His policy met with the strongest 
objections. Sir Charles Cleveland of the Central Intelligence 
Department, armed from his files with a formidable indictment of 
Mrs Besant and the Theosophical Society, pronounced the lady a thorough! 
unsuitable person to be received by members of the government. She 
was, he concluded, 'a charlatan in religion' and an enemy of British 
dominion. Chelmsford replied that the meeting was 'not a question 
of doing honour to Mrs. Besant’  ^ rather it was a 'question of 
expediency'. Similarly, when Willingdon expressed his disquiet, call­
ing Mrs. Besant a dangerous intriguer who should not bo recognised 
as a political leader, Chelmsford replied at first that the protest 
puzzled him, and later added that, while he agreed with much that 
Willingdon said about Mrs. Besant, he did not see that an unsuccessful
YS
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mission would enhance her reputation.88
In the following months, the new policy was consolidated by 
apparent success. In Madras they bewailed the loss of prestige? in 
Bengal they made dire predictions of future disaster? but the Govern-
81
ment of India professed themselves well pleased with the present calm.
Chelmsford thought that events had proved the policy 'wise' and
'absolutely justified'. Mrs, Besant was touring India, Chelmsford
believed it 'would be asking too much of human nature, especially her
nature, to expect her to refrain' - limelight was 'necessary to her
82existence'. But she was counselling moderation.
The results committod Chelmsford more explicitly to the new
approach. In June 1918, Montagu drew his attention to a provocative
fetter written to President Wilson by Sir Subramania Aiyar, a former
High Court judge who had espoused Home Rule, The letter, which was
widely distributed and publicised in the United States, had complained
of Mrs. Besant's internment and had informed the Presidents
you and the other leaders have been kept in ignorance of 
the full measure of misrule and oppression in India.
Officials of an alien nation, speaking a foreign tongue, 
force their will upon us? they grant themselves exorbitant 
salaries and large allowances? they refuse us education? 
thoy sap us of our wealth? they impose crushing taxation 
without our consent? they cast thousands of our people 
into prisons for uttering patriotic sentiments - prisons 
so filthy that often the inmates die from loathsome 
diseases.
The Secretary of State had become alarmed at pressure that was being 
exerted in Britain to have Subramania Aiyar deprived of his K.C.S.I.
The Government of India had. already sent a private reprimand drawing 
attention to the rules concerning government pensioners, and they did 
not propose to act publicly, oven though Subramania Aiyar (before 
receiving the reprimand) had announced to the press that he could meet 
'no more glorious fate ... than to bo the object of official tyranny'.
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This was not what was expected, of a retired judge* Some of Chelmsford's
Council had favoured reprisals, hut Chelmsford did not, and the
dissenters did not press their view, Montagu also accepted the point,
and, rather mixing his metaphors, urged Pentland not to waste his heavy
artillery on second fiddles, 'We want to walk warily,’ Chelmsford
explained? 'no-one who had experience of the results of interning
Mrs. Besant last year wants to repeat the mistake1. He did not intend
to rfiake a martyr out of this 'silly old man1. For the first time
Chelmsford had admitted that the internment of Mrs. Besant, however
83
justified in law, had been wrongheaded,
Hon-interference and repression were now seen as twin weapons 
in a battle which aimed at maintaining both political advantage and 
public order. As before, 'moderate' politicians were left alone, and 
'revolutionary conspirators' were suppressed. But it had been decided 
that 'extremist' politicians were to be given rein for as long as 
possible even if technically they broke the law, until at strategic 
moments action could be taken against them. In such cases the govern­
ment would prefer to use the ordinary law, in order to minimise the claim
ft A
to martyrdom. Executive action was still 'considered' - and, although
the government did not explicitly state this, had to be both politic
and necessary before approval would be given. Thus In April 1$)18 the
Madras Government wanted to extern Tilak and B.C. Pal; the Government
of India refused permission because such action might have jeopardised
83the War Conference which they were holding in Delhi, In August the 
some local government suggested that executive restrictions should bo 
placed on the political activities of government pensioners; the 
Government of India did not favour this, or a Bombay scheme for in­
creasing magistrates 1 powers over public meetings £ such measures were
07
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not worth the ill-feeling they would create. But, also in August, 
the Bombay Government were permitted to place Tilak under an order 
forbidding him to speak in public - they had convinced the central govern­
ment that the need for army recruitment, which Tilak's speechc-s were 
supposed to be discouraging, outweighed the risk of agitation if Tilak 
defied the ban and had to be arrested; and they minimised that risk by
allowing Tilak, who was about to leave the country, to speak before the 
87
Congress session.
Such executive measures, in a general context of non-inter­
ference, took on the appearance of surgical operations. In April 1919j 
when the Bombay authorities wore permitted to deport the journalist.
B.C. Ilorniman, the move was planned carefully in .advance and carried out 
swiftly and secretly. Willingdon had earlier urged deportation; and 
Chelmsford had then advised the local government to choose their moment 
well, to have a ship ready, and to allow no time for farewell speeches. 
When Sir George Lloyd replaced Willingdon in Bombay, before the de­
portation, he announced to Meston that 'he was not disposed to begin his
88career by conferring unnecessary martyrdom'; later, however, he 
visited Chelmsford to urge wholesale deportations, including Jinnah, 
Gandhi, Mrs. Naidu, and Jamnadas Dwnrkadas, The Home Department asked 
Bombay to consider the possibility that such deportations would cause 
more trouble, and, though they would have agreed in part if necessary, 
they refused to act against Jinnah, and ruled that Gandhi should not be 
deported unless something further happened to make this unavoidable.
Lloyd had to be satisfied with deporting Horniman. The Home Department
86 See H.Poll. 26, Nov, 1917? & 29-28 & 43? Sept. 19'18, & 695, Juno Vr p 
& H. Police 74-75? Oct. 1917* The Fan jab Government were permitted to 
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Sadasiva Aiyar of the Madras High Court for his involvement in politics 
while practising as a judge; H.Poll. 160, Feb. 1919.
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busied, themselves with having a ship in readiness; Lloyd chose a moment 
'when popular excitement was temporarily allayed'; and, in accordance 
with Chelmsford's original instructions, Horniman was sent off quietly 
on a waiting steamer. There were no demonstrations. The atmosphere
Sc
of the Presidency was reported to have 'improved out of all knowledge'.
A similar approach was adopted even in cases to which non-interference
was not applied. When the Ali brothers announced that they considered
themselves no longer bound by their internment orders (which they were
already defying), the central Government ordered that they be imprisoned,
and issued detailed instructions regarding the suddenness and discretion
with which this was to bo done. They used executive powers, but
90expressly to avoid publicity.
The Government of India had formulated a consistent policy.
But they were continually under pressure to revert to an earlier
approach. In November 1918? the India Office wondered if they should
prosecute the Home Rulers for the design of mock postage stamps issued
for publicity and fund raising. The Home Department declined on the
grounds that prohibition would only advertise the stamps, which had not
91been very successful. Some of the local governors, notably Meston 
and, on the whole, Lloyd, approved of the tactic of non-interference. 
Others did not. Willingdon, as Governor of Bombay and later of Madras, 
repeatedly showed his lack of sympathy with 'softness' - he wanted the 
Government of India to 'stiffen up' and stand no nonsense. He believed 
in tho efficacy of a ’straight talk' such as he had given to the Home 
Rulers at the Bombay War Conference; he recognised that this was 'oxacti­
the opposite' of what Chelmsford seemed to want. He did not share the 
Viceroy's hope that extremists, if left alone, would discredit them­
selves | and, although he sometimes admitted that there were risks in
^  See G/Bombny to V, 16 April 1919? CP22; Lloyd to Montagu, 6 April,
& 2 & 15 May, & 12 June 1919? HP24? Willingdon to Montagu, 5 Oct. 191S, 
Ml18! & H.Poll. 20-22, June 1918, & 619-634, & 638, May 1919. Lloyd's*
proposal for deportations seems to have grown out of a I1D suggestion in 
May that a wanning might be given to the Bombay Chronicle, Horniman's 
peeper; after the Bombay War Conferonce the G/Bombay had suggested 
'strong measures', including internments, procensorship and outlawing 
of speeches on certain subjects, against the Chronicle, The Mahratta, 
Kosari, Horniman, Tilak, Annie Besant and others. Lloyd had’ found 
Willingdon's predictions borne out.
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acting against prominent politicians, he felt sure that these should
he braved. When Tilak announced that it would not matter to him if
Turks or Germans took over from the British, the only answer, according
to Willingdon, was to 'put a stopper’ on to him In 1919s similarly,
Willingdon vowed he would either ’shoot or deport' Muhammad and Shaukat
92
Air. His opposition was to increase as time wont on.
In 1919? however, the strongest objection came from a more 
unexpected quarter. In November, Sir Edward Maclagan, Lieutenant 
Governor of the Panjab, launched a fierce attack on the central policy. 
The Home Department had decided that all restrictions on Tilak should 
be removed, Maclagan, his patience at an end, argued that the Panjab 
had problems enough without Tilak. He saw the Home Department decision 
as another in a series of 'extraordinary difficulties' in which (he 
implied) the Government of India had placed him. He had wanted the 
continuance of the Seditious Meetings Act, the exclusion of Gandhi 
until after the forthcoming Congress session at Amritsar, the post­
ponement of Lajpat Rai’s departure from the Urited States - and ali 
these had been refused,. Now, in Tilak's case, he was Doing asked 1 to 
let loose in the Province the most dangerous agitator of all', one who 
'specialised ... in the reduction to the level of everyday life ... of 
/~the_J high sounding phrases used by other politicians'. Only after 
personal consult ations did Maclagan agree to fall into line. He had 
displayed the civilian's orthodox nervousness and desire to keep his 
own preserve free from the contamination of outside forces. The 
Government of India had refused to accept tM® isolationism. They were
committed to a quite different approach5 they demonstrated this again
95
by releasing the Air brothers on the eve of the Amritsar Congress„
But, in another sense as well, the buttles had to be 
continually refought. It was probable that the policy evolved in 
response to Mrs Besarvt would be applied also to Gandhis his credit 
started higher than hers, and his methods wore not dissimilar. In 1919
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with Lloyd to his wife (1916), in Colin Porbes Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd 
London 1948, 106 - Maintaining that obvious persecution merely helped 
agitators 'to enlist ... sympathies which they claimed before bub 
never had'.
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however, during the agitation against the Rowlatt "bill, the Government 
of India agreed in principle to Gandhi's arrest, and allowed the Panjab 
Government to exclude him from the Province, There ensued in several 
parts of the country serious rioting which amounted in the Panjab to a 
near rebellion. The Government had thought they were applying their 
usual policy. Two factors seem to have convinced them that action could 
not be avoided. Firstly, by publishing his sat.yagraha leaflets without 
a licence, Gandhi purported to be defying the law. It was not in­
consistent of the government to believe that there must come a point 
when it was more expedient to risk an arrest than to have the law 
brought into contempt. Secondly, there took place on JO March in Delhi 
a hartal which led to violence. On 8 April, the Government of India 
agreed with the Bombay Government that, when the law was being openly 
defied for political advantage, it was better to prosecute - at a 
conference in Delhi, Lloyd had argued that they could net 'abandon all
the functions of Government *? and Chelmsford had agreed that they
: 94-must be wary but 'perfectly firm1. ^  On 8 April he had personally
instructed the Home Department to formulate a definite plan of action 
to deal with possible developments in passive resistance, so that local 
actions might be co-ordinated, and to instruct local governments to 
issue if necessary simply-worded manifestos explaining the Rowlatt Bill, 
sympathising with rational opposition, pointing out the moral of the 
Delhi incident, calling for cooperation, and warning that the govern­
ment would deal rigorously with movements which endangered the peace - 
Gandhi's leaflets might be met, Chelmsford thought, by confiscating
95his printing press. A copy of these instructions was sent to Bombay.
It was found that Gandhi was not breaking the law on this occasionj
nevertheless, when the Panjab Government asked to be allowed to exclude
him, there was already an agreement in principle to his arrest. The
central Government were also ready to admit that the Panjab was a
special case. Chelmsford had. been uneasy at the fervour of the recruit-
96
m g  campaign under O'Dwyery  the aftermath of this campaign, added to
See G/Bombay to V, 7 & 9 April, & HD to PSY, 8 April, & Chelmsford 
to Lloyd, 8 April 1919, & see also the earlier cordial attitude to 
Gandhi in Maffey to Gandhi, 13 March 1919> CP22. See also below, 
note 97.
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^  Y to HD, 8 April 1919, CP22.
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He expressed his fears to 0 'Dwyer on 24 Feb. I9I85 see Chelmsford 
to Montagu, 4 Sept. 1919, CP5.
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the problems of the return of disbanded soldiers and the Muslim 
grievances over the Turkish peace terms, were seen to have contributed 
to a serious situation, and the Viceroy thought it !of the first 
importance1 to avoid the spread of unrest and allow the local govern­
ments full discretion in measures to restore order. In t’ ese 
circumstances the Government authorised Gandhi’s exclusion.
In accordance with their usual policy, they issued meticulous 
instructions on the manner in which the exclusion was to be carried 
out. Gandhi was to be treated with 'every possible consideration1, and 
force was not to bt= used unless he disobeyed the order* He was to 
be informed that ’the Government would be willing to consider thc- 
position later should he give J_ anJ7 explicit undertaking to refrain 
from inaugurating a campaign to break the law’. In the instructions 
issued to the Governor-General’s Agent in Rajputana, in case Gandhi was 
turned back there, the Government added that if Gandhi disobeyed the 
authorities ’should not arrest him, but merely use such means as may 
be necessary ..., treating him with call consideration’. It is almost 
certain that the Government intended this in the Panjab. They seem to 
have thought that this was what happened - even in confidential reports 
they do not refer to the action as an arrest, although it is difficult 
to seo wheat else it could have been. Gandhi was ’sent’ or ’escorted’ 
back to Bombay. He himself had given reason for hope that an arrest 
would not be necessary; he had written instructions to satyagrahis 
that 'All police orders are to be implicitly obeyed’ , The Government 
intended to arrest Gandhi, but only under the ordinary ]aw, after his 
return to Bombay.
The exclusion proved a vast miscalculation. But the decision 
had not been different in principle from those other decisions on Tilak 
and Horniman which wore to be effected without disaster. Chelmsford 
later defended the decision, explaining to Montagus 'the temper of the 
Delhi mob was very sullen; Gandhi's avowed object was to induce men to 
break the law, and it had been made clear that he could not control 
the excitement he aroused; therefore his arrest in Delhi would have 
been inevitable and would have led to even worse riots’. This may 
have been subsequent rationalisation. Taken with the reasons given at 
the time, however, it demonstrates that the Government, even in the 
action against Gandhi, were still considering prior’ties in the fashion 
of their tactical non-interference.^
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SeG 45r-45Q, 462, 463, 465? 467, 469 & 471, May, & 452,
Aug. 1919? HD to PSV, 9 April 1919* CP22; Lloyd to Montagu, 6 April, 
& 2 & 15 May 1919, KP24? Chelmsford to Montagu, 9 & 16 April & 23
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Subsequent handling of Gandhi was more circumspect. The- irn- 
.mediate response to the outcry at Gandhi's exclusion was to abandon 
all thought of arresting him. He was being helpful in limiting the 
violence in Ahmedabad, and Chelmsford and Lloyd were agreed that
’Interned he would be a rallying cry to the disaffected, out he may
98
prove of greet assistance...1. Cn May 1919» tin yd wrote to Montagu 
his view that Gandhi was 'really pretty wicked’ and would eventually 
have to be arrested and deported? but when he saw Gandhi he told him 
that the government would take no action. At this, Lloyd reported, 
Gandhi
smiled and said, 'I wish to goodness Sir you would arrest 
me1, I said, 'No Nr, Gandhi, this is a luxury I reserve 
entirely for those who surround you and who /'"sic / you 
mislead. If they break tho law they will be dealt with 
and you will be left until It suits me’. He pointed 
out frankly how unpopular that would make him with his 
friends and I could only add how much I regretted in­
conveniencing him in this way, but suggested that hg 
should try some foreign missionary work for a bit.
In early June Lloyd thought Gandhi was losing ground daily? but when 
Gandhi announced his intention to resume his campaign on 1 July, Lloyd 
expected serious trouble - he had tried quiet methods, he told Montagu 
and he would now have to ’stamp out the- evil once and for all*. He 
had lost faith in talking to Gandhis ’argument with a lunatic is a 
pastime that is generally unprofitablo he noted to Chamberlain,
July 1919? Cl5• Chelmsford was on tour and the decision to arrest 
Gandhi was taken by Vincent, after consulting Lowndes and Meston?
0 ’ Dwyer had wanted Gandhi dc-ported to Burma but Vincent feared a 
'general conflagration’. Gandhi reported; ’The two days detention 
was no detention .... The officials ... were all attention and 
kindness .... I was afforded greater comforts that I am used to when 
free’? Gandhi to Maffey, 15 April 1919? CP22. 8ee also M.k. Gandhi, 
An Autobiography ... (tr. Mahadev Desai), 2nd ed. Ahrnedebar 1940, 
342-545? & The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol.XV, Ahmedabad
1965? 86-243 - notably, for instructions to obey police orders and 
eschew violence (3 tl 5 April 1919)j Pi • 174-178? lor his interview 
with Chelmsford in March & later telegrams, pp. 126, 129-130, for his 
reaction to the Delhi shooting, pp.173? 179, & I84-I87, & for his 
arrest, pp.208-210.
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oeo ibid., 218-225, 228-2^2, 256 & 250? Gandhi to Maffey, 14 & 15 
April, & Maffey to Gandhi. 7 May 1919, CP22? Chelmsford to Montagu,
16 April 4 18 July 1919, CP5.
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'and insanity of his kind is particularly difficult to deal with.'^0
The Government of India were not so easily discouraged.
Gandhi had avowed his intention of breaking' the law by leaving Bombay, 
and the central Government, realising that he would have to be stopped, 
again accepted that this might mean prosecution. But they suggested 
that Bombay's Chief Secretary or a senior police officer should 
interview Gandhi, and point out that, despite his claims, there was 
no guarantee that civil disobedience would be any less disastrous in 
July than it had been in April, and moreover that the eve of the 
conclusion of hostilities with Afghanistan was 'a most unsuitable 
occasion in which to risk,., internal disorder'. This remarkable 
appeal was duly delivered. It seems to demonstrate a considerable 
understanding of Gandhi's thinking; and it was successful. Gandhi 
expressed his willingness to suspend civil disobedience until any date, 
not too far distant, which the Government might prescribe* He also 
promised to give notice of its resumption and to limit it to himself 
and his coadjutors. He declared that he did not propose to enter the 
Panjab for the present. The bargain had proved even more remarkable 
than the a p p e a l . M o n t a g u  had suggested to Lloyd that when Gandhi 
found he could not force the Government's hand, 'without committing 
himself to the sort of action that is all against his principles, he 
should be an easier problem to tackle1. For the moment there seemed 
some grounds for this optimism. Lloyd agreed that Gandhi had been 
glad of the excuse to abandon his campaign for a time; he persuaded 
Chelmsford to allow Gandhi to announce that the suspension had been 
at government request.
The Government of India then enquired of the local govern­
ments whether they wished to retain their ban on Gandhi. They
Lloyd to Chelmsford, 12 June 1919? CP22, & to Chamberlain, 11 
July 1919? ACP18/1/6, & to Montagu, 31 May, MP24, & 12 June 1919,
MP26. See also Lloyd to Chamberlain, 13 June 1920, ACPI8/1/9. For 
his policy, July to August, see G/Bombay to V, 6 July, & Lloyd to 
Chelmsford, 27 July 1919? CP23; for Chelmsford's opposition to measures 
except in the courts, see Chelmsford to Lloyd, 22 June 1919, CP22.
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See HD to G/Bombay, 28 June 1919, H.Poll. 26l, Aug. 1919; see 
also ibid. 262 & 270, Lloyd to Chelmsford, 27 July, & Chelmsford to 
Lloyd, 2 Aug. 1919, CP23.
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Montagu to Lloyd, 18 July 1919, MP22, & Lloyd to Montagu, 
24 July 1919, MP24.
94 .
envisaged, retaining the restriction only for the province where Gandhi
promised not to go, and thus avoid the risk of having to arrest him,
Delhi, Bihar and Orissa, the Central and the United Provinces, Bengal
and Madras all expressed their preference for having Gandhi confined
to Bombay, The Government of India accepted these views and supported
them to the Secretary of State, nevertheless in September, about a
month after the replies had been received, the Government decided to
remove all restrictions on Gandhi. Madras and Bengal continued to
express doubts? Delhi pleaded for delay? and the Panjab wanted to
prevent Gandhi's attendance at the Amritsar Congress* The central
Government ordered the restrictions to be lifted on 15 October? in
105Bombay they had already been removed.
Gandhi, with even more cause than Mrs. Besant in 1917, was 
not to be interfered with unless absolutely necessary. His campaign, 
like that of the Home Rulers, was dangerous and in a doubtful category 
somewhere between politics and revolution, because it too attempted 
to secure mass participation and a permanent opposition. It was very 
likely that the policy which had been evolved successfully in. response 
to the first such campaign, would be applied to the second. Policy 
was not static after 1917* H  continued to evolve in response to 
changing circumstances. Sometimes, as with Gandhi in 1919, H  H I  not 
respond quickly enough at first. But, through the mistakes in 
application, the direction and purpose remained, as with Mrs. Besant, 
towards the method of tactical non-interference.
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Chapter 4* Repression - 1 Revolutionary1 crime
Repression, the other aspect of government policy, was not 
conciliatory; it was the opposite hut also the accompaniment of non­
interference. In theory it was applied to lawlessness and violence, 
not politics. But by 1916? when Chelmsford became viceroy, the govern­
ment in India, had armed itself with strong powers to deal with what it 
called political crime.^ The principle was well-established that the 
executive must be able to circumvent the ordinary judicial process in 
order to deal promptly with sedition. W.S. Marris, officiating Secretary 
in the Home Department, had written in 191$, after the attempt to 
assassinate Lord Hardinge, that it was incumbent on. the Government of 
India and the local governments to consider the connection between 
’anarchical' crime and the ’political circumstances of the country' 
and to unearth and suppress existing conspiracies. It was thought 
clear that the outrages prevalent in Bengal were not 'the last flicker 
of expiring anarchy in one Province'; the conspiracies wore ’a living 
force in India1. The Government’s attitude had hardened. The local 
governments were instructed to take ’continuous and systematic action 0.. 
to enforce moderation in speech and writing, and to check the expression 
of views and criticisms which may conceal, but thinly, incitements to 
resistance of the authority of Government’. Hardinge’s Government 
argued , through Marris;
Though the inspiration of anarchist outrages may stand 
outside all direct connection with ordinary political 
agitation, it is the excesses of the latter which prepare 
the ground for the inculcation of anarchical doctrines and 
create an environment in which such doctrines find adherents.
It follows as a consequence that any too indulgent toleration 
of such excesses may be the direct or indirect cause of morbid 
growths especially among young and impressionable minds which 
lead in the end to atrocious crimes such as th^t perpetrated 
on the occasion of the State Entry into Delhi.^
At the beginning of Chelmsford’s viceroyalty there were thus 
two main axioms accepted by the government with regard to ’revolutionary’ 
crime; first that the problem wcs special, serious and widespread;
1 The main enactments of these powers were Regulation III of 1818,
the Press Act 1910, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian penal 
Code as last amended under Hardinge, and the Defence of India Act 1915.
2
HD circular, 8 April 1913, IOR J&P 1589(4468/19).
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second that it was related to other extreme political activities. The 
latter axiom was to he whittled away and finally discredited -under 
Chelmsfcrd. The first was to remain unchallenged for most of the period,, 
It had led to the passage of the Defence of India Act in 1915, and was
/
the rationale of the- so-called Rowlatt Bills in 1919* rl^e finst Rowlatt 
Bill was the only repressive measure enacted under Lord Chelmsford. In .■ 
its final form, it was temporary, qualified, and altogether weaker than 
its wartime predecessor. But the former confusion Between revolutionary 
and political activities, introduced in the Home- Department circular 
of 1915? had led in practice to widespread suspicion among Indians 
about the purposes for which executive powers would be used. The Rowlatt 
Bill was thus the occasion of serious disturbances, which were mot with 
official reprisals of exceptional ferocity.
The problem in Bengal was certainly serious. Lord Hardinge 
described the province as ’seething with sedition’. Armed robberies 
(or daooities) and assassinations of police and informers were, by his 
account, 'almost of daily occurrence', and 'it was practically impossible 
to secure a conviction by the ordinary process of law'.'' This rather 
overstated the position| nonetheless there was a bad situation which 
had deteriorated under Hardinge. Austen Chamberlain believed that both 
the Viceroy and the local Governor, Lord Carmichael, had neglected the 
problem^ Chelmsford had to dissuade the Secretary of State from 
intervening, and himself set about a vigorous investigation. Shortly 
after taking up office he went to Calcutta, read the files on the subject, 
and had a long interview with the Governor. He asked Carmichael to give 
him a comprehensive report on tho action his Government had taken, and 
their proposals for remedial measures and the postwar replacement of 
the Defence of India Act. Carmichael replied that they would investi­
gate the result of the use of wartime powers to see in what form they 
should be retained. This response evoked no groat enthusiasm in Lord 
Chelmsford - Carmichael had written, he said, perhaps ’the sort of note
3
Hardinge of Penshurst, My Indian Years 1910-1916, London 1948,
14.
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Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 5 May 1916, CP2. In 191Q there were 9 
revolutionary crimes in Bengal with one fatality and loot of Rs.78,607. 
while in 1915, in Calcutta alone, there were 11 incidents, 6 fatalities 
and loot of Rs.84,850. Sec- Secret Report of the Sedition Committee 1918,
23-58, IOR L/PARI.444. ' ~
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which Lord Carmichael would write1. Meanwhile the Government of India 
proceeded with some immediate remedies; in particular they sought an 
arrangement with the French whose territory, Chandernagore, was alleged 
to be an 'anarchist centre1 and refuge. Agreement was difficult, but 
eventually, in 1918, the London authorities reported that the French 
had agreed to a projet d'accord whereby British Indian 1 seditionists ’ 
would be immediately expelled and French subjects would be placed under 
serveillance.^
Chelmsford had placed some emphasis on positive remedial
measures. He reported in September 1916 that his Government were 'not
unmindful1 of the need to remedy 'the root-cause of the- evil1.  ^ He
interviewed several of the Bengal officials. His conversations convinced
0
him that educational reform lay at the heart of the remedy. It was
believed that 'anarchical1 crime, largely committed by educated
bhadralok Hindus, was partly the expression of frustration at the lack
of opportunities for those with a liberal education; and Chelmsford
hoped, as had his predecessors, for advances in technical education and
some channelling of talent away from law and government service and into
commerce and industry. Chelmsford was also strongly in favour of a
proposal to transfer the Presidency College away from the heady political
9
atmosphere of Calcutta;y and, urging that education was 'at the bottom' 
of most of the Bengal problems, he favoured and supported the general 
review of Bengal secondary and university education undertaken by the
5 See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 14 April, CP2, & Carmichael to 
Chelmsford, 16 Axjril, & Minute by H.E. the Viceroy on the situation 
in Bengal, 27 April 1916, CPI7• See .also Chelmsford to Chamberlain,
11 Jan. 1917> CP 3; Chelmsford called the Bengal Government 'inverte­
brate' and marked by 'floppiness'.
See V to S/S, 9 July 1916, CP7? & Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 20 
June 1917j CP5? Sedition Committee Report, 23-28 & 59-60? H.Poll. 
192-199) Jan., 144) Feb., 316-317) April, & 424-425) June 1917? & 308, 
May, & 480-481, June 1918* Other early initiatives were the considera­
tion of proposals to use tho Criminal Tribes Act, by redefining a tribe 
as any single criminal, and to take powers to detain habitual criminals 
after the expiry of their sentence; the Government rejected these 
schemes. See Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 24 May, & Chelmsford to 
Chamberlain, 7 July 1916, CP2.
^ Speeches I, 60 (5 Sept. 1916).
0
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 15 Sept. 1916, CP2.
9
Chelmsford to Ronaldshay, 24 May 1917, CP18; ED (c) Proceedings, 
28-29, Oct. 1917.
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Sadler Committee."^ The situation needed this thorough investigations
the Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, had stated in his annual
report for 1915-1916;
The present condition of secondary schools is undoubtedly 
prejudicing the development of the Presidency and is by no 
means a negligible feature in the existing: state of general 
disturbance »*t. it is in the high schools, with their under­
paid and discontented teachers, their c-rowdod, dark and ill- 
ventilated rooms, and their soul-destroying process of un­
ceasing cram, that the seeds of discontent and fanaticism 
11are sown.
In reply to the Government of India’s call for suggestions for
substantive reforms, the Bengal Government had endorsed the ideas of
a commission on Bengal district administration, which had recommended
a reduction in the size of administrative charges, and also local self-
government, industrial development and educational reform. The local
government had decided to advance the first and last of these, in spite
12of wartime financial stringency, as matters of urgency.
It was obvious that Bengal administration needed overhaulingr
The Government of India had suggested that organisation would have to
be strengthened, and in January 1917 the Secretary of State urged that
East Bengal districts and police station areas should bo split up, .as
recommended in the District Administration Committee report. Dacca,
IIMidnapur and Myraensingh districts were divided during 1918I end 
several police station areas had also been made smaller.^ Some police
See Ronaldshay to Montagu, 24 July 1917? HP21$ Chelmsford to 
Chamberlain, 14 April, 15 Sept. & 28 Dec. 1916, CP2$ Carmichael to 
Chelmsford, 3 Sept. 1916, CP17 ? Hornell (Director, Public Instruction, 
Bengal) to Maffey, 13 Sept. 1916, CP17. See also, on the writing of 
the Sadler Report (Chelmsford urging the need for unanimity and speed), 
Sadler to Chelmsford, 22 Aug., & Chelmsford to Sadler, 28 Aug. A 5-6 
Bov, 1918, CP21 $ on the refusal to allow publication of a draft bill,
S/S to Y, 25 June 1920, CPI2; &, for a similar refusal of urgent
educational proposals, & Chelmsford's protest, Chelmsford to Montagu,
8 Sept. 1917, Cl3.
11
See Sedition Committee Report, 75*
12
See HD to G/Bengal, 6 May, Il.Poll. 172, May 1916, & G/Bengal to HD,
21 Sept. 1916, H.Poll. 229, Aug. 1917* In 1920 Ronaldshay was to 
suggest a separate education board for the Dacca area$ see Ronaldshay 
to Montagu, 2 Dec. 1920, HP31.
13
SeG H.Poll. 140, May, & 298, June 1916, & 118, April 1917; &
H.Public 364-378, April, 44-45? July 1918, & 482-502, Dec. 1919.
14
H.Police 1-5? Pob. 1917* See also discussions of the Public Services 
Commission and measures for the indianisation of the police, in H.Police 
1-29? July 1919?-v 247-335? June 1921$ and, for a reorganisation in the
24-Parganas district, see H.Police 1-3, Fob. 1919.
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were also "being armed, and squads were formed to protect Special Branch
officers investigating ’conspiracies' and thus in danger of assassina- 
15tion. Several improvements were made in police pay and special
-allowances. Numbers wore also increased, and a new class of 'writer'
constables, with a higher pay scale, was introduced to attract better
recruits. In 1918? however, average police earnings in Bengal wore
still below those of local durwans, coolies and mill-operatives, and
below those of the police in Madras and Bombay. In 1920 Bengal police
were understaffed, by one thousand out of a nominal 19,0005 and, in
spite of recruiting drives and annual pay rises, wastage was continuing
16at an increasing rate. But the Bengal Government maintained that the
problems of the police wore separate from the question of 'revolutionary'
crime - this was handled by the Special Branch .and not by the force in
general. The intelligence staff had boon enormously increased by both
temporary -and permanent appointments, and their deployment had beer.
improved in the districts. In 1916 Bengal intelligence staff comprised
11 inspectors, 15 sub-inspectors and 37 constables. In 1917, after two
increases, the permanent establishment was 20 inspectors, 51 sub-
inspectors, 43 head constables, 351 constables and 36 confidential
clerks - representing a. total increase of 488. The Calcutta Special
Branch was also strengthened by more than half.^ About the same time
as these changes, the number of outrages in Bengal decreased. There
were 64 in 1915-1916, but only ton between January 1917 and February 
181918. This period, however, coincided also with tho more vigorous 
application of the Defence of India Act, which course had been urged 
on the Bengal authorities by Chelmsford's Government. The cause of the 
improvement was therefore not certain.
In August 1917, the Government of India decided that it was 
time to prepare for the continuation of the Defence of India powers
15 H.Poll. 39-40, Aug. 19165 H .Police 80-81, Sept. 1916, & 124-125 
March, & 95-98 April 1917.
16
H-Poll. 44, 45, 47-49, Aug. 1916; H.Police 100-105, March, & 66- 
68, Aug. 1918, & 30-34 & 317-334, April 1919, & 217-219, Feb., & 126- 
127 & 174-176, April 1920.
17 _ ' / N
See H.Police(C) 50-53 Aug., 88, Sept., & 91, Oct. 19165 H.PoIice
93-97, July, & 156-157, Oct. 1919, 96, March, & 257-258, June 1920, T. 
136-137, April 1921. See also G/Bongal to HD, 28 July 1916, H.Poll.
228, Aug-. 1917.
18
ILC Proceedings, 6 Feb, 1919, IOR J&PI571(2539/19).
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after the war. There had been some delays before this could be 
considered - the Bengal Government and then the new Home Member, Sir
19 ~William Vincent, had needed time to study the question. Chelmsford
had stressed in 1916 that no time should be lost and 'the matter
20thoroughly thrashed out before the occasion arises1. But a further
problem had arisen. As we have noted, the wartime measures had not been
confined to Bengali terrorists, but, by deliberate jjolicy, had been
applied to a wide and ill-defined area of political activity; as a
result Indians had severely criticised the Defence of India Act,
privately and in the press. Accordingly, the Bengal proposals for the
future sought to modify the wartime provisions, in the hope of making
them more acceptable without sacrificing any essential feature. The
local government proposed that the application of the executive powers
should be subject to the prior scrutiny of advisory committees, that
there should be no provision for rapid trial by Commission, and that the
21new Act should have a life of only three years. liven more important. 
Lord Ronaldshay, the Governor, suggested that the whole question should 
bcj referred to a somi-judicial commission of enquiry. He thought it 
necessary to convince public opinion in India and Britain that extra­
ordinary jjowcrs wore justified, and, as it was not thought possible to 
publish the evidence of the conspiracies, either because it was itself 
objectionable or because it was based on testimony secured by promises
of secrecy, a commission sitting mainly in camera was the obvious 
22
answer. The Government of India endorsed the official Bengal
19 See G/Bengal to HD, 1/ July 1916, H.Poll. 227, Aug. 1917; & 
Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 July 1917, CPJ.
20
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 14 April 1916, CP2.
21 G/Bengal to HD, 17 & 28 July I9I6, H.Poll. 227-228, Aug. 1917. The 
Bengal proposal was in response to the Government of India's request 
which in turn was a reaction to the urging of the Secretary of State; 
see HD to G/Bengal, 6 May, H.Poll. 172, May 1916, & 20 July 1916,
H.Poll. 226, Aug, I917, & S/S"despatch, 21 April 1916, followed up by 
S/H to V(HD), 17 July 1916, H.Poll. 225, Aug. 1917.
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The Secretary of Stn.te had again pressed for an early decision, In 
his despatch of 13 October 1916, suggesting that the Defence of India 
Act should be substantially maintained; see H.Poll. 230, Aug. 1917.
The Bengal Government suggested an enquiry officially on 21 June 1917 
(see ibid, 231) and the Government of India endorsed the idea on 16 
August (ibid. 232). Ronaldshay had noted the proposal in his diary as 
early as 26 May 1917 (he quotes an extract in his memoirs, Zetland, 
"ffssayex1 London 1956, 77), and had suggested it to Chamberlain in a 
letter of 27 June (ACP21/5/66) - this letter was lost at sea, end a copy 
was not sent until 26 April 19I8 (see ACP26/4/18). The Government of 
India i^ ere evidently not thinking of an enquiry in December 1916, when 
they appointed an official to summarise information on record in their
suggestion, and proposed a committee hen,ded by an eminent English judge, 
with one English and one Indian judge from the Indian High Courts, -n 
Indian non-off icia.1, and one British official with executive experience.
The Government had already decided what was needed. They 
envisaged special courts, modifications in the laws of procedure and 
possibljr evidence, and something like the Defence of India rules. The 
committee was thus not intended to help a decision; it was purely a 
public relations gesture. Therefore its personnel and procedure had 
to command public confidence. Its decision, favourable to the Govern­
ment, was ensured by having it base its deliberations largely on 
'documentary evidence already available' (that is, on official sources).
Ronaldshay had no doubts that he could convince the committee 'of the
2Aexistence of a widespread and dangerous conspiracy1. A committee, 
under the Scottish judge, S.A.T. Rowlatt, was appointed at the end cf 
1917* Montagu had found it difficult to recruit a chairman in Britain, 
and the Government of India had hoped for a mere famous name. They had 
no other reason to be dissatisfied with the procedure. The committee 
members studied statements placed before them by the governments of 
Bengal, Bombay, Madras, Bihar and Orissa, the Gentral and the United 
provinces, the Panjab, and Burma, and by the Government cf India. They 
also heard verbal statements from officials, except in the case of 
Madras, and in the Panjab and Bengal they 'invited and secured the 
attendance' of individuals and deputations representing 'various non- 
official. points of view'. The result was the Rowlatt Report, which 
vindicated government policy and favoured the continuance of wartime 
powers, as the government wished. Official and judicial ovidence had 
carried most weight; and the procedure was by no means above suspicion.
own Criminal Intelligence Department (see Director, CID, to HD, 15 Dec. 
1916, H.Police, 126-131, March 1917)* In 1917 they refused a non- 
official resolution calling for a committee on ’Indian anarchism'; See 
ILC Proceedings, 8 Feb. 1917, H.Poll. 463 & 463A, May 1917. Thus it is 
clear that the Rowlatt Committee was Ronaldshay’s invention. (it is 
interesting to note that the understanding of 'revolutionaries' anc the 
need for reform, to be shown, in his Heart of itryavarta, London 19255 
82-87, seems to have had little practical effect on Ronaldshay's 
policies.)
^  See Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 22 Feb., CP3, & V(HD) to S/S,
16 Aug. 1917, CP8 (or H.Poll. 232, Aug. 191717
24
See G/Bengal to HD, 21 June 1917, ibid. 231.
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But the Report is a desirous and convincing document all the same. In 
the India Office Holderness hoped that it might 'open the eyes of many 
Indians to thu mischief wh. political movements of the kind incited by 
Tilak bring about'. There, as elsewhere, the Report was held to carry
'a great authority by reason of the eminent men who have drawn it up'.
25The Government of India, were well satisfied.
The Rowlatt Report had examined those crimes, mainly daccities 
and murders, which the committee characterised as 'revolutionary1 - 
crimes known to be a result of conspiracy, involving groups and advance 
planning; crimes carried out for political motfvas and by bhadralok 
youths; crimes shown to be interconnected, as revealed in confessions, 
the movement of loot and the sharing of weapons and information (notably 
on bomb manufacture); and finally crimes arising out of these other 
types, in particular the murder of police, prosecutors and witnesses 
in conspiracy trials, and the theft of arms to be used in dacoities and 
murders. The Report traced the crimes to revolutionary societies which 
had grown out of Barinda Kumar Ghosh's Anusilan Samiti, especially the 
Bacon branch which had been directly implicated in the Barisal 
conspiracy ca.se of 1913* These societies were claimed to be working 
'very largely in concert', attempting to subvert students, and espous­
ing 'revolut ionary1 aims.  ^^
The Report's own evidence was perhaps not totally convincing 
in these regards. The impression given was of deliberate campaigns 
of terrorism - one letter, discovered in 1916, ooa.sted in the name of 
the 'Finance Secretary of the Bengal Branch of the Independent Kingdom 
of Indio.1 that 'adequate punishment' was being inflicted on police
25
Soe HI) resolution, 10 Dec. 1917? & note by Holdernoss, & July 1916, 
IQR J&P1517(2404/18); Rowlatt to HD, 15 April 1918? & Secret Report 
of the Sedition Committee 191S, IQR L/PARL444* The Committee members 
were Sir Basil Scott, C.J*(Bombay), Rai Bahadur C.V. Kumaraswami Sastri, 
J.(Madras), Sir Vorney Lovett, member of the United Provinces1 Board of 
Revenue, & Prcvash Chandra Hitter, vakil, Calcutta High Court. Thoir 
Report was unaminous.
See Sedition Committee Report, passim, especially 11-60, & for the 
classification of evidence, 19-21, on education, 76, on rules & 
ceremonies, 6l, 63 & Appendices, Ixiii-lxvi, on conspiracy & inter­
connection between societies, 68-74? on the Panjab, 99-113, & on other 
provinces, 1-10, 87-97 & 115-122. The British in India were perhaps 
rather over-ready to suspect conspiracies. In July 1918, for example, 
the Home Department reported a bomb outrage in which the bomb appeared 
to have been made from the same materials .as in an earlier explosion; 
four weeks later they had to report, sheepishly, that there had been 
no political motive in the second explosion - indeed there had been no 
bomb. See V(HD) to S/S, 2, 4 & 30 July 1918, CP9*
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officers; this 'Independent Kingdom' also professed to regard robbery
27as something in the nature of tax-collection, Such reasoning was
reflected in other documents. But the 'revolutionary' societies (as
the Report admitted) were not altogether of one mind - there was even
28
one instance of a pamphlet disapproving of violence and dacoities.
The Report also made no attempt to gain an historical perspective on the 
long-standing incidence of violent crime as a characteristic of Bengali 
unrest. Bor did it make a general survey of the alleged subversion of 
students, and, although it cited one or two schools as notorious, it was 
content to show intention rather than prove success in this policy. 
Moreover the rules and ceremonies of the Dacca samiti displayed 
religious as much as political, fanaticism; the Report did net 
differentiate between the two. And, while documents were found exhort­
ing members to secrecy, the societies often seemed amateurish, the 
adherents -proving remark .ably indiscreet, keeping incriminating documents
and even lists of members. On the other hand, judgments in the various
29
conspiracy trials did bear out the Report's picture, and the 
authorities had uncovered and destroyed three main conspiracies whose 
instigators had -planned uprisings and arms shipments and made contact
27
Sedition Committee Report, 53-56.
28
See ibid., 63-67 & Appendices, Ixxxv & lxxxix~xc.
29
See in particular the judgment, pp. 1-104? & ^he evidence (829pp.), 
in the Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case (trying members of the G-hadr 
conspiracy in the Punjab), H.Poll. 221, May 1916. See also other trial 
proceedings, H.Poll. 264 & 403-410, Sept. 1916, 55-57? 63, 69 & 183, 
Sept. 1918; of these the first (264, Sept. 1916) & the 1 ast (183, Sept 
1918) are especially interesting, the last including prosecution evid­
ence from one Bibhuti Bhusan Haidar on organisation & revolutionary 
intentions in Benares, & the first, an appeal case, upholding the 
existence of a conspiracjr in Barisal. The Rowlr.tt Report's picture 
of revolutionaries A, their societies has also been supported by an 
account of the activities of Narendranath Bhattacharya (or M.N. Roy), 
a follower of Jatin Mukherjee, the leader of tho Jugantur party; see 
Leonard A. Gordon, 'Portrait of a Bengal Revolutionary', Journal of 
Asian Studies XXVII, 2 (Feb. 1968), 197-216. This account also supports 
the contention that the crimes were committed mostly by youngbhadralok 
Bengalis, usually students - lists of suspects detained under executive 
orders also bear out at least that the majority of detenus were Brahmin 
or Kayastha; see H.Poll. 345 & 405? Jan., 167, 172, 240, 251, 258,
428, 538, Peb,, 479, 488, 596, 607, March, 129-134, April 26-30, 35-39. 
40-44, 153-160, May, 128-131, June, 1-5, 6-10, 59-63, 479 & 492, July, 
120-126, 201-207, 250-253, Aug., 28-31, Sept., 12-20, 639, 644 & 651, 
Nov., 318-327, 336-340, 343-359, Doc. 1917, & 339, Jan. 1918.
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with tho Germans. One conspiracy centred on Bengal had ended with a
gun Battle and the death of the leader of the Jugantar party of Calcutta,
30a grouj) already responsible for a resurgence of crime in that .area.
Having identified the problem and established how serious it 
was, the Report went on to advocate the remedy already decided upon by 
the government. A token interest was shown in positive and administra­
tive remedies, but perhaps surprisingly in a semi-judicial enquiry there 
was no assessment of possible ways of avoiding executive powers. The 
courts were pronounced inadequate, pertly because of tho danger of 
intimidation of witnesses, the reliance on confessions and other evidence 
not adinissable in law, and the difficulty of attributing blame to 
individual members of a gang, but also because of shortcomings in the 
judicial system. It was claimed that there had been 210 outrages since 
1906, and evidence cf the complicity of 1088 persons, but only 84 
convictions in 39 attempts at prosecution. (No attempt was mado to 
correlate this with figures for crime in general.) Thus the Rowlatt
Committee argued that the 1 forces of law and order working through the
31ordinary channels were beaten'. They had admitted that there was only 
a very small number cf 'conspirators’ - but they concentrated on the 
nature not the extent of the problem. 'Revolutionaries' were seen as 
a special case, not amenable to ordinary control, demanding special
See Sedition Committee Report, 81-85, 99-115 & 123-127. Japan was 
also suspected of having been .involved in arms shipments to India, & 
of having ambitions in the area; see India Office A War Committee 
memoranda, 16 & 19 May 1916, ACP21/6/20 & 20A.
31
See Sedition Committee Report, 43“45? 131-132 & 139 (criticisms of 
the courts),, & 142. Bor the increase in 'revolutionary' crime, 19G6- 
1921, see ibid., 23-58; but for a perspective also compiare the state 
of tho Dacca area in this period - there were 28 'revolutionary' out­
rages in Bengal in 1915? hut 18,841 'serious crimes' in the Dacca 
police range alone; all crime was increasing; & there was also civil 
unrest, with tho Dacca battalion called out 65 times between April 1912 
& July I9I8. See H.Police 100, Oct. 1918. The courts were not 
completely helpless either? there were ten prosecutions of groups 
in the period, involving 192 persons A resulting in 63 convictions A 
82 persons being bound over to be of good behaviour. B.N, Sarma was 
to tell the Imperial Legislative Council that these figures compared 
favourably with those for other serious crime in Bengal - success in 
33i° of cases compared with jfo (1912) or 11 <f0 (1915) for murdur. See 
ICL Proceedings, 7 Feb. I919, I0R J&P1571(2539/19)• The Rowlatt Report 
itself claimed, moreover, that the number of confessions had increased 
during the war as measures ’broke the morale1 of the revolutionaries 
(Report, 19-21)? it was arguable that the worst was over.
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32measures.
Thus the Rowlatt Committee recommended some changes in the 
law of evidence, "but concentrated on a method of continuing the extra­
judicial wartime powers. Following the lead of the Bengal Government, 
they sought to hedge the powers about with safeguards. They proposed 
that the measures should "be introduced in any area only by express 
notification of the Governor-General in Council and then in three stages 
according to the seriousness of the situation - the first stage would 
allow expeditious trials; the second would permit the demand for 
security or the application of certain orders and restrictions, all such 
actions being subject to prior investigation by an independent authority; 
and the third would permit arrests and searches without warrants and 
detentions for up to one month pending an order, aga.in subject to 
investigation (though not necessarily beforehand) and also to scrutiny 
of the conditions of detention by independent committees. These powers 
were to be available throughout the country - it would have been 
impolitic and unwise to confine the provisions to Bengal. They were 
to be applied only when needed. The Committee had recommended special 
emergency powers, applicable if necessary to a tiny minority, who, 
because their activities were believed to be dangerous and uncontrollable, 
were not be given the ordinary benefits of the law.
The Government of India duly received the Rowlatt Report and
published a censored version. They had decided to introduce legislation
as soon as possible, and in the exact form of the Committee's proposals.
They were concerned not to waste the good effect they anticipated from
34the publication of the Report. As time went on, moreover, their desire 
for haste became greater. V.J. Patel, sharing the general puzzlement 
at this, was later to claim that they were making one of the 'blunders
32
This rationalisation showed, for example, when the Report quoted 
(pp.105-106 - apparently with approval) the Punjab Government as argu­
ing, 'it is most undesirable at the present time to allow trials of any 
of these revolutionaries ... to be protracted by the ingenuity of 
Counsel and drawn out to inordinate length by the committal and appeal 
procedure...1. This was an odd stance for a quasi-judicial committee. 
Lovett later explained that the main point for him had been the question 
of whether or not the government was going to protect its servants and 
subjects (other, presumably, than the 'revolutionaries'); see ILC 
Proceedings, 7 Feb. 1919, ICR J&J157X 2539/19).
33 See Sedition Committee Report, 141-152. For the striking similarity 
of these proposals to those of the Secretary of State (April, July A 
Oct.. 1 916)the Government of Bengal (July 1916), & the Government of 
India (Aug. 1917), see H.Poll. 225, 227, & 230, Aug. 1917, & V(HD) to 
S/S, 17 Aug. .1917, CP8.
54 V(HD) to S/S, 23 Nov. 1919, CP9.
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which a Government not responsible to the people is likely to commit
35in moments of excitement1. But haste was deliberate. By 1919 the
Government wero worried at the imminence of the signing of the peace
treaty, which they expected to occur at any moment. They did not wish
to be accused of using wartime measures unfairly. It is also probable
that there was some truth in Sastri's suggestion in the imperial
legislature that tho Government were trying to reassure English opinion
and so facilitate the acceptance of the Reforms scheme. Certainly the
Government believed that the 'revolutionary movement' would be 'far
more likely to impair the chances of political progress ... than any- 
56thing else'. Austen Chamberlain also stressed the link between reforms
and continued executive powers - he believed 'The more democratic the
37Government becomes the more fatal disorder is likely to be1.
The Government wore also over-sanguine about the reaction to
their proposals. In September, G.5.Khaparde had tried to postpone
consideration of the Rowlatt Report by passing a hostile resolution in
the imperial legislature. The Government argued that a unanimous report
by such distinguished men could not be ignored, end all but two of the
non-official members agreed with them. Sastri, Banerjen, Shafi and
Sapru declared Kharparde's resolution inopportune,* Sapru added that he
had read the Report asking if it read like fact or fiction, and had
decided it read like fact. Even Jinnah opposed the resolution, although,
unlike the others, he made it clear that he would also oppose the Report1
38proposals when the proper time came. The Government regarded the
outcome of this debate, as noted by officials in the India Office, has
indicating that legislation on the linos proposed would not be unfavour- 
39ably received1. This optimism was encouraged in February 1919 by the 
defeat in the Bengal Legislative Council of another hostile resolution/^ 
Chelmsford's assessment of his own Council was that opposition had 
’slackened off1. He called his opponents the ’Malaviya faction1, and 
thought that, although tho Government were having a strenuous time, they
55 IIC Proceedings, 6 Feb. I919, I0R J&P157l(2539/l9).
36
See Vincent's speech, ibid., 12 March 1919.
37
See Chamberlain to Ronaldshay, 7 June 1918, ACP21/5/70.
38
ILC Proceedings, 23 Sept. 1918, IOR J&P157l(2539/19); H.Poll. 159, 
Jan. 1919,
39
See note by Soton, 8 April 1919, IOR J&P1571(2539/19).
Bengal Legislative Proceedings, Calcutta Gazette, 5 Feb. 1919,
IOR J&P157T 3132/19)
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were 'on solid ground'. In March he considered the position ’healthy'. 
His Government were thus hurrying to pass the Rowlatt Bill while the 
good humour lasted.
The same arguments applied of course to agitation outside the 
Legislative Council. Gandhi and the Congress had declared their 
opposition to the continuance of repressive executive powers, Gandhi 
had pleaded and cajoled, and threatened to invoke his weapon of passive; 
resistance. The Government underestimated this threat. Chelmsford 
was pleased to find that Sastri and Banerjea. had spoken out against 
Gandhi's campaign? he interviewed Gandhi himself, found him a little 
shaken by the Government's sympathy with his objections to the Bill .and 
by a smaller degree of support than he had expected among legislators, 
but decided that he had 'passive resistance cn the brain1 and was now 
committed to his campaign, Chelmsford concluded that the Government 
would have to call Gandhi's bluff? he expressed himself 'quite happy1 
defending his position, and judged that Gandhi had not chosen his ground 
well for a 'thorough-going passive resistance movement’, Montagu was
42
wrong to presume that they were in for 'a period of great agitation'.
But, if opposition in and outside the legislature was under­
estimated, it was nonetheless recognised that delay would increase and 
not diminish the difficulties. Vincent told the legislators, 'the more 
the Government yields in this matter, the greater force would the 
agitation obtain’. Ho was probably right. Most of the Council members 
who were attempting to delay the Bill admitted that they believed, as
41 Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 Feb., 12 & 28 March, CF?, & V to S/S,
28 March 1919? CP10. The assessment was wrong, mainly because of the 
pressures on the legislators from outside, notably from Gandhi, and a 
suspicion that the Government were giving with one hand and taking away 
with the other - the Rowlatt Bills were interpreted as proof that the 
Government had no real intention (in the reforms) of relinquishing 
power. Perhaps too the Council could have been handled better. Montagu 
thought Chelmsford should have made a major policjr speech? Chelmsford 
wished Vincent could have been more of a conciliator - he had remarked 
in I9I85 on Vincent's performance at the Delhi War Conference, that 'if 
only he would keep calm, his usefulness would be increased a hundred­
fold' ? he must have had similar feelings over Vincent's heated exchanges 
with Malaviya and Banerjea at the end of the committal debate on the 
Rowlatt Bill. See Chelmsford to Montagu, 28 April 1918, CP4, & ILC 
Proceedings, 7 Feb. 1919, IOR J&P157l(2539/19).
42
Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 Feb. 1919? CP5» This error was general. 
Cumming, in charge of the investigation of political crime in Bengal, 
told Chelmsford that Bengalis were 'heartily tired of the present un­
rest' and would welcome restrictions? see Chelmsford to Chamberlain,
15 Sept. 1916, CP2. In their letter of 17 July 1916, the G/Bengal 
echoed this assessment (H.Poll. 227, Aug. 1917).
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V.J. Patel put it, that ’the only way to improve this Bill is to
entirely drop it'. A delay would only have raised hopes. Patel
said that, with postponement, ’the Government might see the unwisdom
of passing this measure at any time’5 and Rai Bahadur B. D. Shukul
went so far as to admit that it was expected, with the agitation,
43’that the Government would ... drop the Bill altogether*. This nope 
was perhaps well-founded. The minor permanent proposals of the 
Rowlatt Report were embodied in a second bill, which was eventually 
abandoned after the Government had given in to a demand for re­
publication.44 Moreover, as was never very far from anyone’s mind, a 
delay on the main Rowlatt Bill might well have meant that it would 
have had to be introduced before the new reformed Legislative Assembly, 
where it would have had the double disadvantage, as far as the Govern­
ment wore concerned, of souring the atmosphere and of being in danger 
of defeat. Before the war such difficulty had been experienced in 
trying to pass a similar bill through tho Bengal Legislative Council
that the attempt had been abandoned, and the measure left to the Govern- 
AS
ment of India.
The Government therefore had good reasons for haste. It
is less easy to see why they were so determined to go ahead in the
face of Indian objections. They were beginning to enunciate the
principle, later to grow in importance, of giving effect to the
wishes of the legislature. In 1920, over the Dacca University
Bill, they exx^lained to the Secretary of State that 'it would be
impolitic in a case of this kind to use our official majority on the
eve of the introduction of reforms to override non-official opinion
4 6freely and strongly expressed'. Moreover, the Introduction of the 
Rowlatt Bill - a decision to 'override non-official opinion' - followed, 
a new concern to limit the application of executive powers. In March 
1918 a general order was issued instructing local governments to work 
the Defence of India Act with discretion - it was not to be used 
indiscriminately, nor ’merely because the accused person happens to be
45 ILC Proceedings, 12 March 1919, IOR J&P157l(2539/19).
44 The Bill contained provisions punishing possession of a seditious 
document, giving magistrates some power to order preliminary inquiries, 
allowing promises of protection to witnesses, admitting evidence of 
previous convictions, and providing for restrictions after release; see 
IOR J&PI567(2278/19), & also below,pp.303“304*
45 See H. Public, 602, May 1918. The bill which was abandoned was thu 
Calcutta A Suburban Police (Amendment) Bill of 1910.
46 V(LD) to S/S, 22 May 1920, CPI2.
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a suspected revolutionary or because the crime is believed to be in 
pursuance of a revolutionary conspiracy'. The ordinary law was to be 
used where possible end the special powers evoked 'only when clear 
necessity ... can be established'. Hitherto tho Government had 'invari­
ably accepted' any local request to apply the Act; they now served 
notice that they would do so no longer. The change was to reverse the 
tendency to 'supersede the ordinary criminal courts in respect of the 
ordinary crime of the country' - a tendency which was unattributed but 
which dated, as we have seen, from 1913- how repression was to be 
limited to those crimes which were both dangerous and not amenable to 
judicial control.4"^ This strict attitude was in accord with the 
principle of non-interference with lawful agitation and national 
political leaders.
Moreover, if the Rowlatt Bill seemed to run counter to the 
tendencies of Chelmsford's administration, it certainly did not conform 
with Edwin Montagu's ideas for Indian government. Ho made every con­
ceivable protest, except tho only effective one of refusing his sanction. 
He found much that was 'repugnant1 in the Rowlatt proposals - they 
'made a radical think hard'. He asked, without success, for the Bills 
to be accompanied by a concession, the abandonment of Regulation III 
of 1818. He wrote that he loathed the retention of wartime measures 
and dreaded the perpetuation of that sort of police government which, 
he claimed, had given Sir Michael O'Dwyer a 'cheap' success in the
Panjab. He predicted that the Government would not be able to use the
A A
Rowla.tt powers in the conditions of the future. In the face of this 
pressure, in defiance of Indian opposition, in .apparent contradiction 
of their own predilections, the Government of India pressed on with 
tho main Rowlatt Bill.
There were several reasons for their persistence. The first 
was a belief that the measures were unavoidable, Vincent told the 
legislature that the Rowlatt Bill was an infringement of normal rights,
A7
*' HD circular, 16 March 1918, H.Poll. 275 (& see also 272-274),
April 1918, See also H.Poll, 440-445, Aug, 1916s the Act was applied 
to Patna District in 1916 for the flimsiest of reasons - for the speedy 
trial of a clerk charged with distributing seditious literature, and 
because 'it was not impossible that other sedition cases' might arise,
48
See Montagu to Chelmsford, 10 Oct. & 23-24 Dec, 1918, CP4, &
8 & 26 March & 1 May 1919, CP5; S/S to V, 19 March & 2 May 1919,
CPIQg & Montagu to Ronaldshay, 25 Sept. & 24 Oct. 1918, MP27.
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but one that could not bo avoided. Lowndes professed a. great dislike
of such legislation? and claimed he would have opposed it, had it not
been necessary. Chelmsford wrote that no-one regretted the step more
AQ
than he? but, ho argued, it could not be postponed. He told the
Legislative Council that the Government could not contemplate 'the
sudden release- from restraint and control of the forces of anarchy';
they could not shut their eyes to the 'existence in India of definitely
50revolutionary organisations'. He agreed with tho Rowlatt Report that 
the forces of law wore beaten? he did not believe India would be un­
touched by the 'reaction against all authority' that was abroad? ho
did believe that the Government had to defend their'friends in India
51from the criminal few1. One idea occurred again and again, Clielmsfo
thought tho Government would be failing in their duty if they did not
act, Vincent claimed, 'we are responsible for the public peace in this
country, and it is our duty to take such measures as may bo necessary
to secure that'. At tho end of tho Rowlatt debates, he declared, 'Tho
conscience of the Government ... is clear, We are acting from a deop-
52rooted conviction that we are right'.
'Moreover, if there wore any danger of this conviction falter­
ing, the Bengal Government wort, ready to give encouragement, They 
argued;
Wo hcave unfortunately the best reasons for going on with 
whatever checks have boon imposed by the measures taken 
under the Defence Act. Mon are still abroad who were 
known to be loaders in tho revolutionary movement? they 
are still ... endeavouring to foment trouble, paid simply 
because sedition has been checked for the moment, we 
should not be justified in assuming that it does not 
exist.
... this revolutionary movement in Bengal was not the 
product of the war. It was accentuated by tho war, but 
there is no a priori reason why, because ... the war. is 
over, wo should discord measures which wo have found 
so useful.-5^
49
Speeches II, 208 (21 March 1919)I Chelmsford to Montagu, 21 Fob. 
1919? CP51 ILC Proceedings, 7 Feb. 1919, IOR J&Pl57l(2539/19).
50
Speeches II, 174-175 (6 Feb. 1919).
51 Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 Nov. 1918, CP4.
52
ILC Proceedings, 6 Feb. & 18 March 1919? IOR. J&P157l(2559/19).
53
Bengal Legislative Proceedings, Calcutta Gazette, 5 Feb. 1919,
IOR J&P1577(5152/19) - Statement by Sir Henry Wheeler.
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The Government of India thought tho new Bill was the least objection­
able way of meeting tho need. Regulation III of 1818 was more re­
pressive , and to use tho Defence of India Act in peacetime was to break 
a pledge. It was undesirable, too, to proceed by ordinance. The 
Government thought it their duty to face the legislature - it enabled
them to consult public opinion (which they proceeded to ignore), and was
54altogether 'more open and honest'.
The government thinking was thus a strange mixture of high­
mindedness and muddle. The Bengal authorities were perhaps more single- 
minded, with their steadfast reluctance to consider the basic question 
of whether or not wartime measures could be justified merely by their 
being useful. But the Government of India, although they claimed to 
have seen this dilemma, did not carry through their reasoning. They 
could not break a pledge not to use tho Defence of India Act in peace­
time; but they could re-introduce the Act in a slightly different form. 
They could not proceed by ordinance, but they could ignore the advice of 
the non-official legislators and carry the Bill by official majority.
Tho difference, the effect of their 'openness', was little more than 
to publicise their measures and antagonise the legislators.
They argued, of course, that the will of the legislature
could not prevail in an essential measure. Lowndes told the Council,
In the Rowlatt debate, that 'no reasonable Government' could give way
before a threat of agitation; they were responsible for policy and
55could not surrender their own judgment. Montagu, too, accepted this 
argument, and the thinking which had led up to it. Ho had agreed that 
the Rowlatt Report had'focussed attention' on the urgency of the 
terrorist problem; he was 'firmly convinced' that extra, powers were 
needed to fill a gap in the Government's armour'. Thus he accepted 
publication of the bills; he defended the main measure in Parliament 
with the claim that it was ’tho most liberal Act of its kind ever 
produced'. Indeed, when the Government in their haste introduced the 
Bills without sanction, causing something of a. flurry in the India 
Office, it was admitted that the Secretary of State was unlikely to 
have disallowed them, and Montagu, after sending a mild telegram asking; 
for information, later gave his approval, over the objections of Basu 
and Sinha. He acquiesced in measures he disliked because he was
54
ILC Proceedings, 7 Peb. 1919, IOR J&P1571 (2539/19) - Vincent,
55^  Ibid,
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reluctant to interfere, but also because he had been convinced that the 
measures were necessary - the Indian legal system was so bad that these 
dangerous expedients could not bo avoided. He too accepted the view of
eg
the Rowlatt Committee that the ordinary forces cf law had boon beaten *
In r sense the British had boon trapped by the Rowlatt Report, 
Chelmsford claimed it gave him 'no choice but to act'; his Government
told the Secretary of State that it left 'no option as to tho introduc-
57tion of legislation'. Certainly such recommendations, from a
unanimous committee, left little room for manoeuvre. Some members of
Parliament had shown an interest - a question in tho Commons as early
as October 1918 raised tho matter of the action to be taken; some
'severe criticism' had already been heard over the delay in making copies
of the Rowlatt Report available in England, a 'blunder' which had
exercised the India Office where it was thought to call for a. 'very 
58sharp censure'. Even more important, tho Report had reinforced, in a
quite spurious way, the Government's conviction that it was necessary
to perpetuate the repressive powers. The Home Department explained in
August 1918 that the recommendations involved 'legislation which it
would have been difficult to justify to the public and to the
Legislative Council unless it had been supported by tho real authority'
of tho Committee. But the Committee had based their recommendations on
the evidence supplied by the government, and their remedy merely endorsc-d
earlier government thinking. As far as the Government of India were
concerned, neither the evidence nor the proposals should have gained
59authority from this process. Both evidence and proposals did so.
The effect of tho Rowlatt Report was to forestall any official question­
ing of the need for special powers.
In October 1918 Ronaldshay had reported that his Government had 
had gratifying success in their endeavours to prosecute the 'revolu­
tionaries' in the courts - from January to August there had been 54
56
See above, note 48j & notes by Holdorness, 14 Feb., Basu, 4 March,
& Sinha, 6 March 1919, IOR J&P157l(2539/19).
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V(HD) to S/S, 25 Nov., CP19? & Chelmsford to Lloyd, 8 April 19195 CF22
58 Question, Sir J.D. Rees, 25 Oct., & other questions (Commons), 17? 22
24 & 28 Oct., & (Lords), 15 Oct. 1918; S/S to V(BD) , 17 Oct. 1918; note
by Seton, 10 Oct. 1918s IOR J&P1529(4189/19).
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HD circular, 28 Aug. 1918, H.Poll. 45 > Jan, 1919* The spurious 
nature of this .argument was emphasized when Vincent pointed out that 
it had been the Government's awareness of the 'revolutionary' threat 
which had made them appoint the Committee; see ILC Proceedings, 25 
Sept. 1918, IOR J&P1571(2539/19).
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prosecutions, 28 of them successful.^ This highly significant develop­
ment, like the contributions of the improvements in and the strengthen­
ing of the Bengal police, did not enter into the Government1s calcula­
tions. The Rowlatt Report had already given its verdict.
The failure to question the basic assumptions of the re­
pressive policy was not new. In their letter of 6 May 1916, the Hone 
Department had asked the Government of Bengal what (if any) special 
powers would be needed after the war; ^  but this fundamental question, 
whether any special powers would be needed, was never at issue. It was 
thought axiomatic both that the Bengal situation was serious and that 
it could not be contained by ordinary measures. The Bengal Government 
had been making requests for special powers before the war, and, as far
as they were concerned, the Defence of India Act had merely delayed a
6 2permanent enactment. In May 1916, after the murder of a police officer 
the eighteenth in eight years, they had tried to persuade the Home 
Department to allow them even wider powers, especially the use of 
Regulation 111 of 1818 at local discretion to imprison 'suspects’5 in 
August they had .also asked to bo allowed to prosecute for the possession 
of (not only for intention to circulate) seditious literature. The 
Government of India had refused the former request, and, in agreeing to 
the latter, had urged 'the greatest discretion' in sanctioning prosecu­
tions, and provided that the new rule would .apply only to those docu­
ments whose dissemination would be dangerous 'under existing war 
conditions'. But the special measures were not generally seen as limit.- 
by the war, the end of which would now, in tho Bengal view, 'material.1 y
See Ronaldshay to Montagu, 15 Oct. 1918, MP29* Equally significant 
and also ignored were other facts - the Bengal Government had argued, in 
May 1916 that the Defence of India Act had not been effective; & on 
the other hand Vincent had quoted a letter from a conspirator claiming 
that 'Some of our best men were lost .... we had to drop the idea of an 
immediate rising' (though 'local organisations' wore allegedly intact)* 
See H.Poll. 495? Aug, 1916, & ILC Proceedings, 6 Hob. 1919? IOR 
J&P1571(2539/19).
HD to G/Bengal, 6 May 1916, H.Poll. 172, May 1916.
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See II.poll. 227, Aug. 19-17* At this time there was perhaps the only 
questioning of the policy. In 1916 there was a dispute in tho Bengal 
Government about priorities; P.O. Lyon and Sir Syod Shams if.’. Huda 
suggested that substantive reforms should precede the taking of 
repressive powers - Lyon outlined a plan which included an announce­
ment on self-government, indianisation of the higher public services,
& the devolution of power upon democratic Indian institutions (enlarged 
provincial legislatures with 'more interest in the control of the 
finances', and tin- inclusion of two Indians in local Executive Councils) 
as a preparation for self-government.. See H.Poll. 229, Aug. 1917. (in 
tho event, the Government of India more or less abided by this timetable
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alter the circumstances1. The Home Department, even in 1916, had claimed 
to he considering the whole problem of ’revolutionary' crime, including 
the possibility of introducing measures of 'a more stringent and far
63
reaching character'. The idea of responding to sedition by increasing 
government powers had been around so long that it had become habitual.
The war had merely reinforced this tendency. It was believed that the 
powers had been used successfully5 this strengthened the case for 
making them permanent. Chelmsford had warned his legislature in 
September 1916 that it was impossible to 'tolerate the indefinite con­
tinuance of dangerous activities1, and in Calcutta in December ho 
concluded that the government had been able 'seriously to check' the 
progress of the 'revolutionary' movements by depriving conspirators of 
their l i b e r t y . T h e  containment of the problem was presented as being 
due to imprisonment without trial when trial was thought impossible; 
the Government were not going to abandon this weapon. Chamberlain had
65actively advocated its use; the Government of Bengal argued that at
the least it would have to be continued in some form to avoid the
dangerous situation of the sudden release of the detenus on the expiry
66ol the Defence of India Act, six months after the end of the war.
The whole tradition of government thinking was ti-us against any assess­
ment of the need for repression. And yet thinking was changing. De­
pression had been ruled out for a whole category of political activists? 
the Government of India had ordered that it should be applied more 
selectively even to 'revolutionaries'. The effect of the Rowlatt 
Report, reflecting as it did the unquestioning acceptance of special 
powers, was to continue the traditional response for a few more years, 
long enough to pass the Rowlatt Bill and to discredit the Government 
in the eyes of Indian politicians.
^  See H.Poll. 302, 304-30b, Nov., & 493-494? Aug. 1916. The Govern­
ment did approve the Bengal requests for the use of Regulation III 
against specific prisoners; see H.Poll. 198-201 & 234-240, Oct. 1916.
The offence of possessing sedition literature was_ limited to wartime, 
but only because of the abandonment of the second Rowlatt Bill; see 
above note 44*
64 Sec- Speeches I, 60 & 200 (5 Sept. & 23 Dec. 1916),
65
See above, note 37? Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 18 Dec. 1916, CP2;
& H.Poll. 225 & 230, Aug. 1917.
66 H.Poll. 227, Aug. 1917.
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This habitual response, this failure to consider whether
sedition could not have been answered by improvements in the police
and the courts, was one of the main reasons for the Government of India's
persistence with the Rowlatt Bill. The othor main reason was the
argument, also favoured by the Rowlatt Committee, that 'revolutionaries5
were a special case. In the Rowlatt debates, Sastri had argued that the
Government seemed to be saying ’these are wicked people, it does not
Cl
matter how they are dealt with'. This was perilously near the truth.
The Rowlatt Committee favoured extraordinary means partly because they
would be applied only to a minority; the Government cf India would never
have considered such powers for general application, but argued that
they could not avoid special powers for special circumstances.
They had made concessions on the Rowlatt Bill in the hope cf
reconciling opinion. It was made- temporary, to remain in force for
only three years, because discussion with the moderates hp„d shown that
this might bo useful. Tho Rowlatt Report had softened its proposals by
calling them 'preventive'; Chelmsford followed this line by announcing
that ho had every hopo that 'when the three years ... have passed away,
68it will be found, that tho crime ... has passed away also'. The 
Government planned minor concessions in committee because this too 
would 'facilitate matters'; and by tho end of the debate of 14 March 
1919s quite apart from changes in committee, they had accepted a large 
number of amendments designed to protect the accused. There were 
several provisions to ensure the proper cross-examination of witnesses 
by the defence, and some to limit the discretion of the local govern­
ments. Death sentences were not to be passed unless the judges were
unanimous; there was to be a lessoning in the effect cf the continuance
70of restrictions originally imposed under tho Defence of India Act.
When these concessions did not reconcile opinion the Government were 
puzzled - as Vincent complained to the legislature, they had not been
71unreasonable. But, although Ronaldshay considered that the amendments
72were a dangerous and unnecessary weakening of the proposals, the 
C 7
ILC Proceedings, 12 March 1919, IOR J&Pl57l(2539/19).
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Speeches II, 207-208 (21 March 1919)'
69 V to S/S, 11 Feb. 19199 CP10.
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ILC Proceedings,12 L 14 March 1919, IOR J&P1571(2539/19).
71 Ibid-, 18 March 1919.
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Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 21 Feb, 1919, CP22.
116a
Government had boon concerned, as the Select Committee put it, not to
73destroy the efficacy of the procedure,  ^ They opposed any arrogation
of executive functions to the judiciary; they refused tc- concede
anything not compatible with thvj needs as they saw them. What the
concessions did, inmost cases, was to define the Government's
intentions more clearly.
The short title of the.- main Bill was changed from the 'Criminal
Law (Emergency Powers) Bill* to the 1 Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes
Bill'. The long title and some clauses were amended similarly, ana to
the preamble were added the words, 'for the purpose of dealing with
anarchical and revolutionary movements'. In one clause the words
'prejudicial to public safety' (defining an offence) were replacc-d by
7 A'connected with any anarchical or revolutionary movement1. The
abortive second Bill, the Indian Criminal Law (amendment) Bill, also
gr.vo a definition of sedition, which, though fairly wide, specified what
the Government had in mind; they wore concerned with tho instigation
of the use of criminal force against the Government or public 
75servants. The particular case of tho Bengali terrorist was obviously 
intended here. All these changes were intended to allay fears that the
If
special powers would be used to suppress legitimate political .activities. 
Clearly they were also an important part of tho attempt to reconcile 
opinion; but their main effect was to restrict the application of the 
powers to those crimes alone which the Government thought had to be 
dealt with in this way.
Sastri and Jinnah in debate had claimed that the main Bill 
was repugnant to Western justice; end Vincent, in reply, had admitted 
that this had 'moved all of us and prompted a careful reconsideration 
of the facts' - he had made it clear that only the 'practical point of 
view' had sustained the Government in their resolve. But he had 
countered tin idea that the measures wore repugnant to justice by the
75 Report of Soluct Committee, 27 Feb. 1919, IOR J&P1571(2539/19)•
74 / v  Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act (as amended), ibid. There
Is a copy of the Act (ho.XI of 1919) in the Moral and Material Progress
Report, 1919-
75
Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, IOR J&P157l(2539/19)>
76 V(ED) to S/S, 2 March 1919, CP10.
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contention that the powers would become available only under very
special circumstances, and that even then they would apply only to 
77certain people. This in no way contradicted the members' argument, 
but evidently it had made the Government happier about it. The con­
cessions, clarifying the purposes of the Bill, thus had the effect of 
reconciling the Government to a procedure which they found distasteful,
The need for special powers had long been canvassed, had 
scarcely been questioned among officials and had been eloquently 
supported by an 'impartial' enquiry? therefore there had been no 
question of going back on tho Bill in response to Indian objections.
The 'special case' rationalisation, favoured by the Rowlatt Committee, 
and the concessions based upon it, had contributed to the decision to 
take up the Bill in the first place. The 'special case' idea was indeed 
the guiding principle of the Bill, the only point to much of its 
machinery. More than anything else, it reconciles the apparent con­
tradiction in government attitudes which the Rowlatt Bills represent,
It reveals the central point about the policy towards repression.
Lowndes told the legislature that the Government's policy was one of 
’wait and see', but that they intended to arm themselves in case of
'7 0
need. The powers wore what the Government sa.id they were - for 
emergencies, held in reserve, to be applied only to political activity 
which had crossed the dividing line and become political crime, and 
indeed only to that in special circumstances and in its most serious
forms. The repressive powers were not, in theory, any part of the
generad policy towards political agitation. They were tho ultimate
deterrent. Ironically they were never to be used? so great was the ?
outcry that the government hid to rely on earlier powers of repression, 
and tin. Rowlatt Bills proved not to bo worth the trouble they caused,
In theory they were consistent with general government policy, although 
it was moving in the opposite direction; in effect they helped to 
nullify the advantage which othc-rwiso might have been gained.
Repression and conciliation were seen as separate policies, 
but the distinction was not absolute? also repression haul to be made 
palatable to the politicians. In the first place the government tried
77 
ILC Proceedings, 18 March 1919, IOR J&P157l(2559/19).
78 » 7 Feb. I919.
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to-use minimum powers and to treat prisoners as leniently as possible.
In the second place they used committees of enquiry, as with the Rowlatt 
Committee. Thus several committees were set up to vindicate the applica­
tion of repressive powers or tc reassure the public on the lot of 
prisoners. (Lnto-r, in a similar way, tho Hunter Committee invostigr ted 
tin use1 of executive powers during the 1919 disturbances, and a 
legislative committee was allowed to review the use of repressive 
powers over the press.)
As part of the first element in this conciliation within 
repression, the Government of India received monthly reports on State 
prisoners from district magistrates. There was only one complaint of 
ranitreatment in 1917 - a prisoner at Dacca was threatened, by a warder,
and, although the magistrate suggested that the prisoner was known to
79be difficult, the warder was transferred-. In May 1918 the central
Government issued instructions, following a question in the legislature,
that local governments were 'to ensure that in every case of serious
illness, special attention, nodical and other, is given to tho detenu
concerned and that should death in any case supervene, full enquiries
a.re made as quickly as possible' - the Government's investigation had
revealed that no deaths or breakdowns In health could be attributed tc
internments, but that some deaths had not boon made the subject of an 
SOenquiry. Some prisoners tried to use hunger strikes as a means of 
protesting against their confinement - such strikes (at Alipur and 
Midnapur) were dealt with by transferring prisoners to other jails cr 
by forcible feeding. The Government instructed that forcible feedir: 
was to be resorted to before- tho hunger striker was too weak - it was 
'the duty of the Medical Officer-in-charge by every possible moons tc* 
preserve life', tho means including feeding tubes and necessary force. 
Prison deaths were too much of a political embarrassment? the treatment 
of prisoners had to be above suspicion.
At Midnapur a hunger strike also resulted in measures to 
reduce the number of prisoners, to givo them better colls, more exorcis.. 
time, writing materials and more books. Later in 1918 these changes 
were extended In revised prison rules which divided all 'political' 
prisoners - those detained by executive powers - into two classes, 
dangerous end not, and allowed privileges to the latter while retaining
79
H.Poll. 339, Jem. 1918.
80 H.Poll. 91-103, May 1918.
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H^Pcll. 639-644, Nov. 1917, 7-19, 21-22 & 30A & 339, Jan. 1918.
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82strict control for the former. It won also decided that the non- 
clangorous prisoners should not be kept in gaol. The Bengal Government 
proposed and the Government of India agreed that these prisoners should 
bo detained in isolated but healthy places whore attempts could bo made 
at their education and reformation. In late 1919 it was agreed that a 
camp should be established in Upper Burma, complete with school rooms, 
playing fields and a guard of Gurkha and Sikh military police. The 
recurring cost was to be more than a quarter of a million rupees a 
year. Later, finding they had fewer prisoners than expected, the 
Bengal Government decided on a smaller camp in Bengal*8^
Checks on and improvements in the conditions of prisoners 
were one way of representing tho government as lenient. Amnesties 
were another. In March 1917, os wo have seen, the Viceroy wrote to 
Lord Carmichael of his hope that, if there were no recrudescence of 
crime, they would be able to announce ’a very general measure of 
amnesty' after the war. In August 1917 Montagu suggested that it 
would be politic to announce an amnesty as a prelude to the reforms 
discussions. Tho Government of India thought an amnesty 'obviously 
desirable ... if ... compatible with the public safety'. The local 
governments opposed any general amnesty and generally favoured the 
distinction, suggested by the United Provinces, between those restricted 
for 'extravagance of speech' and those penalised for 'conspiracy to 
murder or to incite to rebellion or for trafficking with ^ *"the_] King's 
enemies'. There were not many detenus within the first category - end 
most local governments were prepared to lift such restrictions. In 
Madras, when they had lost out over Annie Besant, the Government agreed 
to release one other political agitator. In the Pan jab, however, any
O A
relaxation continued to be opposed. In November 1918, after the 
armistice, the Government of India suggested to the local governments
DO
H.Poll. 649? Nov. 1917, & 478, June, & 226, July 1918.
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H.Poll. 1, Sept., 125, Oct. 1918, 379-380, Feb. 1920; Sir Henry 
Wheeler (of Bengal Government), 20 Oct., A. Ronaldshay, 21 Oct. 1919 
to Chelmsford, CP23-
84 See 3/S to V, 16 Aug. 1917, CP8§ H.Poll. 310-313, 316, 318-323, 
327-331, Sept, 1917, & 57, 60-69, 72 & 80, Feb. 1918. See also 
Chelmsford to Carmichael, 24 March 1917» CP18? & above, p.78 & ED
circular, 14 Sept. 1917? H.Poll. 14? Sept. 1917 - Vincent had given 
an undertaking that wartime restrictions would be lifted from persons 
who guaranteed to abstain from violence for the duration (reply to 
Jinnah, ILC, 5 Sept. 1917).
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that they reconsider the cases of Muslims detained for pre-Turkish 
activities; they should consider only whether the release would "be 
prejudicial to safety, and should not maintain restrictions for mere 
political convenience. There was some opposition to this proposal in 
Bengal, Coorg and the United Provinces, but by January 1919 most 
governments had agreed to release Muslim prisoners, even including 
those involved in tho 'silk letters’ conspiracy. The Secretary of 
State objected to the release of Maulana Mahmud Hasan and his followers, 
interned on Malta for their part in this conspiracy5 Montagu held that 
the release would be ’gratuitous encouragement’ to the agitation over 
the Turkish peace terms, but withdrew his objection when the Govern­
ment of India replied that in their opinion ’any pro-Turkish agitation 
is more likely to draw strength from the Maulana’s detention than from 
his release’. ^
In 1919? when the reforms proposals were finalised, Montagu 
suggested a wider amnesty. The Government of India agreed that the 
amnesty ’should be as wide as consistent with public safety’. It was 
announced in a proclamation of 23 December 1919* The Government of 
India urged the local governments to release (and, according to their
interpretation of the proclamation, to pardon) all ’political’
prisoners except those convicted of murder or other serious crimes of
violence. The Government of Bengal had argued earlier that this
proviso should be made explicit in the terms of the proclamation lest 
popular expectations should be raised too high. The Government of India 
had supported this view, but Montagu refused, arguing that such a 
proviso might have allowed the release of conspirators while detaining 
their ’dupes’. Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, found this reason­
ing 'unexpectedly stupid’. Montagu’s main reasons, later to be better 
expressed, were firstly that arrests without trial were ’tolerable only 
if releases are sought whenever they can possibly be justified’ and 
secondly that, under the terms of the proclamation, the local govern­
ments could already refuse any release on the grounds of public safety. 
Montagu's idea was that the government should interpret the amnesty 
widely and then act promptly against anyone who subsequently ’misbehaved’ 
he later criticised Chelmsford for not proceeding in this way with 
Shaukat Ali. The Bengal authorities, on tho other hand, believed that, 
if certain categories were not specifically excluded, each continued 
detention would have to be defended and would create disappointment 
undermining the good effect of the amnesty. They were already
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following Montagu's ideal of 'releases ... whenever ... justified’ -
nine hundred detenus had been released before the amnesty - and they
did not see how they cculd release a sufficient number so as to appear
tc respond to the spirit of a general proclamation. Ronaldshay attended
a meeting of the Viceroy's Council to discuss this dilemmas it was
decided that it was necessary to offor to release, subject to assurances
of good conduct, even the sixty detenus whose continued detention had
86been recommended by the local government. By mid-1920 only eighteen 
remained under detention in Bengal. In the Panjab 1,682 out of 1,779 
had been released. In January 1920, in tho whole of India, only nine 
(out of 310) remained subject to restrictions under the Defence of 
India Act and one (out of 132) under the Ingress Ordinance, although
07
fifty-five were still confined under Regulation III of 1818, In 
most provinces the 1919 amnesty had represented a sudden upsurge in a 
policy of progressive release. The Government of India’s policy re­
mained to release detenus as far as was thought safe - the intention 
was to mollify their use of executive powers. The amnesty, in the 
form insisted on by Montagu, had forced them to step up the releases 
and reconsider the question of safety in order still to achieve this 
aim.
Alongside these deliberate shows of moderation, came the same 
impulse in its second form, tho committees for public reassurance. In 
March 1918, in reply to a question by Surondranath Banerjea in the 
Imperial legislature, tho Government of India outlined a three part 
plan. They announced their intention of setting up two types of 
advisory committee, one to consider tho cases of existing detenus and 
the other to make recommendations on any future detentions? they also 
proposed tc institute a system of non-official prison visiters to 
supplement the present arrangement with district magistrates. The main
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Se- H.Poll. 423, 440, 445-446, 450-452, 455, 458, 464-465, 468, 
470-472, 474-476, & also 60-70, May 1920? V(HD) to S/S, 4 & 11 Jan.
& 4 Rob., & V to S/S, 11 & 20 Jan. 1920, GP12; Ronaldshay to Chelmsford 
8 & 27 Jan. 1920, CP24; Montagu to Ronaldshay, 8 April, MP27, & 
Ronaldshay to Montagu, 5 Fob. 1920, MP31• For Montagu1s views on the 
reinternment cf Sliaukat Ali and a general resumption of a strong line, 
see Montagu to Ronaldshay, MP27, & tc Willingdon, MP16, 9 Sept. 1920s 
see also below* pp.200 & 203
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See H.Poll. 156“l60, March, & 265-266, April 1920; Ronaldshay tc 
Montagu, 8 April, 12 May, 9 June & 6 July 1920, MP31, & 6 Jan. 1921, 
MP32, & to Chamberlain, 26 April I9I8, AGP21/5/71 ~ ^ven in 1918 
Ronaldshay was enunciating; a principle of maximum possible releases.
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object of the-so changes was to ensure that the public were not dependent
entirely on official sources for information about detenus. The Govern-*
88ment had first suggested advisory committees in 1917? now the Bengal
authorities had some objections, but, although the central Government
accepted more limited terms of reference fox* the Bengal Committee, they
insisted on their policy. Other local governments also were reluctant
to reopen cases? the Government of India asked them to reconsider.
Their scheme was eventually adopted in all provinces to which it 
89applied. The Beachcroft-ChandaYarkar committee in Bengal and the
S. Abdur Rauf - B. Lindsay committee in the Panjab later published
findings which overwhelmingly approved the government’s use of its 
90executive powers. After those committees had started their work, a
’Civil Rights Committee1 began campaigning about the conditions of
detention in Bengal, In connection with this campaign Annie Besant
approached the Government of India and accused tho Bengal police of
ill-treating end torturing': political prisoners. The central Government
asked officially for an investigation - the Government of Bengal thought
they should have referred Mrs. Besant to them, but the Government of
India insisted that where the liberty of the subject was restricted
by executive action it was necessary ’to meet and refute complaints...
not prima facie malicious’. The Bengal Government set up a committee,
comprising C.J. Stevenson-floore and Sir Benode Chandra Mitter, who
reported that, of eleven specific allegations, two were admitted by
the prisoners to be false, one was minor and unreliable, four were
withdrawn, and four were found to be quite unfounded. A version of
91their report was published.
Thus the government tried to mitigate against the worst 
repercussions of repression. But tho government could bo only as go- d 
as its officials. So much had to be left to local discretion. Tin
See ILC Proceedings, 21 Fob. 1917, H.Poll. 799? April 1917.
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Sey H.Poll. 1-8, May, & 14-17, 519-320 & 324-326, June, 79-81, Aug, 
202-214, Sept., 108-118, Oct., & 105-106, Nov. 1918, & 3-5 & 206, Jan. 
1919? Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 July 1919, CP3* The Bengal objections 
were not in principle - the local government had suggested a limited 
sort of advisory council as early as July 1916? see H.Poll. 227, Aug. 
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 .jfr-^ ll- 18? Oct. 1918 (Beachcrcft-Chandavarkar memorandum, 31 Auv.
I918)” A P o 6 , Jan, 1919 (Rauf-Lindsay report, 16 Dec. 1918). ^
 ^ H.Poll. 149 & 151? Sept. 1918? Ronaldshay to Montagu, 10 June &
24 July 1916 (with copy of Stevenson-Moore - Mitter report, 6 June 
!918), HP29 ? & to Chamberlain, 26 April 1918, ACP21/5/71. For the 
judges, see Ap?endix, below.
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central authority laid down general principles, but even when a crisis 
arose supervision was usually little more than a nominal check that 
general principles were being observed. In extreme cases a subsequent 
investigation could be mounted. In most cases the Government cf In^ia 
were powerless to intervene. This was true of the application cf 
repressive powers, in cases of local interest. It was also true of 
the control of disturbances. In 1917? for example, there wore serious 
communal riots in Shahabad division, Bihar. Before the outbreak a 
local magistrate in one village had arranged a modus vivendi whereby 
tho Muslims were to sacrifice a goat provided by the Hindus instead of 
a cow as usual in the Bakr Id. Bo higher official was aware of this 
agreement until after it had been violated and the village had become 
the starting-point of widespread disorders. During the riots, moreover, 
policy was decided almost entirely by the local commissioner, and, 
although the situation was not badly handled, the approach was in­
fluenced by the quite unproven assumption that there had been a Hindu 
conspiracy. The Government of India were scarcely informed of the 
course of events, let alone given the means to judge the suitability
of the measures taken locally. They were not able to act until aftor
92
the event, when they sent an officer to investigate the outbreak.
This pattern of immediate local initiative and subsequent 
inquiry was both typical (as we shall see with the 1919 disturbances) 
and deliberate. Even when they had been informed, the Government 
consistently refused to interfere in local arrangements. Towards tho 
end of 1917? having received complaints over decisions in Delhi regard­
ing the route to be taken by a Hindu procession which conflicted with 
a Muslim observance, the Home Department explained the general 
principle behind their thinking. They wrote; 'the Governor-General in 
Council ... has no doubt that the views and sentiments of the Hindu 
community on the subject will be taken into the fullest consideration 
before a decision is reached. But he will not be prepared to overrule 
the local Administration on the question whether a particular arrange­
ment ... is or is not likely to involve a breach of the peace. That
92
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fully informed after the event; Those very extensive proceedings include 
official reports from all levels and trial transcripts.) Sec also Bihar 
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93is a matter which tho local Administration alone can decide'. 
Presumably tho Council would have interfered if they had considered 
that Hindu views had not received tho ’fullest consideration’§ but 
they would not become involved in what was basically a question cf 
judgment in a matter on which local officials could claim expertise, 
The same principle could be applied to the whole range of political 
policy5 and it was political policy which was peculiarly lacking 
in this supervision, for of all tho departments of local government 
this alone was not subject to financial control by involving capital 
expenditure and budgetary allowances. Policies towards communal 
relations, riots, ’seditious' speeches , the press, Indian leaders - 
all political questions - were matters of judgment. The Chelmsford 
Government asserted thornselves in several areas, including' the use of 
repressive powers, by insisting on national interests which had to 
override local considerations. But the effect cf this was necessarily 
limited? there remained largo areas in which they wore powerless tc 
intervene. The result was that not infrequently there wore 
discrepancies between policy at the centre and practice in the 
districts. It was chiefly this disability, rather than the Govern­
ment of India's own failure tc heed Indian opinion over the Rowlatt 
Bill, which was to discredit the repressive powers and undermine the 
central efforts at appeasement.
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Chapter 5* Disturbances
In dealing with riots and disturbances, which had to be 
repressed, there were three approaches open to the central government 
for the minimising of subsequent political agitation. They could lay 
down general standards of conduct and try to ensure that local 
authorities abode by then5 they could take steps to convince opinion 
that no unjustifiable measures had been taken; and they could re­
compense and punish where mistakes or abuses had occurred* In April 
1919? with the serious disturbances in the Punjab, all three of these 
lines of defence broke down.
There were several factors underlying these disturbances.
The end of the war had not brought the expected relief from a number 
of difficulties and disabilities. The demands of political movements, 
such as the Hone Rule and the Khilafat campaigns, had not been net in 
full. The Rowlatt Bill, and more particularly the rumours surround­
ing it, had increased apprehension. A serious food shortage continued 
and prices in most commodities remained high. Between five and six 
million people were dead as a result of the influenza epidemic;
1
between 50 and 80 per cent of the population had been affected. The 
disturbances began in Delhi on 30 March and spread elsewhere after 
the news of Gandhi’s arrest. They were severe in Bombay city and 
Ahmedabad, but most widespread and serious in the Panjab. The general 
unrest and insecurity in India was thus not a complete explanation of 
the troublest there is no strong case for suggesting that these problems 
existed exclusively or particularly severely in the Panjab alone. One 
million had died there of influenza, and epidemics of plague, cholera or 
malaria had struck annually since 1915* But the incidence of influenza 
in the Panjab, though high (42.2 deaths per 1000), was lower than in 
the Central Provinces (56.8), where there were no disorders, or than 
in Delhi (55*6) and Bombay (45*9) where disorders were more easily
1
See Ronaldshay to Montagu, 13 Oct. 1918, MP29, & 19 May 1919, MP50;
& G/Bombay to V, 23 April, & Ronaldshay, 22 May, & Craddock, 24 May 
1919> to Chelmsford, CP22. See also Report of the Disorders Inquiry 
Committee 1920, pp. 64-71» GP47 (also Cmd. 681). Deaths from 'influent, 
had been most frequent in northwest and central India, least in south 
and east. Thus to some extent the disturbances followed the incidence 
of influenza; but there x^ ere exceptions - the Central Provinces had 
no disturbances but the highest death rate in British India (the central 
Indian states and those of Rajputana had even higher death rates - 90 
per 10Q0 in Bikaner); Bengal with a comparatively tiny death rate 
(4.7 per 1000) nevertheless suffered minor outbreaks of disorder. See 
V(ED) to S/S, 21 Feb, 1919, CP10.
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controlled. There was an additional cause for discontent among house­
holders in Amritsar and Lahore, where house-to-house surveys in 1916- 
1917 had uncovered tax-defaulters and increased the yield by JO per 
cent (in Lahore) and 55 per cent (in Amritsar). But rioters were not 
usually drawn from among tax-payers. And the political excitement of 
the war years had probably been felt less in the Panjab than in any 
other major province; in September 1917 Chelmsford had advised the 
Secretary of State that the Panjab was 'the really quiet Province in 
India1.^
The reason for the severity of the Panjab disturbances was 
sought at the time, by the local administration, in talk of a con­
spiracy. Lord Sinha advanced this suggestion in the House of Lords,^ 
But even at the time the Government of India saw ’no signs of central 
organisation*, and, although there had clearly been ad hoc collusion 
in the cutting of telegraph wires and attacks on trains, subsequent 
enquiry bore out the Simla view.^ A later explanation was found, by 
Lord Willingdon, Sir George Lloyd and Edwin Montagu, among others, in 
the nature of the Panjab administration under Sir Michael O'Dwyer.
It was claimed that the Lieutenant-Governor1s zeal in army recruitment 
had created anxieties and hardship. Chelmsford too ascribed the 
disturbances partly to nervous excitement after the war, and he had 
earlier made anxious enquiries of 0 'Dwyer about the effects and the 
methods of his recruitment. In general it was felt also that 0*Dwyer 
had practised ’strong government’ - Chelmsford considered his policies 
’repressive* - and that the explosion of feeling had occurred because 
the local government had kept, in Willingdon’s phrase, the ’screw on 
too tight’. There was some justification for this description, and 
0 'Dwyer himself admitted that he had not been in close relations with
2
Chelmsford to Montagu, 8 Sept. 1917? CP3*
x
Parliamentary Debates (Lords) 56, No.76, 498 (6 Aug. 1919); & see
0 ’Dwyer to Chelmsford, 21 Aug. '1919? CP5, for the claim that the Afghan 
had ’counted on the Internal troubles ... favouring their plans’.
4 V to S/S, 13 April 1919, CP10; & seG Report of the Disorders 
Inquiry Committee 1920, pp. 71 & 109-114, CP47.
5
Willingdon to Montagu, 15 April & 4 May, MP19, & Montagu to Lloyd,
1 May & 11 June 1919? MP22; Montagu to Chelmsford, 1 & 28 May & 8 
Aug., & Chelmsford to Montagu, 16 April & 4 Sept. 1919 (reference tc 
Chelmsford to O'Dwyer, 24 Eeb. 1918), CP5? O'Dwyer to Chelmsford,
4 March I9I8, CP2Q.
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the political classes.8 But it should he noted that the Muslim rural
population, including some who had used force against army recruiters
in 1918? were, in 0 fDwyer’s words, ’everywhere actively loyal’ in
April 1919j that there was no evidence of disbanded soldiers among
the rioters ; that the number of persons in the Panjab dealt with under
executive powers before 31 January 1919 was less than one-eighth of
the number so dealt with in Bengal and less than one-tenth of the all-
India total5 and that 011 1 April 1919 only 24 out of 145 were still
restricted in the Panjab under the Defence of India Act, and seven cut
of 488 under the Ingress Ordinance. 0 !Dwyer was also accused of a policy
of isolating the province from outside influences. This was certainly
7
his intention; and yet only four persons were excluded in April.
for a more complete explanation of the disaster in the Panjab
it is necessary to look closely at the measures taken to control the
disturbances in different parts of India. The least difficulty, of
all areas where disturbances occurred as a result of the anti-Bowlatt
protests, was experienced in the Northwest frontier Province. There,
as excitement rose, the Chief Commissioner, Sir George Roos-Keppel,
confined all troops to the cantonment and told the police to keep as
little In evidence as possible. He met a deputation from the Peshawar
Union Committee, organising the protest, and after discussion persuaded
them to cancel further demonstrations. They later sent him a memorial
0appreciating his sympathetic handling of their protests. The success 
of these methods was repeated elsewhere, among agitators less amenable 
and more politically experienced. In Bengal, Lord Ronaldshay remained
0 ’Dwyer to Chelmsford, 27 Aug. 1916, CP17 (while declining appoint­
ment as Home Member).
7
See 0 ’Dwyer to Chelmsford, 4 May, & to Maffey, 17 April 1919, CP22; 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 116, Ho.68, 328-329 (Montagu, 22 May
I919)? draft answers to parliamentary questions, 13 May, & note by Soton- 
22 July 1919? I8R J&P3132/19? Karl Reinhold Haellquist, 'The Socio- 
Political Development in the Punjab 1907-1919'? unpublished paper read 
at the Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, St. John's College, 
Cambridge, p“9 July 1968. for the earlier outbreak over recruiting - 
and a far more cautious local policy - see G/Panjab to HD, 23 feb. 1918, 
H.Polioe 100, April 19I8.
8 V(HD) to S/S, 17 April 1919, CP10; Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 21 & 27 
April, & to Chelmsford, 28 April, & Chelmsford to Roos-Keppel, 3 May 
1919> CP22.
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in close contact with C.R. Das, B. Chakravarti and Surendranath Banerjea,
met a number of Indian leaders at Government House and enlisted their
cooperation in condemning violence, issued a proclamation in vernacular
languages, addressed a deputation of Marwaris, and, except in one
instance of shooting, later made the subject of a magistrate's enquiry,
9avoided 'provocative' action by the police or military. In Bombay the 
Police Commissioner delayed the use of fire-arms in spite of violent 
attacks and interference with trams and shops, and then ceilled on 
Gandhi himself to help quieten his supporters. Gandhi was permitted 
to held an enormous meeting, and the city returned to normal without 
a shot having been fired.
Moderation was also shown elsewhere, in more serious situa­
tions. In Viramgan, where local authority broke down and the city was 
given over to rioting, looting and arson, the situation was controlled 
by the arrival of a small force of sepoys, the imposition of a curfew 
and orders to open shops, but also by meetings with local leaders. In 
Ahffledabad there were oven more serious riots - 51 government and a number 
of other buildings were burned, with damage estimated at Rs.14,24?000;
28 persons were killed. The District Magistrate imposed a night curfew, 
and in several incidents troops were ordered to fire; but leading 
satyagrahis, including finally Gandhi himself, were asked to assist 
the authorities, and on at least one occasion the magistrate ordered 
that arrested persons should be released in order to appease the crowd. 
Even in Delhi the authorities had tried to take 'unobtrusive precautions: 
before the hartal of 30 March - extra police and troops were kept in 
readiness but out of sight. When rioting broke out, the authorities 
waited two hours before giving the order to fire on the crowd; and next 
day the Deputy Commissioner refrained from taking action against 'the 
turbulent' because, in his view, to do so would have 'brought on serious
9
Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 11 & 14 April 1919, CP22; G/Bengal to 
G/l, 29 April 1919? IOR J&P1566(2200/19)J Ronaldshay to Montagu, 14 
& 22 April, Id May & 20 Aug., MP30, & see Montagu to Ronaldshay, 22 
April & 20 May 1919, MR27.
10 Report of Acting Commissioner of Police, Bombay, 19 April 1919, 
H.Poll. 54, July 1919, & IOR J&P1566(2200/19); & see H.Poll. 354,
Sept. 1919* On Gandhi's arrest and Bombay policy, see above pp.89-94.
Report of Assistant Collector, Viramgan, 5 May, IOR J&P1566(2200/ 
19) & Report of District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, 12 April 1919, ibid.
& H«Poll' 451-452, Sept. 1919; V(HD) to S/S, 11 April 1919? CP10.
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disturbances1♦ On 2 April all troops were withdrawn as they were thought
to be adding to the excitement. Meetings were later allowed so that
’the crowds might be given something to do'. Then, when there were
renewed troubles on the news of Gandhi's arrest, attempts were made to
work through local leaders - the District Magistrate, the Deputy
Commissioner and the Commissioner held a series of meetings asking
for cooperation. Some of the leading Home Rulers were enrolled as
special constables. There remained military patrols and there was
some further shooting, but order was finally restored more by tact
12and persuasion than force.
In all these local measures there wore certain common features, 
which acdorded with the general approach favoured by the Government 
of India. Local authorities tended to allow peaceful demonstrations, 
to avoid provocation by the police and military, and to use as little 
force as necessary, holding off firing on crowds, shooting for as 
brief a period as possible, removing pickets and withdrawing troops 
immediately order was restored. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
they remained In contact with Indian leaders and called meetings tc 
enlist their supporti The picture in the Panjab, however, was very 
different. Demonstrations were banned, provocative orders and 
punishments instituted, and the Lieutenant-Governor prided himself 
on the fact that his Government 'had no parley with extremists'. Indeed 
they arrested them. And the military were not kept out of sight and 
quickly withdrawn; they were put in charge.
Meetings in Lahore had led to riots. In Amritsar local leaders, 
Drs Kitchlew and Satyapal, were arrested under the Defence of India 
Act, and, in the expectation of repercussions, British infantry picketed 
railway crossings. A crowd was intercepted at the railway bridge by 
armed police; but members of the local bar were allowed to persuade 
them to return to the city. Later a larger crowd returned, stoned 
the picket and were fired upon. The crowd whose members had been aroused 
by the arrest of their leaders were enraged by the casualties among 
their number. They returned to the city, set fire to the Post Office 
and attacked the banks, killing in all five Europeans. The local 
Commissioner handed over to the military. The Panjab authorities
12
Report of Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, 20 May 1919, H.Poll. 452,
Aug, 1919? Reports of Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 31 March & 17 April 
1919? IOR J&P1566(2200/19)I Inquest Proceedings, 28 & 29 /~April 
1919 1 7 H.Poll. 452, Aug. 1919. .
reported 'a state of open rebellion1 in the countryside between 
Amritsar and Lahore, and requested the imposition of martial law. Their 
request was granted, and military and civil authorities combined to 
enforce a harsh and in some cases vicious discipline upon the province.
Measures in Lahore, for example, wore increasingly severe, 
out of proportion to the problem, and unfortunately m t  unique. Colonel 
Frank Johnson, the military commander, first introduced a curfew and 
forbad gatherings of more than ten people. He ordered langars (cooked 
food shops) to bo closed, threatened to shut off water and electricity 
supplies, and warned owners of property that they would be likely to 
suffer severe reprisals if shots were fired at the police or bombs 
thrown in the vicinity of their holdings.. Next day, on 16 April,
Johnson ordered students at the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College to report 
four times a day for a roll-call, demanded the immediate ending of the 
hartal on.penalty of suffering any loss resulting from the forcible 
opening of businesses, forbad lathis, forbad walking more than two 
abrea.st, and throatoned property owners with 'severe punishment' if 
damage occurred to proclamations and notices displayed on their 
property. On the 17th ho threatened shop-owners with arrest and 
summary trial if they continued their hartal; he introduced more parades 
of students; he ordered the arrest of all male students and staff of 
Sanatan Dharm College in reprisal for the removal of a martial law 
notice from the College. On the 21st he requisitioned from Indians 
pedal-drawn cycles and lights and electric fans for the use of the 
troops. Johnson was evidently prepared, although he had announced that 
loyal and law-abiding citizens had nothing to fear, to punish before 
he had established guilt and to hold the whole community to ransom for 
the good conduct of a minority. Under such control Lahore remained 
qui&t; but the hartal dragged on. Johnson's methods were more likely 
to create bitterness n.nd defiance than cooperation.
Order had also been restored in Amritsar, But the city had 
then come under the control of General Dyer, who published a pro­
clamation forbidding public meetings and on 13 April (before the 
imposition of martial law) fired without warning on a gathering in the 
Jallianwala Bagh, inflicting very heavy casualties. He also introduced 
an order requiring all Indians who wished to pass to crawl the length 
of a street where a European woman missionary had been assaulted. On 
the same spot some young offenders against prison discipline were 
publicly whipped. Dyer's actions were later supposed by some to have 
'saved the P a n j a b ' I n  fact, while they cowed the people of Amritsar, 
already under control before the firing in the Bagh, they had a serious
13*
effect elsewhere in the province. News of the firing, of martial law
orders in Lahore and Amritsar, and of other excesses, helped to
inflame the situation. The measures were offensive in themselves; the
offence was compounded by the fact that they applied only to Indians.
Disturbances continued t.. spread in the province. Telegraph wires were
cut, public buildings attacked, railway lines torn up. Damage to
property in Gujranwala (where the authorities had lost control and been
forced to use aeroplanes against the rioters) was estimated at 24 lakhs
of rupees; at Amritsar it was thought to have been more than 60 lakhs.
The Seditious Meetings Act and then martial law were applied to the
districts of Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur; and repressive measures
remained consistently in excess of what wa,s necessary - for example,
Lyallpur came under martial law on 21 April, by which time there had been
no disturbances in the whole province for three days, except for the
13cutting of telegraph wires.
Considering all the disturbances there had been least trouble 
where consultations with the Indian leaders started before any outbreak 
of violence and where soldiers were least in evidence. Most trouble 
occurred a.fter measures against Indian leaders and after police or 
soldiers had fired cn crowds. This is not necessarily a comment on the 
validity of the government's actions; it is a comment on the order of 
events. Obviously in some canes police and troops had to intervene, 
even to fire on crowds, In Delhi, for example, it was necessary for 
the police to protect shopkeepers and railway officials on 30 March 
when violent attempts were made to enforce the hartal at the railway 
station. But such intervention wan a two-edged sword, to be handled 
with care. It is possible that in Delhi the police were unwise to try 
to make arrests at the station, and, at the cost of more shooting, to 
drive the crowd further and further away from the scene of the original 
outbreak. Patience, such as was shown in Bombay and later in Delhi as 
well, would have been less expensive in lives, and might also have been 
more effective. Each official reprisal, while controlling an immediate
13 V(HD) to S/S, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 20, & 23 April &
7 May, & V to S/S, 14, 16, 17 A 21 April 1919, CF10; O'Dwyer to 
Chelmsford, 21 April 1919, 8P22; Press communique on Amritsar riots,
30 May 1919, & 'Punjab Disturbances' (reprints from Civil and Military 
Gazette & list of Lahore Martial Law Notices), IOR J&P1566( 2200/l9);
& H.Poll. 74-85, May 1919* Mor' a chronology of events in the Panjab, 
a list of offences 011 railways and a statement of damage to property, 
see Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee 1920, Appendices I-III 
pp.167-191/CP47. See"ibid., pp. 37-43 & 104-105 on'Lahore, 19-36 &
104 on Amritsar, 2)4-47 on Kasur, & 48-56 on Gujranwala.
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danger, inflamed the general situation and led to further violence.
Thus the Government of India were responsible for the main impulse of 
the 'disturbances when they agreed to the arrest of Gandhi.^ The 
Government of the Panjab precipitated trouble in Amritsar when they 
arrested Kitchlew and Satyapal.
In Amritsar was also perhaps the best documented case in 
which firing unleased worse violence. The Civil and Military Gazette, 
which supported the government, printed two reports on 13 April, both 
of which established the sequence of events. In the first, a Mr Jarman, 
the Amritsar Municipal Engineer, described how he was cycling into the 
city, with three European companions, when he met a crowd coming towards 
him. The crowd took no notice of the Europeans. Fifteen minutes later, 
however, Jarman heard a crowd rushing back shouting, 'They have killed 
two of us. Bring lathis. ' - this crowd set fire to the Post Office, 
smashed the windows of Jarman's Office, and went away ( as was dis­
covered later) to murder two Europeans at the National Bank. In the 
second report, in the same edition of the Gazette, one A. Ross of the 
Chartered Bank told how he too had encountered crowds jnssing through th- 
city, without understanding what was happening, then had seen wounded
being brought back, and then had heard the crowds returning shouting,
13'Burn and loot the banks'. The interpretation suggested by these 
accounts was in fact adopted by a judicial committee set up to consider 
the operation of the martial law trials. B.K. Mullick gave as his 
view (on the Amritsar Leaders' Case) that 'the evidence seems ... to 
show that the acts committed for the purpose of obtaining the repeal of 
the Rowlatt Act were all peaceful .... On the 10th Ajjril the arrest 
of Satyapal and Kitchlew was followed by firing at the overbridge.
This appears to have so infuriated the mob that they proceeded to attack 
Europeans and European Institutions'. The other judge on the committee 
disputed with Mullick on a point of law, whether the defendants had 
been 'waging war'; he held that the actions of the mob had to be con­
sidered 'as a determined attempt not only to take revenge for the 
firing but also to force the hands of the Government'. But even this
14 See V(HD) to S/S, 13 April 1919, CP10 - there were no outbreaks 
in any province during the hartal of 6 April. See also Robertson to 
Chelmsford, 19 April 1919» CP22, for an account of the hartal in the 
Central Provinces. For a discussion of the arrest of Gandhi, see 
above, pp.89-91. 1
15
Civil and Military Gazette, 13 April 1919? reprinted in 'Punjab 
Disturbances' ("see above, note 13).
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judge, B. Chevis, did not contradict Mullick1s view on the cause of 
the violence ; he was prepared to concede that 1 the immediate causes 
of the outbreak may have been the deportation of Satyapal and Kitchlew 
and the firing on the mob'."*^ In this instance at least the causal 
relationship between reprisals and violence is surely beyond question.
Obviously underlying grievances provided the climate for 
disturbances, and obviously some local differences in severity may be 
explained in local conditions - one might point to the political back­
wardness of Peshawar, the slowness of Bengal to accept Gandhi's leader­
ship, the particularly deep feelings in Ahmedabad over Gandhi's arrest, 
a certain irritation among the more educated in Amritsar and Lahore 
over O'Dwyer's methods. But it is difficult, in view of the clear 
difference in methods enrployed in the Panjab and in face of unmistakable 
evidence of the crowd's reaction to firing in Amritsar, not to conclude 
that the extent of the violence in the Panjab was partly due to 
government action. Chelmsford, at the time, went so far as to admit 
that, while he was not criticising 0 'Dwyer, he had noted that the pjrobl.m. 
had been dealt with equally effectively in other provinces and with
less violence. Chelmsford went ons 'If only people would realise that
17the day has passed when you can keep India down by the sword'.
The control of riots was largely In local hands; local
differences in treatment partly accounted for the varying severity of
the outbreaks of violence. The Government of India's role was limited.
They tried to help by issuing a reassuring communique on the Rowlatt
net; the document produced was unfortunately pompous and not altogether
reassuring in tone.^ On 12 April censorship was imposed on inland
telegrams to prevent the transmission of news of the disturbances or
19of troop movements.  ^ But for the most part the central authorities did
little beyond approving action taken at local discretion and promising
full support. Chelmsford explained that his policy was to suppiort each
20government 'as far as possible In measures it considered suitable'.
16 H.Poll. 526, March 1920.
17
Chelmsford to Montagu, 30 April 1919, CP5*
18
G/l communique, note by Hose, & Gazette of India, Extraordinary,
14 April 1919, IOR J&P 1566(2200/19).
H.Poll. 146, April 1919‘
20
Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 14 April 1919, IOR J&P1566(2200/
19)? V to S/S, 5 May, CP10, & 14 July 1919, CPU.
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He promptly acceded to local requests for extra powers. All decisions
were, as usual, a collective responsibility? 'I have rightly or wrongly
developed the system of Council or in other words constitutional
Government out here,' he later explained to Montagu; during the Panjab
disturbances, he claimed, he had had ’with the solitary exception of
Sir Sankaran Hair's protest against the continuance of Martial law ...
22the whole-hearted support' of his Council. Willingdon concluded
from Madras that the Viceroy had 'stiffened up well' and was ’determined
25to put down the insurrection at all costs with a strong hand'.
But the collective decisions of the Government of India did
not Involve restoring order 'at all costs'* Chelmsford set down for
O ’Dwyer two ’cardinal principles' as conditions for his promised support
for local actions. Ho greater force or more severe methods were to be
used than were necessary to maintain law and order; and actions were
to be such as would leave behind as little bitterness as possible. In
order to achieve these ends, Chelmsford added, the civil authorities
24were not to allow the military an absolutely free hand. Martial law 
was proclaimed only for a specified range of offences (those named in 
section two of the Bengal State Offences Regulation 1804)> and the 
ordinary law and courts were to be retained for ordinary offences. In 
all matters the army was ordered to cooperate with the civil authorities. 
On 18 April the Commander-in-Chief directed the local army commander in 
the Panjab, General Benyon, to 'act In close communication with and on 
the advice of /~theLieutenant-Governor'. The military authorities 
had argued that it was impossible to place an army officer with 
executive powers under the local government, and the Government of
H.Poll. 74-85, 91-101 & 114-118, May 1919; IOR J&P1566(2200/l9).
The Seditious Meetings Act was applied to Lahore and Amritsar on 15 
April, to Multan and Jullandar on the 16th, to Delhi on the 17th and 
to Lyallpur on the 20th; also to Sind after the 29th. Defence of 
India rules were applied, mainly to expedite trials, to Bombay province 
in April, Delhi in May, end two Panjab districts in June. Martial law 
was approved for the Panjab progressively after 15 April with re­
trospective effect in respect of trials for offences relating to the 
disturbances; the authorities were also able to arrest without warrant 
persons assistimgor promoting the 'rebellion1.
22
Chelmsford to Montagu, 25 Sept. 1919, CP5* Hair had later made his
opposition seem more general; see Willingdon to Montagu, 21 July 1919, 
MP19 (Willingdon largely agreed with him).
25
Willingdon to Montagu, 28 April 1919, MP19.
24
Chelmsford to O'Dwyer, 26 April 1919, CP22.
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India agreed with the general principle that the supremacy of the
pn:
military authority (where it applied) must be maintained.
There were later to be attempts to blame the whole catastrophe 
on this insistence by the C-overnmont of India upon the legal supremacy 
of the army. But there was no suggestion that the civil authority 
should be abrogated. On 16 April the Panjab Government had reported 
that they had issued orders making punishable acts not punishable by 
ordinary law, and granting punitive powers to selected military and 
civil officers. The powers were to be used with tact and commonsense 
and without 'irresponsible violence' - 'Force ... should never exceed 
the immediate necessities of the case’. The Government of India had 
replied that under the martial law regulations only the General Officer 
Commanding had the power to issue such orders but they noted that he had 
been asked to cooperate with the local government, and suggested that 
he should be requested to ratify the instructions. The Panjab Govern­
ment acted on this advice. 0'Dwyer had written to Chelmsford on the 
l6th? 'Wo were terribly in the dark as to the non-statutory side of 
martial law and aren't yet quite clear'. In 1920 he wrote to the 
Times and the Morning Post claiming that the Government of India had 
denied the martial lav/ administration the benefit of civil advice; in 
fact civil and military authorities, following the Government of India's 
instructions, had conferred daily in Lahore and wore in close contact 
elsewhere, while several of the officers later censured for their
conduct were not military but civil. Dyer's measures in Amritsar were
26instituted before the establishment of martial law.
Chelmsford had given clear instructions ordering moderation; 
these instructions were endorsed by the local government. Yet they 
were not observed. The imposition of martial law was no excuse for 
this neglect; but confusion was one of the reasons that the excesses 
were allowed to continue. The Panjab Government, for example, re­
quested that the punitive powers for certain officers (ratified by the 
n.rmy command on 19 April) should be made retrospective to 50 March,
Some officers, they reported, had already exercised such extended 
powers in spite of efforts to make the position clear. The Home De­
partment professed to be puzzled, and informed the Panjab Government
25 V(HD) to S/S, 14 June 1920, CP12 & H.Poll. 228, June 1920.
2 6
H.Poll. 86-87, May 1919, 0 'Dwyer to Chelmsford, l6 April 1919,
CF22; Chelmsford to Maffey, 16 June, CP16, & V(HD) to S/S, 15 June 
1920, CP 12 A H.Poll. 229, June- 1920.
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that they had understood that ordinary courts were being used for 
ordinary offences, that special tribunals were trying offences specified 
in the martial law ordinances or added later, and that courts established 
by the military were trying only those offences created under martial 
law. Any other procedure was an irregularity. They asked for an officer 
to be sent from the Punjab to discuss the matter with them. At this 
point, on 4 May, the Government of India began to realise, as had the 
Panjab Government, that it would bo necessary to pass an act of valida­
tion and indemnity to regularize these local actions. Chelmsford was 
most concerned, for the moment, therefore, not with legal correctness, 
but with ensuring that the personnel of any summary tribunal was 'above 
reproach'. He was not sure that some of the young officers would not 
'see red1; but he was also aware that summary procedure would be ’a 
most effective weapon’. His Government accordingly agreed to allow 
selected civil officers to be appointed to summary courts for all minor
offences, provided that there were no sentancos imposed other than those
27permitted by the ordinary law.
Thus alarm at the situation (as rejjorted to them) and aware­
ness of the needs of hard-pressed administrators also limited the 
effectiveness of central supervision. There was one case in which the 
Government of India respected local advice to the extent of refusing 
to reverse a policy they believed to be wrong. For the special 
tribunals, the military authorities haul passed a general order exclud­
ing counsel from outside the Panjab. There had been some ’agitators1 
among the applicants and it was feared they would delay or inflame the 
trials; a general order was p.ussed to avoid invidious distinctions. 
Complaints were received by the Government of India - including some 
from Surendranath Banerjea, Motilal Nehru, and a meeting of the Calcutta 
Bar. The Commander-in-Chief telegraphed General Benyon; 'Unless good 
rea.sons exist to the contrary the Commander-in-Chief considers refusal 
impolitic; but responsibility for decision rests with you'. The Panjab 
Government agreed with the local military - they argued that sufficient 
local counsel were available (and being supplied by the government if 
necessary), and that outside counsel were not normally admitted before 
the Panjab High Court. The Government of India replied that they still 
thought the decision ’unwise’; but they were not prepared to interfere 
during the continuance of martial law. The Secretary of State showed
27
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more courage, and later ordered that trials should he postponed if
necessary to allow outside counsel to appear; hy this time martial law
28had ended and counsel were being allowed to attend.
In most cases, however, the Government of India did try to
intervene when they found Chelmsford's 'cardinal principles * were not
being observed. In response to protests from Gandhi and C.F. Andrews
about public whippings, for example, Chelmsford telegraphed to O'Dwyer
on 23 Aprils 'I wish to point out ... the very grave effect that these
whippings are having on public opinion throughout India. I am ready
to give you my support in every way, but I think it right that you should
know that I consider this particular form of jjunishment should be avoided
29
as far as possible and the least publicity given'. Chelmsford refused
a request for a public whipping at Kasur; he insisted that the flogging
and the ’crawling' order at Amritsar offended 'against all the canons of 
30wise punishment'. On 22 April the Commpjider-in-Chief had instructed
General Benyon that 'public opinion in India was markedly opposed to
corporal punishment' and that he would be glad if the authorities
31'would dispense with punishments of this nature'. On 30 April, 
nevertheless, the Panjab Government asked for clarification on the inter­
pretation of one of the Government's martial law ordinances relating to 
the special commissions set upi to try offenders against martial law.
The local government asked if the authority given to pass 'any sentence 
authorised by law’ allowed the commissions to pass any sentence 
authorised for the particular offence under trial, or to pass, for that 
offence, any sentence authorised for any offence. They were really 
asking if the Commissions could be allowed to pass lesser or additional 
sentences for the main offence of 'waging war against the King-Emperor1, 
and they were particularly anxious to extend the power to order whipping 
to cover any offence, notably for arson, rioting or receiving stolen
property. The Government of India interpreted their ordinance strictly,
32and refused to allow any general application of whipping.
28
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Chelmsford had. taken the opportunity, while objecting to the
whipping and the 'crawling' order in Amritsar, to repeat one of his
'cardinal principles'. This form of punishment, ho explained to O'Dwyers,
is not deterrent and is calculated to leave behind the 
maximum amount of bitterness. It will be regarded as 
intended to aim at racial degradation. It is not imposed 
on the guilty, but on Indians as a race. A punishment of 
this sort will be remembered with rancour long after the 
stern lessons of justice will have been forgotten. I hate 
to write and cavil at what is being done at a time when we 
all owe you so much for your prompt handling of the situation 
and I know how high feelings are running' among your European 
population. But we have to live with Indians after all this 
is over, and we should do nothing which leaves unnecessary 
bitterness behind. No province is self-contained and the 
Pan jab, important as it is, is only a ijortion of a much 
greater India., and I feel confident that throughout India, 
the racial animosity which exists at present will be 
intensified a hundredfold when this story is told, and 
cui bono?33
O'Dwyer, who pointed out that he was not responsible for actions by the 
military (in this case General Dyer), had also been shocked, and asked 
that the order should be w i t h d r a w n . I n  such cases, of course, the 
damage had already been done.
Thus the excesses occurred. ; The Government of India were 
prevented from intervening both by declared policy and by circumstances. 
The practical difficulties of supervision were enormous. 0 'Dwyer, as 
ho admitted to Chelmsford on 27 May, had been unable to give the Govern­
ment of India a clear picture of the situation.^ At times, because 
of interference with railways and telegraph, only wireless communication 
could be maintained between the governments and with different parts 
of the province. Chelmsford could presumably have left Simla, and 
visited the disturbed areas in the Panjab - but this would have weakened 
or superseded the local government, and put the Viceroy out of touch with 
headquarters and thus with other parts of India.^ And, even without 
special difficulties, it was, on Chelmsford recognised, 'always 
difficult to control tho man on the spot1. O'Dwyor had recommended 
the Viceroy's 'cardinal principles' to tho military authorities, but
'2T2
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niceties were not always observed when everyone was ’working at high 
37pressure1. There was no control over the type of local official
through which tho superior authorities had to work. O'Dwyer himself
believed that the government could not operate martial law ’without
taking the kid gloves off’? he in turn had to rely on subordinates and
military personnel, of whom some faced the Panjab crisis with a lack
of either humanity or political sense. 0 1 Dwyer was able to prevent
General Dyer from imposing an enormous fine on Armitsar on the basis
of claims for damages 5 but he had not been able to prevent the General1 
38’crawling* order. ■ The Government of India, in turn, had been able to
deny O ’Dwyor his wish to have martial law proclaimed in Delhi - but only
because the Delhi authorities were not sympathetic to the idea, as the
city was quiet and they could find no evidence to support O ’Dwyer's
claim that it was Delhi-based emissaries who were disturbing the 
39Panjab. Excesses of repression occurred contrary to Chelmsford's 
stated policy? there had been a failure of supervision and an almost 
total unpreparedness for the administration of martial law on the part 
of both tho local government and the Government of India. The re­
sponsibility belonged to both authorities, but the blame on the superior 
administrators must be qualified by an understanding of the difficulties 
Moreover the central Government had made strenuous, though 
unavailing, efforts to see that their policy was followed in the 
province. The extent of these efforts has been underestimated, and 
indeed was deliberately concealed. In November, following the dispute 
with Maclagan over the Government's refusal to exclude Tilak from tho 
Panjab, Chelmsford wrote in indignation at the tone of Maclagan1s 
protest?
When I remember ray support of tho Punjab Government during 
the past six months; when I see myself pilloried in every 
Indian paper because of my unwavering support; when I 
reflect that this support was given, as you know, often 
with reluctance, but that no word has ever been spoken 
by me either to the Secretary of State or publicly even 
suggesting reluctance, I feel that I have full right to 
complain ,.*.40
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The Government had failed in their supervisory role. Nov/ they 
could only try to minimise the after effects of the repressive local 
actions, and to vindicate as much as possible of the administration 
during the emergency. There were still some difficulties in their 
path.
One of the first needs was the removal of the conditions under 
which excesses had been possible. Chelmsford urged the withdrawal of 
martial lav/ on 12 May, on the grounds that it was no longer needed 
and that the longer it remained the more difficult it would make the 
future situation, 0 1 Dwyer opposed this, at least for Lahore, Amritsar 
and Gujranwala. (lie had no objection for Gujrat and possibly Lyallpur.) 
After consultation with General Benyon, Colonel Johnson, Sir Gdward 
Maclagan (about to take over as Lieutenant-Governor), J.p. Thomson 
(Panjab's Chief Secretary), and others, including the Officiating Agent 
for the Northwest Railway, O'Dwyer suggested that it was necessary to 
finish the trials under martial law, that the civil administration would 
become more difficult if it were withdrawn, and that the railway 
interest needed to be protected. It would be undesirable to have to 
restore martial law once it had been withdrawn? it was necessary to 
exclude some persons from the province? and martial laws had been 
reviewed and in a number of cases relaxed, Chelmsford disliked this 
stand, and claimed that he would have insisted on withdrawal if it had 
not been for the Afghan war. Por the time being, therefore, his Govern­
ment accepted the local view, except for Sankaran Nair v/ho resigned 
in protest over the delay. The Government recommended the abrogation 
of martial lav/ in Gujrat and lyallpur, and on 28 Hay it was announced 
that it had ended in Gujrat and would be withdrawn in Lyallpur as soon 
as the military force there had been increased (to satisfy Panjab 
objections). Martial law wa.s abrogated everywhere on 9 June, except 
for railway lands. A further ordinance (No. VI of 1919) allowed trials 
to continue. The delays in the return to normal had not helped to 
restore confidence.^
The act of validation and indemnity also aroused alarm. The 
Government's draft bill validated and prevented legal proceedings in 
respect of all sentences, punishments and other actions done in good 
faith and in the reasonable belief that they were necessary to maintain
^  Chelmsford to O'Dwyer, 12 May, O'Dwyer to Chelmsford, & Thompson 
to Maffey, 15 May, CP22, & Chelmsford to Montagu, 21 & 28 May 1919,
CP5; H.Poll. 23"51, June, & 295, March 1919*
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or restore order. Compensation was to be paid for property used under 
martial law. The Secretary of State suggested that it would be wiser 
to indemnify officials for actions and not to validate all sentences? 
but the Government pointed out that without validation they would 
presumably have to release all those convicted summarily, and the 
Secretary of State concurred. In the bill presented to the Imperial 
Legislative Council, however, the Government circumvented their own 
objection by introducing a new clause validating all confinements under 
martial law, but no other actions - officers were merely indemnified 
against legal proceedings, unless they had acted unreasonably or not in 
good faith. The effect of this change was to make it clearer to the 
legislature that there was no question of prejudging the validity of 
actions or preventing proceedings against officers. The Home Depart­
ment also aslced for the preamble to be changed so that there was no 
suggestion that the legislators agreed that martial law had been 
necessary. To help the debate Sir William Vincent announced that all 
summary cases would be referred to two High Court judges for review, 
and two extra non-officials (one Indian and one European) would be 
added to the committee of enquiry which was about to consider the 
disturbances. Two-thirds of the non-official members of the Council 
supported the Indemnity Bill (six out of eighteen voted against it). 
Chelmsford attributed the result to the good work of the new Education 
Member, M.M. Shafi, and to the moderation of Vincent and the persuasive 
ness of Lowndes. But the passing of the Act, however necessary it may 
have been in legalistic terms, did not help to reconcile the public to
the martial law administration, and added credibility to the argument
4-2that the government was trying to conceal grave abuses.
It was the more important, therefore, to convince Indians tha 
the prisoners held in gaol or already punished had been properly tried, 
and, where appropriate, were being treated leniently. The first martia 
law ordinance had provided for trial under Regulation III of 1804, 
whereby sentences only of death and forfeiture of property could be 
passed. The Government removed this anomaly by their fourth ordinance
42 V(HD) to S/S, 28 Aug. & 5 Sept., V to S/S, 20 Sept., & S/S to V,
7 Aug., C P U , & Montagu to Chelmsford, 2 Oct., & Chelmsford to 
Montagu, 1 Oct. 1919, CP5; H.Poll. 14, Aug., 239-295, Nov., & 58,
Dec. 1919.
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45allowing a minimum sentence of transportation for life. " Severe 
penalties were needed, in Chelmsford's view, to prevent a recurrence 
of tho disturhances| hut reductions in sentences were readily consider, 
as soon as the situation returned to normal.44 The following table 
shows the numbers tried in different ways during the period of mp.rtial 
law.45
Chart I. Ho. of persons 1. tried; 2. convicted; 3* acquitted or
discharged
J-., Hartial Law Commissions 852 581 271
P. Summary courts 1437 1179 258
(including area officers 564 495 69)
C. Ordinary Municipal Courts 15 11 2
D. Special D. of I. Tribunal 56 21 55
The martial law commissions early began to recommend reductions in 
sentences below the minimum permitted them, and tho local government 
agreed with this procedure, The judicial review, announced by Vincent 
during tho Indemnity Bill debate, was to apply to all cases, whether 
or not the offender had applied for it, except where the sentence had 
already been served. The Government of India had already decided to 
remit all sentences other than those for offences which were serious 
under ordinary law, Maclagan wanted to consider reducing sentences for 
such serious offences, and had already begun his own review; he 
suggested that he refer to the judicial enquiry any cases on which he 
felt doubt.4^ These charts illustrate the action taken.4^
41
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44 V to S/S, 4 May 1919, CP10; H.Poll. 109, Sept. 1919-
45
H.Poll. 492, Jan. 19205 ILC Proceedings, 10 Sept. 1919*
46
i-I.Foll. 425, April 1920; HD to G/Panjab, 23 Sept., & G/
Panjab to HD, 27 Sept. 1919? H.Poll. 59-60, bee. 1919. Maclagan's 
changes were designed to adjust sentences so that none was lighter 
than that which a Panjab magistrate would have given for a comparable 
offence in normal circumstances; in August he considered that 
existing sentences represented the 'irreducible minimum' in terms 
of this principle; see Maclagan to Chelmsford, 7 Aug. 1919,
CP23«
47 H.Poll. 122-125, Au g . 1920.
145
Chart II. Sentence3 under martial law
■by summary by martial by D.of Totals
courts ? la v; I. trib­
commissions ? unals
For 'waging war' - 555 8 565
Other offences 1179 226 13 1418
Total 1179 581 21 1781
of whoms
served sentences 650 85 1 714
released I89 16 205
pardoned (l/l/20) 56 - - 56
released through
proclamation
(28/12/20) 252 288 9 529
(some conditionally 104 5 109)
released through
reviewing judges 92 9 - 101
still in gaol
(51/7/20) - 80 6 86
Chart ill. Convictions for murder or waging war
by martial law by 1, of I.
commissions? tribunals
A. Sentence by court
- death 104
- transportation for life 248
B. Sentence under government 
review
- death 20
- transportation for life 25
- over 2 years1 imprisonment 263
- under 2 years 1 imprisonment 40
C. Releases
- by government review 8
- by proclamation (25/12/20) 248
- by reviewing judges 5
D. Still in gaol (51/7/20) J6
Chart IV. Comparative figures for
Convictions during disturbances
- total
- for 'waging war'
- for other offences
Subsequently pardoned 
Sentences reduced 
Released (51/7/20 Bombay?
2/8/20 Delhi)
The extent of these remissions of sentence was one reason put forward 
against the amnesty of December 1919*^  Most releases were in 1920.
Bombay ? Delhi.
125 21
36 -
87 21
18 2
72 9
Me3ton to Chelmsford, 12 Aug. 1919, CPI5.
144
The purpose of the judicial enquiry in the Panjab was not, 
however, merely to provide machinery whereby leniency could be shown 
to political prisoners. It was to demonstrate that the special courts 
had functioned justly. The findings of the reviewing judges, B, Chovis 
and B.K. Mullick, were not entirely suitable for this purpose. Of the 
twelve officials responsible for trying summary cases, the judges praised 
or were generally satisfied with the procedure and record of five, but 
they also criticised the methods of three, representing 84 out of the 
550 cases reviewed. The officials criticised were Major Shirley, the 
Provost Marshall, Captain Doveton at Kasur, and B.M. Bosworth Smith. In 
the case of the last, it was particularly unsatisfactory that he, who 
had investigated the crimes, should also have conducted the trials - it 
was perhaps not surprising that ho recorded an unusually large number 
of defendants who pleaded guilty. Moreover, one or both of the re­
viewing judges considered that there was unsatisfactory evidence or 
wrongful convictions for almost one hundred defendants in summary cases - 
and these were found under all the officers, including those whose 
procedure was thought satisfactory, (indeed examination reveals, in 
spite of the judges' findings, that all the records of the summary 
trials, with the exception of one officer who dealt only with petty 
cases, were fairly scanty especially in particulars relating to defence 
evidence.) In addition, when they came to consider cases before martial 
law commissions, both judges recommended five pardons, fourteen releases 
and two reductions in sentence. Mullick suggested a further five 
pardons and one release. These figures represented the failures of 
the administration in a certain number of the trials - the judges did 
not deal with all cases 5 for commissions they dealt with 51 out of 114» 
Nevertheless in February 1920 the Panjab Government suggested a press 
communique to convince people that the trials had generally been fair. 
They proposed to stress that the judges had approved the general 
procedure and endorsed the findings in all the most serious cases.
Where they recommended releases, the government had complied - by this 
time all those convicted summarily had also been released. ^
The Government of India recognised that in non-judicial aspects 
the administration and supervision of martial law had been defective.
They were determined that they would not be unprepared in future. Parly 
in 1920 they put an officer on special duty to devise a set of martial
49
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law instructions. These were ready in April. The military were to he
instructed to interfere as little as possible and to cooperate with
the civil authorities, and to transfer charge as soon as order was
restored. Martial law officers were to remember that Indians were
British subjects? they were to conduct trials carefully and without
awarding excessive sentences. Whipping wa.s not to be ordered except
where it was permitted under the ordinary law or for crimes of violence.
Martial law orders were not to offend classes, individuals or religious
feelings, and were not to involve racial discrimination. If military
force were to be employed it was not to exceed the minimum necessary.
The Government of India proposed to print these instructions - which -
were 110 more than a formal statement of their former policy and
Chelmsford's 'cardinal principles' - and to distribute coi)ies In
confidence to all Divisional and Brigade Commanders and to district
officers, for further distribution to subordinates should martial lav/
be declared. Copies of tho first chapter of the manual, containing
general principles, were also to be issued to all police officers and
magistrates? the contents were to be made known to all commissioned
military officers. These matters were confidential in detail, but the
50Government were able to announce their existence publicly.
The Government of India would have been inclined to leave
matters there as far as published reassurances went, and hope that
in time both disturbances and repression would be forgotten. In this
regard Chelmsford regarded tho Afghan wen as a 'godsend' - it diverted
51public attention from internal matters. The Government made sure that 
all news, except for military details, was made public. Montagu, how­
ever, was not satisfied with silence about the Panjab disturbances. He 
first asked for an enquiry early in May 1919* He endorsed Bhupendranath 
Basu's plan for restoring confidence j this included tho pardon of all 
those convicted except in cases of crimes of violence, and a public 
commission of enquiry. Montagu announced to tho House of Commons1
'You cannot have disturbances of this kind and of this magnitude without
52an enquiry into the causes ... and the measures taken1. The Govtun-
50
V to S/S, 2? Jan., & (HD), 10 April 1920, CP12? H.Poll. 49"53s 185 
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ment of India had envisaged that there would he an enquiry, hut they did 
not wish to put the whole administration publicly on trial, reawakening 
interest and publicising grievances? they favoured departmental investi­
gations. They had earlier resisted a suggestion from Surendranath 
Banerjea for an enquiry after the Delhi riots of 30 March? Chelmsford 
had replied to Montagu's first querys 'I have always contemplated 
announcing an enquiry Into these disturbances when order has been 
restored and normal conditions prevail. I have held my hand, however, 
because I do not wish to give tho appearance of discouragement to 
officers who are performing onerous, distasteful and resj/onsible duties.' 
Now his Government added that they saw 'serious disadvantages attending 
the investigation of matters about which feeling both European and 
Indian has been deeply stirred'. They had concluded that there were 
three incidents which might have been unreasonable - the public floggings 
the firing at the Jallianwala Bagh, and the use of aeroplanes to bomb 
crowds at Gujranwala. They conceded that there might have been others, 
But they Informed the Secretary of State that they would 'certainly have 
preferred to be left to make such enquiries as were necessary ... and 
to deal with any ... officers whose conduct might be found to deserve 
either censure or punishment in tho ordinary course1. They agreed that 
they were 'bound to see that ... measures taken ... are reasonable* and 
*to enquire dispassionately into any cases where there appears to be any
reason for thinking that ... limits have been eccoeded', But they did
53not like the Secretary of State's way of achieving this end. In short 
they wanted justice - if necessary retribution - but they feared 
publicity. They knew that, if given the material, Indian politicians 
now had the skill and the machinery to make capital out of the govern­
ment* s errors and excesses.
The Government's objection was endorsed by Sir George Lloyd, 
who wrote to Montagu of his fear about the consequences of an enquiry. 
Hareourt Butler suggested similarly that an enquiry would enhance racial 
tension, and that acts of clemency would have a better effect. Montagu 
advised against being apprehensive at things 'being thrown into the 
melting pot again as a result of an Enquiry's he thought that the 
situation was becoming quieter, and that an enquiry was 'the only 
possible way to deal with tho Punjab situation'. He wished to avoid 
a 'pompous indictment1 of Chelmsford's administration, but insisted that
53
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54it was necessary to dissipate 'monstrous allegations'. In view of 
the Secretary of State's opinions and his announcement to the Commons, 
the Government of India proposed an enquiry covering the Panjab, Delhi, 
Bombay and Bengal, and investigating the disorders and the measures 
taken to deal with them. They did not wish to include the question of 
causes, as this would provide an opportunity for politicians to attack 
the whole administration and would 'leave a dangerous legacy of bad 
feeling1. For members they suggested a chairman from Britain, a high- 
ranking military officer, a senior civilian and an Indian; meetings
jr c
would be in public unless the committee directed otherwise. Of the
local governments which were addressed on this scheme, Bengal was
strongly opposed to an enquiry and Bombay thought it would be open tc
the most serious objections. The Panjab government agreed to an enquiry
and were prepared to allow it to discuss causes; Delhi thought an
enquiry 'inevitable' but added that it was unfortunate that it should
56be held at a time when the country might have settled down again.
Tho Government of India set out their objections (as we have seen), but 
agreed, in their reply to the Secretary of State, that an enquiry was 
now unavoidable. They modified their original proposals to include a 
second Indian member (so as to represent both Hindus and Muslims), and 
to allow investigation into the question of whether the disorders were 
organised, and if so why and by whom. Thus they included some con­
sideration of causes without risking a general investigation of past 
administration - they had accepted the Panjab point of view, as they 
had realised that Montagu had mentioned 1 causes' in his Commons
statement. They also wished to minimise the risks for them by having
57the committee appointed by and reporting to tho Government of India.
A majority of Chelmsford's Council also agreed that they 
should not now conduct their own preliminary enquiry, on the grounds
54
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that it would he thought to anticipate or prejudice the main committee.
Sir William Vincent did not agree because of the immediate need to
collect evidence and perhaps also to take action against some officers.
58Montagu supported the majority view. The Government of India had 
therefore not only accepted a public enquiry; they had also transferred 
to it exclusively the decision on the disturbances and the hopes for 
appeasing public opinion. It was necessary to make sure that the 
committee would be as useful as possible, and the Government favoured 
appointing a well-known English judge as Chairman. Hone were avail­
able, and they were forced to accept the appointment of a little-known 
Scottish judge, Lord Hunter. Chelmsford expressed his disappointment 
at this decision. The Government were also unable to avail themselves
of the prestige of Sir Edward Gait, as he was personally 'unwilling to
serve, and it was decided that it would be invidious for the head of
59one province to sit in judgment on the affairs of another. The 
Government had decided that it might help tho committee if they agreed 
to suggestions in the Imperial Legislative Council, where Indian members 
led by Malaviya requested a third Indian member on the committee and 
were prepared to accept an extra non-official European as well. The 
Government asked Tej Bahadur Sapru to be the third Indian member, and 
when he declined appointed Jagat Narayan.^  The other Hindu member, 
Chimanlal Setalvad, had been among the counsel excluded from the Panjab 
under martial law; Marayan had been a critic of the Panjab government
in the past and had contributed to the Punjab Relief Pund. The local
government had drawn these facts to the attention of the Government of 
India, but had not protested - on the contrary they thought the 
information might be useful later in showing the impartial constitution 
of the committee.
Public acceptance of the committee was nevertheless put at 
risk by a disagreement with the Congress, The All-India Congress 
Committee had appointed a sub-committee under Malaviya to attend tc
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the question of the Panjab enquiry. This sub-committee demanded that 
the principal local leaders should be released from prison for the 
duration of the enquiry, in order that they might give evidence before 
the Hunter committee and thus assure people that the investigation was 
to be full and impartial. The local government offered to provide 
facilities for any prisoners who wanted to testify - they would be 
released on bail for as long as necessary to allow them to give evidence 
and instruct counsel - but Malaviya refused to be satisfied with any­
thing less than unconditional release on security. Accordingly the 
Congress decided to boycott the Hunter committee, and instituted their 
own enquiry under Motilal Nehru. Ho prisoners gave evidence to the 
Hunter committee, although some were represented by counsel. A few 
prisoners who had been released later offered to travel to Bombay to 
testify; Lord Hunter declined their offer on the grounds that after 
six weeks in Lahore his committee had completed their hearings on the 
Panjab.
In their report the Hunter committee on the whole vindicated 
government policy, including the actions of local officers. They con­
sidered, for example, more than thirty-six instances of firing by troops
police or (on two occasions) from aeroplanes, and justified all but 
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two. But this favourable verdict was not very useful, firstly the 
Indian members of the committee had written a minority report. They 
questioned the existence of a rebellion and the need for martial law, 
but admitted that some persons were rightly tried for waging war, and 
did not contradict the majority’s general approval of government polic5T? 
except in a few cases they dissented over the severity of the condemna-
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Chelmsford to Montagu, 3 Dec. 1919, CP5; draft reply to parliamen­
tary question,^ 7 June 1920, IOR JAP3132/19; Malaviya to PSV, 13 Nov.
1919? CP23 & H.Poll, 473? Peb. 19205 ibid. 474-480. Hunter concluded 
that 'no further concession was necessary to give the Congress Committee 
the fullest opportunity for placing before us any evidence relevant to 
the enquiry’ - Hunter to HI), 8 March 1920 (with Hunter Report), CP47>
On the appearance of counsel, see H.Poll., 469-471? Peb. 1920. Gandhi 
also requested the withdrawal of the restrictions on him in view cf the 
enquiry; see Gandhi to PSV, 2 Oct. I919, CP23.
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1920, CP47 - especially, for general approval by the majority, pp. 1-18 
(Delhi, Ahmedabad, Viramguam, Kaira, Bombay city), 72-86 (introduction 
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tion of particular excesses. Nevertheless the existence of a division 
on racial lines inevitably undermined the persuasiveness of the official 
enquiry as a whole. Secondly the C ngress committee had reported 
strongly condemning the Panjab government and the Government of India, 
and making (on the evidence of a different set of witnesses) accusations 
of excesses even greater than those revealed by the Hunter committee. 
Finally, and most of all, the positive findings of the majority and 
minority reports of the official enquiry had been completely outweighed 
and obscured by the discovery and publication of the details of one 
incident, the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar.
General Dyer had arrived in iimritsar and taken control before 
the imposition of martial law. He decided on 12 April to issue a pro­
clamation forbidding public meetings, and had this proclaimed in several 
parts of the city. On the afternoon of the 15th he was informed that 
a meeting was being held in the Jallianwala Bagh, an almost completely 
enclosed square. He marched to the square with troops and an armoured 
car, entered with the troops through a narrow alley, and immediately 
ordered the soldiers to open fire. More than 1500 rounds were fired, 
directed at the thickest parts of the crowd as they tried to escape 
through the only other exit. Casualties were high - the number of deaths 
was later estimated officially at just under four hundred, and by the 
Hindu charitable organisation, the Seva Samiti, at about 550 - and the 
casualties would presumably have been higher if the entrance to the Bagh 
had not been too narrow for the armoured car. Dyer then left the scene 
without making any arrangements to attend to the wounded.
The evidence before the Hunter committee had made it clear 
that this shooting was completely unjustified. Dyer had at first claimed 
that his object 'was to disperse the crowd', but, under cross-examina­
tion, he admitted that probably he could have dispersed the crowd with­
out firing and that he 'meant to punish those who had disobeyed the 
order and to give them a lesson'5 he had thought he would 'make a 
wide impression throughout the Punjab'. He admitted that he would have 
used the armoured car if it had been possible, and that he stopped 
firing because ammunition was running low. It was revealed that the 
crowd had not been riotous - they were listening to a lecture - and 
that Dyer had not given them any warning or a chance to disperse. It 
was suggested that the proclamation forbidding meetings had been 
inadequately publicised and that many in the crowd were villagers 
who had come to Amritsar for a traditional festival. It was this body
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64of evidence which provided the main shock to opinion.
Dyer's action hore no resemblance to established practice or 
instructions. The Panjab government was later to order that no un­
necessary violence should be used under martial law. The Panjab Police
Rules stated?
4- When an officer ... determines to resort to the 
use of fire-arms, he shall, when the circumstances 
of the case admit of this being done, before giving 
the order to use such arms, give ... to the crowd a 
special warning that if they do not disperse an order 
to fire upon them will be given, and that the police 
will fire with buckshot or balled cartridges.
6. As a rule only very few files should be allowed 
to fire at first. Three or four shots ... may suffice 
to disperse a large crowds but the officer ... must 
use his discretion ....
8. No firing should be permitted a moment after the
necessity for it has ceased to exist. b
These rules, though not binding on a military officer, were presumably
still in force until martial law had been declared. The shooting at
Jallianwala Bagh had been shown to be indefensible in motive and out
of all proportion to what was necessary. The Commissioner, .Amritsar
Division, was later to report? 'We lost control of Amritsar on 10th
66April and did not recover control of the city till 12th April'. There 
was, therefore, no apparent need for further action on the 13th except 
to disperse an illegal gathering. According to the evidence of Captain 
P.C.C. Briggs, who had been attached to Dyer's staff, the General had
been warned on the morning of the 13th that a meeting was to bo held
that afternoon. Dyer had made no attempt to prevent it and had not 
believed that the meeting would be held. Briggs also claimed that on 
the 12th Dyer had mentioned that he intended, once his proclamation had
/ ' r 7
been well-circulated, 'to take strong measures'. Dyer's own evidence 
bore this out: on hearing that the meeting was being held, he had made 
up his mind, he said 'that if his order was defied he would shoot
Ibid., 30-36 A 131-138^ The Times 15 Dec, 1919s Daily Express 13 
Dec. 1919.
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Panjab Police Rules, p. 55, IOR J&P1566(2200/19). Compare United 
Provinces Police Regulations, ch.VI, para.66, loc.cit.
66 Note by /~Holderness_7, pOR J&P3132/19.
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Statement of evidence by Capt. P.C.C. Briggs, 11 April-8 May 1919 
IOR J&P3132/19, The Hunter Committee saw this statement but did not 
include it in the evidence appended to the Report, as Briggs had died 
on the Northwest Frontier before being cross-examined.
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straight away’ - he had made up his mind before he had assessed the
60needs of the situation. In his official report on the incident, he 
stated that 'It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, 
but one of producing/ a sufficient moral effect, from a military point
of view, not only on those present, but more especially throughout
69the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity'. " This 
point is very important, for it disposes of the argument that the 
extreme position taken by Dyer before the Hunter Committee was a dis­
tortion introduced because an honest soldier was harried and out­
manoeuvred by Hindu lawyers far too clever for him. On the evidence of 
his own report, written in August 1919? there can be no doubt that Dyer 
acted in the Bagh unnecessarily and for improper motives. It is 
difficult not to interpret Dyer's own explanations of his purpose and 
his admitted intention of teaching the crowd a lesson, as revealing 
that the shooting at the Jallianwala Bagh was a deliberate and pre­
meditated attempt to revenge the murdered Europeans of Amritsar. It 
was the job of the soldier to keep order, not to instil terror nor to 
act as judge and executioner.
Sir George Lloyd concluded that the misfortune was that a 
'thoroughly stupid' (though perhaps honest) soldier had had to deal 
with such a situation.^ Certainly Dyer's conduct at Amritsar was not 
altogether out of character, in spite of his 'distinguished' record? 
in November 1916 Chelmsford had complained of a 'policy of advanturc1
pursued by Dyer in Sarhad in South-Eastern Persia? Dyer had been
71removed and in Chelmsford's view the position had improved.
Before the Hunter committee and the revelation of the details, 
the Amritsar shooting had not received the attention it warranted. The 
bombing at Gujranwala (which the committee also criticised) had been 
objected to, as had some of the more bizarre punishments under martial 
law. There was no mention of the Jallianwala Bagh in the complaints of 
the moderates' conference at the end of April 1919? not one of many
^  See above, note 64.
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Appendix.
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questions in the House of Commons mentioned the shooting before August.
T'he All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution on 8 June, mention-
72ing the Jallianwala Bagh first among many other incidents. Not until 
the Imperial Legislative Council debate on the Indemnity Bill in 
September was thu shooting singled out for attention and fairly full 
accounts made public. But even then there was little attention paid 
in the India Office or, it seems, the Government of India.
One reason for the lack of official attention was x^obably 
the confusion over the number of casualties. The Government of India
first reported casualties of two hundred, and this statement was re­
peated in the London Times of 19 April. On the 17th tho Government 
had corrected their first report by adding that the casualties were 
deaths. The India Office, by a coincidence, seem to have received this 
second telegram at 11.00 a.m. on the 17th, before the first which arrived
at 10.00 p.m. that evening. Tho India Office was at no time in tho
possession of incorrect information. Nevertheless only the first 
telegram (arriving second) was communicated to the press. Full 
particulars were not given until 28 May. In addition to this confusion, 
there was a dispute about the wounded. It was at first assumed that 
the wounded would bo about three times the numbc-r of deaths (the pro­
portion usual in war)5 but it was later recognised that such a high 
proportion was unlikely with the closo range firing which occurred at 
the Jallianwala Bagh. The Seva Samiti verified only 192 wounded - and, 
although the number must have been higher, given a natural tendency to 
conceal participation in the Bagh meeting, the Government of India, in 
repeating the Samiti’ s figures, argued that it was at least possible 
for the number of wounded to be lower than the number killed. The number 
of deaths also remained under-estimated until September when Sir William
Vincent suggested In the Imperial Legislative Council that there wore
nx
probably about 354 - instead of Dyer’s estimate of two hundred.
Even two hundred deaths represented a very large number, as
large as that for fatalities from all the other incidents during tbm-
d isomers, but the situation in the Pan jab was being’ presented by the
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local government and others in terms of conspiracy and rebellion.
Perhaps the scale of Indian natural disasters should also be remembered — 
quite apart from the influenza epidemic, for example, nearly 2000 people 
died in a cyclone in Bengal in October 1919. ^
The shooting had been presented to the local government, to 
the Government of India, and to the Secretary of State as a necessary 
action in a dangerous situation. The Commissioner at Amritsar con­
sidered that 'the blow ,.. saved the central Panjab from anarchy, loot 
A murder'. The Government of India had earlier reported the shooting 
(on information from the Panjab) with the explanations that 'At Amritsar 
there was defiance ... of a proclamation forbidding public meetings, 
and it was necessary to fire on the mob', and that 'Further particulars 
show that fifty sepoys faced unlawful assembly of 5000'. General Dyer 
gave a brief verbal rejDort to O'Dwyer during a fifteen minute interview 
on 16 April. No written reports were received in London until October - 
Dyer had not made his written report, with the first mention of his 
motives, until August, and even then it was submitted to the Army Depart­
ment and not seen by the Viceroy. Montagu and others at the India Office 
had met O'Dwyer on his return to Britain, but had not received the 
impression (according to Sir T.W. lioldemess) that the force employed by 
Dyer had been in excess of the necessities of the situation. Indeed 
O'Dwyer had left the Panjab before seeing Dyer's report. Accordingly the
details of Dyer's evidence came as a surprise."^
Montagu had a reply drafted for the House of Commons stating 
that 'Until the evidence of Gen1.Dyer reached this country last week 
the S/S was without information as to what took place in the Jallianwala 
Bagh'. Ho meant, as he explained later, that he did not know the details
as they emerged before the Hunter committee. He had suggested that
Dyer should be relieved of his command, when telegraphing to the Viceroy 
early in June, but his objections had focussed on Dyer's 'crawling' 
order, which still had his main attention, with other 'Inexcusable' 
orders, as late as September 1919*^° The Government of India, too, had 
been in ignorance. Chelmsford explained to Montagu that in April he had
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known of the small number of Dyer's force, the fact that the pro­
clamation had been disobeyed, and the possibility of Dyer's being
attacked if he hesitated. He knew no further details until he read
77Dyer's evidence to the Hunter committee. In rejjly to Montagu's call 
for Dyer's dismissal, Chelmsford had telegraphed of the General's 
•otherwise admirable handling' (that is apart from the 'crawling order') 
and had urged that to act against him would give a handle ' to 
political sensation-mongers ... when things have practically settled
7Q
down'.1 Thus, at this time, in June 1919? ho was not considering the
Jallianwala Bagh shooting. Later, after the Hunter committee, he
argued that Dyer's evidence had been exaggerated, that Amritsar had
been in a state of rebellion, and that Dyer had been right to consider
that position. But he admitted that Dyer had been wrong to think of
himself as responsible for the state of the province, and he no longer
opposed Dyer's dismissal? he explained to Montagu that he had not
acted earlier because he was waiting for the report of the Hunter 
79committee. Such scruples were general in Chelmsford's handling of
the situation. Montagu had suggested that he should have made public
his private objections to flogging and the 'crawling' order, and have
announced his moves to forbid them. But the Viceroy had believed that,
in such a serious situation, it was essential that subordinates should
feel they had full support. Montagu had agreed that it was right to
support the local authorities at the tune, but suggested that this did
not prevent expressing an opinion afterwards; Chelmsford had explained
that, although he was not defending ’0 'Dwyerism', his principle had
Bn
been to assume his officials right until they were proved wrong.
77 V to S/S, 2 July 1920, CF13.
7^ V to S/S, 8 June 1919? CP10.
79 V to 3/S, 21 March 1920, CPI 2, & 23, 24 & 30 Dec. 1919, CPU. By
this tune Chelmsford, who had once made excuses for Dyer, was no longer 
accepting any? Craddock wrote suggesting that Dyer had not realised there 
was no way out of the Bagh, or that tho treatment of Miss Sherwood, the 
European missionary who had been assaulted, had been much worse than had 
been revealed and that this knowledge had affected Dyer's judgment; 
Chelmsford replied merely that he was sceptical that there were any un­
known facts about Miss Sherwood's case. See Craddock to Chelmsford, 23 
Dec., and Chelmsford to. Craddock, 31 Dec. 1919, CP23. Chelmsford's 
change of heart seems to have come during December, as full reports 
became available. He had first thought that Dyer, though a bluff 
soldier, had well survived his ordeal before the inquiry committee; sec; 
Chelmsford to Harcourt Bxitler, 21 Nov. 1919, CP23.
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lined by Chamberlain in 1916, was that officials thought responsible
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The Government could have been quicker to investigate the 
details of the Jallianwala Bagh incident. But their neglect was to 
some extent matched by a delay in public awareness generally. Tho largo 
casualties wore of course bound to cause alarm and resentment; but not 
until the details and motives wore revealed to the Hunter committee was 
the shooting shown to have been a massacre. From this point the Govern­
ment of India began to lose the capacity to limit the progressive 
alienation of Indian opinion. Bhupendranath Basu noted? 'just as another 
great act of conciliation was about to be inaugurated, the Punjab
incident fell like a thunderbolt riving in twain the reuniting forces
81of the great war ... ', It was difficult to see how to recover the 
situation. The Panjab government abandoned any idea of claiming the 
cost of the disturbances and compensation for losses by direct taxation - 
the municipality of Amritsar had agreed to provide by direct taxation 
compensation to a total of 18-^iakhs over five years. Tho government 
also decided not to collect the cost of extra police from Gujranwala, 
Amritsar and Lahore. They had suggested that a pension of up to Rs.5*0 
should be paid for persons disabled or killed where families were more 
or loss destitute. The Government of India had not then agreed, as they 
thought the payments night be construed as an attempt to buy silenco 
at a time when the disturbances were being investigated. A total of 
Rs.12,000 was quietly distributed by the Government of India to the 
dependants of villagers killed at Jallianwala Bagh, and once the Hunter 
committee had reported a further Rs.15,000 was provided for dependants 
living in Amritsar.
The Government of India had been anxious to forestall the 
Congress report by earlier publication of the official committee's 
verdict. They did not succeed in this, but nevertheless were fairly 
satisfied that 'little interest' was being taken in the Congress 
accusations. To the Secretary of State, who suggested a further enquiry 
into these accusations, they stressed that the non-official investigation
for offences were suspended x>ending an enquiry - their retention of 
positions of authority was recognised to create dangerous feeling. See 
Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 5 Aug. 1916, CP2. The difference in the 
Panjab case was that on Montagu's initiative normal procedure - an 
internal government enquiry - had been suspended.
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had been -undertaken by parties already publicly committed to a
condemnation of the Panjab administration, and that their report was
patently biassed and exaggerated - complainants could take action through
the courts if they wished (although only two minor cases had been
instituted). But the Government nevertheless investigated all of the
major Congress allegations against government officers, and made, for
83their own purposes, detailed refutations of the- Congress evidence.
The criticisms from tho Hunter committee could not be dealt 
with so informally. It was necessary to issue a statement. The initial 
reaction of Chelmsford's Council was to accept the majority report 
almost without exception, and to admit the cogoxicy of much of what the 
minority had said, agreeing with them particularly in disapproving 
of long’ prison sentences. In the Government's view, Dyer, having acted 
beyond what could reasonably have been thought necessary and with 
inadequate humanity, should bu compelled to retire - Chelmsford told 
Montagus 'I cannot contemplate the retention of a man of his mentality 
and with his record1* The Government agreed that Dyer's proclamation 
should have been published more widely, condemned his failure to give 
a warning beforehand or medical assistance afterwards, and found his 
continuation of tho shooting after the crowd had begun to disperse to 
be indefensible and a misconception of his duty. But they did net 
propose to prosecute Dyer5 they intended to remain neutral in the event 
of a private prosecution. The Government also criticised O'Dwyer's 
approval of Dyer's act - they thought it would have been 'wiser' if he 
had found out the details first - but they intended to exonerate the 
Lieutenant-Governor from any other censure. For the other officers who 
had acted improperly, the Government proposed to ask the Panjab govern­
ment to take appropriate action - certain conduct should be condemned 
and some officers censured. The Delhi and Bombay authorities should 
be commended. Regret should be expressed for the lives lost, and steps 
announced which would prevent any repetition of the mistakes or the 
misuse of power. In March 1920, J.L. Maffey, the Viceroy's Private 
Secretary, writing to Vincent, had supported a suggestion of Sastri 
that the lack of a government expression of sympathy for the loss of 
innocent lives was causing a continuation of bad feeling; Maffey had 
hoped that the right note could be struck in the Government of India 
resolution. Tho Government also proposed to announce- that compensation
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would be paid to victims and dependants suffering on account of tho
p. A
Jallianwala Bagh shooting.
Montagu proposed that the British Cabinet should also make 
an announcement, and suggested that the Government of India resolution 
should begin with the Cabinet statement and go on to give the Govern­
ment's views. The Government thought this an unusual procedure and 
argued that any omissions on their part would be construed as dis­
agreement. It was eventually decided that the two governments should 
publish ’despatches1 specially written for the purpose and based on the 
Goverrunent of India’s proposed resolution and the Cabinet’s statement. 
The Government of India wished to give their ’despatch’ a date as near 
as possible to that of their real communication to the Secretary of 
State, if not of the Viceroy's telegram of 21 March, then of the draft 
resolution sent in tho week of 10 Aprils they were anxious to counter 
charges that they had delayed rnduly. Montagu did not agree - it would 
have publicised the delays which had occurred in London, and there had 
already been parliamentary questions on the publication of the Hunter 
report - and therefore the Indian 'despatch' was dated 3 May? the
Secretary of State's ’reply’ was dated 26 May, the date of its publica-
85tion along with the Hunter report.
In their 'despatch' the Government of India defended the 
exclusion of Gandhi, which had been criticised by the minority report 
of the Hunter committee, and endorsed the favourable findings of both 
majority and minority on the action taken in Delhi, Ahmedabad, Viram gam 
and Bombay City. The minority had argued that there had been no re­
bellion in the Panjab, no conspiracy and no justification for martial 
law, but the majority believed that there had been a rebellion, that 
martial law had been justified, and that, although there was no evidence 
of a conspiracy, It was difficult and perhaps unsafe for the government
V to S/S, 21 March, & draft resolution of G/l, week of 10 April, 
GP24, &, Maffey to Vincent, 19 March 1920, CP24. Tho Government's 
attitude was no doubt influenced by a report that the King entertained 
'a great ... admiration for O'Dwyer'; see Me5>-er to Chelmsford, 5 Sept. 
1919, CPI5.
85 S/S to V(HD), 6 May, ft V(HD) to S/S, 11 May 1920, CP12; H.Poll. 
126-161, June 1920; G/l(HD) to S/S, 3 May, & S/S to Gjl, 26 May 1920, 
H.Poll. 162-163, June 1920. There were Commons questions on the 
publication of the Hunter Report, on 17 & 24 (2) March ft 26 April 1920. 
The Government of India had sent H.W. Williamson, a United Provinces 
police officer who had been secretary to the Hunter committee, on de­
putation to London to assist the Secretary of State and express the 
Government's view; see H.Poll. 18-35? Aug. 1920. For references in 
the following paragraphs to criticisms by the Hunter committee, see tho 
descriptive analysis, above, note 63.
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at the time not to assume there was. The Government of India, with 
Shafi dissenting, accepted the majority view and pointed out that they 
had had no choice hut to rely on the Panjab reports of a rebellion and 
a critical situation needing martial lav/ - they quoted the local 
government's telegram in full. Both minority and majority, with 
different degrees of severity, condemned detentions without trials the 
Government of India , while justifying more preventive detentions, 
admitted that long imprisonments, especially in nine cases singled out 
by the minority report, had been g, serious error. On trials in general 
the majority had had favourable comments, while regretting that certain 
cases had not been tried in the ordinary courts and criticising the 
exclusion of outside counsel. The Government of India, agreed with this 
view. The use of aircraft on two or three occasions at Gujranwala had 
been criticised by both reports, tho minority adding that the pilot had 
not used sufficient discretion: the Government of India were not pre­
pared to criticise the pilot but agreed that instructions had been 
inadequate - the5>- proposed to issue better instructions. Thus far the 
Government's 'despatch' followed their original intention of endorsing 
the majority view. On the central matters, however, they went further, 
Both reports had had severe criticisms of certain martial 
law orders? the majority condemned the 'crawling' order of Dyer and the. 
public flogging of certain offenders, the students' ’roll calls' imposed 
by Colonel Johnson in Lahore, an order of General Campbell requiring 
Indians to salaam on meeting Europeans, and oth.r 'fantastic' ‘penalties? 
the minority added objections to almost all of tho Lahore orders, to the 
flogging of a, marriage party, and to actions by three officers, Colonel 
O'Brien, Bosworth Smith and Jacob, The Government of India accepted 
almost all the criticisms of both reports. They announced that steps 
would be taken to avoid 'fantastic' penalties in future and that the 
officer who ordered the flogging of the marriage party had already been 
censured - in fact they asked the Panjab government to reopen the case 
and consider further measures. They admitted that some (though not all) 
of the Lahore orders had gone too far - they agreed with the minority 
particularly in condemning the confinement of students and professors 
after the destruction of a martial law notice on college property. It 
may be that the Government's condemnation would have been total, given 
the needs of the situation, If they had not earlier defended one of 
Colonel Johnson's measures to the Secretary of State - the Home Depart­
ment had justified the order threatening imprisonment, fine and whipping 
for continued refusal to open shops, on the grounds that closure had 
been an expression of resistance to the government and that anyway the
order had not "been invoked. As it was the Government concluded in 
their 'despatch' that the administration of martial law had "been 'marred' 
in particular instances by a misuse of power, by irregularities, and by 
’injudicious and irresponsible acts', and they announced their intention 
of issuing Instructions which would associate civil advisers formally 
with the military in future emergencies; they also reported that they 
had asked the local government to take action against the officers who 
had been criticised.
On the crucial matter of Dyer and Jallianwala Bagh, the 
majority had criticised the failure to give warning or stop firing as 
the crowd dispersed, and the fact that Dyer had decided on firing before 
he had arrived at tho Bagh or been confronted with an emergency; they 
condemned his attempt to create a moral effect and denied that his action 
averted a rebellion. The minority added to these criticisms strong 
condemnations for Dyer's failure sufficiently to publish the pro­
clamation forbidding meetings, his suggestion that he would have used 
machine guns, his firing until his ammunition x^/as almost exhausted, his 
assumption that the crowd in the Bagh consisted of persons guilty of 
the earlier outrages, and his failure to attend to the wounded. The 
Government agreed with both reports that warning should have been given, 
that the continuation of firing was indefensible, and that the firing 
was in excess of the needs of the occasion; they supported the minority 
view that the proclamation was insufficiently published and that tho 
wounded should have been tended. They criticised O'Dwyer as in their 
draft resolution, and announced that Dyer was to bo asked to resign.
They ended their 'despatch' with a reminder that only 88 out of 1779 
wore still in prison as a result of the outbreak, with an expression of 
regret at the loss of life and a promise of compensation, and with tho 
observation that the lesson of the disasters was that non-cooperation 
(currently being advocated again by Gandhi) was too dangerous a weapon.
The Secretary of State's 'reply' differed from the 'despatch1 
in tho vehemence of its language. The Secretary of State recorded his 
tribute to the officers who had not been criticised, and stressed the 
British Government's 'obligation' to and 'fullest confidence' in Lord 
Chelmsford personally. Montagu justified martial law. But ho admitted 
that its administration had been marred, not generally but also not 
uncommonly, by a spirit which promoted improper and inhumane punishments,
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humiliating to Indians and causing unwarranted inconvenience - as if 
the officers involved had been governing a hostile country. Dyer, in 
the view of the Secretary of State, had violated tho British Govern­
ment’s principle of using the minimum necessary force, and thus had 
caused ’lamentable and unnecessary’ loss of life. His 'crawling' order 
had 'offended against every canon of civilised conduct'; at Jallianwala 
Bagh his failure to give a warning had been 'inexcusable' and his 
failure to tend the wounded was an 'omission from his obvious duty'.
He was 'not entitled to select for condign punishment an unarmed crowd 
which ... had committed no act of violence, had made no attempt to 
oppose him by force, and many members of which must have been unaware 
that they were disobeying his commands', Dyor's 'conception of his 
duty ... was so fundamentally at variance with that which His Majesty's 
Government had a right to expect from and a duty to enforce upon 
officers ..., that it is impossible to regard him as fitted to remain 
entrusted with the responsibilities which his rank and position impose 
on him'. The matter was being referred to the Army Council.
Thus the condemnations made by the majority of the Hunter 
committee had been clearly endorsed by both the Government of India, and 
the British Governments the Government of India sought to place some 
emphasis on the difficulties of the situation, but on the main points 
their position, if not their terminology, was close to that of the 
Secretary of State and not greatly removed from that of the minority 
report. Chelmsford professed himself perfectly satisfied with the 
procedure adopted. But he admitteds 'Of course ... we shall not 
please anyone, but that is not our business. The European community 
will be offended at our judgment on Dyer, and the extremists wanted 
either my or 0 'Dwyer's head on a chargor .... I think, however, that 
the ultimate verdict will be that we have been strictly judicial in our 
treatment of the matter'. Montagu was also apprehensive about the 
results of the publication of the Hunter report and the two 'despatches' 
later he admitted that he might have made a mistake in ordering an 
enquiry. He had written to Lord Hunter in August 1919 that the govern­
ment had nothing to fear from a searching enquiry and that the purpose 
was to restore public confidence. Later he wrote to Lloyd (who had 
always been apprehensive) : 'until the enquiry opened, I had not the
slightest conception that anything would be revealed which would cause 
us embarrassment. I thought the enquiry would justify everjrthing tha.t
87
' Y to S/S, 20 May 1920, CPI2.
162
had been done, and the Government of India assured me that they had
nothing to foar’. ^
The English language newspapers responded predictably. All
those which were English-owned, except for the Times of India, gave
varying degrees of support to General Dyer, ’the saviour of the Punjab’.
All those which were Indian-owned, except for New India, the Indian
Daily Telegraph and the Indian Mirror, considered the majority Hunter
report to be whitewashing and called for more severe penalties for 
89Dyer. This racial division did not bode well for the usefulness of
the Governments' ’despatches’ in restoring confidence among English-
educated and politically-minded Indians. Any chance of a good effect
was lost, however, when the British Parliament debated the Hunter report
and the action taken against Dyer. There were Members in both Houses
who were prepared, as Meyer explained to Chelmsford, to praise Dyer for
actions they would have condemned as 'Hunnishness’ if they had been
committed by a German general in Belgium. But Montagu, as he himself
admitted, made the situation much worse by delivering a provocative
speech in the Commons. Maffey, who wan in Britain on leave, called
this speech 'utterly deplorable’; it gave the impression only of
’nervousness, pallor and lack of judgment’ so that Maffey could feel
antipathy ’sweeping all over the House'. Montagu spoke heatedly,
abandoning his prepared speech, and was rattled by hostile interjections
he tried to label Dyer's defenders as advocates of a doctrine of 'fright
fulness’ and he thoroughly ’ruffled’ tho Conservative Party. The
Government carried the vote- in the Commons, after rallying support, by
247 votes to 37; but in the Lords they were defeated 129 ^0 86. The
sole issues, in Maffey’s view, had become; 'Is it English to break a
man who tried to do his duty?’ and 'Is a British General to be downed
90at the bidding of a crooked Jew?’. The Morning Post started a sub­
scription for Dyer, who had been forcibly retired; tho fund was
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eventually to reach £26,000. In India officials and military were
formally barred from contributing to the funds this was small reply to
91the damage already done to Indian opinion.
A further factor compounding resentment was the action taken
against the officers who had been criticised. The local government
censured three of their European officers - one of these (Bosworth-
Smith) was forced to retire early. On the other hand one Indian police
officer was reduced in rank and another reduced and retired as a result
of thoir failure to try to deploy police under their command to prevent
the murders of three Europeans in Amritsar. The Panjab authorities
had defended the actions of the Commissioner and. Deputy Commissioner
of Amritsar; the- Government of India insisted that these officers had
improperly abdicated control to the military and censured them for
this failure. The Government of India also censured three other
officers for improper orders. General Campbell (of the ’salaaming;'
order) was informed, of the Commander-in-Chiof's regret and displeasure
at his measures; the Commander-in-Chief declined to accept any excuse
from Colonel Doveton, another inventor (at Kasur) of injudicious and
irregular punishments. No action was taken against Colonel Johnson
who had been similarly inventive at Lahore - he was a territorial office
92and. since demobilised. In the face of continuing Indian demands, 
Montagu, although he had agreed in April 1919 that ’The use of force on 
a substantial scale ... was no doubt the right course1, and had 
suggested in his ’despatch’ that censure would be an appropriate re­
action to the excesses, now argued that 'more substantial punishments' 
would have been a better salve to Indian hurts. He was particularly 
alarmed at the prospect of future promotion for the censured officers. 
Lord Willingdon had suggested to him that the dismissal of some of the 
officers would have an enormous effect.^
Chelmsford pointed out that censure would iTormanently be 
taken into account in any promotion - one of the officers had already
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been passed over twice for positions for which ho would otherwise have 
been a strong contender. The officers themselves felt the censure 
very strongly, and the Amritsar Commissioner had decided to retire as 
a. result of the government disapproval. Bosworth Smith’s early retire­
ment was equivalent to a fine of Rs.12,000. The Government of India, 
Chelmsford reported, had considered in full Council several factors in 
assessing the proper action. They felt that they had to make allowance 
for the difficult conditions and the provicuis good records of the 
officers. They had to act in accordance with their own resolution
promising support and with the expressed opinion of His Majesty's
Government that prevention not vindictive punishment should be their 
main object. They had to consider also the effect of harsh punish­
ments on the rest of the service, and the pain and humiliation already 
caused by the public criticism by the Hunter committee and the Govern­
ment* Finally they had to take into account the action against Dyer, 
the most serious offender by far - the Government of India had done tho 
most they could by refusing to employ him; tho Army Council in Britain 
had made this ban general and forced Dyer's retirement. The Govern­
ment of India argued, therefore, that forcible retirement was the most 
severe punishment they could inflict on officers guilty of lesser 
offences. Chelmsford did not agree that dismissals were necessary or
would be justified by tho majority report. He strongly deprecated
Montagu's suggestion that the expediency of influencing the non­
cooperators should take precedence over the justness in the government'
94treatment of its officers. Chelmsford had been, as he claimed, 
’strictly judicial’; but Indian opinion needed some punitive show 
sufficiently harsh to ease the grievance - words censuring officers 
may have been good justice, but they were bad propaganda.
The Government of India had been unable to assuage the sense 
of grievance caused by tho Panjab disturbances and particularly the 
revelations of the Hunter committee. The Government's task had boon 
made more difficult by European support for General Dyer in India, 
in Parliament and in Britain. Indian opinion also found the Govern­
ment’s condemnation inadequate and their punishments derisory. But it 
is unlikely that any action open to the Government would have 
sufficiently captured the imaginationj Dyer would have had to be 
hanged and half the panjab service dismissed - and European opinion 
would not have stood for that. In January 1920 the Amritsar Congress
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had. called for tho impeachment of O ’Dwyer and the recall of Chelmsford.
In February soma newspapers had begun to assort that 'Montagu must go'.
The Indian demands were too high to be satisfied - and this was true
over a wide range of opinion; Chelmsford refused to attend a conference
with Bombay moderates lato in 1920, arguing that it was impossible to
discuss the Fanjab on the basis of tho moderate demands for the dismissal
of or non-payment of pensions for the censured Panjab officials, for
modification of the Turkish treaty, and for a promise of total self-
government (except for foreign relations and military affairs) after 
95five years.
Chelmsford could not see how to heal the hurt. Ho refused
to act further against the Panjab officials, but proposed to compensate
96
Indian sufferers more liberally. Sir Valentino Chirol urged that the
government should 'repudiate more emphatically ... the deplorable
conclusions which Indian public opinion has drawn, not altogether
unreasonably, from many of the things that happened in the Punjab and
have happened since in regard to them'. Chelmsford replied that they
had already clearly repudiated the doctrine of 'preventive massacre'
97and the practice of 'punishment by humiliation'. The Government of
India returned to their policy of keeping quiet and hoping that the
ill-feeling would go away. Chelmsford, against his personal wishes
(for heMew the decision would be misrepresented), accepted tho advice
of Maclagan and the moderates, Surendranath Banerjea and Sirdar Sundar
Singh, and disallowed a debate on Panjab affairs in the Imperial
98Legislative Council, Montagu suggested that it might be best to 
repeal the Howlatt Act, but tho Government of India refused. But as 
early as July 1919 the Bengal Government had recommended that it was 
not worth the risk of using the Act, and in August the Government of 
India had agreed, with the proviso that the Act should be used in 
preference to more severe measures if this could be done safely.
Montagu's view had been that the only satisfactory procedure was 'open 
prosecution and conviction in the Courts', and that repressive executive
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99powers, however justified by committees, were only second best.
In January 1921 Chelmsford decided to nove towards an acceptance of this 
view. He suggested a legislative committee to consider the repressive 
powers, including the Rowlatt and press Acts.
In this atmosphere the Panjab question was finally debated 
in the legislative council. A resolution was moved by Janmadas 
Dwarkadas declaring the ’firm resolve' of the Government of India 
to maintain that tho British connoction was 'based on the principle 
of equal partnership and perfect racial equality', regretting that the 
Panjab martial law administration had departed from this principle 
and deeply wounded 'the self-respect of the Indian population', and 
calling for 'adequate compensation', comparable with that awarded to 
European sufferers, for the families of those killed or wounded at 
the Jallianwala Bagh. The Home Member gave assurances that the Janjab 
Government would be asked to dual generously in awarding compensation, 
and the resolution was carried unanimously. A third clause demanding 
'deterrent punishments' of tho officers responsible had boen deleted 
without a division. The Government considered the general tone of 
this debate to have been very good5 and Stanley Reed, though sceptical
himself, reported to Chelmsford that his Bombay friends thought the
™  ■ -u • 1 ^  1 0 0Panjab issue was now dead.
It was not. The problem was that the shock had not only 
strengthened the resolve and aided to the racial and religious estrange­
ment of the politically minded; it had also affected classes which,
although to some extent already influenced by popular agitation, had
101seldom before felt very strongly abcunt politics. At the time of
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the disturbances, a letter to the Viceroy from Rai Sahib Bishamber
Nath demonstrated this new development, in a strange combination of
loyal phrases, conservative acceptance of British paternalism, and
rigorous indignation at the Panjab atrocities; it was this side of
Indian opinion also which had been alienated. Bishamber Nath wrote;
Your Excellency, you are great and God has made you 
great. The destiny of India ... is entrusted to Your 
Excellency’s charge. India, or at any rate a great 
majority of it, expects groat benefits at your hands.
Bo not pray, great as you are, be led away from the
right course by the attacks of those who do not appreciate
the inner greatness of your heart and the good which is in 
it. It is the tree laden with fruit at which everybody 
throws a stone and it is a tree laden with fruit which bends 
itself to the ground notwithstanding efforts to the contrary.
Do pray in your greatness show mercy to the poor and innocent 
teeming millions of India and so mend matters that it may 
soon tread on a prosperous and progressive pa.th. My heart 
throbs at tho critical state in which India is end the 
present situation has, in fact, affected my liver ....
For the sake of all that is great and good, pray adopt 
a conciliatory policy.
Bishambor Nath correctly predicted in another letter; tho Panjab
repression ’will be an evil day to the peace-loving subjects of
Government, and the Government also, with this thorn in their side,
102will not have a smooth and peaceful time of it'. Neither in their 
supervision at the time, nor in their subsequent actions, had the 
Government of India been able to satisfy the Bishamber Naths of India. 
The loss of confidence at this time was crucial because it was more 
general than ever before.
8-10, & at p. 2 this description of the Rowlatt bill; 'It empowers 
the authorities under which term falls even the meanest C.I.D. in the 
land 1. to arrest even the greatest, the richest and the most respect­
able person without serving any warrant on him, or giving any reasons 
for doing so; (2) to conduct trials as speedily as they like without 
giving any right of appeal and all in camera; 3« to prevent persons 
from having counsel of their own choosing and lastly, 4. to commit ^r 
acquit a person as each officer’s whinis and fancies suggested.’
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Chapter 6. Against Satyagraha
The war raised expectations and changed attitudes, and none 
more than those of many Muslims. After the war, Muslims became 
increasingly involved in politics, and politics with the Muslims. By 
1920, no grievance was more potent or of more general importance than 
the supposed wrongs done to the Khilafat, as the Caliphate was known 
in India. The Government of India had anticipated the danger, but had 
been powerless to avoid it.
Throughout the war they had treated Muslims with particular 
care. At sensitive moments, such as the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca 
or the announcement of a secret treaty proposing to c ede Constantinople 
to Russia, the policy was to suppress alarming and inflammatory news, 
allowing it to 'trickle in' unannounced, but to give private explana­
tions and reassurances; to put right or avoid grievances (as with the 
assistance given to Ha,j pilgrims), but to oppose agitation when it was 
thought dangerous, as with the so-called 'silk letters' conspiracy and 
other expressions of extreme pan-Islamism,^ A similar mixture of
caution, conciliation and toughness marked the handling of Muslim riots
2
in Calcutta in 1918. Tho Afghan War in 1919 was also handled with an 
eye for Muslim feelings - full publicity was given during the campaign, 
and afterwards Chelmsford insisted on a conciliatory attitude to the 
Amir in spite of the strongest objections from London and Lord Curzon
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in particular. The critical issue, however, was the question of the 
Turkish peace terms. The Government of India made strenuous efforts to 
place the Muslim viewpoint before the British Government and the Peace 
Conference; they insisted that, for their purposes, the minimum con­
cession was the retention by the Caliph of Constantinople and of nominal 
suzerainty over Mecca.4 But, even apart from international considera­
tions, there was no hope of this view carrying weight. The British 
Government had decided against both of these concessions as early as 
1916P  Lloyd George, with Austen Chamberlain's agreement, stressed the 
importance of 'completely smashing1 Turkey; Lord Curzon called himself 
a strong 'anti-Turk'. Lord Hardinge, now with the Foreign Office, was 
ready to see Constantinople ceded to Russia; the Political Department 
of the India Office, in a minute of 1916, argued that 'the only satis­
factory solution is the reduction of the Ottoman Erirpire to such 
political non-entity that it shall be worth nobody's while to tamper
7
with it', and Lord Islington, the Under-Secretary, took a similar view. 
Even Edwin Montagu, who claimed to have done all he could to make the 
Indian Muslim view known, and who, in the end, considered that the Allies 
had made 'a monstrous Peace', nevertheless in 1918 wrote a Cabinet 
memorandum in which the main burden of the argument was that Turkey must
Muslims and September 1918', in D.A. Low, ed., Soundings in Modern South 
Asian History, London 1968.
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Id© deprived of territory and must be seen to have been defeated, not
Soome to terms with. The Government of India had realised the hope­
lessness of their position quite early, and sought to prepare the ground 
by warning that the peace terms were likely to be severe - this was
stressed in private meetings and in the Viceroy's reply to a Muslim
9
deputation in January 1920. They also sought to publicise their own 
efforts. When harsh peace terms were offered in Hay 1920, Chelmsford 
issued a statement extending his 'encouragement and sympathy'. The 
Central Khilafat Committee, formed to direct the Muslim campaign, re­
sponded, in a letter signed by eighty-two Muslims and endorsed by Gandhi, 
by asking the Viceroy to make common cause with them, even to resign 
if necessary.^ In the face of such aspirations, Chelmsford's stand 
was inadequate. Yet, by expressing sympathy he had come near to a 
public admission of a divergence between his policy and that of the 
Peace Conference,
Curiously, the strictly conservative and illiberal demand for 
the continuance of the Turkish Empire - the Khilafatist leader, Shaukat 
All, wanted it to stretch from Morocco to the Khanates of Central 
Asia^ - was to become the centrepiece of a campaign for Indian self- 
government. ' The Khilafat issue combined with others to feed Gandhi's 
non-cooperation campaign of 1920-1922, a major challenge in both extent 
and novelty. The special problem of Muslim unrest, although inflamed 
by the war with Turkey and its aftermath, did not result in a 
distinctive Muslim policy - it was met with strategies which accorded 
in every way with the idea of tactical non-interference. But with
0
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Gandhi's campaign it was again possible to argue that this policy had 
failed - that Indians were not appeased, agitation not contained. The 
story of the government's measures against satyagraha is therefore one 
of a series of questionings of the established policy.
The iIrst• erisis .sftme in March 1920 when Gandhi, who had 
joined the Ii'hilafatists, called el hartal. From Bengal Ronaldshay had 
expressed alarm at meetings organised by Shaukat Ali and Maulana Abdul 
Kalam Azad in cooperation with el group of Calcutta pan-Islamists. Tho 
meetings had passed resolutions which declared that Muslim loyalty was 
conditional upon favourable peace terms; and similar declarations were 
to be featured in the proposed hartal. Ronaldshay recommended that the 
Government should make a public disavowal of this idea. The Home 
Department considered that the situation was worsening, and saw the 
question characteristically as a balance between the danger of unchecked 
agitation and that of action .against individuals. In Council Vincent 
favoured the issuing of a Government resolution wanning that action 
would be taken against agitators. His colleagues were uneasy, but did 
not like to oppose the Home Member in his own field. The other local 
governments were consulted and did not favour the suggestion - Bombay, 
the Panjab, Bihar and the United Provinces strongly disaxqproved. 
Chelmsford decided not to accept Vincent's advice, and made no announce­
ment. Ho explained to Montagu that he had thought a government statement 
would be 'unwise1 ; government sympathy had put the Khilafatists 'some­
what in a quandary'; threats of repression would only give them cause 
for complaint, lie agreed to allow Bengal to make a local announcement 
if necessary; but no such announcement was made, nor perhaps was 
possible in view of the silence at the centre. Government servants
were warned that no exception would be made to the general prohibition
12of their participation in political demonstrations.
The initial response to the Khilafat campaign, therefore, was 
to continue the cautious, tactical approach. Several factors helped 
this decision. The central feature of Chelmsford's approach had been 
to appease Muslim feelings, not to oppose them. There was some truth 
in the argument put forward by Gandhi himself, that his influence had 
helped to wean 'the party of violence from its ways'."^ In June the
12
See Ronaldshay to Montagu, 8 April 1920, MP31; V(HD) to S/S, 7, 12 & 
17 March, CPI2, & Chelmsford to Montagu, 17 March 1920, CP6. The local 
government consensus weis that any announcement was likely to do more 
harm than good,
15 101, Sept. 1920; Gandh^ to Chelmsford, 22 June 1920, CP24.
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movement was "believed, to have passed into the hands of fanatical
Maulvis. But at that time there was a joint meeting with a Congress
committee in Allahabad, when the Central Khilafat Conference appointed
a sub-committee to direct its campaign5 and the effect of this Hindu
participation was to avert or delay some of the more flamboyant Muslim
proposals - Hindus had made it clear, for example, that any advocacy
of joining an Afghan invasion would result in active Hindu-opposition.^
Gandhi's non-violent approach also presented difficulties
in law. In June 1920 the Government requested legal opinion on the
feasibility of prosecuting Gandhi and Shaukat Ali under the Indian Penal
Code for their advocacy of non-cooperation. The Home Department
stressed that this was only in case it was 'considered necessary to
take legal action later'. The legal opinion, however, stated that
prosecution would be doubtful and therefore unwise, probably at least
15until the third stage of Gandhi's campaign, which would seek to 
encourage the resignation of Indian police and military, (it was 
thought possible that Shaukat Ali might be tackled earlier, as his 
speeches tended to use stronger language.
Gandhi postulated a symbolic divorce from the alien rulers. He 
envisaged the surrender of titles, suspension of legal practice, non­
participation in government loans, withdrawal from government schools, 
abstention from the reformed councils, avoidance of official functions, 
refusal to join the army, and boycott of British goods. The positive side
was stressed in attempts to form national schools and to provide arbitra-
17tion in place of the courts. The campaign required that Gandhi should 
gain control of the Congress, and fire the public imagination. To the 
Government the prospects of this campaign seemed slight - and this too
V(HD) to S/S, 19 June 1920, CP12.
15
A Khilafat meeting in April had approved 4 stages for satyagraha;
(l) boycott of titles, war loans and Councils; (2) resignation of 
civil posts ; (3) resignation of police and military posts; (4) non­
payment of taxes. These were described as the 'progressive abstention 
from cooperation with Government'. See Justice (Madras) 19 April, A 
Searchlight (Patna) 29 April 1920; H.Poll. 100, Sept. 1920. In Young 
India 5 kay 1920, Gandhi explained that stage (3) was a 'distant goal'; 
in the event the campaign was not to develop beyond an elaboration of 
stage (l).
16
H.Poll. 100, 102 A I47, Sept. 1920.
17
V(HD) to S/S, 10 July A 3 Sept. 1920, CPI3.
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encouraged, their non-interference. The surrender of titles was the
easiest form of non-cooperations by the end of May few titles had 
18been relinquished. Other stages would require more courage and 
greater sacrifice. Chelmsford believed the lure of office would prove 
too strong for a successful boycott of the councils, and he expected 
that Gandhi -would not carry the Congress on this - they could not afford 
to abdicate and leave all political initiative to their rivals. Chelms­
ford calculated also that total withdrawal from governemt schools would
present the Congress with the problem of educating eight million pupils,
19or the choice of leaving them without education.
Thus ho explained to Montagu that he was not gloomy about
the prospects; he could not convince himself that non-cooperation was
practical. All they had to do, he thought, was 'keep cool', Chelmsford
was not even convinced that Gandhi was seriously seeking political
advantages he quoted an explanation from Bombay, that Gandhi was merely
out to cause trouble through ’pique and vanity’. Chelmsford conceived
his main task as one of convincing people 1 of the folly of the whole
thing'i he know he would ’never convince them by repressive measures'.
He avoided interference not because he hoped to convert the agitators,
but becaxise he knew persecution might create sympathy for their ideas.
His view of Gandhi's campaign was such that in August 1920 he hoped
21that the point for action would not come. He referred an uneasy
Montagu to past experience. His Government had earlier resisted a
clamour, some of it from Montagu, for action against Subramania Aiyar.
The inaction had succeeded? Sir Subramania had been forgotten within
two months. Chelmsford admitted ho was comparing small things with
great, but insisted tho principle was the same? Sir Subramania’s case
op
had taught him that they must exercise patience also with Gandhi.
As before, the policy was also confirmed by apparent success. 
The Khilafat Day in March was observed generally by Hindu as well as
18 Ronaldshay to Montagu, 26 May 1920, MP31.
19
Chelmsford to Montagu, 3 & 30 June, CP6, & V to S/S, 24 Oct., & (ED) 
16 Oct. 1920, CPI3.
20
Chelmsford to Montagu, 6 & 27 Oct., CP6, & V to S/S, 24 Oct. 1920, 
CPI3. See also V to S/S, 17 July 1920, CP13° 'repressive action would 
only stimulate' the movement.
21
Chelmsford to Montagu, 25 Aug. 1920, CP6.
22
Chelmsford to Montagu, 4 Aug. 1920, CP6. See above pp.85-86.
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Muslim shopkeepers, hut there were no disturbances and government
servants did not take part. In Bombay the Muslim community split when
loyalists voted against tho conditional loyalty resolution. A secret
meeting was believed to have approved Gandhi's plan for progressive
steps in swadeshi and non-cooperation; but signs were also reported
of a reaction against violence and objections to tho boycott of British 
23goods. - A further week's hartal was called in April, but local
governments reported either little interest or complete failure - though
they stressed that there won much plotting and that speeches were still 
24
violent in tone. Gandhi called another hartal for Sunday, 1 August; 
it was given impetus by tho news of Tilak's death. Almost all shops 
closed in Maratha districts, in Madras, and in headquarter towns else­
where; but most local governments stressed the lack of general
2S
observance or enthusiasm. Thus every stage in Gandhi's mounting
campaign was qualified, in government reports, by reservations and hints
of failure. Non-interference seemed to be containing the threat.
Remarkably, the prevailing mood of the central Government
in mid-1920 was one of confidence and optimism. There was a tendency,
from the lowest District Officer to the Viceroy, to write reports which
minimised the dangers; perhaps they had come to believe their own
propaganda. They concluded that violent language might be defeating
itself and that there was little evidence that non-cooperation would
catch on. Several provinces had reported that agitation was spreading-
less quickly or was abating. In some places moderate councils were
thought to be prevailing; in others speeches seemed less violent. In
26Nagpur Muslim leaders had declined to endorse satyagraha. The Govern­
ment recognised that it was hard for moderates to abstain, particularly
with elections near, but they hoped for the isolation of the
27protagonists of violence. 1 Chelmsford was impressed by the Leader 
of 14 May 1920, which admitted that the Government had. 'displayed an
23
Lloyd to Montagu, 26 March 192O, MP25; V(HD) to S/S, 21 & 25 March 
1920, CP22.
24 V(I-ID) to S/S, 23 April 1920, CP12.
25 V(HD) to S/S, 6 Aug. 1920, CPI3.
2 6
V(HD) to S/S, 23 & 30 April, 7 May, & also 26 June 1920, CPI2.
27 V(HD) to S/S, 11 June 1920, CP12.
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exceptional equanimity of temper at a time when no efforts have been
28spared, to fan religious passion'. In June the Home Department noted
that the non-cooporators were becoming less extreme - the campaign was
to be limited and voluntary5 private servants and government employees
were not to be coercod. The Home Department concluded that the Khilafat
29agitation did not seem to contain 'much real feeling' any more. The
Gandhian challenge was not being mounted sufficiently quickly to shock
the Government into a change of policy.
There remained, as also in the past, enough danger to ensure
repression was kept in reserve. Police reports remained 'alarming',
and the Government knew that incendiary issues were before the public.
Apart from the peace terms, the Hunter Committee Report 011 the 1919
disturbances prevented much improvement in the Indian temper - especially
in view of the European reactions. Chelmsford pointed to Parliamentary
debates and a provocative stand by the European Association5 lie recordid
without satisfaction a 'similar and particularly fatuous resolution'
30by the Bihar Planters. The Home Department were aware that the
mid-year calm could bo a lull before the storm, that the agitators,
rather than trying to sustain indefinitely a high pitch of excitement,
could be biding their time - Shaukat Ali was alleged to have 'roundly
31abused* local leaders in Delhi for 'premature activities'. It was 
also possible to interpret any retreat from extremism, indeed the whole 
of Gandhi's contribution, as a temporary ploy by fanatics, calculated 
to arrest the defection of the moderates and widen the- base of the 
movement. There were signs that the extremists were trying to con­
solidate their position. Gandhi had been elected President of the Home 
Rule League, and it was recognised that it might be dangerous if he 
succeeded in converting the League to his programme. The Home Depart-
52ment watched such organisational developments with particular attention;
33Optimism was tempered by nervous surveillance. J 
28
V to 3/S, 19 May 1920, CPI2.
V(HD) to S/S, 11 & 19 June 1920, CPI2. For later programmes sen,
V(HD) to S/S, 3 Sept. 1920, CPI3.
30
V to S/S, 17 & (HD) 11 June 1920, GP12, & also 7 Dec. 1020, CPI3.
51 V(ED) to S/3, 14 & 20 May 1920, CPI3-
52 V(HD) to S/S, 7 hay 1920, CPI3.
33 For a summary of Home Department policy see V(HD) to S/S, 28 May 
1920, CPI2.
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The Government made ready to act should a new crisis develop.
Local governments were instructed to compile lists of principal
agitators against whom action might "be taken. Some minor figures were 
34prosecuted*' The Army Department had become 'greatly exercised' over 
attempts to interfere with soldiers and recruits? therefore the Govern­
ment recommended also the prosecution, where possible, of anyone who
35interfered with the army. But when Montagu suggested that action be
taken against persons using seditious language, the Home Department
were unwilling to complys it might have meant attacking people of 
36
importance; They were prepared to use even the ordinary law only
against minor figures for whom, unlike national leaders, the notoriety
of martyrdom was not sufficient to compensate for its discomfort.
There were several disputes with local governments in the
mid-1920s. Madras wanted to extern the Khilafat leaders, notably
Gandhi and Shaukat Alij the central Government repeatedly refused to
agree, noting that persecution was just what Gandhi was inviting, and
insisting that there were all-India implications on which they must
decide. It was obvious, they felt, that Gandhi would defy any such
37order, and thereby force them to arrest him. Tho Panjab Government 
wanted to proclaim the Lahore area under the Seditous Meetings Act; 
the Government of India refused this too. The local authorities insisted 
that violent speeches were becoming worse and worse, and that the 
situation was dangerous - 15,000 railway workers had gone on strike, 
and there was unrest among Muslims and Sikhs. In fact, violent agitation 
was confined to a small section, the communities were divided internally, 
and there was only conjecture about political involvement in the rail­
way strike. The central Government could not understand why offenders 
had not been prosecuted under the ordinary law, but gave as their 
categorical opinion, 'that it is desirable to avoid tho application 
of repressive measures to the present political situation, if this can
^  Chelmsford to Maffey, 9 Sept. 1920, CPI6*
35
V to S/S, 17 June 1920, CPI2. The army did not have much need for 
alarm; combatants numbering 15,500 and a total of 20,000 were recruited 
in 1913-1914) ^ d  61,500 and 157,000 in 1919-1920s see Chelmsford to 
Montagu, 13 Oct. 1920. Chelmsford suspected military judgments in 
political matters; see Chelmsford to Montagu, 23 Nov.- 1920, CP6.
36
V(HD) to S/S, 25 April, CP2, & Chelmsford to Maffey, 9 Aug. 1920,
CP! 6.
57 H.Poll. 29-33 & 172-177, May 1918, & 128, Aug., & 273, Nov. 1920.
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possibly "be helped, till it has been seen whether the non-cooperation
movement ...is going to obtain substantial support or prove a failure1.
They had no wish to show their hand by a fresh notification under the
Seditious Meetings Act. They forbad the taking of any action while
Gandhi and Shaukat Ali wore visiting Lahore. They wanted to be informed
well in advance if the local government proposed to act under existing
sanction after the leaders had left. Chelmsford still maintained that
policy should not necessarily be concerted, that local governments
should be allowed latitude; but he insisted also that all-India
considerations must be allowed to influence local action. In this
case, the Government were ’most anxious to avoid precipitating
38disorder'; they wanted some weapons in reserve.
The Government of Bombay also met with a refusal when they
requested permission to use the Defence of India Act to take sharp
action against Mullahs and others who were spreading false rumours
in Sind; the Government of India ordered proceedings to be taken under
the ordinary law if possible. On this occasion, however, the local
Governor, Lloyd, agreed; he wrote to Austen Chamberlain; 'All my
officials wanted me to prosecute right and loft from the beginning,
but I would not do so .... I determined to ... be patient till I got
a good opportunity'. Later a prominent religious leader, Pir Mahbub
Shah, was prosecuted, despite his going on hunger strike, and then
39released in a gesture of ’benign contempt'.
Also in mid-1920, some Muslims took their protest further 
and tried to emigrate from India, This, the Hijrat movement, was a 
specifically Muslim problem, though discouraged by many Muslim leaders; 
it was hardly comprehensible to their Hindu allies. The movement was 
perfectly legal, but there were clearly dangers in any large movement 
of people towards the Afghan frontier, with prospects of excitement at 
the starting-points in Sind, the Central Provinces and elsewhere, 
en route in the Panjab or Baluchistan, and at the final departure point, 
Peshawar. The Government, therefore, tried to discourage the pilgrim- 
emigrant s (or muhajarin). In July a special train had been allowed to 
carry 750 muhajarin from Sind to Peshawar; this provision was at first
38
H.Poll. 71 & 72, Aug. 1920; V to S/S, 17 July 1920, CPI3. Earlier 
Maclagan1s government had followed Chelmsford's policy and refrained 
from prosecuting for violent speeches at the Amritsar Congress; see 
Maclagan to Chelmsford, 3 Jan. 1920, CP24.
39
See Lloyd to Chamberlain, 17 Sept., ACPI8/1/13, & to Montagu, 23 July, 
27 Aug. & 17 Sept. 1920, MP25? V(HD) to S/S, 9 & 16 Aug., CPI3, & Chelms­
ford to Montagu, 11 & 19 Aug. 1920, CP4,
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temporarily anu then permanently removed following protests from the
Panjab, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province - the desire
to conciliate had to give way before the need of maintaining order.
The Foreign and Political Department suggested that a deputation from
the frontier should bo sent to Mecca to reassure Muslims (this was
vetoed in London); that only restricted numbers should be allowed to
leave for Afghanistan, to give time for propaganda among the remainder;
that postal censorship should be imposed to isolate the Northwest
Frontier from the Panjab and thus contain the movement. Earlier the
Department had urged prompt legal proceedings against tho most violent
agitators. One leader had already been interned and another excluded
from the province; and the Chief Commissioner, Sir Hamilton Grant,
was ready to deal 'relentlessly* with any outbreak of disorder. He
combined this policy with one of explanation, making a speech himself
in Peshawar, and sending a party of 'influential Khans and Maulvis 1
to one troubled district to 'persuade people of their folly',^
Discouragement and local control kept tho exodus within bounds.
The Afghan welcome cooled; Gandhi's non-cooperation movement provided
an alternative protest within India; and abruptly the hijrat collapsed,
Chelmsford stressed that it had beon best to trust to local officers
to persuade people out of their folly, and that it had boon important
not to interfere with a largely religious movement, even when it was
believed to be politically inspired. Ho authorised Grant to make a
public appeal for funds to help the muhajarin who were returning to
India - many of thorn had sold their lands and possessions and had
nothing to return to.^" The Viceroy had rebuked Grant for sending in
42inadequate reports, but there had been no practical divergence in 
policy. The hijrat movement was treated with the familiar mixture of 
conciliation, propaganda and control.
Chelmsford did dispute with Grant, however, the speech which 
the Chief Commissioner had made on the Khilafat problem and which he 
wished to publish. Publication meant all-India circulation; and 
Chelmsford's objections thus provide a useful yardstick to his 
priorities in mid-1920. Tho Viceroy wanted certain changes in the text
^  FAPD to CC/Northwest Frontier Province, 6 Aug., CC to PSV, 10, 24?
28 & 30 Aug., Grant to Chelmsford, 7 Aug. & 2 Sept. 1920, CP25; CC
to V, 7 May 1920, CF24; H.Poll. 195-204, Aug. 1920.
^  See Chelmsford to Montagu, 11, 19 & 25 Aug. 1920, CP6.
42
Chelmsford to Grant, 12 Aug. 1920, CP25.
as it was telegraphed to him. Grant had apparently referred to Turkish 
'downfall* and 'punishment'; Chelmsford preferred the words 'misfortunes' 
and 'reparation1. Grant claimed ho avoided religious issues because he 
did not understand them; Chelmsford wanted him to state that it would 
bo 'unwise' for him to discuss religion. Grant .admitted to having 
discouraged 'political meetings'; Chelmsford insisted that ho must 
have discouraged 'meetings likely to promote unrest'. Thus Chelmsford 
demonstrated the principles of his policy - that the government should 
avoid expressions likely to cause offence, be neutral on religious 
matters, and not interfere with legitimate political activity. He also 
showed his care for the Muslim position; Grant had suggested that 
'perhaps' a just Turkish state would rise again; Chelmsford, preferring 
to identify the government as far as possible with Muslim aspirations, 
would have had him 'hope' for this rebirth. All those changes were to 
the telegraphed text, and were in fact the result of misunderstanding n 
Equally significant, however, was Chelmsford's final objection. He 
insisted, even against the full text of the speoch, that Grant would 
have- to omit a sentence which claimed that Hindus were not sincere in 
their support of the Khilafat movement, Chelmsford believed this would 
provoke the charge, which he was determined to avoid, that the govern­
ment was trying to divide and rule. Grant declined to make this 
omission, arguing that it would be noticed; Chelmsford therefore 
refused to allow publication.^ In practice, although there was concern 
at the collusion between Hindu and Muslim politicians, there was no 
serious attempt to separate the two by tho adoption of different 
policies.^
The same principles had been confirmed for the non-cooperation 
campaign. The tactical approach seemed to have been accepted as a 
dictat and unhesitatingly applied. In July Chelmsford had set out 
the conditions under which he would abandon non-interference. His 
Government would allow Gandhi 'full rope', he informed tha Secretary 
of State, 'unless and until collision is precipitated by action of non­
cooperators , or if it becomes clear that the__/ movement is likely to
43
CC/Horthwest Frontier Province to V, 7 May, & PSV to CC, 8 & 10 May 
1920, CP24. (The Secretary was reporting Chelmsford's wishes.)
44 «See above, note 1; and also Kenneth W. Jones, 'Communalism in the 
Punjab. The Arya Samaj Contribution’, Journal of Asian Studies XXVIII,
1 (Nov. 1968) - as this article shows, there could heave been many 
causes for the worsening Hindu-Muslim relations after the brief co­
operation under Gandhi; it is arguable that as it became obvious that 
the British intended to leave, rivalry between the possible heirs to 
power and fears about future governments were unavoidable.
180
48prove an unexpected success’. These conditions had not "been met.
But in October Chelmsford admitted that non-cooperation had 
caught on more than expected. While the Government looked on, Gandhi 
had achieved a tremendous coup. He had originally adopted the Khilafat 
campaign and converted it to satyagxaha. Then he had fused the religious 
issue with a national and racial one by stressing the enormities of the 
British response to the Hunter Report. To many, especially young Hindus, 
some of whom had not been very active in politics but were now aroused, 
Gandhi seemed to present the only sane and positive response to these
A
indignities. Thus Gandhi tightened his held on the Congress until it 
endorsed and identified itself with both the Muslim grievance and the 
Gandhian method. The Government had predicted that this would not 
happen.
The Special Calcutta Session was a personal triumph for Gandhi. 
Congress emerged committed to a first stage which conformed almost 
exactly with Gandhi's programme. The details of the campaign were 
controversial and there were differences of opinion. It had taken a 
long debate in full session before Gandhi was able to have his way; 
and earlier the Subjects Committee had argued for several hours and 
proved unable to reach a decision - it was divided three ways between 
Gandhi's supporters (such as Shaukat Ali, Yakub Hasan, and Chakravarti), 
his partial supporters (Malaviya, Das and Fal), and his opponents 
(Mrs Besant, Jinnah end Dw.arkadas Jamnadas). Moreover, in the Govern­
ment's view the result in full session had been achieved by a 'juggle1 - 
that is, delegates had boon able to vote only for satyc.graha in some
form (Gandhi's motion or the Das amendment excluding the Councils from
A7
the boycott), and about half had abstained. However, with the decision 
passed, many of the doubters fell into line. By 26 September forty-five 
Council members or candidates had withdrawn, mainly, the Government 
believed, out of loyalty to the Congress. C.R. Das and the Bengalis he
45 V to S/S, 17 July 1920, CPI3.
A £
See V to S/S, 24 Oct. 1920, CP13» For the best example of this
reaction to Gandhi, see Michael Brechor, Nehru A Political Biography
London 1959, 58-83 (& especially at p.64 the quotation from Nehru's 
autobiography, Toward Freedom; his reaction to Gandhi's satyagraha 
society 'was one of tremendous relief. Here at last was a way out of 
tho tangle, a method of action which was straight and open and possibly 
effective',)
V(HD) to S/S, 10, 18 & 26 Sept. 1920, CP13; Ronaldshay to Montagu,
15 & 22 Sept. 1920, MP31.
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48had led in opposition to the boycott were among those who conformed*
It had been agreed informally at Calcutta that those who could not 
abide by the majority decision should leave the Congress. This is, 
therefore, the measure of Gandhi's victory, but also of the new 
politica.1 maturity of the Congress. With this the movement became 
more disciplined and dangerous. Gandhi, Motilal Nehru and Patel were 
appointed to frame instructions for the campaign, Gandhi's position 
was unassailable,
In October the victory was made permanent and institution- 
alised. The All-India Congress Committee considered and adopted 
instructions for satyagraha; they made some alterations in the draft, 
mainly to strengthen its effect. A further sub-committee, comprising 
Gandhi, Kelkar, Patel, and Rangaswami Aiyangar, proposed that Congress 
delegates (one for every lakh of population) should be returned on a 
district basis; that the All-India Congress Committee should be re­
constituted and reduced to more business-like proportions (with one 
hundred members); and that the expression 'constitutional means' in 
the aims of the Congress, Article One of the Constitution, should be 
amended to read 'peaceful and legitimate means’. The Subjects Committee, 
which had provided such a forum for disagreement at Calcutta, was to be 
abolished; every town was to have its own committee to encourage the­
me vement,4^
These changes required ratification at the next Congress
session, due in January at Nagpur. In the interim Gandhi sought to
mobilise local Congress committees and Home Rule Leagues to enforce
the Calcutta, programme. His campaign ensured that there would be only
moderates in the new Councils, a situation which, as Chelmsford noted,
50was to be deplored. Gandhi tried to enforce tho boycott of the
elections as well. Montagu considered this the one area in which the
Congress had chosen its ground wiselys the poll was bound to be small
51and Congress could claim the credit for it. The campaign also began
48
Ronaldshay was a little surprised at the number of withdrawals; sue 
Ronaldshay to Montagu, 22 Aug. 1920, MP31. The reaction of B.C. Pal, 
running against the.- trend, is discussed in H. & U, Mukherjee, Bipin 
Chandra Pal and India's Struggle for Swara.j, Calcutta 1958> 113-121.
49 See V(ED) to S/S, 9 & 26 Aug. & 30 Oct. 1920, CP13? A D.G. Tendulkar, 
Mahatma Vol.II (1920-1929), Bombay 1951, I8-I9.
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to have some success among students. After a visit by Gandhi and the
Ali brothers, the students at the now Aligarh University demanded the
renunciation of government grants. The Principal banned outsiders from
addressing the students, and the Syndicate called on parents to control
their sons. Two hundred parents wrote to disapprove of Gandhi's
52interference, and another seventy called, their boys home. Congress
also tried to involve students and young men by adopting the Servants
of India idea of Volunteers - Congress apparently intended them not for
social work but as substitutes for tho police. The Government thought
this development potentially dangerous, and asked local governments to
consider whether they had the powers to deal with the Volunteers if they
53should begin to drill with arms.
The Government wc-ro not convinced that non-interference would 
have to be abandoned, but their uneasiness was increasing. Anxieties 
crystallised when Gandhi made a 'bad speech' which left him open to 
prosecution. He told a Lucknow audionce of 40 to 50,000 that Indians 
were slaves, that the Government was devilish, and that to cooperate 
was sinful. The Viceroy considered that in this speech and in his 
manipulation of the Home Rule League and the Congress, Gandhi had 
virtually abandoned any pretence of aiming at self-government within 
the Empire. He concluded that Gandhi was giving way to wilder councils, 
either because he was conscious of failure or because he was surrender­
ing to his Muslim colleagues. Tho question of arresting Gandhi was 
considered in Executive Council on 19 October.
The objections were that an arrest would probably lead to 
disorder, consolidate the extremists, weaken the moderates, and 
jeopardise the elections. There might even be industrial trouble. The 
arguments for prosecution were that inaction might lead to a worse 
situation, and that moderates might be discouraged through an absence 
of protection. Chelmsford remained convinced that repression would 
not do, and there was no change in policy. Llcyd had reported him 
'quite.- resolute on the matter' before the Lucknow speech. The Viceroy 
was committed to non-interference not only in general but also in its 
application to the satyagraha campaign. He was not ready to admit
;>2 V(HD) to S/S, 24 Oct. 1920, CPI3.
53 Ibid. ; &. see below, note 58.
54
Sec Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 Oct. 1920, CP6; V to S/S, & ibid. 
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failure or error. He rehearsed all the arguments against any arrest, 
and emphasised particularly that his policy enjoyed moderate support, 
which repression would squander, and that interference was the last 
weapon - there would he nothing should it fail. The Government, he 
noted, had kept their tempers 'despite tho greatest provocation', and 
should continue to do so unles s'actually driven into repressive action' 
The time to act might come after the elections when moderate opinion 
might he persuaded to acquiesce - ho hoped ho might secure the partner­
ship of tho new Councils. Chelmsford believed time was on their side. 
He told Montagus 1 Sach day of patience, each day nearer the establish­
ment of the new Councils, is a day gained’. All local governments
55except Burma agreed with the decision not to prosecute. Rupert 
Gwynne continued a campaign in Parliament to have Gandhi arrested; 
Montagu promised not to interfere, but he reported each renewed attack. 
Chelmsford's defence was simple; so far his policy had maintained 
order.
Thus non-interference was reaffirmed. But at the same time 
the increased alarm showed itself in some tougher measures. The Panjab 
Government was permitted, at tho end of October, to proclaim the 
districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Sheikhpura under tho Seditious Meet­
ings Act. At first religious meetings and meetings in the municipaliti 
of Lahore and Amritsar were excepted from the restriction, but early in 
November those exemptions were cancelled and the Act was applied to 
the whole Province. These steps were directed mainly against the Sikhs 
Before the Lucknow speech, the Home Department had been content to 
direct district officers to discuss political matters with leaders, 
take no action that would alienate sympathy, reason with extremists,
and encourage any reasonable politicians. Now, instead, the Seditious
57Meetings ,-i.ct was back in force. At the same time local governments 
in general were reminded to act against anyone who preached violence,
55 Y to S/S, 24 Oct. 1920, CPl3s Chelmsford to Reed, 28 Nov.,
CP25, to Montagu. 2 & 23 Nov., CP6, & also to Maffey, 9 Nov. 1920,
CPI 6.
56
S/S to Y, 19 Nov., Y to S/S, 23 Nov., & (HD) 24 Nov. 1920,
c m .
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Y(lLD) to S/S, 16 & 30 Oct. & 12 Nov. 1920, CPI3.
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There were sixteen such cases by 23 November, always with sobering 
88
effect.
Once again the Government wore able to point to encouraging
signs, Gandhi was now advocating' that the procreation of children
should be given up throughout India - reinforcing Chelmsford’s belief
89that Gandhian ’folly’ could be loft to destroy itself, Gandhi’s success 
with students had not earned him much goodwill among parents, and the 
Home Department hoped his ’meddling1 would do much to discredit his 
campaign. They also took heart from suspicions among some Muslims at 
the way in which their colleges and not those of the Hindus were being 
singled out for Gandhi's attention,^ Non-cooperation was still 
supposed not to be making much j;>rogress.- Even in the elections ther*- 
were already 182 candidates for 55 seats. In Bengal and the Central 
Provinces there were signs of disagreements and possible splits among 
the extremists? in Bombay Jinnah and nineteen others had resigned 
from the Home Rule League when a meeting attended by 6l out of 6000
members approved a constitutional change calling for ’complete'
. 6l s.waraj.
But Gandhi showed no sign of disappearing, and in early 
November the Government began to consider action on several fronts.
They wondered if they should institute prosecutions for all definite 
breaches of the law - there were doubts about the wisdom over a long 
period of the tactical use of penal lawss to some it seemed cynical 
raid Ill-advised to prosecute only when expedient, not whenever the law 
was broken5 and others agreed with Willingdon who declared that Gandhi 
and Muhammad Ali had been allowed to say 'such scandalous things’ that
V to S/S, 23 Nov, 1920, CP15■ At this time action was taken against 
the Volunteers in Delhi. They had prevented the burial of a prominent 
Muslim who had refused to renounce his titles before his death? Chelms­
ford decided that this would be a good moment to act - when public 
opinion would be with the Government - and accordingly had the loaders 
arrested and their movement declared unlawful. See Chelmsford to 
Montagu, 23 Nov. 1920, CP6. See also V(HD) to S/S, 13 Dec. 1920, CPI 3-
59
See Chelmsford to Montagu, 27 Sept. CP6, A to Maffey, 9 Sept. 1920, 
CP16,
^  V to S/S, 24 Oct. -CP13* • Perhaps to encourage this, Chelmsford 
strongly urged Ronaldshay to hurry with the opening of Dacca University 
(to allay suspicion that Calcutta Hindus were causing a delay)? se^ 
Chelmsford to Ronaldshay, 19 May & 9 Juno 1920, CP24.
6l
V(HD) to S/S, 12 Nov. 1920, CP13-
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he could not think they could say anything worse that would justify 
prosecution in future. The Government decided that a distinction 
must continue to be made between prosecution of local leaders for 
violent or seditious speeches, and prosecution of non-cooperators on 
the ground that the movement as a whole was illegal. The latter course 
was deprecated, and, although in theory national leaders might have 
been prosecuted for their speeches, no such prosecutions were made.
The Government were also considering action against persons who sent 
objectionable telegraph or postal messages, and the withholding of
64
government advertisements from papers which advocated satyagraha.
Such measures were not designed to counter disorders or acts of non­
cooperation; they were intended to hinder the 'real danger1, as Chelms-
65
ford described it, from the 'constant vilification of the Government'.
Finally, the Government decided to issue a resolution explain­
ing their policy of non-interference and appealing for a strong effort 
to stop further propaganda among students and the masses.^ With this 
public announcement, the policy of non-interference would seem to have 
received the accolade. But such proclamations always implied the threat 
of reprisals if the aims were not achieved; and this resolution of 
November 1920, in many ways the most confident and explicit assertion 
of Chelmsford's method, represented in other ways a hardening in 
attitudes as a result of anxiety. In July Chelmsford had hoped there 
would be no need for action. In October he admitted that action might 
be taken after the elections. Thus the resolution offered the public 
an unspoken choice between helping the policy of non-interference and 
facing the consequences of that policy's failure. The resolution was 
an attempt to support non-interference; but it was possible that it 
would become the first salvo in a campaign to secure moderate support 
for the suppression of satyagraha.
For the remainder of 1920 the Government, continued to 
interpret the situation in terms which suggested that non-interference
62,
Wlllingdon to Montagu, 15 Nev. 1920, UP20.
65 V(HD) to S/S, 29 Nov. 1920, CPI3.
64 V(HD) to S/S, 8 Nov. 1920, CPI3.
65 Y to S/S, 24 Oct. 1920, CPI3-
66 V(HD) to S/s, 8 Nov. 1920, CP13, H.Poll. 273, Nov. 1920 (HD 
resolution, 6 Nov. 1920).
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was still effective. Prom Aligarh G-andhi had moved on to Amritsar and 
Lahore. He created a temporary excitement among students, and, although 
350 students at Islamia College, Lahore, signed a protest against non- 
cooperation, the College had to he closed. At the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic 
College, Lahore, only three students out of more than a thousand with­
drew; hut Khalsa College, Amritsar, also had to he closed. Its 
managing committee decided to ask for withdrawal of government control 
in the management of local schools, and the local government was pre­
pared to grant this in some measure. The Anjuman-Himayat-ul-lslam, 
the controlling hody of the Islamia College, voted overwhelmingly to 
remain affiliated to Panjab University. Dr. Kitchlew took possession 
of some of the buildings, hut was ordered to leave. By mid-November 
the college had reopened, and hy December it was hack to normal. Some 
modifications in the constitution of the Governing Body were planned. 
Gandhi had gone on to Allahabad where he addressed some t\^ o thousand 
students, thirty or forty of whom signed their adherence to non-
+ . 67cooperation.
At Aligarh, the Trustees had voted against non cooperation, 
and in response Muhammad Ali with about one hundred students occupied 
the college grounds. The College Secretary called upon him to leave, 
and next day appealed for help to the District Magistrate and the police. 
After this show of force, Muhammad Ali was persuaded to withdraw peace­
fully. He addressed the students and told them to leave. The University 
Act was brought into force, with the Raja of Mahmudabad as Chancellor, 
and in December the University opened. A National College had been 
started in Aligarh, but at the end of November, with two bungalows 
and one hundred students, it had achieved one lecture.^ Muhammad Ali 
went 011 to Benares, where classes continued as usual - there was no
69disruption even when Gandhi added his weight. There had been more 
fertile ground in Calcutta, Trouble had occurred in the Madrassa, and 
the Arabic Department had been closed sine die. But the Government 
wrote to the jjarents, denying any wish to force their sons to attend, 
and asking for their wishes in the matter. The majority of students 
returned. The Madrassa reopened, although attendance in the Arabic 
Department remained below normal. A National Madrassa was ostensibly 
offering tuition in the Zachariah Mosque - in December no tuition was
V(ED) to S/S, 10 Dec., & (HD) 30 Oct, 1920, CP13.
68
V(ED) to S/S, 1 & 4 Nov. & 10 Dec., & (HD) 27 Nov, 1920, CPI3. 
69 V(ED) to S/S, 20 Nov. 1920, CP13.
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70Demg given.
Elsewhere there was little serious trouble. About sixty 
students went on strike in the Islamia College, Peshawar5 half a dozen 
left Pachiyappa's College in Madras. In Bombay a national college was 
opened at Ahmedabad with some seventy students 5 there were some 
renunciations of the government connection, and scattered withdrawals 
of staff and students -the most significant being two assistant
71professors and thirty-three students from Gujarat College. In Delhi
there was minor trouble at the Anglo-Arabic School, and the Principal
72
of Ramjas College resigned, declaring himself for non-cooperation.
The campaign had resulted in minor dislocation, but not many students
had been willing, in the Leader1s phrase, to follow Gandhi 'into the 
73wilderness'. The temporary success bore out Chelmsford's belief, 
shared by Montagu, that education was not a very likely area for last-
+ • 74-xng non-cooperatron.
The elections were more seriously interrupted, but in few
cases totally. There had been very few seats - none for the Government
of India - with no candidates, though a number had only one. In all
provinces except the Central Provinces a majority of seats were 
75contested. In Bengal, for example, there were 527 candidates for
115 seats in the Provincial Council, with no contest in nineteen cut
of ninety-four constituencies, and no seat without a candidate. In
neighbouring Bihar and Orissa, I84 candidates sought 68 seats, two
76seats having no candidates. In contested seaxs, polling varied. It 
was poor In some parts of Bengal and Madras, in the latter case being 
hampered by floods. In Bombay the poll was only 10-15^? in Lucknow,
on the other hand, it was 60^ 1, and in some urban areas in Madras it was
7^ V(HD) to S/S, 4s 8 & 11 Nov. 1920, CPI5? Ronaldshay to Montagu,
18 Nov. 1920, MP31.
71 V(ED) to S/S, 20 Nov. 1920, CPI5.
72 V(ED) to S/S, 4 Nov. 1920, CPI3.
75 V(HD) to S/S, 5 Dec. 1920, CPI3.
74 ,See, 1or example, Y to S/S, 25 Nov., C±J15? & Montagu to Ronaldshay,
18 Nov. & 8 Dec. I92O, MP27.
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higher still. In the Panjab an average number voted, hut prosecutions
77wore necessary over intimidation of voters and a near n o t  m  Lahore.,
About a dozen ’men of straw1 - candidates whose obvious unsuitability
was intended to discredit the elections - wore returned in the Central
Provinces, Bengal and Delhi (where intimidation was alleged to have
ruined the election). Another five such candidates were returned to
the Imperial Legislative Assembly. But tho Government had expected low
polls, with a newly and greatly widened franchise; and in general
78they thought reasonably good Councils had been returned.
In November Chelmsford had concluded that, with schools,
lawyers, elections, and surrender of titles, they wore ’winning all 
79down the line1. He was able to continue in this belief to the end
of the year. In lato December there was a lull in agitation. The non-
coopcrators were preparing for tho Nagpur Congress. Chelmsford refused
a suggestion that he should issue a conciliatory statement. He did not
believe this would have a good effect on the extremists, who would only
00find objections in the- most innocent words. Gandhi had embarked on a 
fund-raising tour as a prelude to Nagpur. Largo numbers attended his 
meetings, but with mixed results. In Arrah his visit stimulated army 
recruiting. Bengal reported that Gandhi was venerated, but his 
programme regarded with the tolerance extended to children's games.
The Home Department did not know whether enough subscriptions had been 
raised even to pay for the tour.^
The main issues before the Nagpur Congress were the pro­
posal to change the aims of Congress, and the conduct and progress 
satyagraha. The 22,000 delegates were divided between those 
who opposed any change in the aims, and those who wished to revolu­
tionise them and openly seek a republic. Gandhi stood between, and 
secured a compromise, carrying his own resolution by a huge majority.
He explained that the new aim of Congress, 1swaraj1, could be with or
77 Lloyd to Montagu, 19 Nov. & 3 Dec., MP25, &. Ronaldshay to Montagu, 
16 Dec. 1920, MP31.
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without the British connection as circumstances required. The Subjects
Committee was divided on how to secure swaraj; but unity was preserved
there through the resolution of C.R. Das; non-violent non-cooperation
was to be put into @ffect as the Congress or the All-India Congress
Committee decided. In the meantime parents were to try to withdraw
children under sixteen and establish national schools; students were to
devote themselves to satyagraha. if their consciences so demanded;
trustees, managers and teachers were to help to nationalise their schools.
Lawyers were to make greater efforts to suspend practice, and merchants
were gradually to boycott foreign trade. Village and provincial
organisations wore to further the campaign, and a band of national
82workers was to raise funds. The position of Las was a notable success
for Gandhi. Las had reportedly gone to Nagpur to oppose educational
non-cooperation; he was apparently won over. He decided to give up
legal practice and devote himself to satyagraha. On his return to Bengal
83tho majority of students loft their classes. All opposition had been 
nullified by Nagpur; there was no prospect of a split in either 
direction. The nationalists were ready for another period of intensive 
agitation. The pre-Congress lull had ended.
The Home Department, however, decided that the adherence to 
Gandhi's programme was little more than a saving of face. Tho Council 
elections were no longer an issues Congress had declared the representa­
tives unrepresentative and called on them to resign, but it was little 
more than a matter of form. The boycott of schools and the withdrawal 
from the courts had not had permanent success in the past; they seemed 
no less impractical now. The Government concluded that, whatever the 
appearance at Nagpur, the Congress leaders had realised the futility of 
their campaign. The Government expected future agitation on a new front. 
They predicted that the main attention would turn to propaganda among 
the masses, particularly tenantry and labour.^
The Government thought the rural situation worst in the United 
Provinces. In early January agrarian unrest broke out near Rai Bareli.
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Villagers destroyed the taluqdars1 personal crops, and on two occasions,
at a total cost of nine lives, the police opened fire when faced by
large mohs. Ron-cooperators were allegedly involved. But the villagers
had genuine grievances, which the Commissioners of Lucknow and Fyznbad
were ordered to Investigate. The local government admitted that the
Oudh Tenancy Act needed amendment, and, hoping to secure concessions
from the taluqdars, they appointed a special officer to undertake the
revision. By 24 February the trouble had subsided. A number of
85agitators had been arrested. The Province was next disturbed by a
strike in the railway workshops. There were attempts to stop a mail
train, but the police kept the situation under control. The strike
continued into late February, although at that time nearly all the
running and office staff had returned to work. Economic reasons also
87
caused restiveness among schoolmasters, patwaris, and chaukidars.
In Bengal, non-cooperators were believed to be instrumental
in a strike of taxi-drivers. There were no economic grievancesj the
objections were to government control. Elaborate preparations were
discerned, and the strikers refused to discuss matters with the
authorities. The intention, the Bengal Government reported, was to
paralyse Calcutta during the visit by the Duke of Connaught. The
situation was serious owing to intimidation by upcountry Sikhs and
Muslims. On 21 January, the local government considered there was
strong evidence that the strike was out of control. Orders were issued
suspending the licences of those who continued to strike, and the
Government of India were asked to approve the deportation of non-
Bengalis under the Defence of India Rules. The Government of India.
refused to agree to wholesale deportations, and objected to the use of
a wartime measure long after the war.. But they authorised the use of
the Act, if absolutely necessary, to deport a limited number of up-
country drivers to their homes. The cancellation of licenses had some
88effect, and the strike was over on 24 January. It was followed two 
days later by a strike of tramway employees. This was still unsettled 
in late February. Anglo-Indian drivers were being given police pro-
85
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89tection; one shooting incident had resulted in a magisterial enquxry,
Over the same period, at Muzaffarpur in Bihar, there was a
serious outbreak of hat looting. It was believed to be committed or
inspired by sympathisers with the non-cooperation movement. Local
zamindars were encouraged to organise peons to protect the shopkeepers
from terrorisation, and the Commissioner was asked to prosecute where
possible. Planters were warned of the need for restraint. This out­
go
break was short-lived. In January there had also occurred in Bihar 
an incident in which a cooly was strick by a European for stealing 
sugar-cane. He claimed to be seriously hurt, although the hospital 
could find nothing wrong with him5 his fellow-workers became excited 
and attacked the Superintending Engineer and two other Europeans. 
Twenty-five armed police were called in, and work was suspended. The 
Government laboriously reported this trivial occurrence to the Secretary 
of State - demonstrating perhaps an excessive sensitivity to industrial 
unrest.9"*~
Elsewhere the Government found other alarming omens. In the
Central Provinces the bulk of the people in towns and larger villages
92
were found to be familiar with the idea of non-cooperation. In the 
Panjab a propagandist committee had been formed under Lajpat Rai, and 
was spreading its ideas among the rural classes. The peasantry was 
already discontented? one officer identified the problems as the 
compulsory disbanding of soldiers and their reluctant return to their 
villages, the corruption of officials, and promises made or imagined 
during the war. The central Government thought the situation potentially 
serious. Any problem in the Panjab was also complicated by the unrest 
among the Sikhs, The Sikh League had adopted non-cooperation, and a
91movement to contest control of the temples had been gaining momentum
89 V(HD) to S/S, 24 Feb. 1921, CP14.
90 V(HD) to S/S, 21 Jan. & 8 Feb. 1921, CP14.
91 V(HB) to S/S, 29 Jan.- 1921, CP14-
9  ^ V(ilD) to S/S, 25 Jan. 1921, CPI 4 5 Sly to Chelmsford, 14 Jan. 1921,
CP26. But there was also an opposite reaction; see Peter D. Reeves,
TThe Politics of Order’, Journal of Asian Studies XXV (Feb. 1966), 261- 
264, for an account of anti-non-cooperation in the Central Provinces.
V(HD) to S/S, 8 & 17 Feb. 1921, CPI4. There were two parties of 
Sikhs, the reformers (with an extremist branch, the Akali party) and 
the old Sikhs (the Sanatan party). The latter were In possession of 
virtually all shrines, whose Mahants (or guardians) regarded themselves 
as hereditary tenants enjoying the income in return for performance cf 
religious duties. The reformers wanted common ownership of the shrines
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In Madras there had been a long mill strike, in which the
men would not abate their demands, and the management would not
recognise the Union, Also, in Malabar, a campaign for tenancy reform
94was causing concern. In Bombay some districts predicted difficulty
in collecting land revenue - although it was thought possible that this
was no more than the usual attempt to secure remissions for a partial 
95crop failure. Two other signs were not encouraging. A large anti-
cow-killing conference had been held at Kanwal in the Panjab, and the
temperance movement was spreading in Bihar and Orissa. Both of these
held the prospect of disorder. In February, the Bhagalpur Division in
Bihar was disturbed by intimidation and picketing of liquor shopsj in
March similar trouble erupted in the Central Provinces - it began with
attacks on liquor shops in Nagpur leading to more than thirty arrests,
and ended with six deaths after angry mobs had rescued the prisoners
96and stoned the police.
It was tempting to attribute all the unrest to non-cooperators.
Some nationalist leaders encouraged this tendency, Chotani, the president
of the Central Khilafat Committee, sought to adapt the movement to its
more active role? he issued a manifesto on the need for executive
organisation in the Congress and the Muslim League; he advocated
standing committees to control finance, national education, national
97industries, and propaganda. In Bengal, B. Chakravarti, C.R. Das,
Abdul Kalam Azad and two others issued a village organisation scheme 
pending further action by the Provincial Congress. It included the 
establishment of primary schools, village banks and arbitration courts, 
the boycott of foreign goods, and attempts to reduce the area of jute
and use of the revenues for the benefit of the community. After a 
meeting of the Sikh League (at which Gandhi was present) in October 
1920, the reformers had begun to take possession of the shrines. There 
were riots at Tam Taran shrine, and a terrible massacre at the Nankana 
near Lahore. The local government decided to introduce legislation 
after an ehquiry by a legislative committee; they also called a meeting 
to discuss the situation. A committee was placed in charge at Nankana, 
for the time being the government undertook to protect shrines against 
attacks. Gandhi blamed the British for the tragedy. See v(HD) to S/S, 
4, 6 & 17 March 1921, CPI4, & The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi XIX
(Nov. 1920-April 1921)5 Ahmedabad 1966, 596-402, 407 & 421-425.
94 V(HD) to S/S, 8 Feb. 1921, CPI 4.
95 V(HD) to S/S, 17 Feb. 1921, CP14.
96 V(KD) to S/S, 29 March 1921, CPI4.
9  ^ V(HD) to S/S, 15 Jan. 1921, CPI4.
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98cultivation and prevent the consumption of liquor. The intention was
to carry the C-andhian programme to the villages. Later the Bengal
Government reported that Gandhi's influence was spreading among the
illiterate classes? rumours were Being circulated crediting Gandhi with
99the fall in the price of cloth and ghee, y More directly, Shaukat Ali
welcomed the rural unrest in the United Provinces as proof that non-
100cooperation would ultimately succeed^ and his Brother, Muhammad,
warned students that India would gain swaraj, if not with their support,
then with the help of agriculturalists. A politician from Bhagalpur
visited the coalfields and announced the formation of non-cooperation
101and labour associations. The Government were apprehensive about the
rural disturbances, and expected attempts to engineer industrial troubles 
for political purposes. The time was ripe for a further hardening in 
the government attitude.
For most of January the original Gandhian programme did seem 
to have fallen into abeyance, over most of the country, in favour of the 
new attempts to i^ iden the movement's popular support. Panchayats in the 
Panjab, arbitration courts and Seva Samitis in the United Provinces, 
plans to boycott the visit of the Duke of Connaught, scattered with­
drawals of students, a few more national schools, a ban on overseas
trading by the Umbrella Trades .associations outside Bengal, these wore
102the sum of a quiet month for the official satyagraha campaign. But 
the Home Department had been wrong in predicting that Gandhi's programme 
had failed and the main attention would turn to politicising the masses. 
By February the original campaign had been resumed.
The commercial element had gained impetus with a fall in the 
exchange rate of the rupee - by 19 February it was only ls.3"cd. Many 
Indian traders, alleging an assurance from Montagu or the Government 
that the exchange rate would be stabilised at 2s,0d., declined to honour
9^ V(HD) to S/S, 24 Jan. 1921, CPI4* On prohibition, see P.D. Kaushik, 
The Congress Ideology and Programme 1920-1947? Bombay etc. 19^4j 177-179-
99 V(ED) to S/S, 24 Feb, 1921, CPI4.
100 V(HD) to S/S, 24 Jan. 1921, CPI4,
101 V(HD) to S/S, 23 Jan. A 17 Feb. 1921, CP14.
102
V(HD) to S/S, 23 Jan, 1921, CP14.
their overseas orders. Most of the important Piece-goods Associations 
passed resolutions against the payment of drafts at less than 2s.Od. 
exchange, By mid-February, the exchange banks had proved unable to 
collect between £6 and £8 million sterling in bills, and uncleared stocks 
to a value of Rs, 16 crores had built up in Bombay. This was certainly 
a boycott of foreign trader but, as the Government pointed out, the 
majority of dealers were 'probably using /~the__/ political motive as 
Z~an_7 excuse for evading serious loss..,'. It was nearly the end of 
March before the importers decided to meet their bills - and then the 
Congress Working Committee promptly sought means to deflect the
, . . 103decision.
Attention was focussed more closely on the royal visit and
again on education. The Duke of Connaught was in India to inaugurate
the reformed Councils, The non-cooperators did not achieve a total
boycott, but did produce a marked lack of enthusiasm in Bengal and Delhi,
In Madras a rival meeting was held. Only in Bombay was the Duke greeted
10by cheerful and cheering crowds. ‘ Chelmsford explained why the
response was disconcerting?
... in recent years the attitude of India towards Great 
Britp.in has altered and we now have to face the hostility 
of an unscrupulous party which does not hesitate to 
employ every device however discreditable extending even 
to an attempt to belittle the Importance of the Duke's 
visit, -^5
Lady Blanche Lloyd writing to Chamberlain captured the curious 
psychological effect which the situation had upon the British in India? 
'...it sometimes gives me the queerest feeling,' she wrote, 'to think 
that here we are, living among, entertaining, and trying to do our best 
for, a crowd of people who mostly hate us all the time, not personally, 
perhaps, but for what we represent. ' The reaction to the royal visit 
was new and serious; there had been an attempt, partly successful, to 
achieve not only popular rejection of aspects of British policy, but 
also symbolic repudiation of the British connection.
Bengal alone had not been relatively free of educational 
disturbances during January. The Bengali students had been excited
105 V(FD) to S/S, 19 A 21 Feb. A (ilD) 29 March 1921, CPI4.
1 0 ^ V(IlD) to S/S, 23 & 29 Jan, A  8 A  24 Feb. 1921, CP14? Ronaldshay 
to Montagu, 20 A 27 Jan. 1921, MP32? G/Madras to V, 11 Jan., A G/Bombay 
to V, 23 Feb. 1921, CP26.
105 V to S/S, 19 Feb. 1921, CP14-
Lady Blanche Lloyd bo Chamberlain, 31 Dec. 1920, ACPI8/I/17.
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since C.R. Das made his grand gesture dedicating himself to satyagraha. 
Towards the end of the month there were extensive strikes among students 
in Calcutta, mainly in privately-managed colleges. The Madrassa was 
not affected. Large numbers of students collected in College Square 
and prevented candidates from attending law examinations. In Dacca the 
College and Madrassa remained open, but the situe.tion throughout the 
province was grave and worsening steadily. Early in February the 
atmosphere was calmer, with schools, lav/ colleges and university classes 
■undisturbed| but all other colleges had been closed mainly to enable 
parents to remove their sons from the influence of the non-cooperators,
A visit from Gandhi gave the strike impetus once more. The Education 
Department considered that the colleges should not be reopened until 
students could attend without possibility of interference. A magistrate's 
order against obstructing students had apparently helped in Dacca, where 
the Government college was still open, but a similar notice had had no 
effect in Mymensingh, The probable result of reopening in disaffected 
areas would be, in the Department's view, police intervention and street 
fighting.
Gradually the resurgence spread to other provinces. In Burma
more than half the students were on strike at the beginning of February;
in Assam two colleges and a few schools were affected. In Madras five
hundred students resolved to withdraw5 in Bihar and Orissa there was
a sudden strike in one college and attempts to intimidate students in 
108others. In Bombay seven hundred students declared themselves for non­
cooperation, inspired by the example of Bengal. In early February only 
fifty or sixty had withdrawn, but the movement was encouraged by a 
Students' Convention under the leadership of Patel. By 21 February,
633 students had left; nine anglo-vernacular schools, representing 2771 
pupils, had renounced government grants; Gujarat College had lost five 
professors; and thirty-eight teachers had left various other schoals,"09 
In the Central Provinces, at Nagpur, there were 250 students in national
schools; by mid-February between 50 and 84 per cent of High School
pupils were attending school, but numbers were declining,
107
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In the Panjab the campaign had been revived -under Lajpat Eai.
A virtually complete strike had taken place in the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic 
College when the Managing Committee refused to invite Lajpat Rai to 
address the students. The excitement was caught in other colleges in 
Lahore, and four in all were closed, Tho Government and Islamia Colleges 
wore unaffected at first, but later their students voted for non­
cooperation, began to disturb lectures, and put pressure on the staff 
to resign. In Amritsar a large majority at Khalsa College voted to 
leave and preach non-violent war in tho countryside, and a number did 
quit the College after a mooting held by Dr Kitchlcw. Tho non­
cooperators also hold a well-attended Students 1 Conference at 
111Gujranwala,
The combination of this activity with the indications of
industrial and rural unrest was sufficient to force the Government's
hand. And yet, such was tho commitment to non-interference, optimism
still prevailed sufficiently to save the main part of the policy. The
Government decided that the student unrest was mainly an ebullition to
impress the Duke of Connaught, and was unlikely to be long-lived.
Chelmsford predicted on 14 Februarys
The students are seeing for themselves the damage they 
are suffering from this course and are gradually coming 
back. Gandhi's advice to them to take to the spinning 
wheel is not likely to encourage them. I am confident 
we shall win through, but we must have patience.
A little later he was buoyantly forecasting clea.ror skies and a better
atmosphere, while admitting that the next two or three months (much of
which would be in the hands of the new Viceroy) would test his optimism"^
And again this optimism seemed justified by events. By mid-February the
situation had eased, although on tho 21st two Panjab colleges were still
closed. By the end of the month most colleges had opened, and early in
March local governments were reporting satisfactory or improving 
113conditions,
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Nonetheless the situation was changings it was true that 
each upsurge in Gandhi's campaign was relatively short-lived, hut each 
was also more severe than the last. The Government thought the non­
cooperators were trying to force the pace, and that students were being 
recruited as propagandists among the m a s s e s . T h e r e  was an inevitable 
reassessment of policy, with two results - renewed efforts at appease­
ment, and a further stiffening of attitude.
Already, at the end of January, the Government had reopened
their campaign for a modification of the Turkish peace terms - the Home
Department again placed 'most strongly on record' the contention that
substantial concessions on the Khilafat could be refused only on peril
of very grave consequences for India. In mid-February the Viceroy was
most anxious that an Indian Muslim delegation should be received and
115given some concessions in the peace negotiations. Earlier Chelmsford
had urged that the Duke of Connaught might make p conciliatory statement 
on the Khilafat question. A second line of appeasement was to 
emphasize the role of the new legislatures, in the hope of establishing 
the reality of the reforms and consolidating moderate opinion. The 
Government had decided to make this point by accepting resolutions that 
were moved in the legislature5 and they also suggested that the Duke 
of Connaught, in opening the Imperial Legislative Assembly, should make 
specific reference to this decision. They suggested that he stress 
that under the 1919 Act the Government was to be influenced by the 
legislature 'to an extent incomparably greater than...in the past', and 
that Chelmsford’s Government would give the 'fullest possible effect’ 
to this principle. The statement was delivered, after some verbal
117changes, substantially in the form drafted by the Home Department<,
But appeasement was not enough. In January, the Government,
apprehensive at rural and industrial unrest, had decided to address 
local governments on the new situation. They were responding to the 
supposed new direction of the campaign. While awaiting local govern­
ment replies, and as the situation developed, they settled on a five-
114 V(HD) to S/S, 8 Feb. 1921, CPI4.
115 V to S/S, 6, 19 A 20 Feb. & (HD) 26 Jan, 1921, CP14.
"1 "1 ^
V(KD) to S/S, 2 Feb., & S/S to V, 4 Feb. 1921, CPI4. The Duke r-ls. 
seems to have suggested a conciliatory statement himself (after the 
very wording had been d e c i d e d ! s e e  Lord Cromer to V, 6 Feb. 1921, 
CP26.
See above, note 116, A V to S/S, 8 Feb, 1921, CPI 4*
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point plan. They would watch the attempts to disaffect rural end
labouring classes, introduce special legislation whenever required,
employ counter-propaganda, vigorously prosecute non-cooperators who
were guilty of inciting to violence or making seditious speeches, and
finally enforce general respect for the law, for example in the case
118of clearly unlawful assemblies. . The first three points were un­
remarkable, end the Government had stressed explicitly that they did 
not intend any great policy change. But the last two provisions, with 
their stronger emphasis on the law and prosecutions, represented another 
distinct hardening in attitudes they continued the change which had 
been evident during the previous year and, in November, implicit in 
the Government's Resolution explaining their policy.
In late January, in Karachi, Abdul Rahman, the editor of the
local Khilafat paper, was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment
119on a charge of sedition. j±s with the central Government's decision,
this isolated action came rather in advance of the events which were
to stimulate the fuller use of stern measures, .“During February these
became more frequent. In the United Provinces, public meetings were
prohibited under the Indian Penal Code in seven districts of Qudh, and
several prominent local leaders were arrested. Later a further eight
persons were tried and imprisoned for interfering with candidates for
an examination at the Sanskrit College, Benares, A column of arms was
marched through Sultanpur and Fyzabad districts, and was reported to
have had a good effect. In March the Government of India agreed to
the application of the Seditious Meetings Act to four districts for up
120to one year, after further disturbances in Rai Bareli.
Meetings had been prohibited in most districts in the Panjab, 
iind in February the Secretary of the Provincial Congress Committee was 
confined to Lahore under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Madras the 
Calicut District Magistrate prohibited Khilafat meetings and arrested 
Yakub Hasan -and three others. The Chairman of the Calicut Municipality 
resigned in protest. A hartal was held in Madras to protest these 
imprisonments, but the police dispersed the crowd without great 
difficulty. In the Legislative Council there was no division on a
118 V(HD) to S/S, 25 A 29 Jan. 1921, CPI4.
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resolution against the action, as the debate strongly supported the
121District Magistrate. In the Northwest Frontier Province in March,
when the local Khilafat Committee was widening its activities, the
Deputy Commissioner of Bakka Ivel was permitted to ban Khilafat meetings,
with the intention, if defied, of arresting the leaders under the
122
Frontier Crimes Regulations. In the Central Provinces, the Vice-
President of the Nagpur Municipality, Dr M.R. Cholkar, was arrested
under the Indian Penal Code, There was a large protest meeting and a
general hartal in Nagpur, followed by some looting of liquor shops.
Meetings were prohibited for a month, and there was no further trouble.
The Deputy Commissioner interviewed the leading non-cooperators and
123
warned them that the Government was determined to maintain order.
In Bihar and Orissa a vigorous campaign against offenders was stigmatised
124
by the Independent of Allahabad as a 'tide of repression1.
The Government were directing pressure largely at preventing 
public meetings and propaganda by means of the ordinary law. They 
reported that the provincial governments were encouraging the local 
authorities in more uniform and coordinated steps to counteract the non­
cooperation movement. They believed that loud protests from the
125extremists indicated that the policy was hampering their activities.
The stronger measures did involve the risk of a final confrontation 
with the non-cooperators. In February Chelmsford admitted that Gandhi 
would have to be arrested if he showed 'deliberate .and provocative 
defiance' on his visit to Delhi where the Seditious Meetings Act was
in force. The Government remained rather at the mercy of their local
X 2officials in such circumstances. But this was on increased rather
than a new danger for the Government's policy. M.M. Shafi had explained
in November to Willingdon: the 'policy of sitting tight & doing nothing
127
is right now1; the Government recognised that there might come a 
time when to do nothing would be wrong. Thus the harsher local tactics
1 pi
V to S/S, 24 Feb. 1921, CP14.
1 PP
V(HD) to s/s, 6 & also 29 March 1921, CP14>
125 Ibid., & V(HD) to S/S, 24 Feb. 1921, CPI4.
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did not mean that the Government envisaged a reversal of their method 
of non-interference at the national level, or intended to prohibit non­
cooperation as a whole. The central principles of the approach remained 
unchanged. In February 1920, Chelmsford explained his position once 
again. The real danger, he maintained, lay in the extremists on either 
side - British ones who always saw 'in the big stick a remedy for every
evil', and Indian ones who wanted nothing better than for the Government
128'to use the big stick1. For several years Chelmsford had occupied
the middle position, consistently and to his own satisfaction. The 
satyagraha campaign had not shaken his confidence in this approach.
This fact is remarkable, not only in terms of the challenge 
presented by Gandhi, who, though not fully successful, remained un­
defeated, but also in terms of the fierce opposition which Chelmsford's 
policy aroused. Those, like Lord Willingdon, who had opposed it from 
the first, were now confirmed in their opinion. Willingdon thought non­
interference merely a failure of courage; he scorned it as the method 
of 'Hush. Hush'. Once, after an uneventful visit from Gandhi and 
Shaukat Ali, he admitted to doubts; but generally he became more and
more Incensed every time that 'd d fellow Gandhi' came into his
jurisdiction and he was not allowed to intervene. He wanted to act, 
and argued that they were allowing the non-cooperators to organise - 
the agitation would not be killed by 'a policy of drift1; 'masterly 
inactivity' was no way to govern. Some of his views were seen by 
Sir F.W, Duke and Lord Lytton, and cannot have increased confidence 
at the India Office.12'1
Of the other provincial heads, Lloyd, at a moment when he 
had lost all confidence in Chelmsford, wrote to Montagu complaining 
that Simla was hopelessly out of touch - 'where it is firm it fails to 
be sympathetic, where it attempts to be sympathetic it succeeds only In 
being weak'. He believed that the release of Shaukat Ali had been a 
mistake - Montagu did not agree but admitted that he thought Shaukat 
should have been 'put back again immediately he opened his mouth'. 
Lloyd's Idea was 'to pay out rope and hit the agitator hp.rd', while 
still showing sympathy for nationalist hopes. After seeing Chelmsford 
in October 1920, Lloyd was again prepared to endorse the Viceroy's
1 2ft
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policy. He confided in Chamberlain that the repressive course would hove 
to be followed right through riots and bloodshed once it was begun, where­
as Chelmsford's tactics, although they might do much damage, might 
succeed. At the end of 1920, however, Lloyd was convinced that Gandhi's 
movement had failed and that the- Government should destroy what remained 
of his influence. In the new year Lloyd wrote to Montagu that they 
could not 'go on drifting vaguely'5 they must either make terms with
Gandhi or repress his movement. At the end of February he was happier
130again; but he was never fully committed to Chelmsford's approach.
The non-cooperation campaign convinced most of the other
Governors that the policy was misguided. Ronaldshay was reticent about
giving his opinion, but he was clearly uneasy. He believed the non­
cooperation campaign could end only in violence and that this was the 
aim of its leaders. He remarked that many people - later he mentioned 
particularly the 'loyal Muhammadans’ - were 'puzzled at the length to 
which the extremists are permitted to go1. He made a speech at 
Krishnagar against the Khilafat and satyagraha movements, and believed 
that the favourable response from local leaders showed that 'there are 
two points of view from which to look at a policy of inaction’. He 
thought the Government must make it clear that certain things, such as 
tampering with the army and the police, would not be tolerated. He was 
worried, in August 1920, that the central Government had not 'publicly
defined’ their attitude, with the result that no-one knew where they
stood and 110 uniformity of action was possible between local governments - 
Montagu, to whom these fears had been expressed, suggested that the 
Government of India might have had 'special difficulties' in making their 
attitude clear. No-onc, he insisted, would stand in the way of any 
action against Gandhi once it was seen as really wise; but provinces
had to be a little diffident in pressing strongly for action against
131someone whose activities had an all-India aspect. Ronaldshay hinted 
at his uneasiness to Chelmsford, and, when pressed for definite 
suggestions, tentatively put forward, in March 1921, an idea, that Gandhi 
might be prosecuted if he persisted in his campaign after a personal
See Lloyd to Chamberlain, 15 Oct. 1920, aCP18/1/5, & to Montagu,
26 March, 3 April, 23 July, 13 ^ug., 15 Oct., 19 Nov. A 3 Dec. 1920,
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appeal offering concessions.
Craddock’s Government strongly criticised the Government of
India's policy in an official despatch at the end of 1920. Chelmsford
replied sharply that, while he welcomed private comment, 'there must be
no official criticism' when policy had been laid down distinctly; he
hoped that there would be no 'recurrence of any such thing’. Craddock .
had urged earlier that conciliation was not understood in India and would
have 'no permanent effect'. 'To the extremist,’ he argued, 'the British
Government is an enemy'; conciliation was interpreted as showing that
surrender was near; the only policy was to give 'moderate and sensible-
133men' a chance to come to the fore. This view echoed that of the
Chief Commissioner of Coorg, H.V, Cobb, who had sent the Home Department
a strong minute in 1919? it had struck him that 'Our policy of late
years ... has been to neglect our well-wishers and treat them as a
negligible quantity; but at the same time to go out of our way to try
and placate or conciliate our enemies. It is a policy ... which has not
met with marked success .... I cannot recall the name of any really
prominent extremist who has been won over by it to our side. On the
other hand, many staunch Indian friends have complained to me that loyalty
134is not a policy th.at pays.1. Such opposition, reading a different
lesson from the upheavals of 1919? was thus not new; but by the end of
1920 it had become fairly general. Sir Frank Sly joined the chorus;
135
Harcourt Butler was still recording his hostility many yeans later.
It is important to understand what this attitude represented.
There were three continuing elements; that conciliation discouraged
loyalists and moderates, that it would not win over the extremists, and
that it both allowed them the opportunity and encouraged them to preach
unrest. It is not hard, therefore, to see why this criticism did not
carry the weight which might have been expected. The Government of
of India had rejected all of these arguments. They did not place great
faith in 'moderates', and anyway the most prominent of these publicly
136opposed the repression of extremists; they no longer expected to win
132
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over the extremists - their policy was to buy time not favour - hut 
they believed it was repression not conciliation that would assist the 
nationalist cause.
It would have been more serious if the Secretary of State
had joined the dissenters, as at one time seemed possible, Montagu was
in two minds about the policy* In July 1920 he came under pressure,
with questions in Parliament, to act against Gandhi. He continued to
fear the consequences of action more than the dangers of inaction - the
nightmare of a Gandhi on hunger strike in prison was enough to convince
him. But the campaign was more successful than he expected, and he too
became worried at the need to encourage the moderates* He also made
nervous enquiries about reports that the government had not prevented
Gandhi from drilling recruits. 'Your policy .** is a simple one,' he
told Chelmsford, ’and we hope that in the end it will prove a wise 
137one.’ ■" There was no resounding confidence in that assurance. In
November Montagu’s defence of the policy was drafted, in a letter to
Ronaldshay, as ’I think*.,the policy is a sound one'; Montagu corrected
it by hand to read, 'I think..,the policy is an intelligible one’. This
was a fair account of his position. It was, he admitted, ’a gamble' -
but at least it was a gamble with two throws; immediate intervention
was a gamble with only one. He fell back on his policy of leaving such
matters for decision by the men responsible in India. He wrote to
Willingdon, sentiments repeated also to Chelmsford;
non-cooperation appears to be getting more dangerous, 
but I must leave it to people in India to decide how 
to deal with it. I never thought it would die of 
inanition. What I do think is that perhaps, and I 
speak with great diffidence, it is so impracticable 
and so disadvantageous that people will get sick of 
it,1^
Three factors, therefore, encouraged the Government to continue 
their old policy. Firstly, their handling of the situation was never 
openly challenged by the Secretary of State, Secondly, their own 
judgment and interpretation of wider issues required them to discount 
the basis of the local governments' criticism. Thirdly, as we have 
seen, their generally optimistic attitude to Gandhi’s campaign remained 
unruffled by events; their alarm was answered by progressive hardening
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in their measures, and was never great enough to move them on the main 
principle of non-interference. There was also a final and decisive 
factor. Changing the policy required an act of courages as Chelmsford 
insisted, repression of Gandhi would have been a final and irrevocable 
gamble which would have had to be carried through to the end. Without 
the pressure of unavoidable circumstances, the Government were unwill­
ing to take this step, and it was for this reason, it seems, that they 
allowed themselves to be encouraged by each successive lull in the non­
cooperation campaign. But what was perhaps equally important was tha.t 
this final factor also discounted the criticisms the Secretary of State 
was daunted by it5 and even the local governments, for all their private 
grumbling, shared the same reluctance when forced to make official re­
commendations. When their replies were received (to the Home Department
enquiry) in March 1921, only Burma was prepared to advocate that ncn-
159interference should be abandoned. Other local governments, of course, 
now had to convince Indian colleagues, and perhaps to persuade Indian 
legislators.
Thus the last questioning under Chelmsford resulted in an 
endorsement of his policy. He had been vindicated also in a complementary 
direction. As he had hoped, he had gained the acquiescence of the 
legislative assemblies before embarking on stronger measures. Several 
local governments had received votes in support of their policies, and 
in the Imperial Legislative Assembly a resolution to ban repressive 
measures had been rejected. The feeling of the Assembly had been against 
any weakening of the local governments' position. A resolution had 
been passed approving the Government's policy, while recommending the 
avoidance of any action under exceptional legislation. In March, the 
Home Department urged local governments to institute prosecutions more 
freely for incitement to violence, and against speeches 'calculated to 
produce feelings likely to lead to violence in the near future'.44^
This was the toughest position taken under Chelmsford. But its victims 
were to remain relatively minor figures only. Measures against Gandhi 
were specifically reserved to the central Government as issues of 
national importance. The two main lessons learnt in dealing with Annie 
Besant - the dangers of interference and the need for central supervision 
- had not been forgotten.
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Chelmsford had sometimes felt himself "besieged by extremists
on both sides. Even Lionel Curtis, that 'high priest of Empire’, had
taken the authoritarian view. Writing to Chamberlain, he pronounceds
'There will be no rest in India as long as it is said "Unless you obey,
the Govt, of India may get very angry." ... There will be peace in India
when there is a Viceroy who says "I will be o b e y e d " C u r t i s ,  with
many others,failed to understand the situation. Gandhi's agitation, lilt.
Mrs Besant's, was ambiguous, half-way between legal protest and
revolution. Gandhi too was half-rebel, half-loyalist. It was in June
1920, as his campaign gathered way and he planned to defy authority and
undermine the law, that he wrote to Chelmsford calling himself 'a devoted
142well-wisher of the British Empire1. The Government of India had to 
be equally dextrous.
Curtis to Chamberlain, 10 Nov. 1920, ACP25/10/12. Curtis also 
wondered if Montagu realised how gravely he had endangered his own work 
by ’diluting' the Government of India with three Indians^ see Curtis 
to Chamberlain, 15 Nov. 1920, ACP25/IO/14.
142
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PART THREE. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Chapter 7 * The Goal
The 1919 reforms represented a deliberate attempt to make the
Indian constitution conform to an evolutionary concept of British rule.
The initiative was Lord Chelmsford's. Some time in 1915? while in India
with his regiment, Chelmsford decided that British rule was 'aimless1,
characterised by a 'hand-to-mouth policy of giving Reforms piecemeal in
response to agitation'5 he saw that another advance would have to be
conceded shortly and believed that it should conform to some general
idea of the goal of British rule. His view was reinforced when S.P,
Sinha, in his Congress Presidential address of December 1915? called for
a declaration on the intentions of the British with regard to Indian
self-government, Chelmsford adopted Sinha's questions; at his 'very
first Executive Council' the new Viceroy asked; (l) what is the
ultimate goal of British rule in India? (2) what are the first steps
on the road to that goal? From the first, under Chelmsford, lines of
advance were considered in terms of an attempt to plan coherently.^
Chelmsford's Executive Council, augmented by Sir Michael
0 'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, discussed Chelmsford's
2
questions at informal weekly and later twice weekly meetings. The 
Councillors were being asked to rethink their ideas, for Chelmsford was 
not the first to suggest reforms. His predecessor, Lord Hardinge, in 
an important memorandum of October 1915? had formulated a number of 
questions which were likely to arise at the end of the war, and which, 
in Hardinge's view, 'the conclusion of peace must find us prepared to 
consider'. The Councillors had already expressed views on Hardinge's
1
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proposals. Under Chelmsford, however, they were being given a different 
starting-point, the question of the goal. Each member, as he was ready, 
separately summarised his ideas in a rough note which was then circu­
lated among the other members, for three weeks Chelmsford held dis­
cussions with individual members on their own views, and towards the 
end of May 1916 asked Sir George Barnes to try to find common ground. 
There was more agreement than Chelmsford had expected? the Council 
agreed to a formula stating that the British goal was 'to endow India ... 
with the largest measure of Self-Government compatible with the 
maintenance of the supreme authority of British Rule'. One Councillor, 
Sir Sankaran hair, the Education Member, had argued that the goal should 
be 'good government ... according to Western ideals’ and that at present 
self-government was incompatible with Indian caste and class feeling and 
the low status of women. The other members - the British - all included 
some form of self-government and some degree of British suzerainty among 
their objectives.^
In the qualification ’compatible with the maintenance of the
supreme authority’, the term ’British Rule’ had been introduced by
Chelmsford himself, as a replacement for the words 'King-Emperor'. Sir 
T.W. Holderness of the India Office pointed out that this formula would 
be interpreted as a retreat from Hardinge’s position? it appeared,
unlike Hardinge’s remarks, to hint that complete self-government would 
5
never be obtained. This had not been Chelmsford's intention. He had
preferred the words 'British Rule' and had rejected 'King-Emperor' on
the grounds that the latter seemed to him to involve 'Colonial Swaraj', 
a form of government to which, as it was 'wholly inapplicable to the 
conditions of India', he was 'not prepared to agree at the present 
moment'. His final qualification was important? the goal which was
3 'Memorandum by li.E. the Viceroy upon Questions likely to arise in 
India at the end of the War1; Hardinge to Heads of Governments and 
Members of his Council, 30 Aug.; Meston, 7 Sept., Willingdon, 10 Sept., 
O ’Dwyer, 13 Sept., Hailey, 17 Sept. 1915* to Hardinge; notes orletters 
by Sir Syed Ali Imam, 13 Sept., Sir W. Clark, undated, Sir Reginald 
Craddock, 16 Sept., Sir W. Meyer, 5 Sept., C.H.A. Hill, 4 Sept. 1915, A 
Sir Benjamin Robertson, undated? ACP22/2. See also Chirol to 
Chamberlain, 13 Oct. 1915* AC?12/45.
^ Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 5 A 27 May & 16 June 1916, CP2; 'Formula1, 
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being explained in this formula was not after all an ultimate one. At
this stage, Chelmsford explained to the Secretary of State, Austen
Chamberlain, they should emphasise that, while they sought !a gradual
extension of self-government1, they were determined not to abdicate their
position - that would be for their successors.^ The formula, Chelmsford
explained later in reply to Holderness' criticism, had 'served its
purpose ... in clearing our minds and enabling us to see where we stood
.... It represented a stago in our discussion from which we advanced
7
to further stages'.
accordingly, in the final draft of the formula, the Govern­
ment retained their caution but removed the ambiguity. Chelmsford had 
consulted Sinha, who had convinced him that the original form would 
not be satisfactory from the Indian point of view. 'The goal to which 
we look forward,' the Government stated, in the despatch which they 
sent to the Secretary of State in November, 'is the endowment of British 
India as an integral part of the Umpire, with self-government, but the 
rate of progress ... must depend upon the improvement and wide diffusion 
of education, the softening of racial and religious differences, and 
the acquisition of political experience'. They contemplated India's 
gradual progress towards a larger and larger measure of control by her 
own people, the steady and conscious development of which will ultimate­
ly result in self-government’ - though in a form 'regulated by the 
special circumstances of India' and not altogether on Dominion lines.
In the view of Sir Claude Hill, expressed later in 1917j he and the 
other Council members were safeguarding themselves, as they were 
bureaucrats contemplating a permanent goal, even in this last reserva­
tion - in fact, he claimed, everyone contemplated that India would
receive responsible government as in the Dominions except for modifioa- 
8tions in detail.
8 Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 27 May A 8 Sept. 1916, CP2.
 ^ Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 23 Sept. 1916, CF2.
8 'Formula', 1 June 1916, CP17j HD despatch, 24 Nov. 1916, H.Poll.
358, Dec, 1916? Note, 26 June, with Hill to Chelmsford, 26 June 1916, 
CP18. See also Richard Danzig, 'Common Grounds the Early Stages of the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms', unpublished Oxford B.Phil. thesis, June 
1967? 70-71 (consulted by courtesy of Dr Danzig), which claims that 
Chelmsford accepted the change in the formula because he was desperate 
for an announcement. I would argue that Chelmsford made the change 
because he had been convinced that his wording was ambiguous and un­
acceptable, and that he was not then desperate for an announcement - 
indeed he refused one next month (see below, note 57)* On the question 
of the form of self-government, see Georges Fischer, in his Parti 
travailliste et la decolonisation de l'Inde, Paris 1966, 54~55> where
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The next question was how to take a definite step towards this
goal. The Council discussions postulated three roads of advance; they
were rewards for war service, the removal of grievances, and political
9
progress. There was unanimity on the first two of these. Indeed in 
those areas the recommendations showed virtually complete continuity 
■between Chelmsford’s and Hardinge1s policies; in both Hardinge’s 
memorandum and the Government of India despatch of November 1916 the 
emphasis was placed upon rewarding the army through commissions, pay 
increases and various benefits, and upon answering grievances on matters 
such as the arms Act, indentured emigration, and the cotton excise duties 
Sinha, too, had stressed almost exactly these improvements in his 
Presidential address to the Congress.
There was substantial agreement also that two of the linos of 
political advance should bo the increased employment of Indians in the 
higher branches of the public services, and the development of local 
self-government. Hardinge had supported these lines too - for him the 
latter was 'the safest and most natural lino of development1 which would 
'diminish the force of demands for Colonial Self-government and other 
such claims which aro neither understood nor really wanted'. Sinha, 
while regretting that Hardinge had not agreed to complete internal 
independence for local boards, also believed that local self-government; 
was the way for Indians to gain swaraj. Under Chelmsford the Government 
of India wore prepared to go further. They enunciated similar principles 
for both local self-government and the public services. For both the 
object was to be 'to train the people in the management of their own 
affairs'? the rule for both was to bo that 'education of this sort must
he suggests that the doubt over the universal applicability of British 
institutions developed in the early 20th century - shared in the Labour 
movement by persons as diverse a,s Shaw and Macbonald - and ho comments' 
'Cette explication no nous parait pas pertinent©. II semblo, en rerlite- 
que 1 ’impossibilite de transplanter le modole motropclitain est utilise© 
comme un argument pour refuser des r^formes politiques substantiollos1, 
He sees the Kontagu-Chelmsford Report as a denial of such side-stepping - 
It might be argued, therefore, that Chelmsford and his Council were 
merely continuing a tradition which Moriay, Minto and Crewe had all 
endorsed, and that the change come with the Report. I believe, on the 
contrary, that in 1916 the insistence on a form of government suitable 
to India was no more than a survival, and that Chelmsford's enunciati n 
of the goal had already moved the Government of Indio, away from this 
point, as shown in the changes they proposed (see below, pp.215-218). 
Hill at least recognised this consciously.
9
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 July 1916, CP2.
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take precedence of mere considerations of departmental efficiency’.^
For the public services the increased employment of Indians 
in higher and more responsible posts was hold to be 1 essential to the 
progress of India towards the goal'. There had been disagreement in the 
Council on the one point of the emphasis to be given to the possibility 
of going beyond what the Public Services Commission had recommended - 
Craddock, supported by G 1Dwyer and the Commander-in-Cnief, Duff, was 
unwilling to commit the Government; Meyer, Lowndes, Hill and Lair 
insisted that it was necessary to admit that the situation had changed 
since the Report. Barnes remained uncommitted, and Chelmsford awaited 
the local government reaction before making a decision; the Council 
later agreed to state that the recommendations would be put into cffuct, 
subject to modification and extension whore there wore new circumstances. 
The guiding principle was to bo to allow ’Full opportunity for Indians 
to qualify themselves for the more important posts in the public services 
and to demonstrate ... their fitness for still more responsible duties', 
Frogrcss wo,s to be set anew ’on sound and generous lines’. ^
In local self-government, it was decided that the- ’local 
bodies must be as representative as possible’, 'their control ... should 
be real and not n o m i n a l a n d  ’they must not be kept in leading strings, 
but must learn by making mistakes and profiting by them’. Government 
policy had already been set out on 28 April 1915 in a, resolution on 
the report of the Decentralisation Commission. In a memorandum of 
June 1916, however, the Viceroy set out and circulated to the local 
governments a revised version of his Government’s policy. He confirmed 
that the resolution in Hardinge's time ’usually saw the right path’, 
but stressed that now the Government of India were no longer ’content 
to let the local governments travel by it or not as those saw fit’.
For municipalities, his Government had decided that the Commission's 
proposal for substantial elected majorities should be accepted and urged 
on local governments, with the corollary that the franchise should be 
sufficiently low to include the body of the rate-payors. Chairmen
^  See above, notes 1, 3 a 8, For a contemporary Indian suggestion on 
local government ~ wanting more power for pancha.ya.ts - see M.S. Sesa 
Ayyangar, Madras Village Panchayats, Madura _/.
^  Kotos by Craddock, 5 J 10 June, Meyer to Chelmsford, &, Meyer, dill 
& Lowndes, ’Proposed, formula ro larger employment of Indians in the 
public services', 8 Juno 1916, &. revised formula, undated, CP17; 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 & 21 July 1916, C_P2.
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should normally bo elected non-officials. For rural and district
boards, where the Commission had recommended elected majorities with
an official chairman, the Viceroy now urged that the local governments
should begin tin. experiment, wherever possible, of non-official and
preferably elected chairmen. Powers for local boards should also be
increased. Municipalities, unless indebted, were to be quite free to
impose or alter local taxation? under Hardinge this right had b^en
subject to the local government power to vary any tax, a reservation
which Chelmsford's Government considered to render the right 'nugatory1.
In 1915 also the Government had been reluctant fully to accept the
principle that where a local board paid for a service it should also
control it? the Viceroy now insisted on going the 'whole way' with the
Decentralization Commission - local boards were to have control, subject
to general principles of conduct, and the local governments were
instructed not to interfere on details. In particular, the compulsory
reservation of parts of local funds for specified purposes was to be
abolished, and unnecessary control oven: capital works was to be relaxed.
Thus, Chelmsford's Government had introduced three main changes; they
had asked that the rate of progress should bo increased, they had refused
to leave cortain matters to the discretion of the local governments,
and they had had enunciated a general rulo that local bodies were to bo
subject, as in Britain, to 'ultimate powers of intervention' but not to
12day to day supervision. They had accepted, however, a point which was 
made later by Chamberlain - that it was also necessary to proviue safe­
guards through permanent officials."^ In 191B Edwin Montagu was to 
claim that no official chairman should be 'let near' any local body5 
the Government of India had already accepted this ideal in 1916. ^  They 
stipulated, as Chelmsford was to point out in 1918, only that the pace 
of development should not be so greatly enhanced 'as to bring about a 
fall'.15
Chelmsford’s Government were divided on the question of 
legislative reform. Chelmsford had 'studiously avoided pressing any
12 'General Principles which should be observed in the Development of 
Local Self-Government1, 30 June 1916? CP17? Memorandum circulated by 
Viceroy, H.Poll. 358, Dec, 1916. Swc also, for the Secretary of State's 
approval,“sTs^to G/l, 19 Oct. 1917, H.Poll. 337, March 1918.
Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 15 May 1917? CP3*
^  Montagu to Chelmsford, 15 April 1918, CP4*
15 Chelmsford to Montagu, 18 ^pril 1918, CP4-
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opinion', as he was 'anxious to obtain the considered opinion of those
16
whose experience would justify them in having strong convictions'.
He was trying most of all to socure a unanimous despatch, for that alone
would carry weight and conviction in London. But on legislative reform
Craddock, who, os the member mainly responsible, could not be ignored,
was again ranged with O'Dwyer and Duff, against Meyer, Hill, Lowndes and
Lair. Craddock's group opposed any increase in the poivors of the
legislative councils. In Hardinge's time, Craddock had pointed cut
that the British wore 'at the parting of the ways' in India - the main
question wan whether or not they were 'to convert the non-official
Members from being representatives of interests ... to being representa-
17tives of a self-governing people entitled to control the executive'.
To Chelmsford he insisted that the Government must continue the re­
presentation of 'classes and interests' and not introduce territorial 
constituencies? he advocated the replacement of district board con­
stituencies (which tended to return lawyers) with electorates of land­
owners and commercial interests? and, if Muslim representation was to
be retained, he favoured narrowing the franchise to bring it into line
3 8with that in the general electorates, ‘ The opposing group, on the 
other hand, favoured statutory changes for the legislative councils so a 
to increase their financial and administrative powers and develop the 
elective principle. Meyer and Hill argued, with some individual varia­
tion, for large territorial constituencies, non-official majorities in
tho provinces, and for some moans of associating members with the govern
19ment, .tor.example as advisors on the budget.
Chelmsford remained uncommitted. He was certainly disposed 
to be cautious - it might have seemed that he was likely to favour 
the viewpoint of Craddock whose judgment and knowledge he respected. In 
November 1916 he told a conference which was discussing the prospect of 
a permanent council for the Indian princes and chiefs, 'I would beg you 
to give time to development and growth, and the motto I would ask you 
to place before yourselves is Festina lente', He was inclined to apply
16
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 23 Sept. 1916, CP2.
17
Memorandum by Craddock, 16 Sept. 1915? ACP22/2.
Minute by Craddock on Provincial Legislative Councils, 26 June 1316, 
CP17-
19 See above, note 4*
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the same principle in reforms to British India, He told the Imperial
Legislative Council that 'progress must be circumspect and on well
considered lines'5 he informed the Agra municipalitys 'There can be
no better school for training the political sense than that of Municipal 
20administration'. Craddock's case was reinforced also by his intention
of reducing the ruedominance of lawyers in the councils - Sir James
Meston of the United Provinces had drawn to Chelmsford's attention the
grievances among landowners and had argued that this problem should
have a 'very close bearing on the method of representation in the
21elective institutions of the future'.' For his part, the Viceroy was
concerned about other sections of tne community as well? he told the
Bengal Landowners Association that 'one of the most pressing needs of
22India' was 'the uplifting of the actual tiller of the soil'. There
was also on Craddock's side some political logic. As W.S. Harris, while
temporarily seconded to the United Provinces, had pointed out in a letter
which Heston sent to Chelmsford, elected Indian majorities could mean
a paralysis of government - one could not 'dis-sever legislation from 
23
administration'. Certainly there were changes which Chelmsfo?jd
refused to contemplate. In October 1910, a majoa?ity of the elected 
members of the Imperial Legislative Council put forward a scheme advocat­
ing large elected majorities and complete legislative control (subject 
only to veto) for all legislative councils. A nominated member,
Zulfikar Ali Khan, described this notion (known as the nineteen Members1 
scheme) as 'fantastic and visionary'. Chelmsford agreed? he thought it 
'preposterous 1.^
But, for all this, Craddock's conservatism was untenable,
Meston had replied to Marris that they could not stand still, and wrote 
to Chelmsford that if they were only 'sufficiently courageous' they need 
not fear 'the passing of sovereignty'. Chelmsford replied that he 'very
20
Speeches I, 85, 88-89 & 232.
^  Meston to Chelmsford, 4 Sept. 1916, CP2.
22 Speeches I, 191.
23
Harris to Meston, 22 Sept., with Meston to Chelmsford, 22 Sept,
1916, Meston Papers I.
24
See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 6 Oct., & Zulfikar Ali Khan to Liaffey, 
30 Sept. I916, C?2g V to S/S, 24 Oct. 1916? CP7? & also memorandum by
Ali Chaudhuri, & a review of the 19 Members' scheme by Raja Kushalpal 
Singh (member, United Provinces' Legislative Council), sent to Bolder- 
ness, 18 May 1917? H.Poll, 243? May 1917.
25much agreed' with the view that they could not stand still. Craadock,
at 'the parting of the ways' and refusing to contemplate turning the
legislators into the 'representatives of a self-governing people', was
undoubtedly trying to stand still. Privately, in spite of his caution
and his desire for compromise, Chelmsford had already decided between
the logic of Harris and the optimism of Meston - and between Craddock's
fears and Meyer's and Hill's concessions, he wrote to Chamberlain in
August 1916; ’I have come very definitely to the conclusion ... that we
?6must take a step forward on the political side'. CM was confident of 
the support of the majority of his colleagues. Chelmsford's starting 
point, first asking what was the goal, had implied that the Moriey-Minto 
constitution would have to be reconsidered.
The 1916 despatch, embodying the Government's reforms proposal 
was nevertheless a conservative document. It reflected inevitably a 
careful papering over of the differences in the .Executive Council, for
the legislative councils there was to be no increase in powers - Meyer's
group had had to give way. Against Craddock's advice there were, how­
ever, to be elected majorities and a wide extension of the franchise so 
as to create 'really large constituencies'. The division had crystallis 
about the issue of territorial electorates - Craddock wanted them for­
bidden, and Hair insisted that they should be obligatory. Chelmsford 
agreed to allow the type of constituency to be at local discretion.
This was no solution, and Craddock still wrote a minute of dissent to
the despatch. At the last moment Hair, who had agreed, to everything in
Council, suddenly decided to dissent as well? Chelmsford was convinced
27that he had yielded to political pressure. The Viceroy's tactics had 
been to attain unanimity'.: they had failed.
But even disagreements and compromises could not obscure the 
nature of the change which had been introduced. In most matters the 
despatch had been greatly influenced by the earlier suggestions of 
Hardinge and Sinha. Indeed Hardinge was 'very satisfied' with the
pO
proposals and suggested that they were based on his memorandum. But
25
Meston to Chelmsford, 22 Sept., & Chelmsford to Meston, 14-15 Oct. 
1916, Meston Papers 1,
26
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 Aug. 1916, CP2.
27
HD despatch, 24 Nov. 1916, H.Poll. j>58j Dec. 19165 Chelmsford to 
Chamberlain, 24 Hov. 1$1&, CP2.
26
Hardinge to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1917» AC?12/102.
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in the changes to the legislative councils Chelmsford's Government had 
introduced a new factor. Craddock had argued that territorial 
electorates were the crucial point at issue - if they were conceded
there would he no retreat from a parliamentary system and the British
29would find 'further compulsory advances thrust' upon them. The 
despatch had left this question undecided; but, in a memorandum to the 
local governments, Chelmsford had revealed his own views - he proposed 
to 'sweep away this complicated and anomalous system of class interests' 
and ’to substitute large constituencies primarily based on recognised 
territorial units, such as districts, and with a franchise pitched 
sufficiently low to admit of considerable bodies of voters'. Under his 
proposals no constituency would be considered satisfactory with fewer 
than three thousand voters. Moreover, even when electorates of interests 
and classes were to be retained, election was henceforth to be direct 
and not indirect - for example the body of the graduates and not the 
governors would elect any university representatives, The memorandum 
containing these views was appended to the reforms despatch, so that 
neither Whitehall nor the local governments were left in any doubt about 
the Viceroy's preferences. What was evident also was that Craddock was 
wrong to think that the postponement of the question of territorial 
electorates had prevented any commitment to a parliamentary system.
The changes agreed for the franchise ensured a large increase in the 
numbers of the voters. And large electorates were seen as a definite 
step of preparation for self-government. The despatch explained that 
they were a first stage necessary before the legislatures could be 
allowed financial and administrative control.
The Government had concluded that the preconditions for self- 
government did not exist in India. They thought the Indians needed k o i v  
unity and greater political experiences the iyi6 proposals were directed 
consciously towards creating those conditions. There were to be efforts 
to widen and improve education, and to reduce racial and religious 
intolerance. The immediate channels were to be the public services and 
local self-government. A few Indians were to gain experience in the 
executive councils - half of all members (apart from the Governors) 
were to be Indians. But the legislative councils were also to be slowly 
developed. They wore not to have control - although with elected 
majorities in the provinces their influence was to be more effective.
The time for control, the Government believed, might 'come at somo
29 See above, note 18.
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later stage’s it would come presumably when the experiment of wider
representation had created working electorates. The intention of the
1916 proposals, cautious as they were, was deliberately to ’pave the
way for an ultimate enlargement of the constitutional powers of the
30provincial legislative councils'.
In 1888, Lord Dufferin, arguing for the introduction of the 
elective principle, did not suggest that it would involve any real 
representation of the peoples the association of qualified Indians with 
the government was intended as a means of improving British administra­
tion - decisions would be better informed. Lord Lansdowne and the 
Government of India’s despatch of 26 October 1892 supported this view; 
and in 1907 Minto's despatch of 21 March had stressed that the Govern­
ment were 'no advocates of representative Government for India' - the 
1909 reforms were an advance, therefore, 'in the direction of associat­
ing the people of India' with the British for the operation of
31legislation and administration. Lord Hardinge, in his memorandum of 
October 1915? had advocated the modification of the legislative council 
regulations, and had argued that if the British had any intention rf 
raising India to self-governing status they would have to concede 'some 
measure of real popular control, especially in provincial questions as 
contrasted with questions of wide Imperial concern'. But what did 
Hardinge mean by 'real popular control'? In August 1911? his Govern­
ment had put forward rather confused ideas for provincial self-govern­
ment (under a central government permanently British); even this 
suggestion was in effect refuted by the statements made by Lord Crewe 
in the House of Lords on 22 and 24 June 1912. In the memorandum of 
1915? moreover, Hardinge envisaged no more than changes in regulations 
to allow elected majorities in the provinces. His suggestions, unlike 
those of the 1916 despatch, wore not a step towards even the goal of 
provincial self-government, lie did not suggest that the Morley-Minto 
reforms should be upset; and, although he publicly espoused ultimate
30 See above, note 27? the Viceroy's memorandum was Appendix III of 
the November despatch,
^  Minute by Dufferin, attached to G/l despatch, 6 Nov. 1888; Note 
by Lansdowne on Mandate of Parliament for Indian Councils Act 1892; 
G/lndia despatch, 26 Oct. 1892; Report of Committee considering Hint0 • 
proposals, 1906; G/l despatches, 21 March 1907 & 1 Oct, 1908? annexures 
to Craddock's minute of dissent to the November despatch (see above, 
note 27). See also the quotations from some of these and other docu­
ments in C.xi. Philips, ed., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858- 
1907 (Select Documents on thiTnistory of India and Pakistan IV), London
1962, 60-69 6. 80-95*
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self-government and sought to appease Indian opinion, his proposals
would havo done no more than improve the existing machinery for
consultation. As Chelmsford explained in July 1916, Hardinge1s
memorandum had dealt with isolated problems; in Chelmsford's view
the British now needed to pursue 'the consideration and promulgation
32of a definite policy1 and to accompany it with definite action. His
Government had started from a more theoretical position - not how to
appease Indians, hut how to take a first step towards the goa.1 of
self-government. The result, by the time of the 1916 reforms despatch,
had been a cautious compromise; but already there were some proposals -
the abandonment of the non-representative idea of electorates - which
constituted a new direction in policy. As Chelmsford was to explain
laters 'The truth is the millstone of the Morley-Minto reforms is
round our nocks'. The greatly widened franchise was not thought of as
a better method of consulting Indian opinion; it was deliberately-
designed to help create representative electorates as a small step
towards the distant goal of a transfer of power.
The India Office received the reforms despatch in January 1917 *
Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State, wanted time to consider
the proposals carefully. He was personally, at this stage, disposed
to favour Chelmsford's compromise on the extension of the elective
principle in the Councils; but he was doubtful of his ability to decide
such questions. He formed a committee of the India Council to consider 
34the despatch. In March Sir James Meston, who was in London on
deputation with Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner, representing India
at the Imperial War Conference, reported privately to Chelmsford that
the committee had not got beyond shaking their heads over the reforms 
35despatch. He was wrong; a few days later the committee made their 
report. With a few reservations they supported all the Government of 
India's proposals, but argued that the political changes did not 
’constitute a coherent and well thought out plan of reform’. In terms 
of function the Councils were being left unchanged and this would 
'perpetuate and aggravate a vicious system' of representation without 
responsibility. The territorial electorate would merely return more
32
Chelmsford to Meston, 20 July 1916, Moston Papers 1.
33
Chelmsford to Curzon, 17 Nov, 1917? CP15*
34
Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 10 Jan. & 2 Feb. 1917, CP3*
35 Meston to Chelmsford, 15 March 1917, Meston Papers 1*
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of the already over-represented educated classes, who would manipulate 
their legislative majority, whatever the safeguards, to make the 
government1s position intolerable. Thus the increase in representative
character would be no advantage until the councils were given 'some
56degree of responsibility' for policy. The committeo had introduced 
a very important new idea.
Chelmsford insisted that the fault of the Morley-Minto reforms 
was that they did not attempt to create representative institutions on 
which responsibility could be devolved. The fact was that they hud 
created a system in which there was no possibility for growth, Chelms­
ford had argued that they had skipped a whole stage in evolution, and
37that this had to be undergone before the grant of further powers. But 
this idea, although it methodically prepared for future development, 
made no attempt to deal with the present faults of the Korley-Minto 
system. The India Council committee, while broadly accepting the Govern 
ment of India idea of the goal and agreeing that the Councils should be 
made properly representative, argued that they would have to be reformed 
at the same time. Their disabilities demanded this5 so did the 
political situation| so did the Government of India's own argument abor 
the need to educate the Indians in politics - what was the use of the 
councils, if all that the members learnt was to criticise and obstruct 
the executive?
Chamberlain accepted the committee's arguments. He explained 
to Chelmsford, in May 1917? that he had been convinced that they must 
be ready for 'bold and radical measures'. He had consulted Sinha who 
had urged that the reforms must give 'increased responsibility to the 
elected representatives' and that a mere increase in numbers was not
70
progressive. It was not possible, Chamberlain decided, to continue 
with a system which made it the 'main function of the Legislative 
Councils to oppose and criticise the Government while remaining complete 
free from responsibility for the results of their action'. Chelmsford 
had introduced a new criterion when he related the proposed reforms 
consciously and directly to the goal of future self-government; now
36
Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 22 March 1917, CP3? Report on G/lndia 
despatch, by P.W. Duke, A.A. Baig, M. Hamnick, C.S. Bayley, W.D. 
Sheppard, T.tf. Holderness & Lord Islington, 16 March 1917, AGP21/d/d,
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this same criterion was being used, against the caution of his proposals.
Chamberlain had agreed that they must train Indians in self-government,
but had argued that it was not enough to train only public servants,
local adminstrators, and electors. They had to train legislators as
well, by investing the councils with 'some definite powers and with
real responsibility for their actions', including greater authority
over provincial budgets 'or some part of them', Chamberlain gave no
indication of how 'some' (but not all) powers and 'real' (but not
complete) responsibility could be given, but, by postulating popular
control over 'part' of the budget, he made what was probably the first
authoritative endorsement of the idea of a division of powers, the
direction in which his thinking was to lead. On 22 May he explained
to Chelmsford that the 'kernel' of the problem was 'the devolution of
power and responsibility within such limited spheres as may at present
40be practical and safe'. The first question, however, was how to 
proceed.
The Government of India originally envisaged a fairly rapid
response to their proposals. But the war dragged on, and the prospect
for an early advance grew more remote. At the beginning of May 1917?
Chelmsford suggested to Chamberlain that he visit India and consult
directly with the Government on the measures to be taken. 'You realise, I
am sure,' Chelmsford wrote,'how big the question is and how a visit from
the Secretary of State would impress /the/ imagination of /the/ people1,'^
Chamberlain did not favour this idea. He did not wish to leave England, on
public grounds, and he was worried that a visit by the Secretary of Stain
might be embarrassing to the Government of India and prejudicial to therr
authority. He had been considering appointing a committee to visit 
42
India. Some form of investigation was clearly necessary. The India 
Office had decided that the Government of India proposals did not go
59 I/ii- > & 15 May 1917.
40 S/S to V, 22 May 1917, H.Poll. 305? July 1917- R.C. Majumdar Is one 
of the few to have recognised Chamberlain's contribution? see R.C., 
with A.K,, Majumdar, op.cit., 262-263 - see 261-287 on the reforms
generally.
41 V to S/S, 1 May 1917, CP8.
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far enough, and also had noted that official opinion in India spoke with 
a great number of different voices - the disagreements were to bo care­
fully summed up, as arguments for an impartial enquiry, in an India 
Office memorandum written towards the end of May. Earlier in that month 
suggestions had been made for a parliamentary committee to consider the 
problems and report on the merits of the different schemes. Lord
Islington, the Under Secretary of State, favoured an authoritative
43committee of enquiry by about five persons. Sinha, who at one stage,
until dissuaded by Meston, had thought of raising the question at the
Imperial War Conference, was now urging free and public discussions
of any reforms scheme before it was approved.44 Chamberlain, having
received this advice, decided on a small mainly private enquiry sitting
in India for not more than one cold season. He explained to Chelmsford
that he believed it was necessary for the impulse for change to come
from outside the government - no bureaucracy would ever transform itself
into self-governments the very virtues of bureaucrats, ho claimed, ‘are
inimical to a Parliamentary system, and it is inevitable that they should
magnify the difficulties and the dangers of any change'. The Secretary
of State could not provide this independence - if he were in India,
moreover, 'all eyes would turn ... to him, ... and he would be regarded
45as superseding' the Viceroy. Chamberlain put his proposal before the 
British War Cabinet.4^
The Government of India were vehemently opposed to this idea,- 
Chelmsford explained that the need was for speed - a committee would 
mean delay. It would also probably comprise people who were 'impartial', 
that is, Chelmsford claimed, 'people of definite political views but no 
experience of India1. How would they find members acceptable both to 
them and to Indian opinion? There would be an outcry if the committee 
recommended less than the Government? but it would be even worse if they 
recommended more - only the Secretary of State could do this as he was 
even more responsible for India than the Government. The questions to
43
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be decided, Chelmsford asserted, were questions of policy and not of
fact. The decision could not be transferred away from those responsible4^
Meston had written to Chelmsford privately recommending: that he should
’accept a Commission and make sure of the personnel 1 - in the India
A R
Office, he reported, the atmosphere was 'very conservative'. If there-
had to be a committee, Chelmsford argued, it should sit in India, as a
small body of officials and non-officials, consulting official records
and hearing selected witnesses In private, and then reporting to the
Government of India. Of the members, one third (including the President)
should be non-officials appointed by the Secretary of State, and the
remainder should be Indians and officials selected in equal numbers by
49the Government of India, But even to such a committee Chelmsford
would still have had the strongest objections. His disapproval was
shared by the new Home Member, Sir William Vincent, and endorsed by the 
50Executive Council.
Chamberlain asked, what was the alternative? He had become
even more convinced that it would be wrong for him to visit India as
Secretary of State, and it was impossible to take the decision by mail.
In June 1917 his resolve was strengthened by the report of the Mesopotamia
Commission which, in investigating the reasons for the failure of the
Mesopotamia campaign against the Turks, had criticised ’Hardinge's
attitude to his Council1 and challenged 'the constitutionality of his
proceedings' - Chamberlain observed that this had brought suspicion on
the Government of India as a whole, so that there was likely to be a
51demand for an enquiry even without reforms proposals, Chelmsford
continued to oppose the plan, but concluded, as he admitted to Chamber-
52lain, that he was 'flogging a dead horse'. It seemed probable at this 
stage that a committee of enquiry would be appointed.
Prom a very early stage there had been a second element in 
the reforms discussions. In June 1916, Lord Willingdon, the Governor 
of Bombay, had called for a statement on government policy. He wanted
47 /
V to S/S, 30 May 1917? CP8 ; Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 May 1917?
CP 3.
48
Meston to Chelmsford, 5 April 1917? Meston Papers 1.
49 V to S/S, 30 May 1917, CP8,
50
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 & 31 May, CP3, & V to S/S, 18 May 1917, 
CP8. See also G.N, Barnes to Chamberlain June or July 1 9 1 7 ACP12/
10.
51 Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 14 & 27 June 1917, CP3»
52
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 26 May 1917, CP3-
223
it to stem the advance of the Home Rule movement, which he called the
only 'live policy1 before the country. He continued his pleas in July,
when they were joined by those of Lord Pentland, the Governor of Kadras,
who wanted a statement that India's interests were not being jeopardised
53by the postponement of reforms discussions during the war. Chelmsford
recognised that the intention was that the declaration should tell
Indians that immediate or early Home Rule was out of the question5
Chelmsford was opposed to this 'non possums' approach. He wanted to
be able to says 'You cannot have that, but I will give you this.' Thus,
in his view, nothing short of full disclosure of the Government's plans
would be useful. Chamberlain agreed. He thought it would be impossible
to make a declaration which would satisfy the public Willingdon had in
mind and yet not be open to a wide range of interpretations^ the British
should deal with discontent, he suggested, by introducing practical
55reforms not by coining new phrases.’ ‘ He had some doubts momentarily in
November, when he was faced by suggestions that, without a declaration,
the moderates would be swept away at the next Congress session, Ke was
not convinced, but asked Chelmsford if it would be helpful to announce,
without defining how the policy would be fulfilled or what shape self-
government would take, that in future Indians would be increasingly
associated with government, and that the Civil Service would have to
56learn to persuade and not command. Chelmsford remained sceptical;
he replied that he was 'doubtful whether any statement ... would be of
any value unless it specifically stated f  the_J7 advance which we were 
57prepared to mako'. 1
His Government intended of course that a formula based on 
their suggestions should be announced shortly as just such a prelude to 
specific reforms. But Chelmsford's idea of the 'value' of the announce­
ment differed from Willingdon's. for the Viceroy and his Council - as 
for Sinha - the announcement was primarily a stage in practical reforms; 
for Willingdon it was primarily a means of controlling agitation. Thus
Willingdon to Chelmsford, 27 June & 8 & 18 July, & Pentland to 
Chelmsford, 16 July (plus Pentland to Chamberlain, 7 July) 1916, CPI7,
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1916, CP2o
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1916, CP2.
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Chelmsford was not immediately swayed by developments among Indian
nationalists. In December and January the 'extremists', as Willingdon
had predicted, captured the Congress. They decided to formulate, with
the Muslim League, a joint reforms scheme and a draft bill to amend the
Government of India Act; they proposed to undertake large-scale
propaganda in India and Great Britain, to collect a 'National Fund' of
three lakhs of rupees, and, at the appropriate time, to send a deputation
58
to petition Parliament. Meston thought this 'united front' created a
serious situation, and., adding his voice to Willingdon's and Pentland's,
reported the suggestion of A.C. Mazumdar, the Congress President, that
there should be a formal proclamation recognising the ideal of self- 
59government. Indeed it might have been expected that the Lucknow Pact 
would have had a decisive impact on government thinking. Among the 
lower reaches of officialdom, Hindu-Muslim entente seems to have been 
regarded - in the Panjab during the 1919 disturbances for example - with 
a mixture of suspicion, alarm and scepticism. But Chelmsford did not 
give it this emphasis. He continued to insist that the government could 
combat agitation only by formulating thoir own policy. His persistence 
emphasises again that discussions on reforms had started before the 
nationalist upsurge and not in response to It. .For some the Lucknow Pact 
gave added urgency to their demand for a declaration; for Chelmsford 
It had no immediate impact on policy and merely added to his awareness
of the seriousness of the situation.
Chelmsford went on believing that the declaration should be 
made by the Secretary of State so that it would be 'final and authorita­
tive', Later he was to admits 'Perhaps if I possessed Hardinge's gift 
of honeyed phrase, which I do not, I might have staved off agitation 
for a while'; but he remained convinced that any statement he could 
have made would have been condemned as vague and taken on appeal to the 
Secretary of State, He believed also that 'piecemeal publication' 
would not satisfy opinion but would give rise to demands for action on 
whatever was omitted - and give the impression, when further steps wore 
announced, that the Government were giving way under pressure and could 
be 'squeezed'. A decision of the British Cabinet was therefore needed
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on the whole question of the reforms. Hillingdon's approach would he 
"both bad propaganda and bad policy. It was agreed in India that an 
announcement should be the first stage? but it was advocated for widely 
differing purposes.
In May 1917? when they heard that Chamberlain planned a 
committee of enquiry, the Government of India, decided unanimously that 
It would not be safe to wait any longer for an announcement. I'he Russian 
Revolution had had an effect on India? and the Horne Rule agitation was 
winning attention and raising expectations among those hitherto of loss 
advanced views. To avoid further moderate defection, the Government of 
India asked the Secretary of State, in a telegram of 18 May, for 
permission to publish the explanation of the goal given in the 1916 
reforms despatch. They proposed to announce that they intended to 
institute real and immediate reforms in local self-government and the 
public services, and to take steps towards the ultimate enlargement of 
the powers of the legislative councils. The .intention was to recognise 
'self-government within the Empire as a legitimate and praiseworthy 
aspiration deserving all encouragement', but to warn against 'revolution­
ary changes or rash experiments'. The Government admitted that there 
'must be honest differences of opinion as to the rate of progress', but 
wanted to oppose those who, in the official view, were unscrupulously 
placing 'before tin ill-informed public a political programme impossible 
of early attainment' , ^
The Government had simplified their demands on the Eritish 
Cabinet, but they had not been converted to Hillingdon's idea of a 
declaration merely to combat agitation. They were not suggesting a 
non possumus statements the goal was specifically to be linked to 
immediate advance in certain directions. But they were willing, as th^y 
had not been before, to announce the goal and the lines of advance at a 
time when for details they could only add (as they proposed to do) that 
proposals were being considered by the Secretary of State, Until May 
the Government had been ignorant of the India Office reactions to their 
despatch - seven months had passed with little sign of progress - but 
they had expected a reply in the near future and therefore resisted 
local government demands for an announcement without details of reforms. 
Early in May, however, they were faced with the prospect of Chamberlain's 
committee of enquiry, and It became obvious that, if they continued to 
insist on announcing the goal and the reforms together, there would be
f.o
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no announcement for a long time, probably for several years. Thus,
although the Government did not like the Willingdon approach and had
not abandoned their objectives, they decided that they would have to
63
issue a statement as a temporary stop-gap. Agitation was alarming 
enough, but more alarming still was the prospect that Indian expectations 
would generally be raised unduly high - it was necessary to keep them 
within limits which bore some relation to what the Government expected 
to be able to concede. Chelmsford was aware that in detail the 1916 
despatch was no longer adequate3 'I can only say., ! he wrote to 
Chamberlain early in Hay 1917? ’that, having regard to the pace the 
world is moving, it almost appears to me reactionary'.^ Clearly if 
the reforms were delayed too long, and the world continued to move, 
there would be little prospect of giving satisfaction to Indian 
aspirations,
After his wavering in 1916, the Secretary of State had re­
mained firmly opposed to any announcement of the goal. In April 1917 
Meston had reported that the King was personally opposed to a Royal 
Proclamation, feeling that he had been pestered enough as a result of
the last one in 1911? in addition the India Office was apprehensive
65about any declaration. Chamberlain shared the view of an India Office
memorandum, that ’Issues of high policy must be settled before the
formula can be touched'. ^  Thus he refused to allow a unilateral
declaration by the Government of India; he insisted that the Home
Government had to consider the issues first. But at the same time, on
22 May, when first putting forward his suggestion for a committee of
enquiry, he asked the British Cabinet to consider making 'some general
f 7
statement of ... policy'. On 2 May he had reported to Chelmsford that
he had 'more than once’ dissuaded the Prime Minister, Lloyd George,
68from discussing India at the British or Imperial War Cabinets. But
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he had. nevertheless begun to accept, in the face of the entreaties from 
India? that a declaration was necessary. The Government’s telegram of 
18 Hay had apparently finally made up his mind. He had also discussed 
the question with lieston, who urged an announcement in a note of 21 
May. " Chamberlain had been finally and, ho said, ’reluctantly’ 
converted to the idea. But he still did not favour an elaborate formula, 
believing that it would stimulate controversy, and he wanted the state­
ment to concern itself with the policy and not the goal of the govern­
ment, He was still unwilling to prejudge the 'Issues of high policy'.
He advocated a short and informal statement that the British intended to 
develop free institutions in India with a view to ultimate self-govern­
ment, but that the stages must bo at the discretion of the government.
He had consulted with Sinha, who had seemed willing to accept this last 
condition.^
In the following months Chelmsford repeated his demands, which 
became more and more strident. Early in June he urged an immediate 
announcement, if necessary, along the lines of Chamberlain’s proposal.,/_ 
(lie did not consider Chamberlain's formula to be very different from that 
of the Government of India - although he had hoped that the Secretary 
of State would find it easier to express the necessary qualifications in 
language 'which holds out a hope but which is free from ambiguity'.)^ 
Chelmsford was ever more conscious of the rapidity of political change 5
early in July he wrote % 'It is at least doubtful now whether the pro­
posals in our telegram of 18th May, which would have been effective six
73weeks or two months ago, are suitable under present conditions'. The 
local governors were by now unanimous in demanding an early announce­
ment, The internment of Annie Besant had resulted in an unexpected
upsurge in the Home Rule movement; in India, as in England, it was 
recognised that the report of the Mesopotamia Commission had had a 
'disastrous' effect on the government's prestige. Meston reported that
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’the nir has never teen thicker with suspicion1? he believed that ’the
anti-Government and almost the anti-British feeling among the advanced
party is stronger than I have every seen it. Everything that we do is
misrepresented.... The misunderstandings are spreading into wider
circles For his part Chelmsford had clearly become very
irritated at the delays in London. Almost a year later he reacted
with irony to the memory of this periods Montagu had told him that
Chamberlain regarded himself as the ’father and mother’ of the reforms,
Chelmsford was glad to hear it - it was, he suggested, 'Perhaps the
exercise of this dual function y^which_J led a year ago to the pro-
75longat.ion of the period of gestation almost to danger point' .
Chamberlain circulated Chelmsford’s repeated telegrams to
if
the Cabinet and urged immediate discussion of his own proposals* The 
question went twice before the Cabinet (only once in the presence of 
the Prime Minister), but no decision was taken. By 5 July Chamberlain 
had abandoned hope of an early solution. He reported to Chelmsford, 
however, that Lord Curzon, who at first had concurred in the suggestion 
of a committee of enquiry, at the second Cabinet had argued that 
Chamberlain had been too hasty in rejecting the Viceroy's invitation 
to visit India. Chamberlain had again argued against a visit by a 
Secretary of State, but had expressed his willingness to resign in 
order to become chairman of a commission. He had also expressed re­
luctance to take on himself the whole burden of such a momentous 
decision. Curzon had then pointed out that, if he went as Secretary 
of State, he would still have advisers associated with him - and the 
other members of the Cabinet, Chamberlain reported, had seemed to
H  I P ,
favour this idea. Chelmsford was ’delighted’ at this prospect.
But at the same time he set out a full account of his position. The 
Home Government, he insisted, should either give the Government of 
India a free hand, or state clearly that the solution of Indian problems
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must wait until after the war* He explained to Chamberlain in a letter
of 7 July=
I would have made this suggestion before, but it never 
occurred to me that after our proposals were made, days 
would slip into weeks and weeks into months without a 
decision being reached. You must forgive me if I write 
strongly, but it is only natural that we should feel the 
position in which we are placed. We are a Government 
which does not govern, and inasmuch as I took up this 
question some 15 months ago with the very object of not 
being caught napping, it is the irony of fate that, when 
the crisis comes, I have perforce to remain silent. I 
hold strongly to the principle that you and I must be 
in complete accord and I have acted loyally on that 
principle, but from the public point of view I think 
it would have been almost better that I should have 
spoken out on my policy at the risk of being censured 
or recalled than that the Head of the Supreme Government „ 
here should appear in a position of hopeless indifference.
Chelmsford now proposed a new formula for a declaration. He telegraphed
to the Secretary of State suggesting the following wordings
His Majesty's Government, having considered the proposals 
of the Government of India, concur in the view of the 
Government of India that self-government within the 
Empire is the ultimate goal of British rule in India, 
but His Majesty's Government, in view of their many 
grave preoccupations arising out of the war, are unable 
at present to give consideration to the steps to be 
taken on the road to that goal. In these circumstances 
His Majesty's Government would impress on Indian 
politicians the desirability of patience and absten­
tion from agitation, having in view the fact that the 
Empire' is at the present moment in the throes of a 
great war.
At the request of the Viceroy, Mr. Chamberlain will visit 
India in the course of the next cold weather for the 
purpose of conferring with the Government of India and 
with representatives of different shades of opinion.80
In May the most likely prospect had been for a declaration on policy
followed by a commission of enquiry. Now, once again, there was a
chance that the procedure would be, as the Government of India wished,
a declaration on the goal followed by a visit by the Secretary of State.
In July Chamberlain resigned as a result of the strictures of 
the Mesopotamia Commission on maladministration for which the Secretary 
of State was ultimately responsible. Chelmsford, both to Chamberlain
79 Chelmsford to Chamberlain, '] July 1917, CP3.
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and to the Prime Minister, immediately expressed, in addition to his
regret, his concern for the fate of his policy. To Edwin Montagu,
Chamberlain's successor, he offered his congratulations and at the same
time stressed his hopes for an announcement and renewed his invitation
to the Secretary of State to visit India. In August he reported a
’positive increase in urgency’ and suggested yet another formula for a
declaration - it followed roughly the lines proposed in July, expressing
'sympathy' for India's aspirations, but excluded any mention of the
Secretary of State's visit. Chelmsford had modified his original stands
the positive advance, which had once been a sine qua non, was now
reduced to a promise to examine the first steps, postponed because of
81the war, 'at the very earliest opportunity'. At the end of July a
joint session of the Congress and the Muslim League under the presidency
of Surendranath Banerjea, the ’moderate' leader, had endorsed a scheme
of reforms calling for full legislative powers and elected majorities to
be conceded to both the provincial .and the Imperial legislatures at the
end of the war. They had also demanded a pronouncement of the goal of
British policy, the publication of the Government of India. iDroposnls of
1916, and the reversal of the policy of repression (to be symbolised by
82the release of Annie Besant),  ^ Opinion was coallescing against the 
government, and Chelmsford accordingly tried to streamline his demands 
in the hope of an immediate decision by the British Cabinet. His Govern­
ment still maintained their view ~ as they explained on 12 August, 'A
mere pronouncement as to the goal ... would not ... now meet the re­
quirements of the case unless accompanied by some indications that an
investigation will oe undertaken as to the steps proposed in the
83immediate future for the attainment of the goal'. In Chelmsford's 
formula these indications had appeared at their simplest, in the minimal 
form acceptable to the Government, as a promise of 'the very earliest' 
examination. The Government had moved a long way in their efforts to
extract an announcement from the British Government.
Chelmsford had asked Montagu, 011 8 August, to impress on the 
Cabinet that political agitation made It 'imperative' to have an
81
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announcement before the end of August, The Viceroy's patience was at
an end. His telegram, when read in conjunction with his letter of
7 July to Chamberlain (which would have been due to arrive in the India
Office), was in essence an ultimatum. He explained further in a letter
to Montagu on 7 Augusts if Montagu did not make 'some announcement ...
in the course of this month', Chelmsford warned, ' ... I shall have
to speak very fully on our policy when I meet my Council' - the deadline
was the opening of the Imperial legislature on 5 September. 'I have
endeavoured to act in strict loyalty to the Secretary of State and His
Majesty's Government,' Chelmsford went on, echoing the passage in his
letter of 7 July when he had written of speaking out at the risk of
censure or recall, ’and I think I have a right to ask that we should
ft/L
not in consequence be left in the lurch.'
In Montagu Chelmsford had a firm supporter. By the beginning 
of August the new Secretary of State had ’come to be eager' that the 
Cabinet would consent to his visiting India. At the end of July he had 
addressed a memorandum to the War Cabinet, seeking to reopen the 
question of the Indian reforms. In reply to Chamberlain, the Cabinet 
had claimed that it was impossible 'in the midst of a great war to give 
adequate time and thought' to such a question. Montagu pointed to the 
urgings of the Indian officialss 'I feel,' he wrote, 'that our duty to 
the Vicerojr requires that he should be put in possession of a definite 
policy with which he and his Government can meet ... the growing Indian 
"opposition".' Montagu then introduced a very important new idea - 
endorsing the demand implicit in Chelmsford's urgings - 'We must 
endeavour,' Montagu told the Cabinet, 'to find some immediate announce­
ment without prolonged discussion ... or efforts to solve vastly
85complicated questions'. The India Office had insisted that the policy 
had to be decided before the formula. Montagu had turned this pro­
position on its end.
In the first weeks of August, he tried to secure a Cabinet
86discussion but found the Cabinet 'awfully preoccupied'. At last, 
however, the discussion was agreed to. Montagu armed himself with a 
letter of support from Chamberlain| he lobbied every member of the 
inner Cabinet5 he breakfasted with the Prime Minister on the day of
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the discussion. Hiring the meeting he secured the cooperation of Lord 
Curzon3 and the War Cabinet approved both a declaration and a visit 
to India by the Secretary of State to discuss the practical reforms.
The Government of India had gained what they had so long been demanding, 
In his memorandum Montagu had adopted Chelmsford's view in strongly 
advocating the visit rather than a commission - Chamberlain had drafted 
a possible reference for a commission, and Montagu appended this to his 
memorandum as an indication of how 'alarming' and 'abhorrent' such a 
commission would be. By this time Chamberlain had changed his mind and 
also favoured accepting Chelmsford's invitation. Montagu had also 
supported the Government of India view that the declaration must include 
some statement as to action. His proposed formula included Chamberlain's 
version of the policy as 'the gradual development of free institutions 
... with a view to ultimate self-government within the Empire'3 other­
wise Montagu's proposals were based broadly on the Viceroy’s suggestions,
The Cabinet changed the wording of the declaration, but in substance
87accepted all these proposals.
They had also accepted Montagu's reversal of the usual order 
of procedure. .Paced with demands from India and at the insistence of 
the Secretary of State, the Cabinet had approved a declaration of policy 
at a time when they had not considered how that policy could be carried 
out. At Chelmsford’s insistence, supported by Montagu, they had also 
agreed to announce immediate steps towards the formulation of a specific 
policy. Thus, unwittingly but irrevocably, without ever squarely con­
sidering the issue, they had committed themselves to approving in the 
fairly near future some considerable political advance for India.
The Cabinet had been divided on this question. Balfour, the 
Foreign Secretary (outside the War Cabinet), had opposed Montagu on his 
proposed announcement. Their disagreement hinged on the word ’self- 
government’ - Balfour objected to making any such promise 3 Montagu in­
sisted that the promise was essential, that without some mention of 
self-government the announcement would be uselesss the choice, ho
believed, was not between that word and another, it was between that
88announcement or no announcement at all, Curzon had Intervened in the
07
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Cabinet with the suggestion that 'self-government' should be replaced
by 'responsible government'. What was vital for Montagu's proposal of
course was the concurrence not of Balfour but of Curzon, Lord President
of the Council, who regarded himself as holding a watching brief for
the War Cabinet over all Eastern policy. Thus Montagu, although he
would have preferred 'self-government' (as a word 'current in Indian
discussion'), did not oppose the change - he was satisfied with the
89'great liberality' of the formula Curzon had produced. The final
version, as read by Montagu in the Commons on 20 August 1917? was?
The policy of his Majesty's Government, with which the 
Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the 
increasing association of Indians in every branch of the 
Administration, and the gradual development of self- 
governing institutions, with a view to the progressive 
realisation of responsible government in India as an 
integral part of the British Empire.
Montagu thought that this probably pledged more than his formula? it
committed the Government, as far as he could see, to 'some form of
90Parliamentary institutions'. I-Ie did not point this out to the War
Cabinet. Thus the British Government had not only committed themselves
to political advance for India? it seemed that they had committed
themselves to the form of that advance. They were apparently not aware
of this? they had not considered in detail how responsibility could
be 'progressively' realised. Curzon contented himself with hoping that
91in India Montagu would 'not in any way give away the show'. Montagu, 
by his own interpretation, did not see that he had any choice.
There has been debate on Curzon's contribution to the formula. 
In the first major account, Lord Ronaldshay, Curzon's biographer, gave 
the misleading impression that Curzon's position on the idea of reforms 
was ambiguous, and argued that Curzon adopted the phrase 'responsible 
government' from a speech made by Lord Islington at Oxford and entitled 
'The Problems of Indian Government'. Ronaldshay believed that Curzon 
also recognised that his formula would lead to parliamentary institutions 
in India. It is worth noting that this view attributed by Ronaldshay 
to Curzon coincided, according to his later account, with the view held 
at the time by Ronaldshay himselfs ho supported the word 'responsible'
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while Governor of Bengal (he claimed) because it disposed of the 
’astonishing illusion1 that the reforms did not anticipate parliamentary 
government.92 Ronaldshay's interpretation, which has continued to find 
support, relies heavily on the speculation that Curzon had read 
Islington's speech before the Cabinet meeting, and had made the under­
linings which occur on his copy where there are passages mentioning the
93words 'responsible government'. The view also depends on a remark
made by Curzon in a Cabinet minute; referring to the provincial councils
Curzon wrotes 'I entertain no shadow of doubt that these bodies will
gradually convert themselves into ... small Parliaments', But Curzon
went on in this note to stress that 'The real reform to work for is,
however, not so much expansion of powers, ... as ... a more responsible
94.class of non-official member'. und the lines emphasised in Curzon's
copy of Islington's speech advocated 'responsible government' for India,
but included the explanations that the representatives would be 'held
accountable to constituents free to displace them' if they failed to
'give satisfaction', and that it would be possible 'to make the elected
councillors responsible for policy' only if 'a suitable system of
93elections' had been created. Thus it is very doubtful that Curzon,
even if he had read Islington's speech before the Cabinet meeting, 
would have understood it to advocate responsible government in the 
technical sense of government by ministers responsible to parliament; 
moreover Curzon, like Islington, was interested primarily in ensuring 
that the electoral system would be improved. Islington's speech may 
have had some influence- on Curzon; but, if so, the nature of that 
influence has been misinterpreted.
The importance of such influence has also been over-estimated. 
The minute in which Curzon stressed the need for more responsible non-
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official members had been written in June, several weeks before
Islington 'bad delivered his speech. Curzon wrote a second note in
July, giving more emphasis to his opposition to major changes. Part
of Curzon1 s formula may bo explained by the vie-ws contained in these
minutes. His priorities were very similar to those of the Government
of India, and it is likely that he had noted the views given in
Chelmsford’s letters to the Secretary of State - ho had been sent
06copies just over a week before ho wrote his minute. Montagu’s (and
Chamberlain's) expression, 'the development of free institutions',
seemed too open-ended. Curzon therefore reverted to phrases - 1 the
increasing association of Indians in ... the Administration', and
'the gradual development of self-governing institutions' - which
clearly owed something to the main lines of advance suggested in 1910
by the Government of India.
The term 'responsible government' had already been introduced
by Montagu. In his minute, then before the Cabinet, he had suggested
that he would have no difference with Curzon if the latter would agree
that some day some Indian states might enjoy 'responsible government1A
It is also known that Curzon 'laid great stress' upon the reservations
suggested by Chamberlain in his letter, which Montagu had shown to the
Cabinets 'by the use of the term self-government', Chamberlain had
suggested, they should not 'pretend to define the exact form which
that development will ultimately take'i all that was certain, in his
view, was that the 'growth of power must be accompanied by growth of
98the sense of responsibility'. Both the word 'responsible' and doubts 
about the word 'self-government' had already entered the debate when 
the C&binet met.
In the Cabinet the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, whom 
Chamberlain had reported earlier as seeming to envisage a far more 
extensive enquiry on India than ho had in mind, interrupted Montagu, 
objected to 'quarrelling about words', and declared that 'self-
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government’ meant what Lord Curzon had said it meant in his second 
99note. In this note, written in July, Curzon had rehearsed, in a 
more extreme form, Chelmsford’s objection to colonial self-government 
for India. Chelmsford had not been 'prepared to agree at the present 
moment’? Curzon had suggested that, by self-government for India, the 
government did not mean that India would ever 'become a single 
autonomous ... political unit, in which Indians will be universally 
substituted for British administrators' ~ the idea, that ’the 250 
millions of Indieji peoples’ could ’constitute a self-governing dominion 
was, to Curzon, 'the wildest of dreams'. What self-government did mean 
to Curzon (and it was presumably to this that Lloyd George referred) 
was that there would come a time, after ’the area in which self-govern­
ment exists' had been extended 'step by step', when ’Indian opinion,
trained and moulded by experience, will have a predominant influence
100in the administration of the country'. The term 'responsible govern­
ment’ was used in the declaration as an attempt to find a formula which 
conformed to, or at least did not contradict, this definition of the 
goal.
A majority of the War Cabinet evidently shared Lloyd George's 
view that Curzon had described what they meant by self-government? 
but they were not satisfied that the word necessarily conveyed their 
meaning. Obviously it was possible that some Indians might suppose 
it to mean that universal substitution of Indian for British administra 
tors which Curzon so abhorred. Curzon, therefore, in trying to persuad 
Balfour, intervened to remove an ambiguity. Lloyd George's support for 
Curzon’s definition probably owed something to a minute written in 
July by his private secretary, Philip Kerr. In reply to Curzon's first 
memorandum, Kerr had argued against any extension of the Moriey-Minto 
reforms on the grounds that they were a means of consulting public 
opinion and not a system of representation capable of development? to 
extend them would be to 'paralyse' the government without training 
Indians in ’the real business of self-government’. The line of advance 
in Kerr's view, was gradually to relinquish power to alternative local 
authorities responsible to an electorate large and well-educated 
enough to keep a tolerable government in power. Such an electorate 
did not exist in India. Kerr advised, therefore, that the British
99
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Government should not issue a formula as 'a charter of Indian liberties' 
until practical policies had been decided, but should seek to reassure 
Indians that there was no intention of preserving 'the rule of the 
British Bureaucracy for its own sake1 - in a general statement (Kerr 
suggested) the Secretary of State should announce that self-government 
was not at present a practical policy, but that after the war the 
Government proposed to take steps that would allow Indians 'an ever- 
increasing share in the responsibilities of constitutional government 
in their own c o u n t r y K e r r  was foreshadowing the view which 
Chamberlain was to put before the Cabinet. Kerr’s line of argument 
and the statement he suggested also bore a strong resemblance both to 
that part of Curzon's note endorsed by Lloyd George, and to the final 
form of the declaration approved by the Cabinet* At the least Kerr 
probably influenced the Prime Minister? at the most he may have played 
some part in the formulation of Curzon's ideas as well.
What emerges is that Curzon’s formula and the words 
'responsible government' were not a sudden and unexpected inter­
polation? they were the outcome of a trend in terminology and argu­
ment which may be traced through the writings of Montagu, Chamberlain, 
Chelmsford, Kerr find Curzon himself. 'Responsible government' 
obviously involved a parliamentary system with ministers responsible 
to the legislatures this, in a limited form and in the immensely 
distant future, Curzon was prepared to consider? he appeared to expect 
that it would take decades to create and educate suitable electorates 
in order to guarantee the representative character of the represent­
atives. This concern for representation - usually involving objections 
to lawyers - was of course an old conservative argument. But Curzon 
also insisted that the 'Protecting Power' of the British was the one 
surety for 'the liberties, the rights, and the progressive emancipation
of the Indian masses’ - to withdraw would be the 'most reactionary, as
102well as the most culpable, of crimes'. Yet, even as an ultimate 
goal, Curzon considered ’responsible government' to be 'rather safer 
and certainly nearer 'to his own point of view than Chamberlain's
Kerr to Prime Minister, 7 July, plus Kerr, memorandum on Indian 
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103wording. v Responsible government by Indian ministers was an ideal 
which would not only be long in achievement5 it would also allow the 
maintenance of a protective British paramountcy. The British Cabinet, 
with Curzon? envisaged self-government to the extent of granting Indians 
'a predominant influence in the administration1, but did not contemplate 
the withdrawal of British power? and they called this strange self- 
government, 'responsible government1. The attraction of this term was 
that it was thought to provide a ceiling to 'the association of Indians 
... in the Administration' and 'the gradual development of self-govern­
ing institutions' - government by Indian ministers was set as the limit 
of the advance. The ministers would remain, perhaps rather in the 
fashion of Indian princes, under a paternalistic British suzerainty. 
Curzon had preferred to state a type of government rather than admit to 
the possibility of future independence. As it happened, however, the 
undefined admission of the parliamentary principle and not the con­
servative aim was to leave the greater mark on India.
As the Declaration of 20 August was announced by Montagu, it
has been associated with his name. Montagu's energy had made a
contribution, as had the past endeavours and continuing support of
Chamberlain. But the Declaration was Lord Curzon's. In the discussion
of the wording the Government of India had naturally played small
part - after the Cabinet meeting they suggested but had not insisted
on two small changes? one of these sought with little success to give
the Indian Government more credit for their contribution, by admitting
that they had 'for some time been pressing for an announcement'? the
other (which was accepted) was a clarification replacing the proposed
'under the aegis of the Crown' with 'as an integral part of the British
E m p i r e1 . jn one change, while the former version contained
rather more of Curzon's idea of the 'Protecting Power', it is difficult
to see any significant difference, or indeed any less likelihood of the
intention being interpreted as Dominion status. But the Declaration
owed more than this to the Government of India - and more than to the
presumed familiarity of the key members of the Cabinet with the Indian
1015
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The Government of India had begun discussions to plan reforms which 
led to a definite goal; they had called for an announcement loudly 
enough to move the Cabinet; and they had insisted that the two elements 
should go together, that the declaration should be linked, as this one 
was, to some specific action. „ This last insistence was important for 
the future. The Declaration was portentous, but there had been 
portentous declarations before? the test would be the official 
interpretation of the statement, and the action based upon it*^^
On the reforms proposals, the main effect of the Declaration 
was to consolidate and continue the change already admitted by 
Chamberlain. By his suggestion that it was essential to invest Indian 
representatives with 'some real responsibility for their actions', 
Chamberlain restricted the manner in which the legislative councils 
could be reformed, and ruled out most of the current suggestions for 
advance. G.K. Gokhale, in his 'political testament', recommended an 
arrangement whereby the Government of India would relinquish much of 
their control over the provincial governments, which would be re­
constructed so as to give a greater voice to the tax-payers; each 
local government, made up of a Governor, three iCuropeans and three 
Indians, would have independent financial powers and complete charge 
of the province's internal administration; each legislative coundil,
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four-fifths elected, would have to pass all legislation including the
provincial budget - the Governor would retain a power of veto and
reserve legislative powers would he invested in an enlarged 'Legislative
Assembly of India' in which the official majority would he retained*
But the government would not he responsible to the legislature, so that
elected members would have greater powers but still no responsibility -
this scheme did not satisfy Chamberlain's criterion* Neither did the
Nineteen Members' or the Congress-League schemes, which were based on
107Gokhale1s proposals.
One of the current suggestions did meet Chamberlain's 
requirements. It had been evolved by the Hound Table group| this 
body of people, dedicated to studying imperial problems, had turned 
its attention to India after the Durbar of 1911? with a view to decid­
ing how India could be accommodated in a scheme for imperial federa­
tion."*'^ In 1915 Lionel Curtis had completed the first two volumes of 
his study of the 'Imperial Problems' and had begun to draft chapters 
on the future of India. With the permission of Chamberlain, he had 
discussions with friends of official experience5 a group of these 
agreed to work out a constitutional scheme. In March 1916, Chelmsford, 
who had returned to Britain before taking up the viceroyalty, made 
contact with Curtis and his group through Philip Kerr, who was a Round 
Table member. At Chelmsford's request the group showed him the results 
of their discussions. In May, Kerr sent the Viceroy an amplified
version of their memorandum which it was proposed to circulate to other
Round Table members. At Chelmsford's request, in view of the Government 
of India discussions, the memorandum was not circulated. Chelmsford,
however, presented it to his Council for discussion, and also sent it
109confidentially to all heads of local governments. The novel aspect
of Lionel Curtis' plan was the idea of 'dyarchy', of dividing the 
administration on the basis of reserved and transferred subjects, the 
reserved to be administered in the old way, with the legislature having 
a purely advisory function, and the transferred to be placed under
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direct legislative control. Two governments - two separate types of 
administration - would then exist side by side. When he first 
encountered this idea, Chelmsford found it 'singularly fascinating'.
But the Government of India did not favour it. Chelmsford claimed?
'I only realised its difficulties when I listened to the scheme being 
riddled by the criticism of my colleagues1.
With Chamberlain's dictum, however, the perspective changed. 
The Indian representatives could be given responsibility as well as 
power only if their resolutions were made binding on the Government.
But it was not thought feasible to grant them such control over the 
whole spectrum of provincial administration, A half-way position had 
to be founds and this meant 'dyarchy' or some other form of govern­
mental dualism. During 1917? therefore, the Curtis plan gained support. 
It already had its advocates, of course, and had influenced Chamberlain' 
thinking. Sinha, when Chamberlain consulted him in May before making 
his suggestion, had endorsed the dualist principle by suggesting that 
certain heads, such as education, public works or forests, should be 
placed under the control of reorganised provincial councils which would 
also retain advisory functions in matters reserved to the government as 
'vital to the safety of India'. In April Sinha had spent an evening
discussing Indian problems with Meston, Bikaner and a Round Table 
111group. About the same time, Islington had sent Chamberlain a letter 
which had been written in March by Bhupendranath Basu and which also 
suggested 'a division of functions' and a partial change-over to 
ministerial government if a total transfer of the provincial administra­
tion were not possible. Basu had not advocated this at the end of 1915*
H O
He had been talking to Lionel Curtis in Delhi.
Chamberlain's suggestion was, therefore, a hesitant step 
towards the endorsement of dualism as presented to him by Sinha and 
Basu. Other people began to consider alternative ways of meeting his 
conditions, Meston favoured an idea, which was advocated in slightly 
different forms also by Lerr and Curtis - a true 'dyarchy' whereby some 
responsibility would be devolved upon new legislatures for areas smaller 
than the present provinces, with the existing governments and councils
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11*retained for reserved subjects.'  ^ Lord Islington, nis caution leading 
him in another direction, suggested In his Oxford speech that it might 
be sufficient to associate the Indian representatives with the govern­
ment, perhaps by Standing Committees for different departments, and to 
introduce responsibility in some informal way by the proper choice of 
two Indians among a total of four Executive Councillors, and by placing
the onus upon the legislature for any policy change made in deference 
111\
to its wishes. 1 This sort of thinking, once it had to be translated
into a specific proposal, could only lead nearer to the suggestions
of Sinha and Basu.
Arguments for the partial delegation of powers met with a
response also in the Government of India. Chelmsford had admitted
that the Round Table proposals, although opposed by his Council, did
115reach the 'kernel' of the problem as presented by Chamberlain.
Moreover, as early as June 1917? Sir Claude Hill, who from the first
had advocated some transfer of power over the budgets and the 
inclusion of one elected member In the provincial Executive Councils, 
had recommended giving 'certain real powers of control, in some of the 
provinces, to responsible Ministers selected from among the elected 
representatives' as the persons most likely to command a following.
He did not approve of dyarchy proper, the suggestion of the Round 
Table that the government itself should be divided, the ministers 
taking responsibility only for transferred subjects? Hill felt that 
the executive council would have to act collectively and that a 
minister, although put in control of certain departments, would have
to resign if he could not support government policy in regard to any
department. Hill proposed that the budget would be voted on by the 
legislature, subject to a power of veto and to the maintenance of 
appropriations for essential services. He suggested that an additional 
safeguard might be provided by the establishment In the advanced 
provinces (where the changes were proposed) of second chambers, one 
third nominated and two-thirds elected, enjoying the same rights as 
the legislative councils except for budgetary control, and providing 
a formula for aristocratic and conservative interests otherwise under-
115 Minute by Meston^ /"26 Oct. 1917J ,  H ,Public (C) 572, Oct. 1918; 
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represented in terms of their Importance,'"'1'^  It might have been argued
that such chambers would also have reassured the landed classes and
their friends among the officials - as Chelmsford reported in August
1917? zamindari associations in Madras, the United Provinces and Sind
ha.d passed resolutions which reflected the fear that they were about
117to be handed over to Vakil raj.
Undoubtedly, and quite apart from Chamberlain's dictum, the 
Government of India by the second half of 1917 were ready to 
contemplate further advances, not necessarily as suggested by Hill, 
but certainly in the direction of further concessions to the legisla­
tive councils. In May Chelmsford reported his colleagues steadfast
in the view of the 1916 reforms despatch, that the sphere of advance
118should be in local self-government and the public services. Early
in August he wrote to Montagu that 'what would have satisfied six
months ago will not give satisfaction now, and similarly what will
suffice now will be useless six months hence'; the reason, he claimed,
119was the situation created by political agitators. In that month a
majority at a conference of forty-three Congress delegates, fore­
shadowing Gandhi, voted in favour of the immediate adoption of passive
resistance - the withdrawal of all non-official Indians from all forms
120of public work connected with the government.
There were of course objections to the sort of advance that 
was being contemplated. These were of two types, one conservative, 
the other practical. Both were to be ignored. Thus Sir Michael 
0 ’Dwyer complained in May that there seemed to be a danger that the 
reforms would be based on the expediency of satisfying politicians, 
and would disregard 'the views and needs of the solid masses'. But 
Meston, in a minute written in October 1917? explained; 'We must have 
a profound belief that the placid pathatic sic ~J contentment of the 4*
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masses is not the soil in which Indian nationhood will grow, and that
in disturbing it we are working for India's ultimate good'. On tho
other hand, Meston, in this same minute, argued that it was impossible
as yet to advance in the Councils and made his suggestion for total
self-government at a level below the provincial one. There was, he
claimed, no half-way position between executive and popular control,
for in any mixed system one side would have to give way when conflict
arose - if it was to be the legislature then the concessions were a
sham; If it was to be the government then home rule had already been
attained. Meston opposed the various schemes which suggested partial
devolution tc the councils. He asserted; 'An independent legislature
and an irremovable executive are utterly imcompatible.' It was
impossible, in his view, to have (or in these schemes to avoid) an
executive responsible to the Secretary of State and a legislature
responsible to the electorate; it was equally impossible to have
(or avoid) 'a distribution of power which enables the legislature to
121paralyse the executive, but never to remove it'. To this logical 
and practical objection, Hill's and all such dualistic proposals had 
no answer.
Yet, as Meston had also insisted on an earlier occasion, it
was impossible to stand still. The Government had to respond to the
changing political situation. After the August Declaration, the
immediate danger of passive resistance passed - the proposal was not
endorsed by the Nagpur Congress. Hut Indian demands were unabated;
the Government had to go some way towards meeting them. Indeed the
demands were increasing; all the time the Government had to go further.
Even Meston's scheme of local parliaments was to be a casualty - In its
refusal to change the provincial councils it had too much of the
appearance of standing still. The Declaration, therefore, found the
Government of India ready to contemplate an increase in the powers of
the legislative councils, an advance which they had condemned as
premature and inappropriate. Chelmsford still insisted that they 'must
122not be oblivious of considerations of safety'. But his recognition 
that 'the world has moved' and his implicit admission that the British 
proposals must remain within reaching distance of Indian demands, were 
enough to ensure that as time went on his position would also move and
121
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he would he prepared to recommend larger concessions. Meston argued, 
in a private letter to Chelmsford, 'a year ago, the enlargement and 
popularisation of the Legislative Councils ... seemed as much as wo 
could hope to accomplish and as much as thinking India would expect.
But the position had greatly changed since then, both inside and out­
side India; and power without responsibility has been pushed into the
123region of the impossible'. In September Chelmsford admitted that
with the developments in the situation it wa.s now possible that they
124would have to consider some transfer of power.
The Declaration had laid down the direction of the advance.
Chelmsford concluded (not altogether wrongly as we have seen) that 
the use of the term 'responsible government' was an endorsement of the 
consideration put forward by Chamberlain; the Declaration had ruled 
out 'power without responsibility'. The Government of India's reaction 
was to reopen the question with the local governments. They circulated 
various reforms schemes - the proposals of Curtis, Gokhale, the Nine­
teen Members, the Congress and League, and other suggestions by Jinnah 
and the Aga Khan. Sir Claude Hill's note (slightly altered and re­
dated 7 September) was also sent out for comment, although it had not 
been discussed in the Viceroy's Council. Hill added to his note an 
assessment of the August Declarations he had claimed that the Govern­
ment in their despatch of November 1916 had 'definitely abandoned the 
position that legislative Councils are not to develop into Parliamentary 
institutions'; the Declaration, he now added, had made a final decision 
on this issue, and thus all proposals for reform had to suggest 
machinery suitable, or canable of being developed, for a parliamentary
125system.
The long-delayed reply to the despatch of 1916 bore out this 
interpretation of the Declaration. At the end of September, the report 
of a second special India Office committee, under Sir William Duke, 
had complained of the failure of the existing constitution to provide 
for responsibility or administrative experience in the legislatures,
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and had recommended by a majority that, while as yet no form of 
responsibility of the executive to the legislature should be applied, 
the provincial councils should be allowed 'a definite measure of 
influence, leading up to eventual control' over portions of the budget 
and over such subjects as r o e m i n o r  irrigation, public health, local 
self-government, elementary education and excise. The India Office
despatch of 19 October 1917, replying to that of the Government of 
India almost a year before, in the main approved of the advances 
proposed in local self-government and the public services, but re­
jected the suggestions for the legislative councils; the scheme of 
lylo gave 'weapons of opposition and offence' but no responsibility 
in matters of finance and administration. The Secretary of State 
asked how political training was to be achieved without such res­
ponsibility, and stated that one of the principles of the Declaration
was that progress must take place 'by the progressive development of
127self-governing institutions'.
Chelmsford was later to claim privately that Montagu had 
entered the reforms discussions 'at a moment when the policy was 
more or less cut and dried; it only wanted to be developed in detail’7'" 
It is easy to see how he came to this conclusion; the central feature 
of the reforms was the acceptance of the idea of dualism? from 
Chelmsford's viewpoint this must have seemed to have come at the end 
of the line of development which had begun when his Council first tried 
to relate their proposals to the goal of self-government; which had 
been greatly extended by Chamberlain's endorsement of the objections 
to power without responsibility and through the rapid changes in the 
political situation; and which had only culminated and been confirmed 
in the Declaration of 1917 and the Secretary of State's despatch. In 
fact of course no decision had been taken before Montagu's arrival 
in India; but the main criteria for that decision had been established, 
the main objections had been canvassed, and the main alternatives 
presented.
'Report of Second Special India Office Committee on Indian Reforms' 
(under Sir William Duke), 30 Sept. 1917, ACP21/4/27.
127 S/S despatch, 19 Oct. 1917, II.Poll, 337, March 1918, & ACP23./4/26,
"1 PR
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 20 Sept. 1918, ACP18/3/15*
Chapter 8. The First Steps
On 10 November 1917 Montagu, arrived in Bombay. After spend­
ing some weeks in Delhi, he and the Viceroy began a series of formal 
hearings of local opinion in Calcutta, Madras and Bengal. These were
followed by consultations with the local governments and the Govern-
1
ment of India in Delhi early in the new year. In the Indian press
the Declaration had been received generally favourably, if without 
2
enthusiasm. The Government of India had consolidated this reaction 
by the release of Annie Besant and the rebuke of Sir Michael O'Dwyer 
for his speech in the imperial legislature. The Secretary of State’s 
visit itself was also intended and arranged as a public relations 
gesture. Montagu suggested, and Chelmsford agreed, that they should 
receive deputations formally in public and in some cases follow this 
with private discussions in camera. The desire for full consultation 
was stressed in the Government's communique calling for deputations.^ 
Chelmsford sent a oircular to heads of provinces urging that 'It is 
all-important that the interests of every class ... should be re­
presented' - local governments were to point out the need for action 
to any important gro\ip that was not alive to the needs of the situa- 
tion. The Home Department also stressed that local governments, 
while keeping numbers to a manageable size, should take a liberal view 
in allowing representations.^ Montagu was at first distressed by the 
brevity and formality of the meetings with deputations, and even 
suspected that the Government of India were trying to hurry him out 
of the country. But, unlike the Secretary of State, the Government of 
India had realised that the interviews must be dealt with quickly; as 
it was, Montagu as well as Chelmsford 'almost danced for joy' when the
^ See Edwin S. Montagu, An Indian Diary, London 1930.
V to S/S, 29 Aug, 1917? CP8. The Bengal revolutionaries, however, 
had condemned It5 see Sedition Committee Report 1918, Appendices, 
p.xxix (Proclamation of the Indian Revolutionary Committee), IQR 
L/Parl 444*
3
See above, pp. 75-84.
^ S/S to V, 24 & 30 Aug. & 21 Sept.,AV to S/S, 28 Aug, & 21 Sept.
1917, CP8.
5
Chelmsford to heads of provinces, 27 Sept, 1917, CP19.
 ^ HD circular, 14 Sept. 1917, H.Publio 453, & see also 451-495,
May 1918,
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meetings were finally over, and Montagu was later to try to resist
Chelmsford’s repeated urgings that he should not set a time limit for
7
his departure but should stay until their work was finished.
Opinion in Sngland also had to be oared for, and Montagu
wished to associate representatives of conservative and liberal opinion
with his missioni Thus, he was accompanied by Lord Donoughmore and
Charles Roberts, M.P., in addition to Sir F.W, Duke and M.C. Seton
of the India Office, and, at Chelmsford's suggestion, Bhupendranath
8
Basu, newly appointed to the Secretary of State's Council. In a 
different way, Chelmsford too sought to take care of important opinion 
in Britain - he wrote to Curzon, Chamberlain and Lord Selborne, warn­
ing that dyarchy was inevitable but, to Curzon, predicting that
9changes would not be too far reaching.
The idea of an extensive report was, according to Chelmsford, 
his own. He had, he claimed, 'sketched in broad outline' to V.S. Marris, 
the draftsman, his idea of 'what shape the Report should take', before 
Montagu arriveds Chelmsford wanted something weighty to support their 
proposals.^ The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, therefore, devoted the 
first of two parts to a critical survey of earlier constitutional 
developments 5 here the central and repeated theme was the inadequacy 
of the Morley-Minto reforms.^ The conclusion, shorn of the diplomatic 
language of the Report, was foreshadowed in Chelmsford's letter to 
Curzon in November 1917“ 'The truth is,1 Chelmsford wrote, 'the mill­
stone of the Morley-Minto reforms is round our necks. If it were in
7 See Montagu, Diary, 7-8, 33-35, 64, 163, 283, 285, 287-288, & 310.
8 S/S to V, 24 & 29 Aug. 1917, CP8.
Q
See Chelmsford to Curzon, 17 Nov. (with a collection of reforms 
schemes and departmental papers) & 1 Dec., to Chamberlain, 14 Dec.
1917,A to Selborne, 3 Jan. 1919, & see also Chelmsford to Dawson,
17 May 1918, CP15.
78 See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 20 Sept., & to Dawson, 17 May 1918, 
CPI5. (Montagu's Indian Diary does not contradict this assertion.)
11
See Montagu to Chelmsford, Report on Indian Constitutional
Reforms, 22 April 1918, Chapters 1 to 6. (The Report may be'
consulted in several collections, including Parliamentary Papers,
Cmd. 9109. I have used the signed copy, CP42.) On the drafting, 
see Montagu, Diary, 338-346, 355, 362 & 358-359- See also the 
local government reports on the working of the Morley-Minto reforms,
H.Public 600-606, May 1918.
the region of practical politics to abandon the present line of advance,
12
I doubt whether there would be a single individual who would say no1. 
Montagu and Chelmsford had considered possibilities of 'wiping out' 
the Morley-Minto reforms and 'making a new start', but they felt that 
they had no alternative, for practical and political reasons, but to 
follow the path already set out. The grounds for the Report's 
rejection of the Morley-Minto reforms were strongly influenced by what 
might be called the United Provinces' attitude - at several points 
Marris's drafting reflected or quoted Heston's minute of October 1917? 
which analysed the political situation and the reasons for and the 
line of advance in terms similar to those of the Report, Indeed in 
one key passage the Report echoed Heston's minute without acknowledging 
it - the Report stated, almost in Heston's words, 'We believe pro­
foundly that ... the placid, pathetic contentment of the masses is not 
the soil on which .,. Indian nationhood will grow, and that in
14deliberately disturbing it, we are working for her highest good'.
Chamberlain's letters and the August Declaration convinced
15Chelmsford that some sort of dualism would be needed in the provinces. 
The method by which this was to be achieved was also substantially 
formulated, in spite of the impression given by Montagu's Indian Diary, 
by the India Office committee set up by Montagu under Sir William Duke 
before the Secretary of State left England. Duke's report was notable, 
as we have seen, for the important suggestion that some subjects - 
sanitation, local communications, local self-government, health, 
elementary education, and excise - might be transferred to the control 
of legislatures with small elected majorities, and that the legisla­
tures should vote the provincial budgets subject to powers for restor-
16ing or maintaining expenditure for reserved subjects. All the 
12
Chelmsford to Curzon, 17 Novermber 1917, CP15*
15
See Chelmsford to Selborne, 5 Jan. 1919? & to Guest, 8 April 1918? 
CP15.
^  Montagu & Chelmsford, Report, 71 & see 52? minute by Meston, 
I!.Public(C) 572, Oct. 1918, quoted above, pp.245~244(cv.).
15
See above, pp.240-2451? & Chelmsford to Selborne, 3 Jan. 1919?
CPI 5.
~\ c
See Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 14 Dec. 1917? CP15? Report of 
Second Special Committee on Indian Reforms (Sir Wm. Duke) 30 Sept.
1917? ACP21/4/27? & S/S to V, 16 Oct. 1917> CP8* Montagu thought 
Duke was probably the inventor of 'dyarchy'? see Montagu, Diary, 377c
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schemes seriously considered in India were variants of this idea. By
the time he was ready to start discussions in Delhi in November
Montagu had decided that the elected majorities would have to he
substantial and suggested that the future modifications to the reserved
and transferred lists should be effected by 'enabling' bills' in the
I"7
Government of India, subject to seven-yearly statutory enquiries. 1
Various means of partially transferring responsibility were 
canvassed. Two variants of one - suggesting divisional or sub­
provincial councils dealing with transferred subjects, and advocated 
chiefly by Lionel Curtis and the United Provinces under Meston - were 
discussed and ruled out in the Report, as politically inadequate and
confusing controversial geographical adjustments with constitutional 
18upheaval. The other possibilities were to transfer powers either 
to a separate body at the provincial level - a lower house, or an 
assembly beside the existing councils - or to a modified single 
legislature which would also retain advisory functions in relation 
to reserved subjects. The Report favoured the latters the legisla­
ture as a whole was to vote on the transferred subjects and on the 
budget, subject to the government's restorative powers for reserved 
allotments, but legislation for reserved subjects, if the government 
were to certify it as essential to law and order or the proper 
discharge of its duty, was to be dealt with by an advisory grand
committee drawn from the legislature but retaining a bare majority
19for the government. ' The legislative councils were also to be made 
more representative by the establishment of direct election on the
See ibid., 12-14 (10 Nov. 1917)? & Addendum to Duke Memorandum,
in Montagu to Chelmsford, 26 Nov. 1917? CP3*
18
See Montagu & Chelmsford, Report, 116-119| Montagu, Diary,
11-12 & 54j Meston, Memorandum on Reforms Scheme, 20 Jan, 1918, 
H.Public(c) 590, Oct. I9I85 Report of an informal committee appointed 
to consider the most suitable line of advance towards responsible 
government, Allahabad, 24 Oct. 1917, & Joint Memorandum from European0 
and Indians (of Bengal), ibid. 579•
19
See Montagu to Chelmsford, 26 Nov. 1917 (with enclosures), CF3? 
Montagu, Diary, especially pp. 49? 102-103, 141-142, 147 & 223-224? 
Montagu & Chelmsford, Report, 106-108, 123-124 & 119-123. The 
recommendations of the Report, with paragraph references, are 
summarised in an appendix to that Report? descriptions are widely 
available, and no attempt is made here to give a comprehensive survey 
of the proposals.
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basis of territorial constituencies, except (reluctantly) for Muslins
and Sikhs where they were in a minority. The details of the franchise
as well as of the transferred list were to be referred to separate
20committees of enquiry. In all provinces (the Report recommended)
government was to be conducted by an Executive Council of one service
and one Indian member, and by a Minister or Ministers appointed from
the legislature ~ it was to be government in two halves, one for
reserved and one for transferred subjects, but the halves were to
associate and deliberate as a whole, only the voting being separate
according to subject. The whole government was to decide on the
21
budget, the Governor adjudicating in any difference of opinion.
Originally Montagu had been prepared to delay the transfer of executive
powers to ministers until the third legislative council after the
reforms (after six years) when the presumption would have been that
all subjects would have been transferred in the provinces unless cause
was shown why some should be reserved. Meston and others had preferred
the immediate transfer of a more limited number (as originally suggested
by Duke's committee), and the Viceroy's Council, divided on this issue,
had preferred to leave the question until local governments and public
opinion had shown their preferencess in the end it was decided to 
2?give less sooner,,
This dualism in the provincial governments was the 
distinctive feature of the reforms? there are several points worthy 
of emphasis. It is right to stress that the idea of dualism was not 
new, but that it was a logical outcome of Chelmsford's questions and 
Chamberlain's ideas. Progressively larger and larger concessions 
were proposed as the next step even after Montagu's arrival in India, 
but after 1916 the line of advance had been seen consistently (if at 
first imperfectly) as the development of responsible institutions. 
Moreover if this had not been the case, it is doubtful if the August 
Declaration would have been interpreted as it was by the reformers - 
Chelmsford, the Government of India, Duke, Meston, Montagu. On the
20
Montagu & Chelmsford, Report, 110-113 & 114-115.
21
Ibid. 106-109.
22
See Montagu to Chelmsford, 1 Jan. 1918, CP4j Montagu Diary,
179-183? 186-187. ~~~
other hand, it is also true that tho August Declaration needed to be 
translated into action, and that the interpretation at this time was 
itself important. Later, officials and observers professed to 
interpret the Declaration in ways which excluded dyarchy or any transfer 
of responsibility5 the promise of the Declaration was preserved 
because Montagu and Chelmsford chose not to interpret it in this 
negative way.
It has been generally assumed that the engineer of the 
dualist interpretation was Montagu? but it is probable that this 
idea is false. There were two factors influencing Montagu and 
Chelmsfords the historical consideration of Chamberlain's and the 
Round Table's tentative stops towards dyarchy? and the logical con­
sideration that the progressive realisation of responsible government 
could only be achieved by partial transfers of power. But if we look 
more closely at the form of the transfer we may see that it corresponds 
closely to Chelmsford’s definition of 'responsible government'? namely, 
government in which Indians should be able to say, and be known to have 
said, 'yes' or 'no' on specific policies, and not government in whioh 
formal responsibility of ministers to the legislature obtained - for 
the Indian ministers were at first to be guaranteed their appointments
for the life of each council (their salaries were to be a reserved 
23
subject). The Government of India were very early convinced that
dyarchy could not be avoided. They endorsed the idea in a circular
letter to the local governments on 11 December 1917 ” they put forward
various methods of obtaining some dualism and sought advice not on the
24-principle but on the scheme which produced fewest problems. Montagu's 
Indian Diary, if read carelessly, might give the impression that he was 
campaigning for the acceptance of dyarchy, not his preferred means of 
achieving it. In fact there was no argument among the reformers about 
dyarchy itselfs Montagu was its advocate but had no need to be its 
defender. As for his way of achieving it, the Diary records that in 
December 1917 Montagu found Chelmsford 'a much more eager convert' than
23
See Chelmsford to Guest, 8 April, CPI5, & to Ronaldshay, 30 May 
1918, CP20, & V(liD) to S/S, 25 April 1919, CP10? Montagu & Chelmsford, 
Report, paragraph 218.
24
Il.Public(C) 579? Oct. 1918? & see Chelmsford to Curson, 1 Dec.,
to Chamberlain, 14 Dec., CP15, & to Islington, 30 Dec. 1917,
CP 3*
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he was himselfg 'I am doubtful about it,' Montagu noted, 'because
2S
some people really feel they are not ready for any responsibility.1
The concomitant of progressive transfer of power was 
progressive devolution to the provinces. This subject too was hardly 
a new one, and two main rival schemes for financial devolution were 
in existence before Montagu and Chelmsford began their investigations. 
Both of these sought to do away with heads of revenue which were divided 
between the central and the provincial governments, in order that the 
budgets at each level could be quite independent. The scheme 
formulated by W.S. Meyer and H.F. Howard envisaged a complicated 
system of transfers of formerly divided heads, with fixed proportions 
of income tax and revenue payable to the central government, and 
subsequent provincial adjustments. Its rival, devised by J.B. Brunyate, 
proposed that all divided revenue should become provincial, though 
collected at standard rates fixed by the Government of India, and that 
fixed cash contributions should be made to the central government.
The problem with any scheme was that very different patterns of 
expenditure and sources of revenue (notably the permanent settlement 
in Bengal and Bihar) were found in different provinces, so that any 
standardised system worked to the disadvantage of one province or 
another. Chelmsford had asked Montagu to consider, before he arrived 
in India, how this difficulty could be overcome, and also what 
corresponding relaxations would be possible in the Secretary of 
State's control over the Government of India, In January 1918 the 
finance question was placed before a sub-committee of Duke, Meston 
and Meyer; the Report adopted a modified version of the Brunyate 
scheme.^
On the wider issues of financial supervision the Govern­
ment of India had in effect adopted the general principles of a note 
prepared by Sir L. Abrahams after discussions in the India Office -
these amounted to allowing the provinces a certain limited Increase
27
in financial independence. Again, on the broad question of 
25
Montagu, Diary, 149, & see 65, 157 & 176-177, '
^  Ibid., 19 & 110; Montagu & Chelmsford, Report, 101-105?
Chelmsford to Montagu, 8 Sept. 1917? QP3, Joint memorandum by Sir 
W. Meyer & Hr. Ploward (13 Oct. 1917) & Memorandum by Mr. J.B. Brunyatc- 
(30 Sept. 1917)? with HD circular, 11 Dec. 1917, H.Public(C) 579, Oct. 
1918.
27 Memorandum by Sir L. Abrahams, ibid.; & see another copy of the
same, & notes by T.W. Holderness, L. Currie & Sir L. Abrahams, 
ACP21/2/29-32.
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legislative and administrative control, the Government of India had
"begun investigations among their departments on the possibility for a
general relaxation (following conclusions in the Viceroy's Council
that this was desirable) - the Government circulated an office
memorandum on 12 November 1917, the day after Montagu's consultations
28first began in Delhi. ‘ Chelmsford favoured the retention of all the
statutory powers of intervention enjoyed by the central government,
with relaxations to be introduced by convention? Montagu wanted
statutory changes to limit the central authority. The Report adopted
Chelmsford's views Montagu had decided he was ill-equipped to argue
the question with lawyers like Chelmsford and Lowndes, and it was
agreed that Lowndes should draft the relevant paragraph (212) in the 
29Report. Thus, for devolution as for dyarchy, the reforms dis­
cussions in India led to results within principles discussed earlier, 
and in accordance with the preferences of the Government of India.
The agreement in general on the provincial measures did not 
extend to the question of the Government of India and the Imperial 
Legislative Council. In December 1917 "the Viceroy's Council refused 
to accept a paragraph introduced by Montagu, Duke and Soton into the 
Home Department's circular on reforms. The Government claimed that 
their objection was to committing themselves before they had considered 
Montagu’s proposed changes? but the disagreement soon proved to be 
more substantials the Government of India considered that no extensive 
changes were needed in the central government at this stage. Montagu 
persuaded them that they must agree to some revision. The Report 
envisaged, therefore, that the Legislative Council would be replaced 
by a Legislative Assembly of 100 members with a large, preferably 
directly elected majority, and a Council of State with a membership of 
21 elected members, 4 nominated non-officials and not more than 25 
nominated officials, excluding the Governor-General as President.
Both chambers were to have full legislative powers, disputes to be 
resolved by joint sessions, except that the government would retain 
the power to reserve bills or amendments for decision in the Council 
of State in matters certified as essential to the interests of peace 
and order or good government. The budget was not to be voted, but, 
as in the provinces (though in this case with more limited functions),
28 H.Public 155-171, Sept. 1919.
29
Montagu, Diary, 306-308? Montagu &. Chelmsford, Report, 105? 
Chelmsford to Curtis, 16 July 1918, CPI5»
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standing committees were to be associated with some government 
departments. Chelmsford and his Council had fought Montagu at every 
stage. They were eager that the imperial legislature should be made 
more representative, but unwilling for it to have wider powers. 
Gradually they conceded the bicameral principle, with an elected 
majority in the Assembly? Montagu agreed not to insist on an elected 
majority in the upper house, and it was decided that official and non­
official members should be equal in number. As late as 20 February, 
however, Chelmsford was still trying to persuade Montagu not to include 
the central changes as an essential part of their proposals, and not 
until 6 March was the scheme of the Report accepted by the Government 
of India.^
On 15 March Montagu tried to reopen the question with an
onslaught on compulsory voting by officials, and a proposal that the
reserve powers of the Government of India should be vested, not in
the official bloc of the Council of State, but in restorative powers
for the Viceroy alone. Chelmsford had already allowed officials to
vote on occasions as they pleased, and proposed to extend this in
practice after the reforms to cover all but essential matters. But
neither the Viceroy nor his Council would countenance the complete
abolition of official voting. Montagu’s 1 adieti1 refused to support
him on this issue, which developed into a 'great row' with Chelmsford,.
and the Secretary of State withdrew. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report
31recommended the proposal suggested by the Viceroy. Thus, although 
they had had to agree to changes at the centre, the Government of 
India had not been forced to abandon any principle. The Report stated 
as general criteria that the earlier steps towards responsible govern­
ment should be in the provinces, and that the Government of India
must remain wholly responsible to Parliament, with its authority in
32essential matters indisputable. These principles would not have
seemed out of place in the Government of India's despatch of
November 1916.
30
See Montagu, Diary, 48, 85? 90-93, 105, 116-117, 124, 165, 176-177, 
194-197? 202, 271, 309-310, 312? Montagu to Chelmsford, Report, 
129-135.
31 Montagu to Chelmsford, 15 March, & Chelmsford to Montagu, 16 March 
I9I85 CP4; Montagu, Diary, 326-327 & 330? Montagu & Chelmsford, 
Report, 134? & see also 113 (on the provincial official bloc) & 44-46
(on the defects of the bloc).
52 I M I m  93-94.
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The assessment of the relative contributions of Montagu 
and Chelmsford to the reforms has been prejudiced by the publication 
of Montagu’s Indian Diary. In several respects this is an unsatis­
factory source. Its subject is the preparation and writing of the 
Reports it omits the role of Chelmsford in beginning discussions on 
the goal or in urging reforms (although at one point, recording a 
discussion with a journalist who attributed all to the Secretary of 
State, Montagu stressed Chelmsford's early contributiors). It also 
makes no attempt to deal with the crucial decisions of the period 
before Montagu's arrival in India* Moreover, not only is the Diary 
the impressions of one man; it is also more than usually distorted 
by circumstances; Montagu was writing or dictating hurriedly at the 
end of long tiring days, often in bad health, with a fever particularly 
bad in the evening;s, and his opinions were deliberately immediate and 
not considered. Thus the impression given by the Diary is often 
intemperate and sometimes contradictory - for example Montagu strongly
condemned Chelmsford's formality with deputations on one day, and on
54another recorded his tactful handling of Annie Besant. Finally the
Diary is concerned chiefly with recording Montagu's impressions and
proposalss it mentions Chelmsford's disagreements, but rarely gives
a positive indication of the Viceroy's position.
Montagu praised Chelmsford for keeping the peace between
thorns the rarity of thoir quarrels he attributed entirely to
Chelmsford's personality, patience, self-control and receptiveness.
Chelmsford too found the degree of accord rather than the few disagree- 
55raents remarkable, At the same time and on other occasions, Montagu
criticised Chelmsford's lack of constructiveness% soon after his
arrival in India, Montagu complained that Chelmsford never expressed
56an opinion without consulting his Council. 'When, a month later, he 
made this criticism to Chelmsford himself, the Viceroy replied that 
he was not, like Montagu, independents he had colleagues and he was
55
Montagu, Diary, 96-97*
54 Ibid., 16-17 & 59-60.
7r
Ibid., 363 & 3695 Chelmsford to Curtis, 16 July I9I8, CPI5, & see 
also Chelmsford to Islington, 30 Dec. 1917, CP3*
^  Montagu, Diary, 41 & 363, & see also 16-17, 72, 248, 259-260,
264, 338-346, 356-357 & 359*
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37right to try to carry them with him if he could. Chelmsford 
interpreted his role later, in a letter to Chamberlains ' ... I had 
the responsibility of keeping the peace and bringing the jarring 
elements together. Though tho Report is his / Montagu's_J and mine, 
its proposals are, I may say, practically the accepted proposals of 
my colleagues and his'.^8 There is no indication of this in the Diary, 
other than Montagu's final tribute. The original opposition and final 
agreement of Chelmsford's colleagues are recorded without any indication 
of attempts by the Viceroy to secure unanimity. Indeed, Montagu had 
some criticisms of Chelmsford's handling of his Council - on two 
occasions he felt Chelmsford had been unhelpful through his failure 
to prepare the members by giving them full detailsi he had not made 
it clear to them that in his first scheme Montagu intended the pre­
sumption to be that all subjects would be transferred in the provinces 
after the end of the third council unless the government could show 
cause for reservation; and he did not inform them of Montagu's designs 
on the Government of India and his idea for a Council of State. It 
is difficult not to assume that these omissions were a deliberate 
tactic, especially as Montagu admitted that the Viceroy had out­
manoeuvred him on the first of these occasions, and also earlier by
becoming a firm advocate of the revised provincial scheme about which
39Montagu had come to have some doubts. On one occasion Montagu
complained that he had to spend his time lobbying Chelmsford's
colleagues, 'a task hw ought to do himself. It is fair to assume
that Montagu was lobbying for his own scheme; that would have been
Chelmsford's 'task' if he had approved of it. But Montagu made this
complaint at a time when Chelmsford had expressed his opposition to
several features of Montagu's proposals.40
While the draft Report was being revised by Montagu,
Chelmsford, Duke, Lowndes, Roberts and Harris, the Viceroy set
himself up as a judge, making few positive suggestions but adjudicating
/11between the often warring elements of Secretary of State and draftsman*!
57 Ibid., 110-111.
38
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 17 May 1918, ACRI8/3/H.
39 Montagu, Diary, 179-180 & 194-195.
^  Jkil* f 276. On this occasion Montagu was lobbying hair. For 
Chelmsford's disagreement see pp. 269-271 & 274.
41 Ibid., 338-346.
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This summed up Chelmsford's role - from the first Montagu had complained,
with reference to the formulation of proposals, 'It is I that have got
42
to do this thing ... ' . It was thus valid and understandable for 
Montagu to criticise Chelmsford's lack of imagination in regard to 
details and expedients, We must recognise that this was partly a 
question of personality and aptitude. But we must also recognise that 
Chelmsford could not have acted both as a protagonist for particular 
schemes and as an impartial judge; and that it was by choosing or 
pretending to be 'impartial' - which meant working as the representa­
tive of a Government, not as an individual - that Chelmsford made sure 
of getting the reforms he wanted,
A comparison between the Home Department circular of 
11 December 191? and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report reveals a large 
degree of parity between the two. This is no measure of relative 
influence because of course Montagu was consulted on the circular.
What the circular does represent is the level of advance which the 
Government of India were prepared formally to recommends and its parity 
with the Report is in this sense significant. Nothing came of many 
of Montagu's ideas. We have seen that on no issue of importance did 
the Report go beyond what the Government of India were prepared to 
concede. Noteworthy also is Montagu's reaction when the consultations 
were concluded - before he was reconciled by the satisfaction of being 
involved in drafting what is a most persuasive and elegantly expressed 
Report. He complained (my emphasis); 'I have come to an agreement 
with the Government of India which nobody accepts .... where I fear 
that my own proposals may have been spoiled is in my desperate endeavour 
to find compromises at every stage.
This is not to deny that Montagu's pressure moved the 
Government further than they might otherwise have gone? rather it 
is to point out that the Government of India effectively sot the limits 
for the Report's proposals. This was the product of Chelmsford's 
interpretation of his role, his standpoint as a 'constitutional' 
governor. Its future importance was that it provided weighty endorse­
ment for the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme, endorsement that was to prove 
invaluable for combatting an intractable opposition among the local 
governors. Thus there were two distinct roles in the framing of the 
Report; that of Montagu, with his flair for hitting upon expedients
4 2  I M l ’ s 1 0  •
45 Ibid., 248.
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to carry out agreed changes, and that of Chelmsford, with his more 
'prosaic' ability to keep the peace and secure agreement.^ And, 
although Chelmsford may not have made many positive contributions to 
the details of the scheme, he was not without influence on the proposals 
moreover, his strategy was to be of great importance in ensuring that 
the reforms were accepted.
The picture given by the Indian Diary is thus misleading0, 
Montagu did not wage war when he was in India, making a series of 
successful forays against the collective enemy ~ Chelmsford, the 
Government of India especially Meyer, the local governors, Marris, 
Vincent. Rather he put forward expedients for achieving agreed ends, 
which were scrutinised by the experts, led by Chelmsford, and approved 
or rejected. In positive details, in fertility of mind, Montagu's 
achievement was very great. In determining the level of advance, 
the largeness of the concession, Chelmsford and the Government of 
India had matters very much their own way. This is not to minimise 
either contributions . it is to describe them,
Montagu's first move, on returning to London, was to secure 
the support of the Council of India, and (on 29 May) to ask the
Cabinet to agree to the immediate publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford
45Report. For the time the Cabinet were too occupied with war matters. ' 
The Government of India, too, considered the Report, Their despatch 
recorded that the proposals, although the responsibility of the Report's 
signatories, had been 'framed after prolonged discussion' with the 
Viceroy's Council - there were, they admitted, no doubt detailed 
recommendations on which some of them had divergent views, but they 
wished to convey 'cordial support to the general policy' of the 
Report.^ Montagu was disappointed with this despatch, but Chelmsford 
explained that his problem had been to get a consensus between Vincent 
and Nair - Vincent, in Chelmsford's view, had been difficult because
^  Chelmsford to Montagu, 24 April 1918, CP4, & see Montagu, Diary,
374* See also below, note 108.
45
Montagu to Chelmsford, 31 May 1918, CP4.
46
V to S/S, 15 & 24 May 1918, C£9; & Cmd. 176.
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he felt slighted by the rejection of a chapter he had drafted for the
Report^ because he was strained and overworked, and because he was
asked to agree to a cordial despatch just after the Delhi War
47Conference 'at which he had behaved foolishly' and knew it.
Montagu, about the same time, began to have his own troubles
with Lord Curzon. Curzon had 'little complimentary to say about the
Report1, which he thought 'a confused document' - an attitude which
Montagu dismissed as 'only the manner of the grand Mogul', Curzon,
although he generally agreed to publication, had suggested that some
/Lft
of the Report might first have to be omitted. In the Cabinet, when 
Montagu managed to secure a discussion, Curzon pointed out the dangers 
of publico.tion and opposed allowing Montagu and Chelmsford to defend 
their Report in public. Montagu replied that he and Chelmsford were 
responsible 'up to the neck', and that he declined to stay in office 
unless he could conduct a vigorous defence 011 his own account (while 
stressing that the Cabinet had not accepted the recommendations). The 
Cabinet accepted his arguments. They were impressed by the endorsement 
of the Report by both Montagu's and Chelmsford's Councils? Chamberlain 
had vigorously supported the Secretary of State? Montagu had discussed 
the question privately with the other members before the Cabinet meet­
ings the Cabinet agreed to publish the Report in full without committ-
49ing themselves to actual proposals.
Chamberlain had hoped that the Government would accept the
broad principles set down in the Report - namely that the Government
of India must remain capable of imposing its will in essential matters,
and that no complete responsibility could be transferred anywhere -
and would also agree to the division of subjects and some transfer of
responsibility according to the level of advance in each province and
with corresponding devolution of central authority and relaxation of
parliamentary responsibilitys this would fix the limits of the advance,
but make sure that there would be no going back on the policy of the 
50Declaration. Chamberlain had wanted to rule extremists (on both
47 Montagu to Chelmsford, 16 May, & Chelmsford to Montagu, 30 May &
27 June, CP4, & S/S to V, 15 May 1918, CP 9*
48
Montagu to Chelmsford, 16 & 31 May 1918, CP4.
S/S to V, 29 May & 7 June, CP9s & Montagu to Chelmsford, 15 
June 1918, CP4.
50 Chamberlain, Cabinet note; 'Mr, Montagu's Report', 6 June 1918?
ACP21/6/44*
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sides) out of court by making it clear that the Cabinet invited
suggestions only in the restricted field within the principles they
had approved - they would also have made clear the limits beyond
which no agitation would drive them. But the Cabinet were afraid of
committing themselves. Chamberlain concluded, 'I think that in this
they have made a mistake, and that as a result they are in danger of
51being carried further than they have any intention of going*.
After this defeat Chamberlain tried to achieve the same end
by different means. Montagu and Chelmsford had recommended the
appointment of two committees to consider the details of the questions
of franchise and division of subjects. In June 1918, Chamberlain
prepared a memorandum which argued in support of Montagu that the
Cabinet should give an earnest of their good intentions by the
immediate appointment of these committees - the dangers of delay, as
he saw them, xvere exasperation in India (as reforms had been whittled
down in the past) and the chance that these reforms would fail to
satisfy by the time they were passed. He had consulted (in addition
to Montagu) Sir James Meston and Sir Thomas Holderness. Meston saw
no disadvantage in going ahead, as he considered that 'the Cabinet
is, by the mere publication of the report, committing itself to the
main principles'? Holderness, although he agreed that to appoint
the committees would reassure Indian reformers, could not see how
they could do their work until the Cabinet had decided what sort of
constitution they should plan for, and he also suggested that the
appointment of the committees would go a long way towards committing
the Government to accept the Report. Chamberlain, agreeing with
Meston that it was rather late for such scruples, circulated his
memorandum to the Cabinet, inserting e sentence to explain, 'in my
view simple publication without note or comment does in fact oommit 
52us very deeply'.
Throughout July Montagu and Chamberlain tried to persuade 
the Cabinet to appoint the committees. The main obstacle was Curzon, 
who refused to agree to any steps until he had had time to make up
51
Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 20 June, CPI 5 & ACP18/5/15, & to 
Ronaldshay, 7 June 1918, ACP21/5/70.
52
Chamberlain, 'The Situation in India' (two drafts), notes by 
Meston d Holderness, 21 June, Chamberlain to Montagu, 20 & 26 June,
& Montagu to Chamberlain, 25 June, d see also extract from Chelmsford 
to Chamberlain, 17 May 1918, ACP21/5/56-45.
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53his mind on the Report. Montagu suggested in addition to Chamberlain's 
proposal, that the Government should appoint the third committee 
suggested by the Report, one to consider the functions and powers of 
the India Office and the India Council, and that they should prepare a 
draft bill which could be submitted to a Royal Commission composed of 
members of both houses of Parliament - thus Montagu hoped to make as 
much progress as possible without formally committing the Government, 
as he would have had to do to draft a bill and introduce it in 
Parliament for a second reading and committee stages in the normal 
way.
Chamberlain, however, privately secured Curzon1s agreement 
to the appointment of the two committees on the understanding that the 
Government would not be committed to more than the principle of a 
division of subjects or to any particular framework and constitution 
for the councils* and, as Curzon was opposed to the appointment of 
the India Office committee or to any other step, Montagu reluctantly 
agreed not to press his case - Curzon had 'rather put it1 to Chamberlain 
that he was making concessions and they should too. Montagu also 
wanted to press ahead with an interim measure of indianisation, to 
which Curzon objected as likely to cause controversy? Chamberlain had 
suggested to Sinha (and repeated to Montagu) that it would be unwise 
to prejudice the question of the reforms by insisting on isolated or 
premature actions? but Montagu argued that what he wanted was a 
separate matter, not requiring legislation but merely a parliamentary 
statement so that he could approve the Government of India's own 
proposal to appoint fifty Indians in order to relieve an acute shortage 
of staff.
Towards the end of July, Chamberlain took up with Curzon 
another proposal of Montagu's, modified from his original suggestion 
for submitting a draft bill to a Royal Commission. Taking as his cue 
a motion by Lord Sydenham in the Lords, calling for a discussion of 
the Report, Chamberlain tried to convince Curzon that the Government 
should issue a statement that, although they could not now perfect a 
bill, as soon as possible they would introduce one and submit it to 
a joint committee. Curzon disagreed. He did not think Sydenham's 
motion likely to come up, or, if it did, that Sydenham would expect a 
government pronouncement or more than can opportunity to express his 
own (unfavourable) views on the Report's proposals. But Curzon was
53
Montagu to Chelmsford, 3 & 26 July 1918, CP4»
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not unfriendly to the idea of.a Joint Committee and suggested that the
Report itself might be submitted to one? Chamberlain wondered if this
might be a way of making progress at a time when the Cabinet was
preoccupied. Montagu opposed this - it would mean committee on
committee, and would have a bad effect on Indian opinion. Chamberlain
concluded that in this case the best policy was not to press Curzon -
he had probably already 'gone rather further than he likes'? he was
'uneasy, nervous, and in consequence a little irritable', and it might
5 4'be well to give him a rest'.
The appointment of the two committees was approved by the
Cabinet early in august, and little further was done until the
55beginning of September. At this time Montagu began to urge the
appointment of a Cabinet committee to draft a bill on the assumption
that the Government accepted the four basic principles of the Report,
namely popular control and independence for local bodies, the first
stages for advance in the provinces, the continued responsibility of
the Government of India to Parliament, and the relaxation of
parliamentary control over the Government of India and the provincial
governments. This bill would be submitted to a Joint Committee after 
56
a second reading."" In October the Government successfully warded off 
an attempt in the Lords to have the Report referred to a Joint 
Committee? in November the Prime Minister gave explicit assurances 
that he intended to carry through the reforms programme? and later 
that month Montagu secured the appointment of the India Office 
committee, -under the chairmanship (in spite of Curzon's objections)
54 Chamberlain to Curzon, 6 July, & to Montagu, 6, 15, 26 & 29 July,
& Montagu to Chamberlain, 6, 12 & 18 July 1918, ACP21/5/48-57? 
Chamberlain to Curzon, 25 July, & Curzon to Chamberlain, 26 July 
1918, ACP21/5/5-6.
P C
D Montagu to Chelmsford, 7 uugust 1918, CP4. Lionel Curtis later 
assured Chelmsford that -he (Curtis) had secured the appointment of 
the committees. Ke had urged Lord Sinha to concentrate, when seeing 
the Prime Minister, on the need for the appointment 'to place the good 
faith of the Government beyond question', See Curtis to Chelmsford,
2 Sept. 1918, CP15? & Curtis to Sinha, 19 July, & also to Reville 
Chamberlain, 18 July 1918, Lothian Papers GL40/17/33. Curtis had also 
suggested that Montagu should give in over the submission of the Report 
to a select committee and concentrate on securing satisfactory member­
ship - but Montagu remained opposed to this procedure. See Curtis to 
Montagu, 3 pug. 1918, ibid.
Montagu to Chelmsford, 5 Sept. 1918, CP4,
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57of Lord Crewe, Further progress was halted by the parliamentary
recess and election, and by the need to wait for the reports of the
three reforms committees.
That so much had been achieved, fairly quickly, in spite of
the Cabinet’s preoccupations and Curzon1s reluctance, was due partly
to skilled lobbying and partly to principle. The key figure in the
lobbying was Chamberlain. Montagu had found himself a Liberal in a
coalition that had become almost wholly Conservative - he admitted that
58if it had not been for the reforms he would have considered resigning. 
But this exceptional situation was turned to advantage, because of the 
dexterity of Chamberlain who had re-entered the Cabinet as Chancellor. 
Montagu was able to put forward the steps which he wanted the Cabinet 
to take; Chamberlain would then support him in some of these, privately 
persuade Curzon to agree and then encourage Montagu to reduce his 
immediate demands. After a short time Montagu would suggest again 
the further stages he had wanted, and Chamberlain would repeat his 
manoeuvres. In this way, they carried Curzon in stages from
acquiescence in the publication of the Report to approval of the
appointment of the Cabinet committees at each stage Curzon had been 
reluctant to commit himself before he had had time to consider the 
proposals but had allowed himself to be persuaded to agree to 
Chamberlain's compromises - so that the reformers could turn his own 
agreement against him, and take him a stage further by pointing out 
that he and the Cabinet were already committed by the stages they had
approved. Thus Curzon was placed in a position, once he had read
the Report and decided he objected to it, of being unable to make a 
stand without repudiating his own actions.
The principle which assisted Montagu was the need to adhere 
to the August Declaration. When the Cabinet first discussed publica­
tion of the Report, Chamberlain suggested that although the Report was
a revolution, it was revolution already made by the Declaration, and
59that Curzon's objections were really to the Declaration. y This of
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(Lords) 31? No. 71j 832-876 (24 Oct. 1918). For the terms of reference 
of the India Office committee, see S/S to V, 9 & 22 Jan., & V to S/S,
25 & 29 Jan. 1919, CP10.
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59 Montagu to Chelmsford, 15 June 1918, CP4; Chamberlain, Cabinet
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course could not be countenanced, Curzon himself admitted, in the 
House of Lords, that ’the Declaration did commit his Majesty’s Govern­
ment’ and ’Parliament and the nation as well'.^ The reformers claimed 
that the Report was based on the Declaration, as no other scheme was, 
and that the level of advance promised by the Report (if not its 
precise methods) represented the minimum now practicable. Chelmsford 
commented to Montagu that people acclaimed the Declaration because they 
were 'too stupid or too lazy' to work out what it meant, and then,
when someone tried to translate it into fact, they objected - he used
62
to say 'that this was the attitude of the I.C.S. towards Reform'.
It was an attitude which could not survive; every step taken by the 
Cabinet, every committee appointed, every day without a hostile 
decision by Government or Parliament, made it more probable that 
there would be reforms substantially like those recommended in the 
Report. As with the Declaration, the British Government had committed
63themselves to a policy they had yet to approve formally.
In these negotiations, as in the corresponding stage before 
the Declaration, the Government of India had to remain a spectator.
They could only have influence obliquely, as when their despatch 
supported the Report, or when one of Chelmsford's letters happened 
to be included in a Cabinet memorandum, or when Meston was consulted 
(because he was in London). With the appointment of the reforms 
committees, however, the initiative returned to India. The Secretary 
of State had proposed one committee under Lord Southborough to 
consider the questions of franchise and division of subjects.
Chelmsford urged separate personnel and reports, in the interests 
of efficiency, with joint meetings to be arranged if necessary,
Montagu agreed, but decided (against Chelmsford's advice) to retain 
Southborough as a common chairman for the two committees. In the
^  Parliamentary Debates (Lords) 31; Ro. 71; 865 (24 Oct. 1918).
See, for example, speeches by Lords Crewe and Donoughmore, 
ibid., 832-835 & 850-863; & by Montagu, Parliamentary Debates
(Commons) 116, Ho. 68, 343 (22 May 1919).
62
Chelmsford to Montagu, 31 Aug. 1918, CP4» See also Chelmsford 
to Selborne, 3 Jan, 1919; CP15»
63
An account of the negotiations with Curzon, consisting almost 
entirely of quotations from correspondence, may be found in S.D.
Waley, Edwin Montagu, London 1964; 163^ .181. See also Ronaldshay,
The Life of Lord Curzon, III, London ]_ 1928J ,  169-176.
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event Southborough made himself responsible mainly for the franchise 
committee? and R. Feetham, the Deputy Chairman, dealt with the 
subjects committee. The proposed terms of reference - broadly to 
devise schemes bearing in mind the recommendations of the Report - 
were not disputed by the Government of India, except for one substan­
tive point; Montagu had suggested empowering the franchise committee 
to plan for direct election where possible, except for considering 
special provisions for representing 'illiterate classes'? Chelmsford 
pointed out that prejudging the issue of communal representation by 
this narrow provision \-fould be resented in India, and Montagu widened 
the authority accordingly, A further change made it clear that there 
could be no going back on dyarchy: Montagu had first suggested requir­
ing the subjects committee to take into consideration the principles 
and the illustrative list given in the Report (paragraphs 212-213 and 
238-240, and Appendix II); but in the final version this formula was 
strengthened and the committee were obliged to take into consideration 
the illustrative list and to be 'guided by' the principles (of a 
division of subjects),^
Southborough's committees were to work through a round of 
provincial hearings and discussions, and the Government of India took 
on the role of general overseer. They had asked the provinces to 
prepare schemes, and urged on them the need for hastes as they 
explained, in a telegram to several local governments in mid-October, 
they were having 'great difficulty in preparing a programme ... owing 
to £~-the_J7 unpreparedness of some provinces in spite of the fact, that 
they were asked more than 3 months ago to prepare the requisite 
material and they must impress on the local Government the necessity 
of expediting this work to the utmost possible extent1, Chelmsford 
informed Lord Southborough that he was unwilling to press too hard 
lest the local governments should give inadequate attention to complex 
problems; but at the same time he explained privately to Willingdon 
that it was imperative to carry through the reforms and that even 
temporary setbacks would jeopardise support: despite provincial
64
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65difficulties, therefore, the effort must he made. Chelmsford was
also concerned to preserve the principles of the Report. Southborough
consulted him over an attempt to circumvent dyarchy, when Sir B.
Rohertson, Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, wrote; ’I
have frankly declared for a preliminary period of training with no
divided heads'. Chelmsford replied that this was, as Southborough
thought, outside the committee's terms of reference, and that Robertson
66should be told so 'politely but firmly'. Similarly Chelmsford
sharply informed lord Pentland and the Madras Government that he
'would be obliged' if they would 'immediately' prepare a scheme for
the division of subjects, even though (as would be noted in South-
67
borough's report) they disapproved of dyarchy.
The public reactions to the Report in India were almost 
uniformly unenthusiastic. The Viceroy sent home an early summary of 
newspaper verdicts; some were disappointed, some reserved judgment, 
some condemned outright, but only the Times of India, the Civil and 
Military Gazette, the Rangoon Gazette, and two United Provinces papers 
(the Pioneer and the Indian Daily Telegraph) applauded the scheme. 
Individual Indian commentators generally deplored the arrangements for 
the Government of India as insufficiently progressive? but recognised 
'moderates1 such as Banerjea, Sastri, Sapru and Wacha otherwise gave 
their support. Only Patel and Ayyangar opposed an Imperial Legislative
65
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Council resolution calling the Report a definite advance, although
there were some abstentions, including Sarma, and Jinnah, llalaviya
6yand Khaparde had also opposed the motion in debate. Tilak's initial 
reaction was that the proposals were cheese-paring and entirely un­
acceptable? Gandhi, on the other hand, admitted that he preferred
the scheme 'as a framework' to that put forward by the Congress and 
70League. At their special session in Bombay in 1918, the Congress
declared the Report's scheme unacceptable unless it were amended to
allow full responsibility in the provinces and partial responsibility
in the central government? this conclusion was endorsed at the Delhi
session later in the year, and thus rejection of the final scheme in
1919 was inevitable - as was the breach with the 'moderates', now
combined under their own banner, that of the all-India Moderates'
Conference (later the National Liberal federation). Annie Besant
was the only prominent leader of the 'advanced' \m_ng to defect from
the Congress 011 this issue. With her Home Rule League reconstituted
for the purpose, she was to conduct a vigorous campaign during 1920
against Gandhi and the Congress and in favour of the reforms, which
71she then hailed as a 'death-blow' to the autocracy. Both moderates 
and extremists, however, agreed that the Government of India arrange­
ments should be made more liberal. Montagu's reaction, in October
1918, was to begin to wonder what would be acceptable to both the
72moderates and Chelmsford. He did not propose to raise the matter at 
this stage - it would have been bad tactics to have suggested any 
further advance before the fate of the reforms scheme was more assured - 
but to Chelmsford this suggestion must have seemed like an early 
warning that his and the Secretary of State's paths were likely to 
diverge as discussions progressed.
^  V to S/S, 8 Sept. 1918, CP9. The voting was 46 to 2. See also
Wacha to Chelmsford, 12 July, & Bikaner to Chelmsford, 17 July 1918,
CP21? & Ronaldshay to Montagu, 1 Sept. 1918, HP29.
^  V to S/S, 12 July, CP9, & Gandhi to Chelmsford, 12 July 1918, CP21.
Nevertheless Tilak and his specially founded Congress Democratic Party 
were later to advocate working the refonus, in opposition to Gandhi's 
non-cooperation? see, for example, Stanley A. Wolpert, Tilak and 
Gokhale, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1962, 287-295.
71 See Annie Besant, 'National Home Rule League', Madras 1919, &
'Wounded to Death', 'The Coming Congress', 'The Parting of the Ways',
'The Reform Act 'Patriotism and Cooperation with the new Govern­
ments', 'Our Ministers', 'Organization for Freedom', 'Responsibility of 
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In England the press was divided in its reactionss the 
Daily Telegraph, the Horning Post, the Spectator and the Saturday Review 
attacked the Report? hut it was applauded by The 'Tunes, the Manchester 
Guardian, the Daily News, the Daily Chronicle, the Daily Express,
New Statesman, India and Nation, Montagu professed himself disappointed 
at the Daily Telegraph over which he had taken 'some trouble1j but 
he claimed he had 'got the Times quite easily', and had also convinced 
J.L. Garvin of the Observer. He also interviewed Sir V. Chirol who 
was writing for The Times and favoured Curtis's 'two governments' plan, 
The people with key influence in London were probably Austen Chamberlain, 
Philip Kerr and Lord Curzon. Chamberlain proved himself 'a tower of 
strength' on Montagu's side. Kerr, unlike many Round Table members, 
was a convert to the Report, and thus brought to bear his very con­
siderable influence on the Prime Minister in favour of the scheme - 
when he resigned in 1921, Kerr was told by Montagu that he did not 
know how his Indian work, in so far as it impinged on Downing Street, 
could continue to prospers Kerr had given such helpful advice and
assistance. Curzon, as we have seen, was an enigma? Montagu wrote!
73he 'amuses me, interests me, irritates me1. Montagu suspected that
Curzon had been Influenced by the main opponent of the scheme, the
former Governor of Bombay, lord Sydenham, who, backed by the Morning
Post, presided over a campaign centred on the Anglo-British Association^
but reaching even to India. Pamphlets hostile to the reforms were
issued by the Association? Sydenham sent circulars to firms and
Chambers of Commerce warning that trade would be harmed. Montagu
sought to counter such activities by meeting groups (including Sydenham's)
and by setting up a propaganda committee In the India Office. Lord
Donoughmore, who had been with Montagu in India, had early had a
'very satisfactory1 meeting with selected members of the Conservative 
^ , 74
Party. As early as August, however, Montagu decided that Sydenham's
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group was becoming more and more isolated. At the same time he
concluded - correctly as we have seen - that Curzon, in spite of his
opposition to dyarchy and parliamentary concessions in the provinces, 
would be 'driven by the general attitude in the country to adherence 
in the main’.
The reactions of the local governors in India seemed likely
to create greater difficulties. Chelmsford had tried to carry them
with him on the reforms, at first by keeping them informed, and then,
at Montagu’s suggestion, by involving them in the reforms discussions
7 C
in Delhi in January 1$18. But opposition to dyarchy had early become
apparent. In October 1917 local government replies had made it clear
that, except in Bengal, dyarchy would be rejected, and that thinking 
was, on the whole, very conservative - elected majorities, limited 
budgetary control, and standing committees were about the limits of 
the advance suggested for the councils. In January 1918 the govern­
ments, faced with the Government of India's advocacy of the dualist 
principle (in their circular of 11 November l$G-7), openly argued against 
dyarchy, although some - the Governments of Madras (with Pentland dis­
senting) , Bihar and Orissa, and the United Provinces - favoured forms 
of sub-provincial transfers of power. Bombay, rejecting all dyarchies, 
put forward a scheme of their own whereby the legislature would gain 
budgetary control and the right, except for reserved subjects, to
introduce legislation without the Governor’s consent, while executive
77authority remained undivided. At the 1918 governors' conference a 
compromise was arranged, suggested by Meston, whereby dyarchy would bo 
started earlier in some provinces than in others and a power of recall­
ing transferred siibjects would be safeguarded. The division of opinion 
had been immediately apparent and, although Chelmsford had made what 
Montagu called a 'short and very admirable speech' and Montagu had
rj
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rounded on Vincent (who had sided with the dissenters), no agreement
had seemed possible, even when the local governors went into session
amongst themselves under the- chairmanship of Pentland as the senior
governor. Chelmsford had then suggested that he and Montagu should
chair a further meeting, as Pentland was ' impossible’, and under their
influence Meston’s compromise had been accc-pted. Montagu thought none
7ft
of the governors believed in it. Willingdon described it as uneasy
and unworkable - and to prove this he very soon repudiated it and
79returned to his former position^ In the early formative stages,
Chelmsford had suggested, when Willingdon, Meston and Robertson wore
engaging in preliminary confabulations on the reforms, that he wanted
the best minds at work on the problem and not agreement for the sake
of it? but as the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme became finalised he had
become more eager that there should be general acceptance at least of
the principles on which it was based.
After the Report was published, Ronaldshay agreed heartily
with nearly all the recommendations? Willingdon was irreconcilable
to what he called Montagu's ’rotten "dyarchy" idea'? Earcourt Butler
thought it unworkable? Craddock made it clear that ho thought it wont
beyond what was necessary (although he conceded that if it had a
conciliatory effect on all but the most extreme Indians it would have
been a 'most brilliant piece of statesmanship’).^' Chelmsford's reply
to the criticisms, as expressed to Willingdon in July 1918, was that
ho defied anyone to give 'progressive realisation of responsible
government1 except by dyarchy, and that any transitional scheme was
open to criticisms but the critics should suggest an alternative
82which was not equally objectionable. Before the end of 1918? howovo
^  Montagu, Diary, 206-224.
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Chelmsford continued to try to circumvent the opposition by arguments 
and discussions. Claudo Hill spent two nights in Bombay arguing with 
Willingdon who later told Chelmsford that he would not try to stop his 
scheme if it proved the only liberal advance possible5 but Willingdon 
declined to abandon his own Government’s plan for unitary government, 
which relying as it did on Indian cooperation and the governor's veto 
was suitable to his abilities. Hill concluded that the soundest thinker 
in Bombay was Rahimtoola who dissented from the local scheme on the 
grounds that it did not fulfil the August Declaration. Willingdon1s 
successor. Sir George Lloyd, discussed the issue with Meston, at
Chelmsford's special request, but decided that, although he did not
3 ^favour the Bombay scheme, he was not happy about dyarchy either. J 
As persuasion had not been successful, Chelmsford presented the 
governors, at their conference in January 1919? with the challenge 
he had first suggested to Willingdon and which Lloyd had also put 
forward as a good tactic to adopts the Viceroy asked the dissenters 
to formulate their own scheme, no doubt hoping that this would reveal 
the disagreements among them and at the same time show them the
a a
difficulties. 0 ’Dwyer, Butler, Craddock, Beatson-Bell and Robertson 
agreed on a proposal whereby Indians would be associated with but not 
responsible for government. Willingdon, now in Madras, continued to 
support his own proposal. Ronaldshay and Gait had approved the Montagu- 
Chelmsford scheme. Lloyd had been absent, dealing with a serious 
mill-strike in Bombay. The breach with all but three governors was 
now complete, and the Viceroy concentrated his efforts on trying to
counter the effect of this in London.
His response was to refer to the Declaration of 1917* He
admitted that the governors' opposition was formidable but insisted
that it should be made quite clear to the British Government that 
they would have to decide whether or not they intended to implement 
their announced policy? if they did, then the Montagu-Chelmsford 
scheme was the only possibility - the five governors' proposals, like 
all schemes of unitary government, made no provision for the gradual 
transfer of responsibility. Moreover, in Chelmsford's view the
83
Hill to Chelmsford, 19 Nov., & Willingdon to Chelmsford, 12 Dec. 
1918, CP215 Meston to Chelmsford, 19 Dec., CP21, L Lloyd to Montagu,
26 Dec, 1918, MP24.
84 1
Chelmsford to heads of provinces, 29 Dec. 1918, CP21; Montagu to 
Ronaldshay, 4 March 1919» MP27.
273
proposals would not works the- ’best chance' was to have 'a frank
dualism'. Finally, however, Chelmsford admitted that the first need
was to have something soon - he would have accepted an unsound scheme
85rather than have nothing. He had tried to persuade Lloyd to argue on 
his behalf, that he could not see how the five governors’ scheme complied 
with 'the principle of August 20th'| but Lloyd had preferred to con­
centrate his advocacy on the one point that further delay must be 
avoided,88 Chelmsford quoted Lloyd's view for the benefit of the home 
Government.
Montagu was at once more alarmed and more conciliatory. He 
agreed that the five governors’ scheme was unsound, but suggested that 
it might be possible to counter both Indian and official opposition 
to dyarchy by liberal concessions - for Indians presumably over the 
Government of India, and for the governors by one of two alternative 
proposals In the provinces? the executive councils could be half 
official and half non-official and appointed by the governor (not the 
Crown), or the government could consist of the governor and ministers 
only, with the reserved subjects administered by the governor with the 
help of official advisors who would not be members of the govern-
07
ment. Chelmsford disagreed? it was necessary to emphasise the
division of subjects so that Indian responsibility might clearly be
seen, and to emphasise separation so that friction might be minimised/0
Other disagreements were also appearing. Montagu had been unhappy at
some of the suggestions in the despatch which gave the Government of
India's views 011 the reformsf Chelmsford had insisted that his aim was
to protect the principles of the Report, particularly in his adoption
of the idea of maintaining a separate purse for transferred subjects
(which the Report had not favoured), in his disapproval of the transfer
of higher education, and in his strong opposition to any further
89concessions at this stage in the Government of India. The Governors'
^  Chelmsford to Montagu, 15 Jan., 12, 19 & 26 Feb., & 5 March 1919,
86
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dissent had made it imperative, of course, that the Government should
remain united, and the despatch, had pleased all Chelmsford's
Councillors except Sanlcaran Nair (who thought it too conservative).
On 14 May Montagu gained Cabinet approval for introducing
his reforms bill, which he had dram up with a Cabinet committee corn-
90prising Sinha, Milner, Fisher and Chamberlain. The bill mot with
little opposition in Parliament and was quickly referred to a joint 
91committee. It was at this stage that the effect of the governors'
dissent was likely to be most dangerous, and the chances of a rift
between Montagu and Chelmsford were also increased. They had differed
in their response to the governors - Chelmsford taking a hard line,
insisting on dyarchy? Montagu toying with ideas that would have
blurred or avoided separation. They had differed over the separate
purse, the transfer of higher education, and further liberalisation
in the central government? and in addition Chelmsford had also been
alarmed at some of the recommendations of Lord Crewe's committee on
the India Office, particularly the proposed abolition of the Secretary
92of State's Council. Accordingly the Government of India decided not
to entrust the presentation of their case to the Secretary of State,
and succeeded in deputing Meston as their special representative
93before the joint committee. This extraordinary procedure was to 
have equally extraordinary results. It was usual for the Government 
of India's influence to diminish or disappear in such situations, as 
in the formulation of the 1917 Declaration or in the Cabinet reaction 
to the Report. But for the joint committee the Government of India 
virtually abandoned the fiction of working through the Secretary of 
State, and introduced their own representative as an independent force. 
In 1918 the Government's special sub-committee on reforms had been 
replaced by Meston, who had been appointed as a special officer tc 
coordinate the work on the reforms - to prepare the Government of 
India's case, to provide close informal liaison with the
98 Montagu to Chelmsford, 18 Feb. & 1 May (postscript, 14 May)
1919? CP5.
91 Montagu to Chelmsford, 28 May, 11 June & 17 July 1919? CP5»
92 S/S to V(HD), 14 & 17 June, CP10, & Chelmsford to Montagu, 31 
July 1919, CP5.
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94Southborough committees and the local governments. In continuation 
of this rolo, and on the excuse of bringing his special expertise to 
bear, Meston joined the consultations in London.
Meeton has provided, in a series of remarkable letters to
Chelmsford, a detailed account of his manoeuvres, his cooperation
and disagreements with Montagu, and his success in swaying the joint
committee. From these letters, allowing for Heston's point of view,
we may obtain a picture of the Government of India's involvement in
this penultimate stago of the reforms discussions. Heston's first
reports were not optimistic. Re found dyarchy in the balance before
the joint committee, and Montagu opposing the reservation of higher
education, and the separate purse. The Secretary of State was also
advocating three Indians (instead of two) on the Viceroy's Council,
and claiming the support of five or six members of the joint committee
for this idea. Heston began by meeting members of the joint committee
individually and also lobbied members of Parliament generally, but was
chiefly concerned to bolster up Montagu's morale? he reported having
to dispel ’periodic glooms' and saw his role as one of detaching
Montagu from the influence of Basu, Sastri and Chintamani. Marly in
August Meston put himself rather out of favour by an argument with
Montagu over his being closetted with these moderates and failing to
inform the Government of India of his designs for changing the central 
95government„
At first Meston encountered some reluctance among joint 
committee members to talk with him, as they were not supposed to have 
private discussions with witnesses and regarded Meston as one. But ho 
succeeded in meeting individuals, and was soon able to report that he 
had secured many of the amendments Chelmsford wanted in the proposals 
for the India Office? he regarded most other matters as hopeless. By
mid-August he was able to report that the committee members were no
longer a.loof? rather he was taken into consultation by groups of 
them, and he expected to be allowed to attend some of the sessions 
later. By now he thought dyarchy safe - the five governors' scheme 
was known but had few friends. But he was not confident on the
Meston to V, 26 Oct., & to Maffey, 5 foe., A Maffey to Meston, 5
Dec. I9IB5 CP21. Meston himself had suggested that there should be such 
an appointment,
95 Meston to Chelmsford, 24 July, & 1 f 12 Aug. 1919, CPI5.
276
separate purse and higher education, and was particularly apprehensive 
about a probable confrontation over changes in the central government, 
favoured by Montagu and opposed on the joint committee by Lord Midleton
q6
in particular. ' Meston began to play off the Government of India
against the Secretary of State by calling for timely interventions by
telegram from India. In August he had already suggested that
Chelmsford should telegraph - province by province - his objections
to the Southborough recommendations on the franchise, not in order to
have his own proposals included in the reforms bill, but in order to
prevent the joint committee from laying down any general canons or
particular rules, so that the Government of India could, as they wished,
make the arrangements themselves after the reforms were passed. In
September Meston tried to telegraph to urge on Chelmsford the need to
compromise on the central government in order to concentrate energies on
essential points. He suggested that the Government should make a
strong representation against any weakening of the central executive
but agree to what Meston thought inevitable, namely a Council of State
which would have full revising powers and not be an instrument of
securing essential legislation; he also advised that they should give
the imperial legislature binding powers on the budget subject to
restorative powers for the Governor General. These attempts to arrange
tactics aroused Montagu's opposition - he already, in Heston's view,
regarded Meston as Chelmsford's intelligence officer and withheld
information from him, Holderness asked Meston to moderate his
telegram asking for intervention. Chelmsford, thus unaware of Meston's
tactical considerations, continued to oppose the voting of the budget
and also having three Indian executive councillors, although he agreed
07
to aooept the revising second chamber. In this last respect, 
therefore, Montagu had achieved what he had wanted in Delhi - but he 
now wanted much more which the Government of India continued to 
contest.
In October Meston followed up his idea of strategic 
compromise. He suggested that the Government of India should argue
96
Meston to Chelmsford, 12 A 25 Aug. 1919, CPI5. These views were 
borne out by Meyer (to Chelmsford, 5 Sept. 1919, CP15). On 18 Sept., 
Meston reported that Montagu was again trying to secure in the local 
governments greater apparent unity, or even a unified executive with 
compartmentalised duties - but these efforts gained no support.
97
Meston to Chelmsford, 28 Aug. & 13, 16 & 18 Sept., A Chelmsford 
to Meston, 30 Sept. 1919? 0P15*
277
strongly against having, at the centre, any dyarchy, more than two
Indian councillors or voting on the budget. They should agre*:, to
standing committoos and parliamentary undor-secretaries except for thc-
hrmy and Political Departments, and to an upper chamber with revising
powers and a nominated (later an elected) majority, affirmative
legislation to be possible, when essential, by ordinance. Meston
argued that the joint committoo seemed determined to abandon the
Report's position on the Government of India, and that, of the members,
only Sydenham was disposed to go backwards. Meston had little hope of
avoiding three Indian members of the Viceroy's Council, but was busy
lobbying to prevent the legislature having the power to vote on the
budget. Ho hoped to see all tlio members individually - it was useless
to write to them as they were now impatient of essays - but no longer
98expected to be able to attend the committee's private deliberations»■ 
Meston decided to prepare a memorandum sotting out the Government of 
India's views? and this decision at last precipitated from Montagu 
the outburst that had been brewing for some time. Montagu read 
Meston1s draft and was appalled at its tone, but also objected in 
principle; ho would have to attack the Government publicly if the 
memorandum went in, and he could not see how the Government could 
carry out an alternative policy (if their proposals were rejected) 
once they had placed their opposition on record. Meston realised 
that he could have gone to Lord Selbourne, the chairman of the joint 
committee, and had him insist (as he would have insisted) on hearing 
everything Chelmsford had to say - but this would not have helped 
matters with Montagu. Thus Meston was conciliatory. He agreed to 
alter the tone of his draft (which was his responsibility), but 
argued that the Government of India had a right to be heard. He 
insisted on being allowed to consult Chelmsford.^
The Viceroy seems to have taken the point of Meston's 
manoeuvres. The Government responded to the draft with a straight­
forward official telegram endorsing or strengthening all Meston's 
points, but Chelmsford had earlier sent a private telegram in which 
he admitted the possibility of concessions on some points which were 
not considered vital. A comparison of these three sources - Meston’s 
draft and the two telegrams - gives a clear indication of the important 
objectives of the Government of India before the joint committee.
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Four main elements may be discerned. They wanted the Crewe proposals
for the India Office to be changed so that the Council of India and the
Secretary of State's statutory powers over the Government of India
would be retained - Chelmsford was prepared to see a convention evolve
whereby the Secretary of State would not interfere with the will of
the legislature in matters not essential to peace and good government.
Secondly, the Government wanted British authority unimpaired in the
central arrangements? they were unwilling to have more than two
Indian members, or any dyarchy, or any voting of the budget, and
they insisted on the positive legislative power through ordinances if
the Council of State were to be a full revising chamber. Thirdly, they
wanted the details of franchise and functions to be left to rules to
be drawn up by them, not included in the Act. Finally, they wanted
dyarchy in the provinces, but worked in such a way that efficiency
would not be impaired in essentials and the separation of the two
halves would be obvious? they wanted a separate purse for transferred
subjects and were unwilling for the budget to be voted especially for
reserved subjects; they wanted to give the local governor power to
appoint the president of the legislature and to make sure he was
experienced in parliamentary procedure? they also wished to reserve
100the subjects of higher education and the development of industries.
There were several principles behind these preferences, In 
the first two areas, the Government of India were insisting that the 
Secretary of State's (and also the Government of India's) statutory 
authority had to be maintained as long as full sovereignty and 
responsibility had not passed from Parliament to the Indian electorate; 
and that the Government of India's powers had to be unimpaired to 
reassure British interests and preserve British supremacy during the 
transitional period - the transfer of budgetary control, for example,
100 Meston to Chelmsford, 10 Oct., CP15; S/S (for Meston) to V,
10 Oct., V to S/S (for Meston) 15 Oct.", & V(ED) to S/S, 2 Nov. 1919, 
CPU . The education controversy was characterised by Meston as a 
choice between quality before quantity, and quantity before quality; 
see Lord Meston, India at the Crossways, Cambridge 1920, 56-38.
Perhaps Montagu's attitude may be discerned in his earlier reluctance 
when agreeing to leave compulsory education to local option; he had 
stressed that Indian intellectuals regarded illiteracy (because it 
was cited as an objection to liberal reform) as a stigma which had to 
be vigorously attacked. (See Montagu to Chelmsford, 21 Aug. 1917?
CP5) Presumably then it was a necessary token of good faith to 
transfer all education - to place the main instrument of Indian advance 
firmly in Indian hands.
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would, have given the Indian majorities in the imperial legislatures 
effective power to shape policy, whereas the further concession on 
the Council of State, although it meant that British supremacy had to 
be vested in what the Government considered the less satisfactory 
instrument of the ordinance, did not alter in the last resort the 
distribution of power. In the third element, the omission of detailed 
rules in the reforms bill, the Government again demonstrated their 
belief that arrangements within general principles should remain the 
responsibility of the authorities in India, and should not be pro­
nounced upon by Parliament. Finally, in the provinces, the Government 
wanted friction between the two halves of the government and the two 
roles of the legislature to be at a minimum » they were unwilling to 
make concessions over the budget and the separate purse because they 
wished to avoid the prospect of disagreements over transferred and 
reserved allocations, and the hypocrisy and bitterness if the govern­
ment were forced to employ restorative powers for essential but un­
popular supplies. The objections to the transfer of higher education 
and industries had different motives - the Government were ready to 
transfer primary education (where the possible advances would tend 
towards making education free and compulsory, changes best introduced, 
by Indians), but were not pleased to relinquish their paternalistic 
control over the universities and over industrial expansion, areas in 
which local and communal loyalties were thought likely to prove 
obstacles and in which an era of improvement was promised by the
advent of two major commissions of enquiry (the Sadler on Calcutta
, in
University, and the Indian Industries') instituted under Chelmsford."'' 
Montagu opposed the Government of India on most of these points? he 
wished to do away with the need for the Secretary of State's sanction 
on non-essential ma.tters, to have a third Indian member in the centra] 
executive, to have both imperial and provincial budgets voted by the 
legislatures, and to have a joint purse and the transfer of higher 
education in the provinces.
The joint committee rounded off its discussions by voting 
on a series of resolutions set out by Lord Selborne. Meston was not 
supposed to know of these but in fact had discussed them with Selborne 
in advance. The resolutions supported the Government of India on 
most points - the Secretary of State's responsibility was to remain 
unimpaired, the Governor General was to have a power of ordinance, the
See above, p. 21.
102 Meston to Chelmsford, 11 Oct. 1919? CP15.
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bill was to include only the total strength and official ratio (and
no details of franchises) for the legislative assemblies, there were to
be separate purses by agreement, and the provincial legislatures were
to have only advisory powers on reserved legislation. Montagu tried
to reach a concordat with Selborne whereby he agreed to most of the
propositions but sought support for changes in the Secretary of State's
responsibility, and, in the central government, for the voting of
the budget, three Indian members and parliamentary under-secretaries
(which Chelmsford disapproved of but did not oppose as a vital point).
Meston found himself having 'a horribly strenuous time' between
Montagu and Selborne - Montagu trying to persuade him to abandon his
advocacy of the Government of India case and work on Selborne's
105resolutions to see how they could be applied in practice.
The joint committee began its consideration of the resolu­
tions in camera, and Montagu had much his own way. On the second day, 
however, Meston was shown the committee's conclusions on financial 
arrangements and sent in a strong message saying they were meaningless 
and impractical. He was promptly invited to attend future sessions. 
There is no evidence that the financial questions wore reconsidered - 
Meston's objections may perhaps be assumed to have been to that 
combination of the joint and divided purse schemes recommended in the 
Joint Committee Report when discussing Part one. clause 1 of the Bill. 
The incident's significance thus lay in the future. After October 
Meston was able to report that he had recovered a lot of ground that 
he had hardly hoped to see again. He had been accepted as a regular 
member of the committee, and was called upon to repeat the Government 
of India's views, without hostile cross-examination, whenever they 
differed from Montagu's. The most serious difference of opinion, as 
Meston had predicted, occurred over Montagu's insistence on changes 
in the Report's proposals for the Government of India. In the committee 
session, he suggested doing away with the Secretary of State's sanction 
when there was accord between the government and the legislature, 
introducing certain subjects where the Governor General would accept 
the will of the legislature, and allox^ing the legislature to vote 
the budget. Lord Midleton attacked these proposals as 'irresponsible1, 
and the committee adjourned for luncheon after a heated discussion.
That afternoon Meston attended a conference between Midleton and 
Montagu-Midleton pointed out the dangers of a divided joint committee
105
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report and Montagu proved conciliatory. He abandoned his position on 
dyarchy in the central legislature, modified his demand for budgetary 
control and agreed that the changes in the Secretary of State’s role 
should be included in the committee’s report but not the bill.^^
The report of the joint committee was therefore not too 
unpalatable to the Government of India. They lost out on the third 
Indian members for the central executive - which Meston thought the 
only disastrous decision - and on the transfer of higher education.
But they had their way over leaving the detailed rules out of the 
Act, and in retaining the statutory responsibility of the Secretary 
of State - indeed on Meston's advice it was provided that any 
relaxation of his powers should be subject to the prior approval of
both houses of Parliament. In the Government of India there was to
be no dyarchy, no parliamentary under-secretaries and only limited 
legislative control over the budget - military, political & other 
subjects were not to be voted upon. In a number of points - the 
selection of experienced presidents for the legislatures, the power 
of positive ordinance, and the rejection of Montagu's idea for a. 
quinquennial review of functions (as opposed to a ten year considera­
tion of the reforms as a whole) ~ the Government of India's view was 
upheld. In other respects, where their preferences were not complied 
with, attempts were made to meet their objections; thus provincial 
budgets were to be voted, but the government was to have 'real' 
powers to enforce supplies for the reserved subjects? there was to
be a joint purse initially but the government was to be able to
allocate a definite proportion of revenue for each of the two halves
10of the government should friction develop. ' In these provincial 
arrangements, of course, Montagu too had little reason for dis­
satisfaction, but most of his designs for the Government of India, 
as developed in 1919, were either defeated or rendered harmless.
Meston's involvement had not diminished; in the final 
stages Montagu and Midleton refused to meet one another and Meston 
'had to run about between them, and forget the* mutual asperities of 
their language!' Selborne drafted his report? Meston was summoned 
within an hour by an angry and gloomy Montagu and informed that the
Meston to Chelmsford, 24 & 31 Oct. 1919, CP13* There is a copy o 
the Joint Committee Report in the Moral and Material Progress Report 
of 1919 (financial arrangements at"p.220)*
105 S/S to V(ED), 19 Nov. 1919, CPU.
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draft was unthinkable; ’Rot one line would he accept, not one comma. 
So far1 as he was concerned, the Bill was dead? and his resignation 
would he in the Prime Minister's hands next morning', Meston was 
instructed to write another report, which he did, trying (as he 
informed Chelmsford) 'to use as much of Lord Selhome's excellent 
material as possible'. Montagu retired to Norfolk, Meston was 
called upon for more lobbying before the bill was introduced for the 
third time? he rejjorted to Chelmsfords 'One day Montagu would hear 
that Carson had determined to smash the Bill? and I would be 
dispatched in hot haste to reason with Carson, whom I found as mild 
as a dove'. Montagu was also alarmed at the dangers in the Lords - 
he was fearful of Curson and expected Sinha to collapse, Sinha him­
self predicted he would be on his death~bed before the third reading. 
But all went well. There was very little opposition in either house,
Meston admired Montagu's skill in introducing the bill, and Curzon
107made no trouble in the Lords.
The reforms had been approved at last - probably earlier, 
thanks to Montagu and Chamberlain, than once seemed likely, and 
nearer, thanks largely to Meston, to what the Government of India had 
wanted, Chelmsford's role, however, had been forgotten. Sir George 
Lowndes wrote to him; 't/hat you have initiated, and have worked for 
during more than three and a half years, ... will be for all time a 
great landmark of courageous leadership ..or, Por the moment Mr, 
Montagu rather fills the stage at home, but the honour is yours, and 
we all know it here*. Chelmsford replied that he was touched - this 
was 'the only recognition' he had received, and, although the main 
thing was that thu reforms were through, it seemed that they must 
'congratulate themselves1. Chelmsford's role and also his dedication 
and commitment had been underestimated. Yet Stanley Reed recalled 
that 'Chelmsford was fou with the report? he could think of little 
else the moment current business was put aside'. Chelmsford's irony 
in reply to Lowndes was both an echo of that enthusiasm and a foretasv
Meston to Chelmsford, 8 Nov. 1919? CPI5-
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of the disappointments to come.^^
V/.S. Marris was now appointed Commissioner of a new Reforms
Office in the Government of India, to replace Meston and supervise
109the introduction of the reforms. y The hill had left details to ho 
decided in India in two main matters of the electorates and the 
constitution of the executive councils. There was some opposition, 
on grounds of expense and lack of work, to the idea of having equal 
numbers of Europeans and Indians on the executive councils (in addition 
of course to the Indian ministers) if it meant, as Chelmsford suggested, 
that the provinces must decide to have a council of four (two European 
officials and two Indian non-officials) or possibly three (one European 
official and one Indian and one European non-officia l) or, for the 
smaller provinces, two (European and Indian, possibly both officials).
In Madras Wlllin&don argued for two European officials and one Indian, 
the Europeans to leaven the inexperience already introduced by the 
Indian ministers;: 'The nearer I get to it,' he explained, 'the more,
honestly, I feel that wo must not go too fast'.^^ The provinces did 
not agree on what should be done. Bombay argued against four 
councillors but was uncertain what would be better. In Bengal 
Ronaldshay and all three of his Councillors favoured retaining the 
existing arrangement of two officials and one Indian non-official. 
Maclagan in the Panjab wanted one official European and one official 
Indian (because a suitable official Indian was available), whereas 
Sir Prank Sly in the United Provinces preferred (also on grounds of 
availability) an official European and a non-official Indian. Chelms­
ford explained that several of these suggestions were precluded by 
the joint committee's recommendations, and Madras, Bengal and Bombay 
then expressed their preference for three councillors, one official 
European find two non-officials, European and Indianf but Montagu 
ruled this out as well, interpreting the joint committee's recommenda­
tions as requiring either two or four members. He also objected to 
the Panjab idea for an official Indian member. Chelmsford stressed
See Lowndes to Chelmsford, 24 Dec., & Chelmsford to Lowndes, 28
Dec. 1919) CP25; & Sir Stanley Reed, The India I Knew 1897-1947?
London 1952, 189.
109 V(PD) to S/S, 7 Jan. 1920, CPI2.
2-10 Willingdon to Montagu, 29 March 1920, MP20.
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to the local governors that sufficiency of the .European element
was a 'vital point' and must he allowed to outweigh considerations
of extravagance. Madras, Bengal and finally Bombay agreed to ask for
four councillors; the remainder were to have two. Parity between
European officials and Indian non-officials was to be maintained 
111throughout. A curious situation had thus arisen out of the division 
of the functions of government. Part of the government had been 
transferred to Indian control, but for the remainder, subjects in
which Indians had not hitherto had effective influence, it was argued
that Indian non-official involvement should not be allowed to fall 
below the level which had previously obtained in an undivided govern­
ment. This arrangement obscured a real advance in Indian influence 
over the reserved subjects.
Electoral arrangements had to be made at both imperial and 
provincial levels. The Reforms Office prepared a scheme for an Imperial 
Legislative Assembly of 100 members, elected by general, landlord, 
Muslim, European and Indian commerce constituencies. They referred the 
scheme to an advisory committee which gave approval subject to slight 
modifications increasing the membership to 103. The Government of 
India later decided to allow an extra seat to the Central Provinces.
Electorates for the Imperial Assembly ranged from under 20,000 in
112Assam to more than 180,000 in Bengal. The Council of State, it was 
decided, should also be formed by direct election, except for 
Executive Councillors entitled to sit in both chambers, though to
be voting members only in one, and for a certain number of nominated
V to G/Bengal, Bombay, Madras, LG/Bihar & Orissa, United Provinces, 
CC/Central Provinces, 13 July, Chelmsford to Maclagan, 14 July, G/ 
Bombay to V, 15 July, Ronaldshay, Maclagan, Sly, to Chelmsford, 16 
July, V to G/liadras, Bengal, Bombay, 10 Aug., Chelmsford to Maclagan,
12 Aug., & V to G/Bombay, 10 Sept. 1920, CP25, &. Ronaldshay to
Montagu, 17 & 21 July 1920, MP31.
112 V(R0) to S/S, 9 Jan., 25 Feb., CPI2, A 9 Bov. 1920, CPI3* The
allocation of seats was as follows (by constituency and province) ■:
Ma, Bo. Be. UP Pa. B0 CP As. Bu. Tota]
General 10 7 6 8 3 8 4 2 3 51
Muslim 3 4 6 6 6 3 l 1 30
Landholder 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _ 7
European 1 2 3 1 - - - 1 1 9
Ind.commerce 1 2 1 - - - - 4
Sikh - - - - 2 - - - - 2
Total 16 16 17 16 12 12 6 4 4
N"NOj—1
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non-official!::. The Reforms Office again suggested a scheme with
general and Muslim seats according to the proportions of the Lucknow
pact? and with electorates of about 2000 in major provinces or less in
minor. Again the advisory committee substantially approved the
proposals, the Government resisting suggestions for the representation
of Indian commerce and of non-Brahmins, but abandoning the idea of
any limit on the size of the constituences provided that the electors
were persons with administrative experience or professional eminence,
or representatives of industry, commerce and landed interests - the
electorates totalled about 3000 in the United Provinces, but only
113
about 1000 in the Central Provinces.
Provincial arrangements were largely decided at the heads 
of provinces’ conference in January 1920 and involved electorates 
ranging between rather under 1-g- million in the United Provinces and 
about 140,000 in the Central Provinces - the provincial councils in 
Madras and Bengal were elected by about one million voters, and in 
Bombay and the Panjab by about 500,000. In all cases these figures 
represented substantial increases not only in terms of the actual 
electors in the former system of indirect election, but also in terms 
of the constituencies which had elected the electors.'1’'*'4 The only
115 V(no) to S/0, 9 Jan., 4 Feb., 13 & 21 March, CPI 2, & 9 Nov. 19 
CPI3* The revised numbers were as follows (by constituency and 
provinces)?
Ma. Bo. Be. UP Pa. B0 CP As. Eu. Total
General 4 3 3 3 1 2
1
s 2 21
Muslim 1 2 2 2 li 1 -
1
s 10
Sikh - - - - 1 - - - - 1
Total 5 5 5 5 3s 3§ 2 1 2 32
(Botes Halves indicate seats at alternate elections)
114 V to S/S, 26 Jan., CPI2, & V(R0) to S/S, 9 Bov. 1920, CPI3. 
Comparative figures under the Morley-Minto constitution were just 
over 1,700 electors who were themselves elected in Madras, less 
than 1,500 in the United Provinces, less than 1,400 in Bengal, less 
than 900 in the Central Provinces, less than 700 in the Panjab, and 
about 570 in Bombay. These electors were themselves elected by 
associations or local body constituencies totalling about 170,000 
in Madras, rather more than 130,000 in the United Provinces, rather 
more than 600,000 in Bengal, about 130,000 in the Central Provinces, 
about 300,000 in the Panjab, and under 17,000 in Bombay. These 
numbers are exaggerated in that they include members of trade 
associations and universities, and also elected members who were in 
a minority to nominated members on the bodies entitled to vote for 
Council members. See II.Public 174-183, June 19I8.
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significant step after the provincial conference was the campaign 
waged by V/illingdon against non-Brahmin representation in Madras. 
Willingdon was strongly opposed to communal representation, which he 
thought would increase bitterness, and argued that it could not be 
justified for non-Brahmins when they were in a majority of eight to 
one in the Madras electorate. But the Government under Pentland had 
agreed in principle, and both Southborough and the Government of India 
had endorsed his agreement, so that some concessions had to be made? 
Willingdon offered to reserve half the general seats for the non- 
Brahmins, in addition to the nineteen nominated places, all for non- 
Brahmins (five Indian Christians, eight zamindars, and six members of 
depressed classes), and the thirteen Muslim seats. He put this 
suggestion to a conference of Brahmin and non-Brahmin leaders, and, 
when it was rejected by the latter, gained agreement that Meston should 
arbitrate in the dispute. Under Meston's award the non-Brahmins 
received 28 (or less than half the 65 seats)? in the elections, how­
ever, as if to vindicate V/illingdon1s view, the non-Brahmins won 50 
seats, and all three ministers were therefore non-Brahmin - Willingdon
had to bring two Brahmins into his Executive Council in order to make
115u s e  oi their abilities.
Thus the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were introduced. Electio 
were held? Assemblies opened. Indian legislators took part in govern­
ment not only as advisers but for the first time as decision-makers.
But the Indian National Congress had accepted the logic of their 
position and decided to boycott the elections. The moderates such as 
Sastri and Banerjea in the National Liberal League, and a sufficient 
number of other Indians, decided to cooperate with the reforms and some 
of them entered the Assemblies. The reforms had offered partnership. 
India's oldest political organisation had declined the offer. It had 
been taken up by splinter groups. Chelmsford recognised that this 
placed the reforms under a severe disability - that in so far as 
influential politicians were not represented in the new Assemblies the 
reforms were a failure. But It has been suggested, on the contrary, 
that exclusion of the extremists was, from the British point-of-view, 
the greatest success of the reforms ~ that the reformers had hoped for
115
Hillingdon to Montagu, 20 May, 1 June, 4 Aug. 1919, MP19, JQ Jan., 
8 & 26 Feb., 5 & 20 March, 7 June, 14 Aug., 27 Nov. & 9? 20 & 27 Dec. 
1920, MP20.
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nothing less than the disintegration of Indian political movements, 
and that by separating the moderates in the Assemblies from the 
extremists in the Congress they had achieved their aim.^^ This 
suggestion is wrong.
During the reforms discussions the government had taken 
measures calculated to conciliate interests which they considered 
' extreme', In 1917 a furore arose over a letter written by Lionel 
Curtis to James Meston. Chamberlain called the letter indiscreet 
and dogmatic; its publication created alarm among Indians at the 
prospect it suggested of the government of India passing into the 
hands of the colonies. In the letter Curtis had claimed, inaccurately, 
that his views had been approved by influential officials Including 
Meston himself - some had read drafts of the letter but none had 
expressed support. Curtis also claimed, disingenuously, that the 
letter was ’private'; he had undermined this claim by having had 
five hundred copies printed. The Government of India intervened in
the controversy. Chelmsford asked Meston to let him see the draft
of a statement he proposed to make on the subject, and strengthened 
the draft to include a statement that officials were to be forbidden 
to take Round Table membership. Some of the Viceroy's Council had 
wanted a complete ban on Curtis and his organisation. Chelmsford 
did not think this necessary - he believed the Round Table (with 
which he himself had contacts) was a worthwhile movement. But equally 
he refused to lift the ban on official membership, in spite of suffer­
ing a 'painful' interview with Curtis, Yet this ban had been imposed 
to please 'extremists' - the Home Department explained that they had
acted because Curtis's letter had given rise to apprehension and to
'definite charges ... that Government servants in this country are 
combining with Mr. Curtis, and the "Round Table" to give prominence to 
political views which are unpalatable to advanced Indian political
sentiment... ', The Home Department admitted that they considered
117these fears and charges to be unfounded.
The reforms themselves were also a response to educated 
Indians' demands and aspirations. Chelmsford explained that he had 
considered it necessary to see that they gave satisfaction, and
11 6
See V to S/S, 23 Nov. 1918, CP9.
117
See Chelmsford to Curtis, 13 Jan., to Meston, 26 Jan., CPI8, A 
to Chamberlain, 15 & 20 April & 16 March 1917, CP3s & II.Poll. 132,
June 1917. See also Lionel Curtis, Dyarchy, Oxford 1920.
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'probably wiser to give a little too much than too little'. He made
a comparison between the Irish priesthood and the Indian intellectuals,
both a small minority with influence out of proportion to their numbers.
The Irish priests had become estranged from the British; Chelmsford
wanted the Indians to be treated better - the Montagu-Che1msford Report
was saying to them, he believed, 'Come along and help us. V/e will
guide you .... There are many difficulties in your path and you will
118realise them as you begin to face responsibility'. Austen Chamber­
lain too had argued that the British had to shox^  their good intentions 
to the nationalistss only by leading the movement for reform could
they control it. Montagu had argued that any scheme must command
"ll9
public support in India. The Indian Diary is contradictory on this
point? Montagu was often despondent at the prospects of persuading 
the Government of India to accept anything wrhich would be popular with 
the 'advanced1 politicians, and he was aware that expectations were 
running very high; but nonetheless he had secured important promises 
or indications of support - from Annie Resant, Jinnah, Sankaran fair, 
Setalvad, Chandavarka, Rahimtoola, Ramaswami Aiyar (then Secretary 
of the Congress) - and, by the time the proposals were finalised, he 
had concluded that the Congress would accept them with a rider insist­
ing on certain amendments
In short, the reforms were directed at all those Indians who 
believed in the advance to self-government. It is true that the 
official response, when it was obvious that the moderates would be 
outvoted in the Congress, was to hope that they would combine in a 
separate organisation, from this period comes most of the evidence 
which has been used to suggest that the reforms were directed solely 
at the moderates. Lord i'illingdon went so far as to welcome a breach 
within the nationalist ranks. He wrote to Montagu that his difficulty 
was to persuade the moderates to act as politicians? 'They have got 
Tilak fy, Mrs B. & Co. committed to an entire non-possumus as regards 
yr, scheme. I want the moderates to keep them there & to bring out 
their own policy !> in a sense to "go to the country on it". But all 
these Indians love a compromise & I am desperately afraid that in order
118
Chelmsford to Bryce, 3 June 1919; CP16, & to Chamberlain, 20 
Sept. 1918, CPI5,
119
Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 20 June 19I8, ACP18/3/15, & Montagu 
to Chelmsford, 1 Jan. 1918, CP4.
120
Montagu, Diary, 55, 107, 118-119, 144, 163, 177, 311, 32O A 337* 
Montagu had also expressed himself as more and more anxious about the 
reforms because he thought events, such as the ban on Tilak's deputation
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to save a row they may come to some compromise with Tilak & Co.'. 
Willingdon had conversations with moderates, and soon became optimistic 
at the prospects for a moderate party* Moderates had held a separate 
congress in Bombayi and V/illingdon felt certain that there would be an 
immense effect from this banding together in opposition to the 'froth-
122
ing demogogues1. The extremists, he believed, were already chastened*
Montagu at this time also expressed the hope that 'moderates'
would break away from the Congress if they were defeated on the reforms
issue. Rather overstating his point, as was his custom, he avowed to
Ronaldsliay that his ’whole aim in life' was 'to work with the moderates
and to regard the extremists as the opposition'. With Willingdon, he
hoped for a 'Government party, Indian, courageous and strong’, in the 
123
new councils. Chelmsford hoped, more modestly, that there would be
in the Assemblies some members who would support government policies on 
their merits. His Government had organised propaganda to accompany the 
publication of the Report. The first edition and newspapers which 
featured it were sold out almost at oncej Rushbrook Williams prepared
a pamphlet| Stanley Reed and K.C. Roy surreptiously circulated
articles in support of the proposals. Rut this publicity was not
directed at 'extremists'. Chelmsford too had been influenced by their
reaction to the Report - this had convinced him that opposition was 
their raison d1etre and that they could not be expected to give it
But these reactions after the Report was published must be
distinguished from the motives of Montagu and Chelmsford in deciding
on their proposals, Montagu claimed that he had 'never expected to
have extremists' with him over the reforms\ he discovered this only
125when they had proved to be against him. Indeed, far from never
to England, and Willingdon's rupture with Home Rulers at the Bombay 
V/ar Conference, were going to create 'an important hostile section!| 
see Montagu to Chamberlain, 2 July 1918, ACP21/5/44.
121
Willingdon to Montagu, 31 July 1918, MP18.
122
Willingdon to Montagu, 11 & 30 July, 11 <x 24 Aug., 5 & 17 Sept,
& 8 Bov. 1918, Iff 18.
123
Montagu to Ronaldshay, 13 Aug., 25 Sept., 24 Oct. & 29 Nov. 1918,
& 17 Feb., 4 March & 22 Aug. I919, MP27.
124
Chelmsford to Montagu, 13 & 27 July, 16 Aug. & 17 Sept. 1918,
CP 4.
125
See Montagu to Willingdon, 13 Aug., MP16, & to Ronaldshay, 13 Aug, 
& 24 Oct. 1918, MP27,
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expecting extremist support; Montagu remained optimistic longer than 
most. He even suggested that Chelmsford meet with extremists politicians 
in an attempt to avoid a hostile decision by the Congress, Chelmsford 
refused on the grounds that the "bitterness of these people could not 
be allayed; their opposition would have to be accepted.Chelmsford 
was appealing to realism, not to doctrine - in him, as in Montagu, 
the rejection of the ’extremists' was a reaction to their rejection of 
the reforms.
Moreover, if turning to the moderates was a new development, 
it was also an incomplete one. firstly, the Government of India did 
not share Willingdon's enthusiasm for actively promoting a moderate 
party. This was a unilateral move on Willingdon’s part - even Sir 
Stanley Reed told him he was backing the wrong horse. Thus Chelmsford 
refused not only to cajole extremists, but also to meet and encourage 
moderates. He believed this would discredit them. He did no more than 
interview members of the Imperial Legislative Council; he believed a 
'constitutional' party was possible, but, unlike Willingdon and Montagu, 
did not think it wise to try to create it. Moderates were valuable 
only In so far as they seemed independent of the government. In the 
same way, when Montagu suggested supporting the reforms through a 
government newspaper, provincial durbars, and what amounted to a 
campaign by local officers, Chelmsford explained that he was satisfied 
with progress, and deprecated measures in which the hand of government 
was too obvious. He evidently took a pessimistic view of the govern­
ment's standing. It is also significant that his reservations about 
moderates wore made considering the viewpoint of those hostile to 
British rule, of the committed not the uncommitted, of extremists not 
moderates. And of course it was precisely this consideration which in 
the event made the new Assemblies \insatisfactory - Chelmsford gained 
members who would not oppose him on principle, but, because of the
extremist boycott, these members were no longer felt to be quite
127independent and their support was thereby less valuable.
Chelmsford to Montagu, 27 July, CP4, & V to S/S, 3 & 19 July, A 
S/S to V, 2 & 24 July 1918, CP9-
127
See Chelmsford to Montagu, 13 A 27 July, 16 Aug. & 17 Sept., CP4?
& V to S/S, 3 A 19 July A 7 Aug,, A- S/S to V, 2, 15 A 24 July, & 1 & 7 
Aug. 1918, CP9« Chelmsford passed on Montagu's propaganda suggestions 
to local governments but, while calling for every effort to ensure the 
reforms were properly understood, he stressed the need for delicacy and 
circumspection and did not give the suggestions his personal support; 
see Chelmsford to Pentland, Willingdon, Ronaldshay, Butler, O'Dwyer,
Gait, Robertson, Bell and Beadon, 18 Aug., A also V to G/Madras, 4 A 12 
Aug. 1918, CP21. But he did urge Pentland to call a meeting of his 
legislature to discuss the reforms scheme; see Chelmsford to Pentland, 
16 Sept 1918, CP21.
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Secondly, even Montagu soon bemoaned the moderates' 'lack of
drive or energy'. George Lloyd, finding that moderates would not
repeat in public what they had said in private, concluded that as a
128force in Indian politics they were practically useless. Reginald
Craddock pointed out that the moderates were subject to social persecu-
129tion and newspaper abuse if they supported the government. In Madras, 
whore he had sought a non-communal moderate alliance, even Willingdon 
became disillusioned. The extremists, he recognised, had a simple 
demand, 'Home Rule now's and a press at their command| the moderates 
lacked leadership and organisation, and a positive purpose - they did 
not 'do anything'
Thus there had been some flirtation with the idea of a 
moderate party. But it had come only when extremist opposition was 
inevitable? moreover no-one believed for long that a moderate alterna­
tive was reliable or promising. The Government of India (like the 
Indian people) were looking more and more towards the extremists § it 
was already clear that they were the voice of the future. It had been 
clear to many when the reforms were being written? thus they had not 
been conceived primarily as a sop to government supporters, an attempt 
to divide them from their fellow nationalists. Subsequent events - 
the extremist boycott, the moderate acceptance, the government reaction - 
were an obscuring of the government's intentions, not their natural 
outcome.
Two factors have compounded this confusion. The first is 
semantic. Of course the reforms were intended to encourage cooperation 
with the British, and in this sense were aimed at encouraging 
'moderates' (those prepared to cooperate) and discouraging 'extremists' 
(those who refused). But this precise distinction between different 
politicians was itself a product of the debate on the Montagu-Chclmsford 
reforms. Hitherto the government had applied the labels more loosely. 
Only after the reforms was it obvious that 'extremists' were those who 
disapproved of the proposals and turned them down, and 'moderates' 
those who disapproved but agreed to accept the scheme as a sizeable
1 28
Lloyd to Chelmsford, 6 May 1919? CP221 Montagu to Ronaldshay,
17 Leb. 1919, HP27.
Craddock to Chelmsford, 6 May 1919, CP22.
1^0
See V/illingdon to Montagu, 28 Oct., 6, I4 & 19 Mov. & 16 & 24 hoc, 
1919? MP19» but also, 7 Jan. 1920, MP20.
292
step forward. The difference was not in the changes each group wanted,
hut in whether they would accept the reforms if the changes were not 
131made. Thus it must he understood that Montagu and Chelmsford did not
direct their reforms at the moderates. They wero not seeking to holster
up one group of people at the expense of another} they were trying to
encourage one type of attitude wherever it might he found. And, in the
pre-Gandhian situation, this type of attitude, a willingness to share
the government with the British, included a wide political spectrum,
from a politician like Malaviya, regarded as an extremist in the old
sense, to some conservative and much honoured representative of an
aristocratic family. Thus the reforms were aimed at all5 hut some
people excluded themselves - namely the new type of extremist, the
non-cooperator, who emerged and was identified through his rejection
of the proposals after they had heen made.
In the second place, it is true that the reforms were not
expected to give complete satisfaction to extremists (in the old sense
of the word). Montagu and Chelmsford had had to consider many factors
in deciding how much could he conceded. Chelmsford was influenced hy
the calculation that the Congress were asking for much more than they 
152expected. It was also necessary to convince European opinion m
India - in passing any India hill in parliament, this opinion, as
1*5Chamberlain pointed out to Chelmsford, carried disproportionate weight.'"'' 
Chelmsford introduced this argument when Montagu wanted to extend the 
reforms to the structure of the central Government; he had argued,
’We have to convince people at home and .Europeans out here’ that the
134central authority was indisputable ’in fact1. But to say that 
different interests had to he balanced in this way, and that 1 extremists:
131 Sec Central Provinces Moderate Party leaders to Times of India,
4 Oct., with Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 Oct. 1918, CP4? & Report of 
committee of non-official ILC members on the Report, with Y to S/S,
31 Oct. 1918, CP9? & B ‘,L. Mitter, quoted in V. Chirol, India Old and Rev/, 
Xjondon 1921, 160-161. See also above, note 71? & tor an earlier comment 
on Malaviya (’the young men ... have run away from him, and he is afraid 
to follow1), Meston to Chelmsford, 4 Sept. 1916? CP2. My account differs 
from others in which the tendency has heen to exaggerate the breach 
between ’moderates1 and ’extremists1 -- see for example Ray T. Smith, 
fThe Role of India’s ’'Liberals" in the Rationalist Movement, 1915-1947'? 
Asian Survey Vol.VIII, No*7 (duly 1968), 607-624. Montagu thought oven 
moderates wanted more than was possible5 see Montagu to Ronaldshay,
29 Nov. 1918, MP27.
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 19 Jan. 1917? CP5.
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Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 28 Rov. 1917? CPI5.
134 Chelmsford to Montagu, 16 March 1918, CP4.
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were not going to achieve everything they wanted, is quite different
from saying that the government disregarded extremists' views, or that
they expected their dissatisfaction to take the form of a boycott. It
was not obvious in 1917? or even before the end of 1918? that there
would be politicians who would reject the proposals out of hand. To
anyone versed in parliamentary procedure, it seemed that the government
had made a large concession which, if skilfully exploited, could lead
in a short time to a complete transfer of power. Administrators
alarmed at this prospect, and perhaps a little surprised at their own
daring, at first did not imagine that Indian politicians could mistake
135or afford to decline the opportunity. Indeed the boycott, when it
came, owed more to other events - the Rowlatt bill, the Panjab
atrocities, the rise of Gandhi - than to precise criticisms of the
reforms: the proposals were so new when they wore rejected by the
Congress that few had had the opportunity to study them in detail.
Chelmsford had argued that the whole of the educated
classes had to be considered. Changes were necessary, he held,
because Indians had to be allowed to take responsibility and make
mistakes0, the alternative was to leave them discontented until
everyone went ’over the precipice together’. He had also stood up
against what was being described as a ’white rebellion’ After
the reforms proposals were published, ho wrote to the heads of
provinces stressing that a general protest would be most improper and
would strain racial relations - the heads were to discuss the situation
privately and without publicity with prominent members of the various
137services, in order to reassure them. Thus the reforms were not
135 See above, note 70. Tilak told the Congress in I9I8? ’We had 
asked for eight annas of Self-government and are offered only one . 0 
the entire literary skill of the report lies in making us believe that 
one anna ... was worth more than eight’ - yet Tilak wanted to work the 
reforms. See I),V. Tahmankar, Lokamanya Tilak, London 1956, 298, &
S.L. narandikar, Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Poona 1 9 5 7 ? 515, 
Even V.D. Savarkar, interned in the Andamans for his part in a Bombay 
political murder, responded to the reforms as an ’honourable truce15 
see D. Keer, Veer Savarkar, Bombay 1966 (2nd ed„), 153« The typical 
attitude tnus could reasonably have been expected to be that something 
was better than nothing, a philosophy embraced by A, Rangaswami Aiyangar, 
an opponent of dyarchy, in ’The ’’Coming Reforms” in India’, Hindustan 
Review Vol. XXXVIII, No.227 (July 1918). But Tilak had predicted to 
Gandhi, ’When you get your fingers burnt, I am sure you will go ahead 
of me’. He did. See Karandikar, op.cit., 504*
136
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 17 May 1918, CPI5.
137 Chelmsford to heads of provinces, 11 Peb. 1919, CP22.
intended to divide the nationalists, but, between the two opposing 
interests of politicians and bureaucrats, they were unlikely wholly 
to commend themselves to the more advanced Indian leaders. The govern­
ment hoped they'- would be accepted nevertheless? at this point they 
miscalculated. We have seen why.
And yet it may be that what had happened was more fundamental 
than this account suggests. As Chelmsford saw, the situation in India 
was changing rapidly and Indian demands were growing all the time. 
Montagu and Chelmsford had proposed reforms which led deliberately 
towards self-government within the Empire. But neither of them looked 
further ahead than that. Both of them envisaged at least some 
vestigial British presence in India. The Commonwealth itself was 
still in process of evolution, and many people in Britain were less 
clear than the Dominion governments about the degree of independence 
now enjoyed in the former colonies. Montagu and Chelmsford had looked 
forward to Dominion status for India, but they ha.d not foreseen that 
this was going to require the complete handing over to Indians of all 
things Indian - including the princely states - and the complete 
withdrawal of British sovereignty and suzerainty as well as of day-to- 
day control.
On the other hand, there wore Indians now in the Congress who
were seeing that far ahead, not systematically but emotionally. Their
aim was formally swaraj ? their demand was beginning to be for complete
independence. In the event the Commonwealth changed, independent status
was explicitly recognised, so that Indians were eventually'- to be
satisfied with something which did not look so very different in kind
from what they had wanted before IplG. But there had been a change.
There had developed an urge not only for the substance but also for the
form of self-government. It was the product of impatience with and
138
alienation from the British and their 'satanic' rule, - No reforms 
138
Eor 'satanic' see The Collected vforks of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. XIX 
(hov. 1920-April 1921)? Ahmedabad'1966, 15? ’28, 43, 49, 412 & 418 (for 
example! - the word was one of Gandhi's slogans), A also below, p.311.
It may be that the x^ ord reflected Gandhi's emphasis on the 'moral 
authority' of the state in the sovereignty of the people (which has also 
been taken to explain his belief in swaraj 'when we learn to rule our­
selves')? see Indira Rothormund, 'The Individual and Society in 
Candhiji's Political Thought', Journal of Asian Studies Vol.XXVTII, No.2 
(Feb.1969), 313-320. In this connection one commentator suggests that 
Gandhi implied a moral rather than a political creed by the term swaraj 
- see P.D. Kaushik, The Congress Ideology and Programme 1920-1947?
Bombay etc. 1964, 80ff. I am not sure this is a meaningful distinction, 
and suggest that ’satanic' illustrates the unity and interdependence of 
Gandhi's thought. On the other hand, as Kaushik admits (pp.54-56), the- 
Congress commitment was rather different from Gandhi's, to the end of 
self-government rather than the means of purity and truth, and to non- 
cooperation as an instrument not a duty.
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scheme could have satisfied this drive. Reforms implied concessions 
within an existing system, when the 'extremists' wanted that system to 
end. Perhaps the liontagu-Chelmsford reforms, in being so explicitly 
directed towards a goal, invited Indians to assess that goal. If so 
they contributed to a further change in the British attitude. For the
British they provided an opportunity and a model. For the Indians they
showed for the first time precisely what self-government meant to their 
rulers, and particularly the areas of reserve which still existed.
The reforms, conceived and introduced within one viceroyalty, 
had introduced changes both quantitative and qualitative. In executive 
councils, legislatures, electorates and local boards many more Indians 
were to be associated with the government. They were bound to influence 
policies, and change attitudes. Moreover, because the reforms had been 
deliberately designed to lead to self-government, some Indians were not 
only to be associated with government, they were to be involved in iX -
they wore being asked to administer and not just to advise the
administrators. In all spheres this was to make even their advice 
more persuasive. Thus the British may not have decided in 1920 that 
they were to leave India - the form of self-government was uncertain - 
but the process which was to lead to Independence had in fact begun in 
earnest. The position of the Indian princes was perhaps a gauge for 
this process. It is true that in 1920 there was probably no-one who
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had worked out what Indian self-government would mean to the princes.
The Montagu-Chelmsford proposals might oven be seen as an attempt to 
remove them from democratic contamination - relations with the princes 
were a reserved subject and were being transferred where possible to
139
Congress policy was ambiguous. Using the states as a yardstick, 
it might be argued that Congress in 1920 showed limited vision in 
promising full recognition and accepting princely independence under 
an independent India. P.D. Kaushik, op.cit., 100-104? argues that their 
position did not change until the late 1920s, and cites Jawaharlal 
Nehru putting forward a new policy 'as early as' 1929s Nehru stated 
that the 'Indian States cannot live apart from the rest of India'. If 
this was radical in 1929? then it is curious to mark, its similarity 
with Chelmsford's views 'as early as' 1921 (see below, note 140). I am 
unconvinced that there was any change of attitude in 1929 - Nehru still 
stressed that only the States' rulers and peoples could decide their 
future, Congress had for some time taken an interest in States' affairs, 
and Gandhi's opposition to active Interference (expressed earlier in the 
1920s) was provisional and based on an unwillingness to dissipate 
Congress resources. I would prefer to suggest that no-one had really 
thought the question through in Chelmsford's time, but that the 
implications were gradually recognised as the movement to self-govern­
ment progressed*
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the Government of India. Yet, if the British were to leave India, the 
princes were going to have to come to terms with new rulers. In this 
case, as in others, Chelmsford's attempt to coordinate policy towards 
his limited goal of ultimate self-government within the Empire, was to 
lead to far-reaching and unforeseen consequences. A process of 
assimilating the- princes had already begun. In the first place 
relations with the British were being standardised, a desirable end 
no doubt but also a necessary step towards the future change of status. 
In the second place, the princes had been invited to join their own 
Council for regular and formal conference with the Government of India 
this too was in one sense an attempt to rationalise the situation and 
somehow relate the princes to the constitution of British India, And 
finally, Chelmsford had told the princes, your States also must
move with the times' - demands for freedom from restraint would not be 
confined to British India? the princes too would have to create not 
a beautiful facade but a building men could work,^^ Thus, with the 
princes and much more with the policies within British India, the 
statement of a goal and attempts to move towards it had pushed the 
British firmly in the direction of the future, oven though the goal 
was limited and the first steps hesitant, even though neither had 
commended themselves to the more demanding of the Indian nationalists. 
In another sense from the one Chelmsford intended, the reforms mapped 
out the way to go,.
See Montagu to Chelmsford, Report, chapter X, & Speeches II, 
I48-I65 & 268-281. Chiefs' conferences were held in Feb. 1918, & Jan. 
& Nov. 1919? to inaugurate the system. See also Montagu, Diary, 
116-117 & 124s Montagu suggested an upper chamber designed for future 
development, in the Government of India, and wanted to associate the 
princes with it? Chelmsford, presumably seeing the practical 
difficulties rather than the future necessities, objected, and 
Montagu did not insist.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 9« Coherence
Three lines of approach may he distinguished in the political 
policy of Lord Chelmsford's government. The first was a positive 
policy of response to Indian opinion, seeking to influence it and, as 
far as possible, to meet or forestall its demands. The second was a 
neutral policy which sought to counter agitation by tactical non­
interference. The third policy was negative - the repression of 
agitation. These different approaches coexisted in the same administra­
tion. In general the first two were applied to peaceful and constitu­
tional movements? the last was directed against violent or 'revolution­
ary' outbreaks.
Positive reforms, including the changes in the constitution, 
were pursued both in response to Indian protest and in recognition of 
genuine needs. In a few cases, notably measures for the welfare of 
soldiers, the Government sought to reward Indian services during the 
war. Montagu and Chelmsford were also attempting to find answers to 
larger questions than the solution of immediate problems or the 
avoidance of pending agitation: Chelmsford began his viceroyalty by
asking what was the 'goal' of British .presence in India? he ended it 
in the belief that he and Montagu had ensured that the goal would be 
to transfer power to responsible Indian legislatives.
Before September 1917? the Government had accepted in dealing 
with agitation that once an illegality had been established to local 
satisfaction punishment would follow. They had defended against 
provincial attacks their principle of allowing constitutional agitation? 
but they had been uncertain about how their policy should apply to the 
Home Rule Leagues, and had acquiesced in contradictory local approaches. 
After the August Declaration, however, they realised that the main need 
was for calm. They believed this could be secured only by conciliatory 
methods. They began to accept that the normal reason for acting 
against agitators should be considerations of tactics and expediency. 
They saw, and insisted that local governments consider, the possible 
repercussions of provincial decisions. They argued that calm depended 
on avoiding the repression of those popular agitators who were known 
nationally.
In response to a new form of agitation the Government had 
extended the principle of non-interference with political movements 
to cover popular agitation, rejecting the use of repression as an 
automatic reaction in this sphere; at the same time they conceived 
the idea of using this principle as a political tactic. Faced with
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a national movement, a national policy had evolved. This, a re­
furbishment of a traditional approach, remained Chelmsford's and 
Yincent's habitual method for coping with such agitation. The lesson 
learnt in 1917 with Annie Besant, repeated with horrible emphasis 
with Gandhi in 1919? was applied for the remainder of the viceroyalty| 
it encouraged the Government to be tenacious in advocating the same 
approach in 1920 and 19215 it was left as a legacy for Lord Reading.
It is important to note that the two elements in the approach
- expediency and principle - had become distinct. The same principle
was in theory applied to local figures as to national, but in practice
the interpretation varied. Tn April 19195 for example, K.R. Roy,
editor of the Lahore Tribune, was arrested on a charge of sedition.
In June he was sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Indian
opinion was surprised and alarmed. Concerned enquiries were received
from influential sources, including Lord Sinha and Rabindranath Tagore.
C.F. Andrews telegraphed in protest to Edwin Montagu, stressing that
Roy's Tribune was a 'strictly moderate' newspaper - an opinion borne
out by its opposition to violence during the 1919 disturbances.^ The
Government of India agreed that Roy's sentence had been severe, and
reduced it to three months. But, in reply to Montagu, they stressed
that Royt although sometimes moderate or even helpful, had been
attacking the government at a time of grave unrest and having' an effect
on Panjabi readers which he would not have had on Bengalis accustome1
to 'journalistic vehemence1. The Secretary of State accepted this
view. But he wondered if it would not be wise, for reasons of policy,
to make a distinction in treatment between political and criminal
prisoners. The Government of India opposed this, arguing that nearly
all revolutionary crime had a political element, and refusing to
believe than 'the organisers and preachers of violence' were 'less
criminal that their misguided dupes'. They could not see how they
could distinguish between direct inticement and 'inflammatory speech 
2
leading to crime'.
See Tribune, 2, 3> 8, 9j 10, 11 & 12 April, Punjab Press Abstracts,
5 & 12 April 1919 (Vol. XXKII, 14- & 15) § Andrews to Montagu, 11 June,
6 note by Lord Sinha, 11 June 1919, IOR J&P1594 (4799/19).
2
See G/l telegrams, 30 June & 31 July 1919, loc.cit. This file 
also contains subsequent enquiries and notes, including an India 
Office despatch, Government of India and local government replies.
The proposal was finally refused by the Government in a despatch 
of 31 March 1921, but continued to be discussed at least until 1924.
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This contention was unsounds however much one talks of 
'misguided dupes', it is sinrply not true that the offence of speaking 
or writing violently is strictly comparable with or in practice 
indistinguishable from the offence of planning a specific crime to 
be carried out by others or of actually throwing a bomb or stabbing 
a policeman during a riot. Moreover, it was if anything more difficult 
in practice to distinguish between different political activities 
according to probable results than between political crime and 'criminal' 
crime. The Government were really defending the local action against 
Roy. Their arguments were an attempt to assimilate it into their own 
scheme of things. Their arguments are explicable only with reference 
to their principle of not interfering with constitutional agitation - 
the theoretical line had to bp drawn not between political and criminal 
motives, but on a question of results, between ordinary politics and 
politics likely to lead to crime. The Government firmly believed that 
they must suppress crime not politics, and therefore had to persuade 
themselves that the politics to be suppressed were not only technically 
illegal but also criminal in the same way as theft or murder.
The principle, therefore, was flexible. But the tactic was 
not - it was never acceptable to brand Gandhi as a criminal without 
choosing a suitable moment. For lesser figures, such as K.Nh Roy, 
the moment was less important. The result was that the lines of 
government policy were blurred in the public eye. The inevitable 
outcome was a suspicion that the intention was to suppress politics, 
even though the pretence was of suppressing crime. The confusion of 
violence with the political activity which was thought to lead to it, 
resulted in the discrediting of repressive measures which some Indians 
had otherwise been willing to accept. The Rowlatt Act was one casualty 
of this hardening of attitude. The Press Act was another. More than 
this, the confusion undermined the positive effect which non-inter­
ference might have been expected to have. It also clarified the nature 
of that policy. It showed it to be a central policy, in one way 
independent of the principle on which it was based. The vital feature 
of the approach was the emphasis on expediency, lion-interference, 
although it conformed to a principle, was strictly tactical.
Thus non-interference could also be seen always as 
interference held in abeyance. It was recognised that prosecution 
would be unavoidable or even desirable in certain circumstances. It 
is fair to say that by the end of 1920 the policy was intended to 
manoeuvre Gandhi into a position in which it would be safe to arrest 
him. For this reason it Is necessary to be cautious in interpreting
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subsequent policies in terms of Chelmsford's method. The final arrest 
of Gandhi in 1922, for example, has been described as a coup for 
Reading and the policy of non-interference. But Sir George Lloyd, 
writing heatedly to Chamberlain, gavo a different account. According 
to this, Reading, vacillating between the advice of his Governors and 
that of his colleague, Tej Bahadur Sapru, agreed to the arrest only 
after Lloyd and Hillingdon had visited Simla, Lloyd threatening to 
resign if Gandhi remained at large. Thus the arrest may have resulted 
not so much from deliberate policy as from a fortuitous balance of the 
forces influencing the Viceroys there are grounds for speculation at 
least on whether more emphasis might bo given to Lloyd's version, 
whether Lloyd rather than Reading was the true exponent of tactical 
non-interference in 1922, and whether we have not been given too 
flattering an account of Reading's conduct, Lloyd had argued for the 
arrest, at first gaining Reading's consent, in December 1921 when 
Gandhi openly and defiantly repeated an offence for which the Ali 
brothers had been arrested - certainly Chelmsford's policy would have 
envisaged the arrest at this point.^
It might be thought that tactical non-interference, whose 
advocates at their most optimistic hoped that agitation would dis­
appear if ignored, bore a family resemblance to Curzon's policy of 
officially disregarding the Congress while allowing some measure of 
appeasement. To maintain this would be to miss the point. Curzon 
believed his autocracy to be permanent and saw no reason to come to 
terms with Indian politicians? thus he refrained from attending to 
their aspirations. Chelmsford refrained from repression - because he 
envisaged a transfer of power and saw every reason for conciliation.
His persistence, as we have seen, was not the result of 
enthusiastic support. There wore a few voices favouring the policy. 
Percival Landon, whom the Prime Minister had aslcod to write to him 
on his tours in the East, was doubtful whether they should draw tight 
the noose, even if Gandhi ran his head into it. Bon Spoor, Labour
3
See D.A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Non-cooperation 
Movement - 1920-1922', Journal of Asian Studies XXIV (1965-6),
^ See Lloyd to Chamberlain, 24 March & 11 April 1922, ACPI8/1/25 
& 27? & also V to S/S, 14 Fob. 1922, ACP14/1/57* Lloyd's attitude
had begun earlier, taking a harder line than Chelmsford5 seo above, 
pp.87 & 200-201, & Chamberlain to Lloyd, 31 Dec. 1920, ACP18/1/16,
3
landon to Kerr, 23 Feb. 1921, Lothian Papers GD14/17/213.
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Member- of Parliament, reported to Montagu that nobody in India thought 
it would bt.- wise to touch Gandhi.^ But the rarity of such support 
demonstrates the- novelty of the Government's approach? it may indicate 
that non-interference was not the wisest course. It is possible that 
Montagu and Lloyd, or evon Ronaldshay and Villingdon, wore right to 
have doubts, and that the task would have been easier if Gandhi had 
been stopped sooner or outlawed from the first. It is an open quostion 
whether Chelmsford's Government, by using repression, could have re­
tarded Indian political advance. It can only be established that they 
did not try to do so. Rather tlicir policy had been passivity tempered 
with legal action, even with regard to popular agitation, and a 
deliberate attempt to meet public opinion and further political 
progress.
Moreover, if the aim of British rule was the peaceful de­
volution of power to the Indians, then what is certain is that tactical 
non-interference, like the non-violent nature of Gandhi's opposition, 
made a large contribution to this end. It is probable that, had re­
press ion gained the ascendancy, had no lesson been learnt from Annie 
Besant, had Gandhi been imprisoned before his leadership was secure, 
then the Indian response might also have been different, and Chelms­
ford's legacy might have been a growing commitment to autocracy in the 
face of nationalist violence. Motilal Nehru told the Amritsar Congress 
in December 1919° 'violence cannot avail us. That is the special 
weapon of the West and wo cannot hope to win freedom by armed force,
But even if we could do so it would be a barren victory, a victory
7
which would degrad© and coars&i us . . . ’ , The brutal reprisals in the 
Panjab had offered Nehru his stance of moral superiority? but, 
paradoxically, it had been partly the nature of his enemy - not least 
Chelmsford's Government - which had made it appropriate for such men 
as he to be the leaders of their countrymen.
The non-cooperation campaign forced the Government to place 
added reliance and emphasis upon prosecution of minor figures, as an 
accompaniment to the continuation of non-interference at the centre„
^ See Montagu to Willingdon, 16 Feb. 1921, MP17 (& also to Chelmsford, 
same date, CP6).
7
Motilal Nehru, The Voice of Freedom, London 1961, 16-17.
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But it would be wrong to tliirik that the advocates of conciliation 
were in any sense in retreat or disarray by the end of Chelmsford's 
viceroyalty. On the contrary non-interference was applied to or 
confirmed for wider and wider categories of activity as time went on. 
Industrial unrest was growing, and there was a prospect of political 
involvement* But the government blamed strikes mainly on the 
disparity between price and wage increases, suspicions about 
profiteering and the capitalists' profits, the shortage of labour 
(accentuated by the influenza epidemic), and the reluctance of 
employers, especially in the Bombay mills, to grant concessions 
until strikes had occurred. Strikes were not yet accepted as a 
permanent public concern, but they were seen to be no longer a private 
matter. Chelmsford evolved an attitude very similar to his general 
policy towards agitation. His Government \tforked out rules restricting 
the use of troops in strikes, but encouraged diplomatic involvement by 
the local authorities as long as it was not obvious or compromising.
g
Chelmsford's slogan was 'caution and watchfulness'.
In the sphere of 'revolutionary' crime, too, conciliation 
gained ground, partly of course as a result of the end of the war, 
but also influenced by the new emphasis in policy. In 1919 restric­
tions were removed from the Ali brothers, accused of seditious 
conspiracy. In 1920 very large numbers of political prisoners - all 
who had not been convicted for crimes of violence - were released under
9
amnesty. Similarly the Government abandoned the second Rowlatt Bill, 
embodying permanent changes in the law. The Legislative Department 
claimed that they had heeded 'official and unofficial opinions 
received', But virtually all the official opinion, European and 
Indian, had favoured the bill, as did a significant minority of the 
non-official opinion. Objections came almost exclusively from those 
non-officials who were politically active - from Bar Associations, 
District and Municipal Boards, and members of Legislative Councils - 
the very people who had been ignored in the passage of the first 
Rowlatt Bill. Only Robertson and the Chief Commissioner of Assam,
0
See H.Poll. 242, 244, 246, 247, 249, March 1919, & 366-372, Feb.
19205 II.Police 359-360, June 1921? G/Bombay to V, 11 Jan., & 
Chelmsford to Lloyd, 14, 16 & 28 Jan. 1919, CP22; V to S/S, 23 April 
1919> CP13I Willingdon to Montagu, 23 April" 1919, MP19, & 23 & 28 
May 1920, MP20? Lloyd to Barnes, 25 Jan., A to Montagu, 25 & 31 Jan.
& 14 Feb. 1920, MP25; & Montagu to Ronaldshay, 9 Bov- 1920, MP27*
9
See above, pp.120-121 & 143.
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Sir N. D. Beatson Bell, had expressed doubts about the wisdom of 
going ahead with the second bill- The Government of India clearly 
shared these doubts. They may have been influenced also by Gandhi's 
offer to suspend civil disobedience indefinitely if the bill were 
abandoned.^
Most important, the introduction of the reforms in late 1920
was marked by confirmations of the conciliatory policy. To some extent
these were inevitable reflections of the greater participation of
Indians in the central government. But Chelmsford was also making
concessions in a deliberate attempt to show that the 'extremist1
boycott had been misguided. Ho wanted to prove that even in the much
criticised Government of India the Indian representatives had an
effective role. The first real test came in January 1921 when the
Government, despite the dissent of the Commander-in-Chief, decided that
they must agree to reductions in the army budget if they were to bo
able to pass the estimates in the reformed legislature. The only way
of reducing the allocation, it was decided, was to reduce army strength
in India. Chelmsford argued that, although the reduction would have
to be forced on tho military authorities, he had to have something to
offer the new legislature. He was prepared to contemplate a reduction
in the number and proportion of British personnel in the army. The
Secretary of State protested^ the King himself expressed his concern.
Chelmsford warned that if his policy were thwarted, members of his
Government might claim the privilege of stating in the legislature
that they were voting under orders -- if that happened they would never
pass the budget, and Chelmsford would have to use extraordinary powers.
Legislative members might then absent themselves from the Assembly or
even join the 'extremists'. The Secretary of State nevertheless
insisted on referring the question to a sub-committee of the Committee
of Imperial Defence in London, and no decision was reached during
11Chelmsford's viceroyalty.
More productively, following the same general principle, 
the Government accepted a resolution of B.S. Kamat on 24 February 1921, 
which directed the Government to take steps, as far as practicable,
10 H.PolI. 576, 379? 581, 382-383 (= 377-378?), April 192c.
11 See V to S/S, 20 & 25 Jan., & V(FD) to S/S, 30 Jan. & 17 Feb.,
& V(AD) to S/S, 22 Jan, & 10 March, & S/S to V, 24 Jan. & 11 & 19 
Feb. 1921, CP14? Chelmsford to Montagu, 26 Jan, & 16 March 1921,
CP65 A Appendix (4 Oct. 1917) to Meyer & Howard, memorandum,
B.Public(C) 579? Oct. 19I8. Sec- also above, chapter 2, note 77*
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'to ensure that no action ... he taken on reports of commissions or
committees ... until an opportunity has heen given ... to the Indian
12legislature to express its opinion thereon'. This statement
reflected a wider intention of consulting the legislature. In February
1921, to the Calcutta Club, an audience of Indians and Europeans,
Chelmsford suggested - and repeated his remarks to Montagu - that the
reformed councils would he included in taking any measures necessary
13against extremists. The logic of this was that methods not approved 
hy the Assembly could no longer he adopted, and that in general 
executive powers, unless reaffirmed by the legislature, were suspect. 
This attitude was reflected in the Government’s policy towards the 
press.
The policy had heen gradually changing. In March 1917 
Chelmsford gave an ’uncompromising' reply to a deputation seeking 
abolition of the Press Act of 1910, hut in August he suggested a 
liberalisation of the Act after the war. In September 1918 the 
Government refused a Legislative Council resolution for an enquiry 
and in October an unofficial suggestion from Montagu that they 
completely substitute judicial for executive controls. In December 
1919 Montagu suggested a total amnesty for the pressj the Government 
of India disagreed, and varying numbers were freed in different 
provinces. In January 1920 the Secretary of State officially asked 
the Government to consider transferring to the courts the power of 
forfeiture (though not imposition) of security. Judging from the 
comparative rarity of forfeitures and the use of the demand for 
security as a weapon to prevent small concerns from operating, it was 
the imposition of security which was most effective in controlling 
the tone of the press. Thus, in July, the Government of India 
strongly advocated the change to the local governments, as a partial 
answer to Indian demands. The replies, received in December, mostly 
agreed.^4 At this time, however, Chelmsford telegraphed to Montagu
12
H.Public 40-41t March 1921.
15 Speeches II, 576-577*
14 See ibid., 249-281; H.PolI. 253-254, May 1917, 111-152, July, & 
423, 458 & 464-465, May 1920; TOR J&P1589 (4468/19); V to S/S, 8 Oct. 
1918, CP_9, & 2 June 1920, CPI2; Montagu to Chelmsford, 10 Oct., & 
Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 Nov. 1918, CP4? & to Chamberlain, 1 March 
1917, CP5, & to Heads of Governments, 29 Aug. 1917, CP19; & Gait,
12 Sept., Butler, 15 Sept., Ramsey, 19 Sept., Roos-Keppel, 22 Sept., 
Pentland, 1J Oct., Ronaldshay, 20 Oct., Robertson, 24 Oct., Earle,
7 Nov., Willingdon, 12 Nov., Meston, 16 Nov. 1917, CP19? & O ’Dwyer,
20 Feb., & Hailey, 14 March 1918, to Chelmsford, CP20; Willingdon to
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that his present idea was to have Vincent move in the Legislative
Assembly for the appointment of a committee to investigate the press
law and suggest modifications. He was also, he claimed, prepared to
allow an encpuiry into the whole range of repressive legislation includ-
15ing the 'Rowlatt1 Act.
The Government moved for the press committee on 22 February 
1921, and gave undertakings making it clear that they envisaged a 
mainly non-official enquiry covering the whole question of press re­
strictions and free to recommend abolition of the Press Act. A 
committee under Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Law Member, was duly appointed 
on 10 March, and given the Secretary of State's despatch to consider. 
Vincent was the only official member apart from the Chairman; of the 
other seven members, several were committed opponents of the Act. It 
was obvious that this committee would recommend that the powers be 
abandoned or greatly reduced, and thus commit Reading's Government 
to a change of policy. In due course the committee advised that some 
provisions of the Press Act should be included in other legislation,
but that the Act itself should be repealed; Lord Reading accepted 
l6this advice.
Chelmsford had been concerned to avoid changing the law so 
late in his term of office. Thus to bind his successor would not, he 
believed, be good policy - if Reading wished to abandon the powers, 
then he should do so and gain the good will. Chelmsford was refusing 
to prejudice his successor's position; he was not merely trying to 
delay or avoid the decision. By appointing the committee his Govern­
ment had shown that they were prepared to face the possibility of 
abandoning the Press Act. There would still be control, but the simple 
and direct influence over the press represented by securities and their 
forfeiture was unlikely to be endorsed by any legislative committee.
Chelmsford, 2 & 8 July, G/Madras to V, 4 July, & V to G/Madras, 3 & 9 
July 1919? CP23, & Montagu to Lloyd, 6 Nov., MP22, & Lloyd to Montagu,
7 Oct. & 20 & 30 Dec, 19197 MP24| & Willingdon to Montagu, 7 & 13 July
1919; MP19, & 30 Jan. & 3 March 1920, NIP20. On the use of the Press
Act, see also H.Poll, 373-368, Nov. 1916, 446-463, April 1917, 103,
Feb. 1918, & 274"& 278, July 1920.
15 See G/l circular, 1 July 1920, & Proceedings of the Imperial
Legislative Assembly 22 Feb. 1921, p.341, I0R J&P1589 (4468/19);
FITt6~"s737T6~Dec * 1920, CPI3.
16
See V(HD) to S/S, 10 March & 5 July 1921, Proceedings of the 
Imperial Legislative Assembly 22 Feb. 1921, & Gazette of India 
21 March 1921, ICR ~J&P1589 (4468/19).
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This decision was taken in a period of growing- and alarming activity
by the nationalist agitators. It was accompanied by a debate on the
Panjab disturbances, and followed the declaration made by the Duke of
Connaught promising an 'incomparably greater' involvement of the
17legislature in the formulation of policy. In moving for the press 
committee, S.P. 0'Donnell,Secretary to the Government, had promised 
that future policy would be 'very largely influenced and guided by 
non-official Indian opinion'5 and admitted that, as members generally 
disapproved of wide executive powers over the press, the retention 
of such powers would be 'inconsistent with the spirit of the new era' 
and with the Government’s desire to meet legitimate Indian demands. 
Sardley Norton, a non-official European member of the Assembly, re­
sponding to these remarks, said that he hoped that in future the 
Government would take the Assembly into their confidence and not stand 
'upon remote pillars in inaccessible altitudes'. The appointment of
the press committee was, he said, a 'happy augury of those more Intimate
18relations which will exist between the two sides of this House'. 
Chelmsford and his Government hoped that Indians, both inside and 
outside the Assembly, would draw the same conclusion. As late as
April 1920 Chelmsford had claimed that on matters of law and order the
19only policy could be the 'indisputable supremacy of the British raj'; 
less than a year later, in an attempt to work the reforms faithfully 
and give prestige to the new legislature, he was apparently willing 
to surrender one of the main weapons of that supremacy. Chelmsford 
wanted to leave the credit for any abolition of the press restrictions 
to Lord Reading; but for his Government he wanted the credit of 
consulting the new Assembly in a responsible and constructive manner.
He was not primarily interested in repressive laws or agitators; he 
was committed to the constitutional experiment. The effect of this 
concern, however, was that in the arena of politics the method of 
conciliation was firmly entrenched. The policy of tactical non­
interference was supreme.
In March 1921, Chelmsford recorded his appreciation of his 
legislature. It has, he wrote to Harcourt Butler, 'fulfilled my 
highest hopes; ... it has shown a sense of balance and responsibility
17
See above, p.197.
18 Proceedings of the Imperial legislative Assembly 22 Neb. 1921, 
pp. 242-243» I0lT J&P15Q9 (4468/3 'dT-
Chelmsford to Montagu, 28 April 1920, CP_6.
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which could scarcely he surpassed. "Well begun is half done" and in 
leaving I feel happy that the great adventure, notwithstanding all the
2p
threatening storm clouds ..., has started under the fairest auspices'.
The Congress (it might be argued) had thus made a mistake in rejecting 
the reforms. It is certainly true that the reforms made very great 
concessions in terms of what was envisaged as normal procedure, and 
that astute legislators could have made it difficult for abnormal 
procedures to be used. One observer considered that no Indian under­
stood what had been conceded and that 'any Dominion which got the
powers that India now has would have won everything it wanted in five 
21years'. In the- Government of India deliberate policy encouraged 
adherenco to the will of the legislature\ and Chelmsford's constitu­
tional methods ensured that his three Indian colleagues would have an 
impact upon policy.
Nevertheless it is open to debate how far the reforms marked
a substantive change in British attitudes. In Assam an Indian was
22placed in charge of police, judiciary and prisons5 but in Bombay
Lloyd rePused to give the Law and Order portfolio to an Indian - his
excuse was Indian inexperience, and yet one of the cotmcillors
considered for the post was a new member and presumably less experienced
than the then senior councillor, Sir I. Rahimtoola. Lord Sinha was
appointed the first Governor of Bihar and Orissa under the reformsf
but Lloyd, in spite of Chelmsford's categorical advice, was reluctant
to see Rahimtoola appointed Vice-President of his Council (and hence
Acting Governor when necessary) - and the Secretary of State shared
2^some of Lloyd's doubts.  ^Later criticisms of the reforms included 
cases of lack of cooperation between the two halves of the government 
or between civil servants and Indian ministers. Clearly there was
20
Chelmsford to Butler, 25 March 1921, CP26.
21 r- —
J.H. O/ldham/ to Kerr (?), 31 Dec. 1921, Lothian Papers GD40/17/19. 
See also S/S to V, 24 Jan. 1920, CP12g Montagu noted that the Reform 
Act was being misrepresented in the Indian press and that the ’great 
powers it gives are not understood',
22
Beatson-Bell to Chelmsford, 17 Dec. 1920, CP25.
23
Lloyd to Chelmsford, 24 Dec. 1920, CP25, & 13 March, & G/Bombay 
to V, 19 March, & V to G/Bombay, 24 March 1921, CP26? & S/S to Y,
2 March 1921, CPI4» Compare Willingdon's and Chelmsford's willingness 
to appoint Chaubal Vice-President in Bombay in 1916s Willingdon to 
Chelmsford, 20 April, & Chelmsford to Willingdon, 23 April 1916, CPI?,
On the other hand, Montagu refused to interfere, on constitutional 
grounds, when Harkishen Lai, convicted in 1919? was appointed a minister 
in the Panjab, and this was criticised in the House of Commons| see S/C 
to V, 24 Feb., & S/S to V(R0), 20 Jan., 8 & 11 Feb. 1921, CP14.
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24a deep residue of habits of racial superiority. Nothing of course, 
as we .have seen, convinced the Congress of this fact more than the 
actions, evidence and subsequent treatment of General Dyer. ^
In Bengal, in the only instance of real friction in the 
brief post-reforms period under Chelmsford, the new legislature was, 
according to Ronaldshay, 'seized with a fit of mad irresponsibility1 
expressed chiefly by reducing the police grant by 23 lakhs. Ronaldshay 
calculated that he would have to restore the grant by extraordinary 
powers or reduce numbers in an already short-handed force. Thus 
British supremacy - and their judgement of what was responsible 
conduct - stood undisturbed in the last resort, and on these grounds, 
as well as for the suspicion of the continuance of -old attitudes, 
the Congress abstention was understandable. It is true that the 
dispute on the Bengal budget was resolved not by executive action 
but by a skilfully stage-managed debate in which the practical con­
sequences of the budget changes were brought home to the legislature, 
which in due course and by an over-whelming majority approved 
supplementary grants to save the situations the conclusion here
must be that Ronaldshay, like Chelmsford, was showing extreme
25reluctance to go against the will of the new assembly. Presumably 
then the 'extremists’ might have used the reforms, as Motilal Nehru 
was later to try to do, to manoeuvre the effective power away from 
the government. And yet the questions remain whether the pressure 
would have been more effective inside than it was outside the 
assemblies, whether the consolidation of Congress power through the 
attempts at controlled mass agitation were not a necessary stage of 
political evolution, and indeed whether the nationalist cause could 
have survived a period of cooperation at this time, in the prevailing 
atmosphere of suspicion, grievance and mistrust.
It might also be argued that the Government of India's
success in limiting the changes at the centre precipitated the Congress
boycott. The simple answer is almost certainly that this was not the 
case. Objections that the reforms were inadequate were probably 
unavoidable with any concession short of immediate home rule, and 
the fact that these objections hardened into rejection of the reforms
24
See Majority Report, Reforms Enquiry Committee 1925? Cmd. 2j6o. 
Governors may also have undermined ministers' influence by consulting
them individually? see R.C., with A.K. Majumdar, op.cit., 278-279.
25
See Ronaldshay to Montagu, 17 Peb., 24 & 31 March, 8 & 28 April 
1921, MP52? Chelmsford to Ronaldshay, 27 March 1921, CP26.
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as a whole was due to factors external to the proposals themselves?
these factors were notably the aftermath of the Panjab disturbances
and a general lack of appreciation of how far reaching the reforms
were. It became fashionable to deride them? but what strikes one,
in comparison with British attitudes prevailing even in 1916 or even
with Indian expectations as in 0inha’s Congress address of 1915? is
how extensive the reforms were. In 1918 one commentator proposed to
end the Indian problem by promising a plebiscite after fifty years,
to decide on British withdrawal - or, if 'sedition' continued in the
26interim, after n maximum of a hundred years. The Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms set British and Indians together on a path which was to lead 
to complete provincial transfer in a little more than fifteen years 
and final withdrawal In less than thirty. The 1919 reforms did not 
decide this timetable, but they made the direction and the outcome 
inevitable. In this sense their immediate practicality and the revealed 
short-comings were irrelevant - indeed were expected of a transitional
arrangement.2'?
Chelmsford's role in these reforms, as in all the problems
of government with which we have been concerned, is obscured by his
insistence on consultation and 'constitutional' governorship. A
special tribute was paid to him by Lord Sinha, both publicly and
privately - on the latter occasion talking of India's 1 rank
ingratitude1. Meston hoped history would be just to Chelmsford
for his leadership of a great campaign. Bhupendranath Basu believed
Chelmsford had 'saved the situation'? to Annie Besant he was the
Viceroy who would stand out as having pursued a ’deliberate line of
28action, which has opened India's way to Freedom'. Yet his personal 
unpopularity was striking. Calcutta was reported to have given him 
'a very fair reception' on his last visit? but in Bombay Lloyd could 
not get farewell addresses for him from any Indian body, not even
^  H. Gordon Milburn, England and India, London 1918, 72-73*
27 See Montagu A Chelmsford, Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms,
22 April 1918, CP42, pp. 142-126; & also above, note 24.
28
See V(KL) to S/S, 20 Jan. 1920 (reporting Sinha's speech), CPI2? 
Sinha, 26 Jan., Meston, $1 Jan., Basu, 15 & 31 Jan., &. Besant, 9 Feb. 
1921, to Chelmsford, CP26. See also V. Chirol, India Old and Pew,
London 1921, 151 & 301? A, for a contrary view, disapproving of the 
Report, Sir Reginald Craddock, The Dilemma in India, London 1929*
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29the municipality. He had reported to Chamberlain late in 1920 that 
he thought Chelmsford would feel only 'genuine relief upon his 
departure in April.
The Rowlatt Bill and the alienation of Gandhi had over­
shadowed the successes - and perhaps rightly so, for these failures 
were crucial. Chelmsford saw the need to be political. But, faced with 
a tradition of secret government and a burden of accidents and 
atrocities, he did not have the sort of ability which would have been 
able to recover this ground. In an important speech to the Calcutta 
Club in February 1921, he noted that he and his Government were being 
called 'satanic' - 11 am glad to think I still have a sense of humour, 
he remarked. 'I have had many epithets applied to myself in my time, 
but the epithet of "Satanic" has broken entirely new ground.' Few 
rulers can have suffered such a campaign of vituperation as was under­
gone by Chelmsford at the end of his term. In 1921, Willingdon wrote -
an epitaph for the viceroyalty - 'The mere fact of Chelmsford's
31departure has done good.!
This view cannot be left unqualified. Firstly, the fault
was in Chelmsford's manner and not in lack of sympathy. His Calcutta
Club speech stated the difficulty?
Ho man who takes up the great post of Viceroy can have 
any but one desire? To magnify India in the Councils 
of the Empire? to espouse the cause of Indians within 
the Empire; to champion the aspirations of Indians so 
far as in him lies. But a Viceroy...must choose his own
methods. The flamboyant speech, however much it may
tickle the oar at the time, seldom if ever really 
achieves results. More can be done by quiet, -unostenta­
tious prossure; by arguments pruned of every epithet.
I would say then; Trust your Viceroy and leave him to 
choose his own methods of working. He cannot be- other 
than your champion.32
The Viceroy he spoke of was Reading? but the details referred to
himself. Perhaps the achievements of Chelmsford's'quiet pressure'
are in retrospect impressive? but 'flamboyant speeches' might have
popularised his policies and lessened the disasters. It is quite
possible he was thinking of Hardinge when he expressed his distrust
0 9
See Ronaldshay to Montagu, 1 March, MP32, & Lloyd to Montagu,
18 March 1921, MP26.
30
Lloyd to Chamberlain, 15 Oct. 1920, ACPI8/1/13.
31
Willingdon to Montagu, 24 April 1921, MP21.
^  Speeches II, 576 & 588.
of ostentatious methods - a similar tone creeps into his references
A 'N
to his predecessor. But ho must have reflected on what an asset
Hardingo's personal popularity would have been to him.
Secondly, one of the factors contributing to Chelmsford's
unpopularity was undoubtedly the peculiar relationship with the India
Office. The stigma of the Mesopotamia Commission should have been
removed by Chelmsford's administration; but suspicion and abuse of
the Government of India remained. Perhaps Montagu's enthusiasm for
new projects obscured wrhat had already been done, Holdcrness, in a
note seeking to correct the errors of the Government, suggested in
1917 that minor decisions should bo taken departmental]y and that
Council members should be kept informed. He showed that the Government
34of India was underrated even at the India Office. Chelmsford in
turn showed that he was not pleased to be instructed in practices he
had already put Into operation. In time there developed a feeling
that the India Office was not really giving proper support, Craddock
complained to Chelmsford that Montagu interviewed Indians who visited
London, heard their grievances, and then promised to look into them -
35assuming that his officers were in the wrong. Chelmsford's certainty
of Montagu's support in 1918 was gradually replaced by cynicism at
Montagu's 'extraordinary' sensitivity to questions in the Commons,^
The Secretary of State was not thought altogether reliable. The
Government of India had decided to send Meston to represent them
before the Select Committee on constitutional reforms. Meston reported
that Montagu's attack on the Panjab administration had become the
37general line for those who wished to cause trouble. Later Montagu 
failed to prevent unfavourable peace terms for Turkey. In 1920 there 
was a disagreement over Chelmsford's conciliatory policy towards the 
Afghans - J.L. Maffey claimed that Montagu had been terrorised by
33
See above, p. 21ff.$ & also Chelmsford to Montagu, 22 Sept, 19175 
CP3“ ’We must both remember that the day of honeyed phrases is past1 
- 'some portion of these promises' now had to be redeemed,
34 HoldGrness, note, 11 Aug. 1917? in Montagu to Chelmsford, 21 
Sept. 1917? CP3*
3^
Craddock to Chelmsford, 15 March 1920, CP24.
36
See Chelmsford to Montagu, 22 April 1918, CP4, & to Lloyd, 1 May 
1920, CP24, & also to Willingdon, 17 Sept. 1918? CP21.
37 Meston to Chelmsford, 2 Get. 1919, CP15.
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38Curzon. Roos Keppel (who favoured a strong policy) told him that 
Curzon was ’amazed at the invincible ignorance and optimism of the 
Government of India’5 Maffey retorted, ’The Government of India are
39amazed at the invincible self-satisfaction and arrogance of Curzon*’. 
There wore rumours that Montagu was unpopular in the douse and with 
the Prime Minister - his reforms had not pacified India as ho had 
promised5 his fighting speech on the Panjab disturbances had 
antagonised the Commons and put into jeopardy the vote supporting 
the condemnation of General Dyer. The Government of India's confidence 
had been eroded. In addition, there were attacks from all sides 
following the constitutional reforms and the Hunter Committee - most of 
these rebounded on the central Government. The Government's credit in 
India, as Maffey pointed out, was deeply affected by the credit givun 
in England. There was not much being given - and Montagu did not 
seem to be providing the outspoken support that was needed to redress 
the balance.
Montagu was still popular with Indian politicians - and this 
too did not help Chelmsford. There had been some opposition to 
Montagu's visit in 1917 on the grounds that the 'presence in India 
of the Secretary of State would undermine the position and prestige 
of the Viceroy. The fears may have had some justification. Certainly 
Montagu received credit for most that was thought good, and Chelmsford 
blame for most that was not. He told his legislature in September 1918 
that there were two schools of thought on the constitutional reforms - 
one thought the Secretary of State was the villain and the Viceroy his 
unhappy victim, signing against his better judgment? the other (the 
Indian politicians) thought that 'a sympathetic Secretary of State’ 
had been ’enmeshed in the net of the cold hard bureaucracy'.^ Neither 
view was flattering to Chelmsford in the eyes of those who wanted 
political advance. In a sense each denigration of the Government 
compounded all the otherss the Government's unpopularity with 
politicians influenced the assessment by the local governments, and 
their distrust - with its hints of disagreements - added in turn to
38
Maffey to Chelmsford, 17 May 1920, CPI6. For an insight into 
Curzon's attitude, see Kenneth Rose, Superior Person, A Portrait of 
Curzon and his circle in late Victorian England, London 1969, 201.
39
Maffey to Chelmsford, 27-28 April 1920, CPI6.
Speeches II, 94-95 (4 Sept. 1918).
314
the suspicions of the politicians. The difficulties with the Indin 
Office, the hostility real and rumoured, were the most potent element 
in this cycle. The reputation of Chelmsford and his Government was not 
likely to survive the belief that there was a more liberal attitude 
and consequently disapproval in London.
Chelmsford’s unpopularity but also his achievements are
therefore traceable to his methods of government, which reflected both
the strengths and-the shortcomings of his personality. Inevitably
his insistence on consultation and joint responsibility was misread
as subservience. Traditional and paternalist autocrats, like Lord
Willingdon, could not understand the method - Hillingdon’s verdict
was simply that Chelmsford was a man 'who would never use his personal
authority’. ^  In 1918 that other autocrat, Lord Curson, wrote implying
that the Foreign Department dictated Chelmsford's policy on Persia.
Chelmsford replied sharplys 'This is not so. I am not so presumptuous
as to think I can rule India without the advice of my Department...,
but equally on broad questions of policy my Departments do not run
me.^ He claimed, however, to be indifferent to imputations of
weakness. Montagu once advised him to let himself go. 'Your
instincts are right,1 he wrote? 'your judgment is sound? let your
colleagues know more fully what you want? let them feel your 
45leadership.1 Lord Chelmsford replied^
The policy of the attainment of the goal was ray 
policy? ... the policy of inviting you out was my 
policy, and I think you will own that I had only to 
lift my little finger and I could have obtained 
dissent from the majority of the proposals to which 
you and I with certainly the bulk of my colleagues 
have given agreement. I cite these things not to 
obtain credit, for they will remain locked up in 
our correspondence, but to show my deliberate 
method. I believe I can carry my colleagues with 
me, but if I can, it is not by the obtrusion of my 
own fiat, but by patience and command of temper.44
The contemporary verdict remained, and has marked the 
viceroyalty as a failure. Yet It is worthwhile to look again at its
41 Willingdon to Montagu, 24 April 1921, MP2I, & also 28 May 1920,
IIP 20.
4^ Chelmsford to Curzon, 23 April 1918? CP13- 
45
Montagu to Chelmsford, 23 April 1918, CP4*
^4 Chelmsford to Montagu, 28 April 1918, CP4*
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achievements. It had seen the successful conclusion of a great war? 
it had fostered a new international and imperial status for India? 
it had investigated the possibility for changes in education and for 
state involvement in industry? it had tried to remedy the disability 
of economic exploitation and racial discrimination? it ha.d devised a 
policy for dealing with a new type of agitation? it had refrained 
from beginning a conflagration by suppressing the Khilafat and non­
cooperation movements? it had controlled the Hijrat? it had begun 
to loosen the strait-jacket of executive powers, but had reduced the 
threat of 'revolutionary1 conspiracy? most of all it had initiated, 
fought for, worked out, defended and finally seen the introduction of 
epoch-making constitutional reforms4 It had done all this while staff 
and money were in short supply? while energies were diverted by 
unprecedented difficulties with nationalist agitation? while both 
the Government of India and the Viceroy were supposed to be less than 
usually distinguished by ability or imagination. The reputation and 
the achievement contradict one another.
It is not difficult to see how this happened. The Jallian- 
wala Bagh infected all, and did so at a time when rising prices, 
epidemics, Muslim grievances and social insecurity - all matters out­
side the Government's control and some of them world-wide problems - 
magnified and distorted the public reaction, Chelmsford, for all his 
personal charm, was not ready with informal speeches and imaginative
gestures to restore confidence. His greatest coup - the reforms, the
deliberate relating of government policy to the goal of a future 
transfer of power - -was at first attributed solely to Montagu and 
then, by some Indians, rejected altogether. His cautious policy 
towards unrest pleased neither the agitators nor the loyalists nor 
many of the officials. It Is now possible to be more judicious. 
Alongside the undoubted failures - the indecisiveness over the Panjab, 
the general lack of tact, the tendency to be formal and unyielding - 
must be placed the very considerable achievements of a remarkable 
period of progress and change.
What had happened during these years was that, because 
there had evolved a permanent articulate opposition, the government's 
policies wrere being judged and were having an effect as a whole.
Failures in one area prejudiced success in another? and at the
same time Indian demands and expectations constantly rose higher. 
Hardinge, after a grand gesture in ending the partition of Bengal, 
had been able to make do with little more than promises. Chelmsford 
had been expected to put tin promises into effect. Hardinge, too,
$16
had managed to introduce repressive laws under cover of the war. 
Chelmsford had tried to retain them during the peace, as a last 
resort in dealing with internal hostilities. But the legacy he 
passed on to Reading was a virtual commitment to eschew such executive 
powers in future.
In 1916 when Chelmsford asked ’what is the goal of British 
rule?’, his intention was to start enquiries on constitutional reforms. 
But his conclusions inevitably affected policies in other fields.
If the goal were to be the future transfer of power - not as a pious 
aspiration but as an active principle of policy embodied in immediate 
steps - then public opinion ha.d to be scrutinised and attended to, 
political activity had to be seen in a generous light, the use of 
repressive powers had to be reconsidered. And each of these changes 
influenced or made necessary the others. The autocratic and 
bureaucratic had to take account of and begin to accommodate the 
future rulers of India? and this process was expressed partly in 
an increased awareness of interdependence between different spheres 
of government.
This awareness was one of Chelmsford's achievements* He 
sought coherence. He sought it in method by his collective decision­
making, and in policy by his enunciation of the goal. 'We too must 
assess all his policy. We see then that all the political moves - 
International changes, tactical non-interference, positive advances, 
publicity, repression, constitutional and secretariat reforms - wore 
part of one whole, conceived as complementary, directed towards a 
deliberate goal. It is in this sense, not in any total abandonment 
of old methods or prejudices, that Chelmsford's viceroyalty marks 
a new starting-point.
APPENDIX. SOME biographicai. NOTES
This list gives additional information about persons mentioned in the 
text, in cases where the person may not be well known, or the information 
may be relevant to the discussion. There is no attempt to give 
comprehensive information.
ALI, Muhammad - Scholar and translator of the Quran; member, Central 
Khilafat Committee, 1S2C-1924; Congress President 1923; leader, Civil 
Disobedience Movement (in opposition to Gandhi), 1930*
ALI, Shaulcat - brother of Muhammad; civil servant for 15 years; Khilafa 
leader; representative of Muslim League, Round Table Conference; 
member ILA, 1934*
AUSARI, Dr. M.A. - 1880-1936; Muslim League President 1920; Congress 
General Secretary 1920; Congress President 1927; imprisoned 1930 A 
1932,
ARUUDALE, G.S. - 1878-1945? Theosophist; Honorary Professor of 
History (1903) & later Principal, Central Hindu College, Benares 
(founded by Annie Besant in 1898),
BARNES, Sir George Stap5rlton - barrister; comptroller with Board of 
Trade, 1904-1913? member, various wartime financial commissions;
Commerce 4 Industry Member, G/I, 1915*
BASU, Bhupendranath - Member, Bengal legislature, 1909-1912, ILC, 1916,
& S/S Council, 1917-1924; Congress President 1914*
BEACHCR0FT, C.P. - Acting Puisne Judge, Calcutta High Court.
BEATSOU-BEIL, Sir N. D. - ICS 1886; Member, G/Bengal, 1914-1918;
CC/Assam, 1918 (Governor, Jan. - March 1921).
BISHAMBER NATH - vakil; Government Pleader A Public prosecutor, Ajmir; 
member, Ajmir Municipal Committee, I896; famine worker, 1899-1900 &
1905-1906; Government guest at Delhi coronation durbar.
BRIMYATE, Sir James - ICS 1889; FD Secretary 1914-1917; Member,
S/S Council, 1917? & committee on Indian exchange 4 finance, 1919*
BUTLER, Sir Spencer Ilarcourt - ICS 1888; Member, G/l, 1910-1915;
LG/Burma 1915? LG/United Provinces, Feb. 1918 (Governor, Jan. 1921).
BUXTON, Sir Thomas Powell - 1837-1915; G/South Australia, 1895-1898; 
considered for viceroyalty 1915*
CARMICHAEL, Baron, of Stirling - MP 1895-1900; G/Victoria, 1908-1911; 
G/Madras 1911; G/Bengal, 1912-1917*
CHAKRAVARTI, B. - barrister; Member, Bengal legislature; Minister 1927; 
founding member of Rational Party under Sapru (qv.), 1926.
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CHANDAV.ARKAR , Sir Narayan Ganesh - retired Bombay judge; pleader 1881; 
Editors Indu Prakesh; Delegate to England 1885; Member, Bombay 
legislature, 1897-1900; Congress President 1900; High Court judge 
1901-1913; Vice-Chancellor, Bombay University, 1909*
CHELMSFORD, Lord (Frederick John Napier Thesiger, 3rd Lord & 1st 
Viscount) - born 18 68; educated Winchester, & Magdalen, Oxford (B.A. 
first class in law); Fellow of All Souls, 1892-1899? barrister 1093? 
Member, London School Board, 1901-1904? & London County Council, 1904- 
1905? G/Queensland, 1905-1909; G/New South Wales, 1909-1913? officiat­
ing Governor General of Australia, Dec. 1909 - Jan. 1910; alderman, 
London County Council, 1913? Privy Councillor 1916; V & Governor 
General of India, 4 April 1916 - 2 April 1921; First Lord of the 
Admiralty 1924*
CHEVIS, William - ICS 1883; District Judge 1899? Judge, Panjab Chief 
Court, 1914 (temporary from 1911).
CIIIROL, Sir Valentine - onetime director, Foreign Department, The Times; 
correspondent of Times in India, 1905-1906; Member, Public Service 
Commission, 1912; author of many books, chiefly on Middle East and 
India.
COBB, li.V. - ICS 1883; CC/Coorg, 7 April 1916 - 8 March 1920.
CRADDOCK, Sir R.H. - ICS 1882; CC/Central Provinces 1907? Home Member, 
G/I, 1912-1917? LG/Burma 1018.
CRAWFORD, Earl of (David Alexander Lindsay) - 18/1-1940; conservative 
IIP| party whip, 1903-1913; considered for viceroyalty 1915; later 
President of Board of Agriculture & Fisheries (1916), Lord Privy Seal 
(1916-1919)? Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1919-1921), & 
Commissioner of Works (1921-1922). Described in the DUB as occasionally 
'brusque and dictatorial' but in fact 'open-minded',
D'ABEEHOIT, Viscount (Sir Edgar Vincent) - 1857-1941? former army 
officer; Financial Adviser to Egyptian Government 1883; Governor, 
Imperial Ottoman Bank, 1889? Conservative Mp, 1899-1918? Peer 1914? 
Chairman, Central Control Board, Liquor Trade, 1915? Considered for 
viceroyalty 1915? later (1920-1926) ambassador to Germany.
DAS, Chittaranjan - prosperous lawyer; defender of Aravinda Ghose in 
Alipore Bomb Case; Mayor of Calcutta; Congress President 1921; member, 
Swaraj Party (with Motilal Nehru & N.C. Kelkar). ,
DEVONSHIRE, Duke of (Victor Christian William Cavendish) - 1868-1938; 
Unionist MP 1891; Governor-Genera.1 of Canada, 1916-1921; considered 
for viceroyalty 1915? Secretary of State for Colonies 1922.
D0H0UGHM0RE, Earl of (Richard Walker Hely-Hutchinson) - 1875-1948; 
Chairman of Committees (Lords), 1911-1931; Privy Councillor 1918; on 
deputation to India, 1917-1918; considered for viceroyalty 1915*
DU B0TTLAY, Sir J.H. - ICS 1887; PSV 1915; HD Secretary from 1916; 
temporary Home Member, G-/l, 1917-1918; temporary Member, G/Bombay, 1918; 
member, Jails Committee, 1919»
DUFF, General Sir Beauchamp - Commander-in-Chief in India,, 8 Maroh 1914 
to 1 Oct. I916.
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DDKS, Sir E.W. - ICS 1882:; Member, G/Bengal, 1910-1914? Member, S/S 
Council, 1914-1919? on deputation to India, 1917-1918? Under 
Secretary of State for India, Jan. 1920.
2 9
DYER, Brigadier-General R.E.d. - born Panjab l'96/b>. transferred to 
Indian Army 1888:; awarded decorations in Burma^l806-1887) ? on the 
Northwest frontier (Hazara, 1888; kaziristan, 1902? Zakka Khel,
1908), & mentioned in despatches, 1914-1918 War; Commander, Jullundur 
training brigade, 1917? injured in riding accident, 1917? invalided 
for one year, suffered increasing paralysis (paralysed 1921)? 
responsible for Amritsar massacre 1919? invested as a Sikh by 
guardians in the Golden Temple for services to its protection? 
appointed to active service in Afghan War? forcibly retired.
GAIT, Sir E»A. - ICS 1882? Member, G/l, 1912? LG/Bihar & Orissa 1915-
GRANT, Sir A. Hamilton - ICS 1894? Assistant Secretary, ED, 1903? 
on mission to Kabul, 1904-1905? Deputy Secretary, ED, 1912, &
Secretary, May 1916? CC/horthwest Frontier Province, Sept. 1919*
HAILEY, V.M. - ICS 1894? Secretary, G/Panjab, 1907? with ED, 1903? 
CC/D'oihi, 1913? on deputation with reforms committees 1918? Finance 
Member, Dec. 1919? G/Panjab, 1928-1934? Baron 1936? Privy Councillor 
1949? O.M. 1956o
HILL, Sir C.H.A. - ICS 1885? Member, Royal Commission on decentral­
isation, 1907? Agent to Governor General, Kathiawar, 1908? Member, 
G/Bombay, 1912? Member, G/l, 1915-1920.
HIRTZEL, Sir Arthur - joined India Office 1894? Assistant Under­
secretary of State 1917? Deputy 1921,
HOLDERS!ESS, Sir T.Wi - ICS, 1870-1901? joined India Office 1901? 
Under-Secretary of State, 1912-1919*
HOLLAND, Sir T.H. - ICS 1890, as Assistant Superintendent, Geological 
Museum & Laboratory? Professor of Geology, Manchester, 1909? President, 
Indian Industries Commission, 1916? President, Munitions Board, 1917? 
Member, G/l, 1920 (temporary, 1919)*
H0RNIMAE, B.G. - editor, Bombay Chronicle? formerly with the Daily 
Chronicle, Morning Leader, Daily Express, Manchester Guardian, A 
Calcutta Statesman /T906T ? correspondent of The Times.
ISLINGTON, Baron (Sir John Dickson-Poynder) - 1866-1936? Conservative 
MP 1892 (became a Liberal over tariff reform, 1905)? Member, London 
County Council, 1898-1904? Governor of New Zealand 1910? Privy 
Councillor 1911? Chairman, Public Services Commission, 1912? 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, 1915-1919- Accord­
ing to the Times obituary (8 Dec. 1936)? he was 'unassuming without 
shyness, and able without a touch of intellectual aloofness'.
JAMNADAS DWAEKADAS - Home Ruler? founder editor, Young India, 1916- 
1919? Member, Indian Tariff Commission, 1923? Member, Congress &
Bombay Municipal Corporation.
KELKAR, N.C. - editor, Kgsari (I897-I899 &■ 1910-1931) & Mahratta (1897- 
1919)? President, Poona Municipality, 1918 & 1922-1924 (Councillor, 
I898-I924)5 President, Bombay Provincial Congress, 1920? Member, Rome 
Rule deputation, 1919? Member, ILA, 1923 & 1926? originally (until 
1896) a pleader.
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KHAN, Sardar Saliibzade Sultan Ahmed - Barrister? Member for Appeals, 
Gwalior State? Member, Hunter Committee.
KHAPARDE, Ganesh Shrikrishna - 1854-1938? advocate? co-worker of 
Tilak? member, Home Rule deputation, 1919? Chairman, District Board, 
for 17 years? Member, ILC (re-elected 1925)*
KITCHLEW, Dr. Saif-ud~din - German educated? barrister? Khilafatist? 
Muslim political leader, Amritsar.
LAJPAT RAI, Bala - 1856-1928? lawyer? Arya Samajist? deported 1907? 
Congress President 1919 (Calcutta).
LAWLEY, Sir Thomas - G/West Australia? LG/Transvaal? G/Madras? 
considered for viceroyalty 1915*
LLOYD, Sir G.A. (later Lord) - HM attache, Constantinople, 1905?
MP, 1910-1918 (war service, 1914-1917)? G/Bombay 1918.
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